# Ron Conway at Startup School 2012 > `[00:00:00]` The funny thing is we\'re we\'re sitting in the back seeing which switch stories can we tell in which ones are too secret because for every wrong who is like an iceberg for every story. `[00:00:00]` 有趣的是，我們坐在后面，看哪些故事太秘密了，因為對于每一個錯誤，誰就像每一個故事的冰山。 > Where were you where you hear how he saved the day. 你在哪里聽說他救了我。 > There\'s a bunch where you can never tell how he saved the day he was ever seen Pulp Fiction sort of like the Wolf. 有一群人，你永遠不知道他是如何拯救了他曾經被看到的紙漿小說，有點像“狼”。 > He\'s clean cleaned a lot of brains off the back wins windows and cars. 他干干凈凈地洗了很多后腦勺，贏得了窗戶和汽車。 > `[00:00:27]` He laughs nervously but does not contradict me. `[00:00:27]` 他緊張地笑著，但沒有反駁我。 > So Ron and Ron like officially Ron is ASV angel right. 所以羅恩和羅恩就像正式的羅恩一樣，是 ASV 天使對吧。 > `[00:00:38]` You are the limited partners. `[00:00:38]` 你們是有限合伙人。 > Something like that of SB angel. 就像某人的天使。 > `[00:00:41]` I\'m not a managing partner. `[00:00:41]` 我不是管理合伙人。 > David Leighs the managing partner because I don\'t like being a fiduciary. 大衛·雷伊是執行合伙人，因為我不喜歡做信托人。 > I am just the largest investor. 我只是最大的投資者。 > `[00:00:50]` But officially Ron Conway doesn\'t invest in your company worthS.V. `[00:00:50]` 但根據官方說法，羅恩·康維并不投資于你的公司。 > angel investor right. 天使投資者是對的。 > So if you ever see that in a cap table that\'s that\'s Ranko. 所以，如果你在帽子桌上看到這個，那就是蘭科。 > `[00:00:59]` So how many startups have you funded now since 1994. `[00:00:59]` 自 1994 年以來，你資助了多少家初創公司？ > About six hundred and fifty 1994. 大約六百五十個 1994 年。 > `[00:01:08]` How many and we\'re not born yet in 1994. `[00:01:08]` 1994 年有多少人還沒有出生。 > It\'s not that many 650 including Can you name some of the more successful ones. 它沒有那么多 650，你能說出其中一些比較成功的嗎？ > `[00:01:21]` Ask Jeeves was the first. `[00:01:21]` 問吉夫斯是第一個。 > A good quality event that we had Google Facebook Twitter page how Pinterest. 一個高質量的事件，我們有谷歌 Facebook Twitter 頁面如何 Pinterest。 > `[00:01:30]` OK. `[00:01:30]` 好的。 > You\'re doing pretty well. 你做得很好。 > `[00:01:33]` And then and then the see companies air BMV and Dropbox. `[00:01:33]` 然后看公司的航空 BMV 和 Dropbox。 > The way I see companies that are already getting very big scale. 在我看來，已經有了很大規模的公司。 > `[00:01:43]` How did you how did you get into this. `[00:01:43]` 你是怎么弄到這件事的。 > You started out as a founder yourself right back when startups made computers. 當創業公司制造電腦的時候，你開始是一個創立者。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > `[00:01:52]` Even though I don\'t invest in hardware today the company that I cofounded was Alto\'s computer back in the late 70s and we ended up taking their company public in 1982 and and my experience at Alto\'s plus two other startups that I cofounded is what gives me such respect for what entrepreneurs go through. `[00:01:52]` 盡管我今天不投資硬件，但我共同創立的公司是 20 世紀 70 年代末的 Alto 電腦，我們最終在 1982 年將他們的公司上市，而我在阿爾托公司(Alto‘s)的經歷，再加上我共同創立的另外兩家初創公司，讓我對企業家的經歷產生了如此的尊重。 > The theme all day is that hey it\'s not easy it\'s it\'s actually hard. 整天的主題是，嘿，這不容易，實際上很難。 > I know that because I did it it was even harder then in a lot of ways. 我知道，因為我做到了，在很多方面甚至更難。 > You\'re raising money stories. 你在籌錢。 > Yes. 是 > Back in 0 back in the late 70s in order to get venture capital you had to have high growth and be profitable if you weren\'t you didn\'t even qualify. 回到 70 年代末的 0，為了獲得風險投資，你必須有高增長，如果你沒有資格的話，你就能盈利。 > `[00:02:48]` So why did people take venture capital profitable and growing fast. `[00:02:48]` 那么，為什么人們會拿風險投資賺錢，而且增長很快。 > Well in the case of Alto it was a hardware company. 就阿爾托而言，那是一家硬件公司。 > `[00:02:56]` So we had a lot of cost of goods and marketing. `[00:02:56]` 所以我們的商品和營銷成本很高。 > And so we wanted to build a war chest to keep building the business. 所以我們想要建立一個戰爭基金來繼續建立業務。 > `[00:03:06]` Okay. `[00:03:06]` 好的。 > `[00:03:07]` So that in fact Da Vinci was Don Valentine from Sequoia who you know is really I think the patron saint of venture capital patron. `[00:03:07]` 事實上，達·芬奇是紅杉的唐·瓦倫丁，你知道嗎，我認為他是風投贊助人的守護神。 > `[00:03:18]` He\'s retired now. `[00:03:18]` 他現在退休了。 > What was. 是什么。 > What\'s changed about startups since then. 從那以后，初創公司發生了什么變化。 > `[00:03:27]` Well I I think it\'s I\'d rather talk about what\'s not changed. `[00:03:27]` 嗯，我想我寧愿說什么沒有改變。 > `[00:03:33]` OK sure. `[00:03:33]` 好的。 > That was going to be my next question. 這將是我的下一個問題。 > Oh yes. 哦，是的。 > `[00:03:37]` Because what\'s not changed is what Jessica talked about which is you have to have determination and conviction. `[00:03:37]` 因為杰西卡所說的沒有改變，那就是你必須有決心和信念。 > You have to be a leader. 你必須是一個領導者。 > You know what has changed is in the workplace people drink less at Alto\'s. 你知道，改變的是在工作場所，人們在阿爾托喝得更少。 > `[00:04:01]` That\'s not what I thought you were going to buy in the back of my mind. `[00:04:01]` 那不是我以為你會在我腦子里買的東西。 > `[00:04:03]` I\'ve been saying hey wait a minute I want to answer the question about what has changed at Alto\'s. ‘ > We had a CFO who is in her 60s and at five o\'clock everyday she would wheel around the booze cart everyone would have a drink chit chat for a little bit. 我們有一位 60 多歲的首席財務官，每天五點左右，她會在酒車里轉來轉去，每個人都會喝一杯，聊一聊。 > It wasn\'t even a happy hour. 那不是一個快樂的時刻。 > It was a happy 10 minutes. 這是一個快樂的 10 分鐘。 > But then it motivated everyone to stay till 9 or 10 o\'clock at night. 但它激勵著每個人在晚上 9 點或 10 點之前。 > Now our Modou are kind of a model was work hard and play hard. 現在，我們的 MOMOU 是一種模式，是努力工作和娛樂的。 > `[00:04:38]` And at the same time Yeah we actually we did it via multitasking I think the startup\'s today know how to segment a little better and they have happy hour at the on a Friday instead of everyday instead of everyday. `[00:04:38]` 同時，是的，我們實際上是通過多任務完成的，我認為今天的初創公司知道如何更好地分割，他們在星期五而不是每天都有快樂的時間。 > So what else is changing besides breaking. 所以除了破碎之外還有什么變化。 > `[00:05:00]` Well I think what has not changed is is the fact that once you you have to focus on growth. `[00:05:00]` 我認為沒有改變的是，一旦你必須專注于增長。 > Back in the hardware days you didn\'t have to focus. 在硬件時代，你不需要集中精力。 > In my opinion on product or consumer satisfaction is much interesting. 在我看來，對產品或消費者的滿意是非常有趣的。 > Yeah it was more like you know Ship Ship Ship and get it out and if it doesn\'t work take it back and fix it because hardware was so hard to ship that if you could ship at all. 是的，它更像是你知道船，把它拿出來，如果它不能工作，把它拿回來修理它，因為硬件太難出貨了，如果你能出貨的話。 > `[00:05:31]` That was consumer satisfaction. `[00:05:31]` 那是消費者的滿意。 > Exactly. 一點兒沒錯 > Customers were happy just to get it back at the end of it if it didn\'t work. 如果它不起作用的話，顧客們很樂意在它結束的時候把它拿回來。 > `[00:05:38]` We had this big RMV department return material authorizations. `[00:05:38]` 我們有一個很大的 RMV 部門退回材料授權書。 > But today what\'s changed. 但今天一切都變了。 > And now whileS.V. 而現在.。 > ángela the best decision I ever made in 1994 was only to invest in Internet software in 1994 in 1994 so I think hardware scarred me. 1994 年我所做的最好的決定就是在 1994 年投資于互聯網軟件，所以我認為硬件給我留下了傷痕。 > But but that was the best decision I ever made is that in 94 thinking this thing called the Internet is going to be really disruptive. 但這是我做過的最好的決定，在 94 年的時候，我認為這個叫做互聯網的東西會帶來很大的破壞。 > `[00:06:12]` Back then like 1984. `[00:06:12]` 那時就像 1984 年。 > It probably meant the Internet not the web like the web sort of existed. 它可能意味著互聯網，而不是像網絡那樣存在的網絡。 > `[00:06:17]` Had you heard of it when you decided to go into Internet investing back in 1990 were you thinking like FPP in e-mail. `[00:06:17]` 當你在 1990 年決定投資互聯網的時候，你聽說過嗎？你在電子郵件中想過像 FPP 那樣的想法嗎？ > Well it would be it would be more like people would say TCP/IP. 這更像是人們所說的 TCP/IP。 > `[00:06:30]` Yeah as often as they would say the Internet. `[00:06:30]` 是的，就像他們常說的互聯網一樣。 > And I remember it as TCP/IP at the time but in the end people would talk about email but know they\'d have to explain what e-mail was. 我記得當時它是 TCP/IP，但最終人們會談論電子郵件，但他們知道他們必須解釋電子郵件是什么。 > `[00:06:44]` It was this protocol on TCP/IP. `[00:06:44]` 這是 TCP/IP 上的協議。 > `[00:06:49]` So you sort of didn\'t get in at the ground floor of an idiot investor and you got it in a basement or in the basement go up say yes to the lowly went up the stairs to the to the first floor. `[00:06:49]` 所以你不是在一個白癡投資者的底層，而是在地下室或者地下室里，對低層的人說“是的”，然后爬到第一層。 > How did you like that was a really good decision. 你覺得這是個很好的決定。 > It turns out to get into Internet investing in 1994. 結果是在 1994 年進入互聯網投資。 > But like why did how did you do that. 但就像你為什么要這么做。 > `[00:07:08]` Well I was in CO investing with Ben Rosen at the time after founding a couple of companies I discovered because I started dabbling in angel investing that I really enjoyed mentoring entrepreneurs more than being the entrepreneur or myself. `[00:07:08]` 在我創立了幾家公司后，我在 CO 投資公司工作，因為我開始涉足天使投資，我更喜歡指導企業家，而不是作為企業家或我自己。 > So in 94 is when I sold my second company and went home and told my wife hey you know I found a new job and she said I didn\'t know you were looking. 所以，在 94 年，我賣掉了第二家公司，回家對妻子說嘿，你知道我找到了一份新工作，她說我不知道你在找什么。 > And I said Yeah I\'m going to do this angel investing for the rest of my life. 我說，是的，我要做這個天使投資我的余生。 > `[00:07:44]` What did she think of that. `[00:07:44]` 她是怎么想的。 > Did she know what she was getting into. 她知道她在做什么嗎。 > `[00:07:47]` She\'s always thought it was crazy so she thinks I\'m crazy today. `[00:07:47]` 她總是認為這很瘋狂，所以她認為我今天瘋了。 > But but. 但是.。 > `[00:07:56]` I sat with Ben Rosen who is then the chairman of Compaq. `[00:07:56]` 我和當時擔任康柏公司主席的本·羅森坐在一起。 > Ben lives in New York and we said. 本住在紐約我們說。 > Innovation is all about growth. 創新就是增長。 > So we said let\'s just find a sector that\'s growing like crazy or is going to grow like crazy and be disruptive because innovation is disruptive. 所以我們說，讓我們找到一個正在瘋狂成長的行業，或者是一個瘋狂的行業，因為創新是顛覆性的。 > And we said hey let\'s let\'s just throw all in on the internet so our only rural is Internet software and off we went in sitting here today still only Internet software. 我們說，嘿，讓我們把一切都投入到互聯網上吧，所以我們唯一的農村是互聯網軟件，今天我們坐在這里，仍然只有互聯網軟件。 > Now the market\'s gotten huge. 現在市場變得很大。 > I still think we\'re in the infancy on the internet though I\'ve been saying this since 1994 I believe it more than ever. 我仍然認為我們在互聯網上還處于起步階段，盡管我從 1994 年就開始這么說了，我比以往任何時候都更相信這一點。 > Just add a little touch of e-commerce on top of the Internet and you\'re talking about you know an opportunity that\'s as big as all the Internet today especially with with Facebook an open graph helping companies go find their customers and Pinterest will probably be an effect fact I\'ll quote the monetization guy on twitter. 只要在互聯網上加上一點電子商務，你就會知道一個機會和今天所有的互聯網一樣大，特別是在 Facebook 上，一個開放的圖表幫助公司找到他們的客戶，Pinterest 可能會成為一個影響的事實，我會在 Twitter 上引用這個賺錢的家伙的話。 > I won\'t even take the risk of misquoting but the monetization guy at Twitter told me a couple of weeks ago he goes a Twitter is on a tear. 我甚至不愿意冒錯誤引用的風險，但 Twitter 的貨幣化者幾周前告訴我，他去推特(Twitter)是一滴眼淚。 > Now you know like Google and Facebook once they get to stride you know Twitter\'s got a really nice growth rate now took awhile more than normal revenue growth revenue growth. 現在你知道了，就像谷歌和 Facebook 一樣，一旦他們開始大步前進，你就知道 Twitter 的增長速度非常好，現在的增長速度要比正常的收入增長要花上一段時間。 > Okay this is about revenue growth and this guy said to me it will never grow like Pinterest was once they decide to monetize because they will be an e-commerce engine like never before and they\'ll there\'ll be many other companies like that that take advantage of e-commerce. 好吧，這是關于收入增長的，這個人對我說，Pinterest 公司永遠不會像 Pinterest 那樣，決定賺錢，因為他們將成為一個前所未有的電子商務引擎，他們還會有許多像這樣的公司利用電子商務。 > So it\'s it\'s early days. 所以現在還早呢。 > `[00:09:53]` That\'s encouraging. `[00:09:53]` 這是鼓舞人心的。 > Yeah I couldn\'t be more and you agree with you agree with Ben Horowitz there\'s still stuff left here and lots of lots. 是的，我不能再多了，你同意本？霍洛維茨的觀點，這里還有很多東西。 > So what are the biggest. 那么最大的是什么。 > What are the biggest misses you\'ve had. 你最大的失誤是什么？ > You remember some big ones you missed. 你還記得一些你錯過的大案子。 > `[00:10:08]` Well yes. `[00:10:08]` 是的。 > This is in 1998 99 when the bubble was starting to take effect and I thought 30 million dollar valuation forSalesforce.com was a little too high. 這是在 1998 年 99 年泡沫開始生效的時候，我認為 Salesforce.com 3000 萬美元的估值有點太高了。 > It\'s 21 billion today. 今天是 210 億。 > Pandora Pandora. 潘多拉。 > I had just gotten out of Napster Napster fire and finally had to declare bankruptcy because of all the egos in the world and in the music world. 我剛剛從納普斯特大火中解脫出來，最后因為世界上和音樂世界里所有的自我，我不得不宣布破產。 > I don\'t think it\'s just egos in them. 我不認為這只是他們的自我。 > I wish. 我希望。 > And so I was I was hedging on the music space so for that reason I didn\'t invest in Pandora Palin Teer could have injured invested there didn\'t understand the size of the market even though we invest in the entrepreneur first. 因此，我在音樂領域進行對沖，因此我沒有投資潘多拉·佩林·蒂爾(Pandora Palin Teer)，這可能會傷害我在那里的投資，他不了解市場的規模，盡管我們首先投資的是企業家。 > In the case of Pandora you know I made a dumb move and said hey I\'m not sure I get how big that market is. 在潘多拉的例子中，你知道我做了一個愚蠢的舉動，說：嘿，我不確定我是否知道這個市場有多大。 > Kickstarter we could have invested in it in early as well didn\'t really get what. Kickstarter，我們可以在早期投資它，但沒有真正得到什么。 > What crowdsourcing was. 眾包是什么。 > And look at that space today. 看看今天的空間。 > It\'s it\'s the lifeblood for a lot of startups and we have the. 這是許多初創公司的命脈，我們有。 > The jobs act that takes the legal confusion out of crowdsourcing. 就業法案從眾包中消除了法律上的混亂。 > `[00:11:43]` Do you think. `[00:11:43]` 你認為。 > Do you think there\'s a pattern to what investors miss. 你認為投資者所錯過的東西是有規律的嗎？ > In general not just you but investors in general. 一般來說，不僅僅是你，還有一般的投資者。 > If there\'s a founders are working on something that\'s good but investors are not going to get like what kind of things do investors not get. 如果有一位創始人正在做一件好事，但投資者不會得到投資者所沒有的那種東西。 > `[00:11:59]` Well I think investors don\'t get probably the stuff that is you know is the first one. `[00:11:59]` 我認為投資者可能沒有得到你知道的第一件事。 > Pinterest would be an example. Pinterest 就是一個例子。 > Ben talked about how hard it was to raise money. 本談到籌集資金有多難。 > And if you look at a virtual Pinboard you know that\'s a brand new idea. 如果你看一下虛擬棋盤，你就會知道這是一個全新的想法。 > So I think investors even though they like to say I\'m in venture capital I take risk. 因此，我認為投資者，即使他們喜歡說我在風險投資，我承擔風險。 > They look for pattern recognition which in this business is probably a mistake. 他們尋找模式識別，這在這個行業可能是一個錯誤。 > Look at Twitter in the early days you know that was that was a brand that was a brand new idea and lots of Easy\'s turned down Twitter. 看看早期的 Twitter，你知道這是一個全新的想法，很多人都很容易拒絕 Twitter。 > `[00:12:46]` So with SFE you\'ll tell the story of how you ended up investing in Twitter. `[00:12:46]` 有了 SFE，你會講述你是如何在 Twitter 上投資的。 > Sure that\'s a funny story with a way it is with V Angel though we invest in in the entrepreneur first. 當然，這是一個有趣的故事，雖然我們首先投資的是企業家，但 V 天使也是如此。 > `[00:13:00]` We invest in the human being and all of our biggest successes is when we said hey wow that\'s a really forward thinking idea but let\'s go run with it. `[00:13:00]` 我們投資于人類，我們最大的成功是當我們說嗨，哇，這是一個非常前瞻的想法，但讓我們繼續努力吧。 > I love that entrepreneur. 我喜歡那個企業家。 > I want to invest in every one of their companies. 我想投資他們的每一家公司。 > So so when I invest in an entrepreneur I\'m investing for life unless they do something wrong. 因此，當我投資于一位企業家時，我將終生投資，除非他們做錯了什么。 > I want to invest for example in Shawn Fanning\'s sixth startup airtime. 例如，我想投資于肖恩·范寧(ShawnFning)的第六個創業時間。 > So for me it\'s it\'s a lifelong commitment. 所以對我來說，這是一種終生的承諾。 > It makes it more interesting when you have this awesome relationship with a founder where they know me like a book and I know them like a book so we can move fast and give each other advice. 當你和一位創始人建立了一段令人敬畏的關系時，他們就像一本書一樣了解我，而我就像一本書一樣了解他們，這樣我們就能快速行動，給對方建議。 > So you invested in Odeo right. 所以你投資了 Odeo 對吧。 > Yeah. 嗯 > So back to Twitter. 回到推特。 > Back to Twitter I invested in Odeo with Evan Williams and his team Jack Dorsey was part of that team. 回到 Twitter，我與 EvanWilliams 和他的團隊投資了 Odeo，杰克·多爾西也是這個團隊的一員。 > So is Biz Stone and ODEIO didn\'t work out and Odeo was in an incubator called ObviousCorp. BizStone 和 ODEIO 也沒有成功，Odeo 也在一個名為 ObviousCorp 的孵化器里。 > So it is a classical innovator incubator who had like four or five projects going on Twitter was one of those other projects. 所以，這是一個經典的創新者孵化器，在 Twitter 上有四五個項目，也是其他項目之一。 > Jack was the father of the Twitter project and Odeo ended up shutting down. 杰克是 Twitter 項目的父親，Odeo 最終被關閉。 > `[00:14:21]` Evan Williams was magnanimous to the investors and gave the investors their money back. 埃文·威廉姆斯對投資者寬宏大量，把他們的錢還給了投資者。 > Here\'s an entrepreneur. 這是一位企業家。 > Felt so bad and he had made a little bit of money not a ton of money certainly not enough to give your money back. 他感到很難過，他賺了一點錢，沒有一噸錢，當然也不足以把你的錢還給你。 > He made a little bit of money selling Blogger to Google but he he felt an obligation to pay the investors back and I said this is going to sit in the bank until your next one and the next one was Twitter. 他把博客賣給谷歌，賺了點錢，但他覺得有義務回報投資者，我說過，這會一直呆在銀行里，直到你的下一個博客，下一個是推特(Twitter)。 > So I invested 75 K in Twitter site on scene zero due diligence because I believed in that entrepreneur and then I got to know Jack and and look at Twitter today. 所以我在 Twitter 網站上投入了 75K，因為我相信這位企業家，然后我認識了杰克，今天看了 Twitter。 > `[00:15:01]` So you just you were already signed up for Twitter. `[00:15:01]` 你剛剛注冊了 Twitter。 > I was free where it was three three boarded on that airplane. 在那架飛機上有三個人登上的地方我是自由的。 > That\'s what I called betting on foul with no with no questions asked. 這就是我所謂的下注犯規，不問任何問題。 > What did you think of Twitter as an idea. 你認為 Twitter 是什么想法。 > Guess what. 猜猜看 > Never. 絕不可能 > `[00:15:20]` Never argue with the metrics. `[00:15:20]` 永遠不要與度量標準爭論。 > So Twitter. 所以推特。 > It wasn\'t long before Twitter\'s growth rate on users and numbers of tweets was straight up there just now revenues going to catch up with it. 不久之后，Twitter 在用戶上的增長速度和推特的數量都直線上升，而現在，Twitter 的收入將迎頭趕上。 > It\'s going to be an awesome company but I never argue with growth so whenever we see a company that\'s growing at a thousand percent a month and in the early days when you\'re successful you will grow at a thousand percent a month because going from one users to 10 users. 這將是一家了不起的公司，但我從來不反對增長，所以每當我們看到一家公司以每月 1000%的速度增長，在你成功的初期，你就會因為從一個用戶增加到 10 個用戶而每月增長百分之一。 > But if if they\'re happy users and there\'s word of mouth because Twitter never advertise and there\'s good word of mouth and good PR that\'s the greatest company you can get. 但如果用戶很滿意，因為 Twitter 從來不做廣告，而且有好的口碑和公關，那么這是你能得到的最好的公司。 > Look at the growth of Google. 看看谷歌的發展。 > Google was the very same way. 谷歌也是如此。 > `[00:16:10]` So Twitter you thought basically I don\'t know what this thing is. `[00:16:10]` 所以 Twitter 你認為基本上我不知道這是什么。 > The graphs seem to be going about it. 這些圖表似乎正在進行中。 > But yeah but it\'s growing which means users like it which means it\'s going to be successful. 但是的，但是它正在增長，這意味著用戶喜歡它，這意味著它將是成功的。 > `[00:16:19]` There must be something there because if you look at Google Facebook and Twitter none of them had any idea what the monetization outcome was going to be. `[00:16:19]` 一定有一些東西，因為如果你看看谷歌，Facebook 和 Twitter，他們都不知道貨幣化的結果會是什么。 > All they focused on was happy users and getting lots of them quickly. 他們所關注的只是快樂的用戶，很快就能得到很多用戶。 > And that ends up that\'s a great strategy. 最后那是個很好的策略。 > That\'s what Ben Silverman is doing at Pinterest today. 這就是本？西爾弗曼今天在 Pinterest 所做的事情。 > `[00:16:40]` They just knew that there was an important problem to be solved and they sort of had faith they would be able to make money somehow of course. `[00:16:40]` 他們只是知道有一個重要的問題需要解決，他們有信心，他們當然能夠賺錢。 > `[00:16:47]` And now Google is the one who probably took the biggest risk because now Ben can at least look back to Google Facebook and Twitter and say wow they made sure they had like a hundred million happy users and then they thought about monetization and you actually don\'t need to think about monetization that much. `[00:16:47]` 現在谷歌可能是冒最大風險的人，因為現在 Ben 至少可以回顧谷歌的 Facebook 和 Twitter，并說哇，他們確保擁有大約一億快樂的用戶，然后他們考慮了貨幣化，而你實際上不需要考慮那么多貨幣化。 > Once you get to 100 million users gives you time to figure out hey wait a minute you know there\'s there\'s ways to turn this into a really viable business. 一旦你有了 1 億用戶，你就有時間去弄清楚，嘿，等一下，你知道有辦法把它變成一家真正可行的企業。 > `[00:17:16]` So `[00:17:16]` when Larry and Sergei were starting out doing Google they really didn\'t have they didn\'t know how they were going to make money. 所以`[00:17:16]` 拉里和謝爾蓋剛開始做谷歌的時候，他們真的不知道該如何賺錢。 > `[00:17:23]` No not at all. `[00:17:23]` 不，一點也不。 > I still have Google\'s first ten page investor slide deck and you get to the last page and it says thank you it doesn\'t. 我還有谷歌前十頁的投資者幻燈片，你可以看到最后一頁，上面寫著“謝謝”-它沒有。 > `[00:17:37]` It does not have the spreadsheet that is usually the last page. `[00:17:37]` 它沒有通常是最后一頁的電子表格。 > `[00:17:42]` Yeah. `[00:17:42]` 是的。 > And they were not apologetic about it. 他們并沒有為此道歉。 > They said we have awesome technology and it will lead to monetization and we\'re not going to tell you something we don\'t know because we don\'t know how we\'re going to monetize it. 他們說我們有超棒的技術，它將導致貨幣化，我們不會告訴你一些我們不知道的事情，因為我們不知道我們將如何將它貨幣化。 > They were very honest about it and that was a novel thing in those days that was very novel and that\'s why people misconstrued that as arrogance when in fact Larry and Serguei were just being really bluntly honest with the investors that came in to see them. 他們對此非常誠實，這在當時是一件很新奇的事，這也是為什么人們把它誤解為傲慢，而實際上，拉里和塞爾蓋只是對前來看他們的投資者非常坦率地誠實。 > They were like hey if you look at our search results and they were so much better than the prior search engine which I was an investor in Ask Jeeves you know if you can\'t figure that out you\'re crazy. 如果你看一下我們的搜索結果，它們會比我以前的搜索引擎要好得多，我是 AskJeeves 的投資者，你知道如果你不知道你是不是瘋了。 > Now I know I figured it out and I knew Ask Jeeves really well the minute we started doing Google searches when we went in to see Larry and Serguei we we said hey can one of our guys play with the search engine. 現在我知道我明白了，我知道，當我們開始谷歌搜索的時候，當我們去看拉里和塞爾蓋的時候，我就知道問吉維斯，我們中的一個人能和搜索引擎一起玩嗎？ > While I talked to Larry and Sergei and just because Google said we\'re based on relevance and page rank those are really easy words today. 當我和拉里和謝爾蓋交談的時候，就因為谷歌說我們是基于相關性和頁面排名的，所以今天這些詞都很簡單。 > But back in 1997 when you said I have a search engine based on page rank if other people like that page and they they springboard off of that page then that page must be awfully good. 但早在 1997 年，你說我有一個基于頁面排名的搜索引擎，如果其他人喜歡這個頁面，然后他們跳板，那么這個頁面一定是非常好的。 > So I\'m going to send more people to the pages that people like. 所以我會派更多的人到人們喜歡的網頁上。 > And and it was all motivated by relevancy. 而且所有的動機都是相關的。 > `[00:19:20]` So what did you think when you first met them. `[00:19:20]` 當你第一次見到他們的時候，你是怎么想的。 > Where did you first meet them. 你第一次見到他們是在哪里。 > Do you remember. 你還記得嗎。 > `[00:19:24]` Oh of course I do on University Avenue. `[00:19:24]` 哦，我當然在大學大道上。 > They had moved out of the garage in Menlo Park into the office lesy office the lucky office this is where people thought I was. 他們已經從門羅公園的車庫搬到了辦公室，這間幸運的辦公室，人們以為我在那里。 > And then I think danger after that which is now Android was in that one office saw I actually heard about Google through David Cheriton who is a very famous Stanford professor and a founder himself. 然后我認為，在那之后的危險，也就是現在的 Android 就在那個辦公室里，我通過大衛·切里頓(DavidCheriton)聽說過谷歌，他是斯坦福大學的一位非常著名的教授，也是 > We were at a holiday party six months before I actually met Larry and Sergei and I said Hey you\'re on the you\'re in the labs at Stanford. 在我見到拉里和謝爾蓋的六個月前，我們在一個假日派對上，我說，嘿，你在斯坦福的實驗室里。 > You know what\'s cooking there. 你知道那里在做什么。 > David was an investor in our fund and we said all of our investors you know a David you can invest in the fund but you got to tell us when you see something interesting so at this Christmas party we were both in tuxedos and we both hate tuxedos. 大衛是我們基金的投資者，我們說我們所有的投資者，你知道，大衛，你可以投資這個基金，但你要告訴我們，當你看到有趣的東西，所以在圣誕晚會上，我們都穿著晚禮服，我們都討厭晚禮服。 > I said to get our mind off this. 我說了讓我們別再想這件事了。 > `[00:20:24]` Tell me about what\'s going on at Stanford to get your mind off the uncomfortable tuxedo. `[00:20:24]` 告訴我斯坦福大學發生了什么事，讓你從不舒服的燕尾服中解脫出來。 > Yes. 是 > That\'s how it all started. 一切都是這樣開始的。 > Yes it did. 是的。 > `[00:20:34]` And he said There\'s this company called back Rob. `[00:20:34]` 他說有一家公司叫羅布回來。 > But they\'re not ready to see you yet but when they are you know all. 但他們還沒準備好見你，但他們都知道了。 > I\'ll introduce you. 我來介紹你。 > `[00:20:43]` Did he say you should invest is going to be the biggest. `[00:20:43]` 他有沒有說你應該投資將是最大的。 > Oh yeah. 哦，是的 > Edgy company in a decade. 十年后的新公司。 > `[00:20:48]` David Cheriton was the one who said the two magic words page rank and relevance and back in 1997 those were not buzz words. 大衛·切里頓說了兩個神奇的詞-頁面排名和相關性-而早在 1997 年，這些詞就不是熱門詞了。 > Those were like hey talk to me about. 就像跟我說。 > And then he explained what what they meant. 然后他解釋了他們的意思。 > `[00:21:01]` So what did you think of Larry and Sergei when you met him. `[00:21:01]` 當你遇見拉里和謝爾蓋時，你覺得他怎么樣？ > Did they seem like they were going to be super successful. 他們看上去會超級成功嗎。 > Oh as soon as you met them and this was like a historic historic company. 哦，一旦你遇到他們，這就像一家歷史悠久的公司。 > `[00:21:11]` Well because we\'ve invested in 650 companies by then it was probably 300 companies in 1997. `[00:21:11]` 因為那時我們已經投資了 650 家公司，1997 年大概有 300 家公司。 > You had a good read on entrepreneurs. 你對企業家有很好的了解。 > And keep in mind for every company we invest in we say no to 30. 記住，對于我們投資的每一家公司，我們都會拒絕 30 家。 > So we we see a lot of entrepreneurs. 所以我們看到很多企業家。 > So what I saw was two on two entrepreneurs that were great scientists but very very strategic and determined. 所以，我看到的是兩位企業家，他們都是偉大的科學家，但非常有策略和決心。 > Because they said to me once they said hey we want you to invest. 因為他們對我說，“嗨，我們要你投資。” > They said hey you have to go get Mike Moritz to invest in our company. 他們說你得去找邁克·莫里茨來投資我們公司。 > So you introduced I introduced you to to Google in that round and ice and I said Hey Mike Mars is a great guy. 所以你介紹給我，我把你介紹給谷歌，在那一輪和冰，我說，嘿，邁克，火星是一個偉大的家伙。 > Why. 為什么 > What made you pick him. 是什么讓你選擇了他。 > Oh he\'s on the board of Yahoo. 哦，他是雅虎董事會的成員。 > And one of the Yahoo search do you get to bootstrap this company. 其中一個雅虎搜索，你可以引導這家公司。 > Because at the time they\'re out of Vista was the search engine they had to displace an incumbent. 因為當他們離開 Vista 的時候，他們不得不取代現有的搜索引擎。 > And they said to do that we\'ve got to do two. 他們說要這么做我們得做兩個。 > We\'ve got to do two big OEM deals. 我們得做兩筆大的 OEM 交易。 > Yahoo\'s one more so arrange that for us if we get em and that happened. 雅虎是另外一家，所以如果我們得到了他們，就為我們安排一下，這樣的事情就發生了。 > And then they were already talking to John door at that at kepi and I didn\'t have to figure out the door Bpeace door andK.P. 然后他們已經和約翰門在 kepi 談了，我不需要弄清楚門，BPeace 門和 K.P。 > were on the board of AOL. 是美國在線的董事會成員。 > `[00:22:37]` And so they got Google and Kleiner in that first round because they were on the boards of AOL and Yahoo respectively. `[00:22:37]` 所以他們在第一輪中得到了谷歌和凱鵬華盈，因為他們分別是美國在線和雅虎的董事會成員。 > Yes which is boy. 是的，哪個是男孩。 > `[00:22:45]` Yes. `[00:22:45]` 是的。 > And that. 還有那個。 > OK. 好的 > So once they got both to agree to invest then kepi didn\'t want Secoya and Sequoia didn\'t want kepi that took a month of wrangling and Larian Serguei. 因此，一旦他們雙方都同意投資，凱皮就不想要塞科亞和紅杉，不想要一個月的爭吵和拉里安·塞爾蓋(LarianSerguei)的凱皮(Kepi)。 > You almost got the whole deal you almost got the whole deal ourselves. 你幾乎得到了全部交易，我們自己也幾乎得到了全部交易。 > After a month Larry and Serguei said. 一個月后拉里和塞爾蓋說。 > Now after a month Google is exploding. 現在，在一個月后，谷歌正在爆炸。 > You can tell that this is a technology that people are going to use for 50 years. 你可以看出，這是一種人們將使用 50 年的技術。 > And Google\'s 14 years old now and Larry and Sergei got exasperated and they called me one Friday and they said hey Yuto the first day I went in there I said hey let\'s do a quick 10 million dollar round all lead it and I\'m an angel investor. 谷歌現在 14 歲了，拉里和謝爾蓋生氣了，他們在一個星期五打電話給我，他們說嘿，Yuto，我第一天去那里，我說，嘿，讓我們做一個一千萬美元的快速循環，所有這一切都是由我領導的，我是一個天使投資者。 > But I knew for this technology we we could round up the money and syndicate that and they said hey you said you said a month ago you can do that can you do it. 但我知道，對于這項技術，我們可以把錢集中起來，然后聯合起來。他們說，嘿，你一個月前說過，你能做到的。 > I said I can do it by Monday. 我說我星期一就能搞定。 > And I actually believed it because then I knew even more about the company and the quality of these two founders. 我相信這一點，因為那時我對公司和這兩位創始人的素質了解得更多了。 > But I did call KPN Sequoia and I said hey these founders are very determined they\'re going to do it with your we\'re not bullshit artists. 但我確實給 KPN 紅杉公司打了電話，我說，嘿，這些創始人非常堅定，他們會和你們一起做這件事，我們不是胡說八道的藝術家。 > They really are telling you it\'s over on Monday. 他們真的告訴你星期一就結束了。 > And I told them why I said I\'m going to do the funding myself. 我告訴他們為什么我說我要自己做資金。 > If you guys can\'t you know get. 如果你們不能\你們不知道。 > `[00:24:17]` This is this is possibly the most generous moment in the history of Silicon Valley. `[00:24:17]` 這可能是硅谷歷史上最慷慨的時刻。 > Can I just I just not made that call right. 我能不能別打錯電話了。 > Of course there\'s a lot of people in this venture business who have made the call and said Oh yeah they\'re bullshitting. 當然，在這個風投行業里，有很多人打過電話說，哦，是的，他們在胡說八道。 > `[00:24:29]` Don\'t worry they have no option except you guys are here. `[00:24:29]` 別擔心，除了你們，他們別無選擇。 > They know they\'d read about it around here\'s another here\'s another. 他們知道他們會在這附近讀到這件事。 > `[00:24:37]` Your wife thinks you\'re crazy. 你妻子認為你瘋了。 > So so Friday I called John door and Mike Moretz said it\'s over on Monday. 所以星期五我給約翰門打了電話，邁克？莫雷茨說星期一就結束了。 > `[00:24:47]` Sure enough it only took them just Saturday morning. `[00:24:47]` 足夠肯定的是，他們只花了星期六早上的時間。 > I know exactly what effect that I got. 我很清楚我有什么效果。 > `[00:24:55]` I was sitting in a Starbucks in foster city. `[00:24:55]` 我坐在寄養城的一家星巴克里。 > I don\'t know what street it was on. 我不知道它在哪條街。 > And I got the calls and I put so close the cell phone and I said to my wife this is history. 我接到電話，把手機關得那么近，我對我妻子說，這是歷史。 > And she said really. 她說真的。 > I said yes. 我答應了。 > The funding of like the biggest company ever is going to happen. 像最大的公司一樣的資金將會發生。 > So you knew it you knew it. 所以你就知道你知道。 > I knew it. 我就知道。 > Like today is today that they themselves. 就像今天他們自己。 > `[00:25:33]` I don\'t always know it. `[00:25:33]` 我并不總是知道。 > `[00:25:36]` Yeah. `[00:25:36]` 是的。 > You know with Facebook. 你知道在 Facebook 上。 > That\'s what I wanted to say. 這就是我想說的。 > Yeah I I did not get Facebook. 是的，我沒拿到臉書。 > But. 但 > But. 但 > I get growth and growth is the lifeblood of innovation. 我得到了成長，成長是創新的命脈。 > And every time I met with Zach and Sean Parker who was the president then I met Facebook through Parker because we had gone through the Napster experience together. 每次我見到扎克和肖恩·帕克時，我都是通過帕克認識 Facebook 的，因為我們一起經歷了納普斯特的經歷。 > The growth was like this and I said you can\'t argue with metrics every time you met them the numbers were different and they were right way way up to the right and they were doing all the right things. 增長是這樣的，我說你不能每次遇到他們的時候都和度量標準爭論，數字是不同的，他們是正確的，他們在做所有正確的事情。 > What did you think of Mark the first time you met him. 你第一次見到馬克時覺得他怎么樣。 > I met him at university Cafe in in Palo Alto. 我在帕洛阿爾托的大學咖啡廳見過他。 > It was just him and I. 只有他和我。 > Even though Sean Parker introduced us I\'ve never told this before. 雖然肖恩·帕克介紹了我們，但我從未告訴過我們。 > You sure you want to. 你確定你想。 > Yeah. 嗯 > `[00:26:38]` OK. `[00:26:38]` 好的。 > Go ahead. 您先請 > Number one I think everyone knows Sean Parker is an edgy person. 第一，我想大家都知道肖恩·帕克是個脾氣暴躁的人。 > And so I want to just tell Zuck even though I didn\'t even I had never met Zach. 所以我想告訴扎克，即使我從來沒有見過扎克。 > `[00:26:50]` Hey your prison is pretty edgy. `[00:26:50]` 嘿，你的監獄很緊張。 > `[00:26:52]` So I just want to tell you that without him here and Zach to his credit said Yeah I have figured that out. `[00:26:52]` 所以我只想告訴你，沒有他在這里，扎克對他的功勞說：是的，我已經弄清楚了。 > `[00:27:01]` Zooks 19 years old at the time and Parkers maybe 20 or 21 Parkers probably a few years older than Zach and Zach goes Yeah I figured that out was kind of a rocky start because it was like Oh OK. `[00:27:01]` 當時 19 歲的 Zooks 和 Parkers 可能比 Zach 和 Zach 大幾歲，是的，我覺得這是個艱難的開始，因為這就像哦，好吧。 > So let\'s move and Zack was like let\'s move on. 所以讓我們行動，扎克就像讓我們繼續前進。 > You know what. 你知道嗎。 > What can you help Facebook do. 你能幫 Facebook 做什么。 > And one of the huge things that SUV Angel does is help companies get funded. SUV 天使所做的一件大事就是幫助公司獲得資金。 > We help Google with their funding issue help Twitter with their funding issues especially in the benchmark round. 我們幫助谷歌解決他們的資金問題，幫助 Twitter 解決他們的資金問題，特別是在基準回合中。 > So did you get involved with Facebook. 你和 Facebook 有關系嗎。 > DC right. 右轉。 > Oh yeah yeah. 哦，是的。 > So they had taken the PTO money and they were getting ready to do the V C round. 因此，他們已經拿了 PTO 的錢，他們正在準備做 VC 一輪。 > So and Sean Parker because of Napster knew that as well. 所以肖恩·帕克因為納普斯特也知道這一點。 > Angel investors at the time that we could really help work with all these vaccines and get them to close around quickly and efficiently because the process can be really painful if you know enough forcing functions you essentially orchestrate a bidding war. 天使投資者當時真的可以幫助我們處理所有這些疫苗，讓他們迅速而有效地結束，因為如果你知道足夠多的話，這個過程可能會很痛苦，迫使功能，你基本上策劃了一場競價戰。 > And I with Facebook. 我和 Facebook 在一起。 > No I did not. 不，我沒有。 > No I we triaged the list of about 20 vaccines that we wanted to go to. 不，我們對我們想要去的大約 20 種疫苗進行了分類。 > They were already talking to the Washington Post Don Graham Don Graham offered a 50 million valuation and Zerkin Parker called me when they got out of the office. 他們已經和“華盛頓郵報”談過了，唐·格雷厄姆(DonGraham)提供了 5000 萬英鎊的估值，澤爾金·帕克(Zerkin Parker)離開辦公室后 > Ron Ron we got a 50 million dollar valuation from from Don Graham. 羅恩，我們從唐·格雷厄姆那里得到了五千萬美元的估價。 > I got a go back in. 我又進去了。 > I don\'t think you heard him right. 我覺得你聽錯了。 > I bet she said five million. 我打賭她說了五百萬。 > Now no he said 50 million. 現在不，他說了五千萬。 > I said hurry up and get it to happen. 我說快點讓它發生。 > So in this case I didn\'t need to do anything in that process. 所以在這個過程中，我不需要做任何事情。 > Jim Bryer was looking at the company and decided to offer 80 million. 吉姆·布里耶(JimBryer)正看著這家公司，決定出價 8000 萬英鎊。 > I think it was 80 million pre 90 million post which you know that that was the rebirth of Excel right there after the bubble. 我想這是九千萬篇文章中的八千萬篇，你知道，這是 Excel 在泡沫之后的重生。 > `[00:29:15]` So Jim where did the funding that was that Google\'s pre money series A Google\'s free money was 75 million free. `[00:29:15]` 那么 Jim，Google 的預付費系列 A 的免費資金是 7500 萬美元，在哪里呢？ > Do you think it was a coincidence. 你覺得這是巧合嗎。 > There was a little more at Facebook. Facebook 上還有更多。 > Yeah I would say it\'s a coincidence. 是的，我會說這是個巧合。 > `[00:29:29]` All right. `[00:29:29]` 好的。 > If I want to sucker over to take my money I would offer them a little bit more than good. 如果我想吸走我的錢，我會給他們多一點好處。 > `[00:29:37]` Free on brand was it Facebook first. `[00:29:37]` 自由品牌是 Facebook 的第一大品牌。 > And I I always felt bad. 我總是感覺很糟糕。 > And Don Graham was a gentleman about saying hey Excel is offering 30 million more than me. 唐·格雷厄姆是個紳士，他說：“嗨，Excel 比我多出 3000 萬美元。” > Excel should be easy and fast forward five years Don Gram\'s on the board of Facebook today which I think is awesome because Don Gramm was a mentor to Mark Zuckerberg in the early days. Excel 應該是輕松而快速的，五年前唐·格拉姆(DonGram)在 Facebook 的董事會工作，我認為這很棒，因為唐·格拉姆(DonGramm)在早期曾是馬克·扎克伯格的導師。 > Did any BCSC network went and spent two weeks at the post just following Don Graham around while the company was growing like a weed. 是否有任何 BCSC 網絡在公司像雜草一樣長的時候，跟隨唐·格雷厄姆(DonGraham)，在郵報上呆了兩個星期。 > Because he wanted to see what a CEO did. 因為他想看看 CEO 做了什么。 > `[00:30:16]` And he followed suit in the journalism business. `[00:30:16]` 他在新聞業也是這樣。 > Yeah. 嗯 > So was I going to ask kind of completely forgotten I was surprised by that. 所以我要問的是，我完全忘記了，我對此感到驚訝。 > Oh yes. 哦，是的。 > Did say no to Facebook in that round yeah any I said no that is not going to work. 在那一輪中對 Facebook 說了不，是的，我說了，不，那是行不通的。 > Oh no I have the e-mails. 哦，不，我有電子郵件。 > `[00:30:38]` And I am not naming them. `[00:30:38]` 我不給他們起名字。 > OK. 好的 > Now I want to ask you. 現在我想問你。 > `[00:30:42]` Privately hey this is really this is really early days. `[00:30:42]` 私下里嘿，這真是太早了。 > Yeah. 嗯 > Did they say no because they didn\'t believe in the business. 他們說不是因為他們不相信這一行。 > What did they say no because the price was too high. 因為價格太高，他們拒絕了什么？ > No I did not believe in the business. 不，我不相信這個生意。 > This is wacky like the social network for college dude. 這就像大學男生的社交網絡一樣古怪。 > Yeah right. 對。 > Like who cares. 比如誰在乎。 > So let\'s see them do you do you know incidentally what multiple you got on Google. 那么讓我們看看他們，你知道你在 Google 上的倍數是多少嗎？ > It was Google Google. 是谷歌。 > `[00:31:13]` Goog. `[00:31:13]` > I don\'t think so. 我不這么認為。 > No no. 不，不。 > `[00:31:21]` Roughly three. `[00:31:21]` 大概三點。 > Three hundred to one. 三百比一。 > Three hundred. 三百。 > That\'s right. 那是正確的。 > If you sold it the all time high you would get like 700 dollars for each dollar you invested. 如果你把它賣到歷史高點，你每投資一美元就能得到 700 美元。 > Some high might be in the future. 未來可能會有一些高企。 > Yes the all time high for Google is definitely in the future. 是的，谷歌的歷史高點肯定是在未來。 > `[00:31:40]` Do you think Larry and Sergey knew that they were gonna be that big. `[00:31:40]` 你認為拉里和謝爾蓋知道他們會這么大嗎？ > `[00:31:46]` No definitely not. `[00:31:46]` 不，絕對不是。 > Which makes me think of a story can I. 這讓我想起了一個故事。 > Yes. 是 > How are we doing on time. 我們準時過得怎么樣。 > `[00:31:55]` We\'re minutes. `[00:31:55]` 我們只剩幾分鐘了。 > You bet. 行!沒問題 > This is a good story so. 這是個很好的故事。 > So Ben Horowitz showed his picture with Warren Buffett. 因此，本·霍洛維茨向沃倫·巴菲特展示了他的照片。 > `[00:32:06]` At a party at my home when he talked. `[00:32:06]` 在我家的一個聚會上，他說話的時候。 > `[00:32:09]` It was his first slide. `[00:32:09]` 這是他的第一張幻燈片。 > Iran is running secretly behind everything at that at that they\'re attending that party along with with Ben. 伊朗正在暗中操縱一切，因為他們和本一起參加了那次聚會。 > `[00:32:23]` This party was sponsored by Angel investors at the time which was my fund at the time. `[00:32:23]` 這個聚會當時是由天使投資人贊助的，當時是我的基金。 > And we had in our yard every internet person known to man including Sean Parker Shawn Fanning and Larry and Serguei. 在我們的院子里，包括肖恩·帕克、肖恩·范寧、拉里和塞爾蓋在內的所有人都認識我們。 > And it was in 1998. 那是在 1998 年。 > Let\'s say so google was like one year old Napster probably a year and a half old and the day of this party Napster was at its all time high. 讓我們說，Google 就像一年前的 Napster，大概有一年半了，而這次聚會的那一天，Napster 達到了空前的高度。 > Forty million users Sean Parker has been on the cover of every major magazine in America. 肖恩·帕克(SeanParker)在美國的每一本主要雜志的封面上都有 4000 萬用戶。 > Within three weeks and major magazines in America don\'t put the same guy on the cover. 三個星期之內，美國的主要雜志就不會把同一個人放到封面上了。 > But Napster was so disruptive they said the hell with it. 但是納普斯特是如此的混亂，他們說去死吧。 > This kid\'s got to go on the cover Shawn Fanning is really famous. 這孩子必須上封面肖恩范寧是真的很有名。 > He is the shyest person on the Earth not a malicious bone in his body. 他是地球上最害羞的人，而不是他身體里的一根惡意骨頭。 > He had a keeper with them at the party even though I knew him really well. 雖然我很了解他，但他在晚會上還是有個看門人。 > He was like You know I don\'t like all this attention. 他就像你知道的我不喜歡這么多注意力。 > So Larry Larian Serguei say hey will you introduce us to. 拉里·拉里安·塞爾蓋說，嘿，你能給我們介紹一下。 > Fanning I golf course I will. 范寧我的高爾夫球場我會的。 > Google is barely known. 谷歌幾乎不為人所知。 > Probably a third of the people at this party he would say Google and they\'d say I\'ve heard it good. 在這個聚會上，他可能會說三分之一的人會說谷歌，他們會說我聽得很好。 > You know what do they do. 你知道他們是做什么的。 > So I take them off when I say to Fanning I said this will be the biggest company on or some day because their search results are so accurate and so good. 所以，當我對范寧說，我說這將是最大的公司，或有一天，因為他們的搜索結果是如此準確和如此好，我就把它們摘掉。 > And Fanning is fascinated. 范寧被迷住了。 > Talks to him shake hands. 和他握手。 > We go. 我們走吧。 > We walk away. 我們走開。 > And Larry and Sergei follow me and I go. 拉里和謝爾蓋跟著我就走。 > Is there somebody else you want to meet. 你還想見見其他人嗎。 > They go No no we have to talk to you. 他們走了不我們得和你談談。 > They said it is so frustrating. 他們說這太令人沮喪了。 > We will we will never be famous like him. 我們永遠不會像他那樣出名。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > And they were looking at me like. 他們看著我就像。 > Tell us. 告訴我們。 > Were right. 都是對的。 > And I said You guys are so wrong because you\'re going to make money while this guy fights with the record labels. 我說你們錯了，因為你們會賺錢的，而這家伙卻在和唱片公司打架。 > `[00:34:42]` Let\'s `[00:34:42]` not end on that. `[00:34:42]` `[00:34:42]` 不要就此結束。 > No no no. 不不不。 > Won\'t. 不會的。 > And with that we\'ll end with the question everybody in this. 到此為止，我們將以這件事中的每一個人的問題結束。 > `[00:34:50]` Well a lot of people in audience probably want to know which is how do they get your money. `[00:34:50]` 很多觀眾可能想知道他們是怎么得到你的錢的。 > Well you makes you want to invest in somebody. 你讓你想投資于某個人。 > Well we invest in people first. 我們先投資人。 > `[00:35:00]` There will be people but they they have to they have to be people with personalities with drive they know it\'s 24 by 7. `[00:35:00]` 會有人的，但他們必須是有動力的人，他們知道是 24 比 7。 > They have to be a leader because if you\'re going to build a big company you have to have enough charisma to get other people to work on your team. 他們必須是一個領導者，因為如果你要建立一個大公司，你必須有足夠的魅力，讓其他人在你的團隊中工作。 > You\'ve got a Renoir what he\'s saying is yeah. 你有一個雷諾阿他說的是對的。 > So Andy termination what what Jessica talked about you you have to be completely fearless. 所以安迪終止了杰西卡所說的你必須無所畏懼。 > How can you tell when you meet somebody that they have these qualities. 當你遇到一個人時，你怎么知道他們有這些品質。 > In fact I want to be doing it so long that I can just tell after 10 minutes I\'ve made up my mind. 事實上，我想做的時間太長了，所以 10 分鐘后我就知道了，我已經下定決心了。 > So the SVM you I have to keep saying hey I don\'t want to come across as rude but after 10 minutes I\'ve decided if I like the company or not because I\'m looking at the personality of the individual how can they build a great company. 所以，支持向量機，我必須一直說，嘿，我不想被視為粗魯，但 10 分鐘后，我決定我是否喜歡公司，因為我看的是個人的個性，他們如何才能建立一個偉大的公司。 > So there\'s like a 50 I\'m an algorithm in my brain that goes through like 50 traits that person\'s got it and you don\'t have this. 所以在我的大腦中有一種類似于 50 我的算法，它經歷了一個人所擁有的 50 個特征，而你卻沒有這樣的特性。 > I want to invest I don\'t I\'m not I really don\'t care what the company does today. 我想投資，我不是真的不在乎公司今天做什么。 > I want to invest in that entrepreneurs company like their sixth seventh a company. 我想投資那家企業家公司，就像他們的第六家第七家公司。 > You know it\'s a lifelong commitment. 你知道這是一種終生的承諾。 > I don\'t think other investors look at it that way. 我不認為其他投資者會這么看。 > It\'s not very useful advice either you got it or you don\'t. 無論你得到了還是沒有得到它，這都不是很有用的建議。 > `[00:36:37]` No no no no no no no. `[00:36:37]` 不，不。 > I\'m looking for traits that are all identifiable you know. 我在尋找你所知道的所有可以識別的特征。 > `[00:36:42]` Are you a good communicator. `[00:36:42]` 你是個善于溝通的人嗎？ > Are you a leader. 你是領導者嗎。 > Are you driven. 你開車嗎。 > You can tell that when you\'re talking to somebody. 當你和別人說話的時候你就知道了。 > `[00:36:48]` I suppose the good news is if the person has these traits even if they don\'t think they would necessarily make a good startup founders something like that you\'ll back them while they figure it out. `[00:36:48]` 我想好消息是，如果一個人有這些特質，即使他們不認為他們一定會成為一個好的初創公司創始人，當他們想出辦法的時候，你就會支持他們。 > Of course very well right. 當然很好。 > `[00:36:58]` Yeah that\'s as unique about as V Angel. `[00:36:58]` 是的，這和 V 天使一樣獨特。 > The other thing is product focus. 另一件事是關注產品。 > So if you look at the success of Facebook and Pinterest and square these founders are focused on the product and they are focused on the product because they know if the products good they\'re gonna have a happy customer they care almost too much about it. 所以，如果你看看 Facebook 和 Pinterest 的成功，這些創始人關注的是產品，他們關注的是產品，因為他們知道如果產品好的話，他們會有一個快樂的客戶，他們幾乎太在意它了。 > You clearly never care too much craftsmen who really care. 很明顯，你從來不關心那些真正在乎你的工匠。 > They are all graphs. 它們都是圖表。 > You know in this day and age. 你知道在這個時代。 > So much of the success is about UI. 很多成功都是關于 UI 的。 > So if you look at Ben Silverman Jack Dorsey and Zuck they they care about happy users and in a perfect world they will go back in their Harvel and just make their product great. 所以，如果你看看本·西爾弗曼、杰克·多爾西和扎克，他們關心的是快樂的用戶，在一個完美的世界里，他們會回到他們的哈維爾，讓他們的產品變得更棒。 > They hate coming out in public takes them away from from the brass ring which is millions and millions of happy customers. 他們討厭當眾出柜，把他們從數百萬快樂顧客的黃銅戒指上帶走。 > `[00:38:07]` Robert there\'s no Q and A\'s we don\'t win outright on an awkward note. `[00:38:07]` 羅伯特，我們沒有問題，也沒有 A，我們不能以尷尬的口吻徹底贏球。 > These press guys a gentleman. 這些記者是個紳士。 > Thanks Ron. 謝謝羅恩。