# Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012 > `[00:00:00]` Hi everyone. `[00:00:00]` 大家好。 > So believe this year I can\'t believe we have this team of people in the back helping. 所以相信今年我不能相信我們有一隊人在背后幫忙。 > There\'s real chairs. 有真正的椅子。 > Look how many seats there are. 看看有多少個座位。 > `[00:00:12]` This is so exciting. `[00:00:12]` 這太令人興奮了。 > I\'m Jessica Livingston. 我是杰西卡·利文斯頓。 > I\'m one of the founders of Y Combinator and it\'s been more than seven years since we started ricey. 我是 Y Combinator 的創始人之一，自從我們創辦 ricey 以來已經有 7 年多了。 > And in that time we\'ve funded 467 startups so I\'ve seen a lot of pattern. 在這段時間里，我們資助了 467 家初創公司，所以我看到了很多模式。 > I was a little nervous back there so thanks. 我剛才有點緊張所以謝謝。 > There\'s a talk I always want to give at the beginning of each batch warning everyone about stuff that I know is probably going to happen to them. 我總是想在每一批開始的時候做一次演講，警告每個人我知道可能會發生在他們身上的事情。 > I finally wrote down my thoughts and I\'m going to share it with you today. 我終于寫下了我的想法，今天我將和你分享。 > So we all know that lots of smart and talented people start startups on the left side. 所以我們都知道很多聰明有才華的人都是從左邊開始創業的。 > There you see huge numbers of startups getting started. 在這里，你可以看到大量的初創企業正在起步。 > And yet if you look at the other side a few years later there\'s actually only a handful of startups that are big successes. 然而，如果你看另一面，幾年后，實際上只有少數幾家初創企業取得了巨大的成功。 > What\'s happening in the middle there that\'s causing such failure. 在中間發生了什么，導致了這樣的失敗。 > It\'s like there\'s a tunnel full of monsters that kill them along the way. 就像在路上有一條滿是怪物的隧道一樣。 > And I just want to thank Mineau monsters for providing me these fabulous cartoon monsters. 我只想感謝米諾怪物為我提供了這些神奇的卡通怪物。 > So I\'m gonna tell you about these monsters today so you can know how to avoid them in general. 所以我今天要告訴你關于這些怪物的事，這樣你就可以知道如何避開它們了。 > Your best weapon against these monsters is determination and even though we usually use one word for it determination is really two separate things. 你對付這些怪物的最好武器是決心，即使我們通常用一個詞來形容它，決心實際上是兩件事。 > It\'s resilience and drive resilience keeps you from being pushed backwards and drive makes you go forwards. 它的彈性和駕駛彈性，防止你被推后，驅動使你前進。 > One reason you need resilience in a startup is that you\'re going to get rejected a lot. 你在創業中需要彈性的一個原因是你會被很多人拒絕。 > Even the most famous startups had a surprising amount of rejection early on. 即使是最著名的初創公司也在一開始就遭到了令人驚訝的拒絕。 > Everyone you encounter will have doubts about what you are doing whether it\'s investors potential employees reporters your family and friends. 你遇到的每個人都會懷疑你在做什么，不管是投資者、潛在雇員、記者、家人和朋友。 > What you don\'t realize until you start a startup is how much external validation you\'ve gotten for the conservative choices you\'ve made in the past. 除非你創業，否則你不會意識到的是，你在過去所做的保守選擇中得到了多少外部驗證。 > You go to college and everyone says great you graduate and get a job at Google and everyone says Great. 你上了大學，每個人都說你很棒，你畢業后在谷歌找到了一份工作，每個人都說你很棒。 > Well what do you think happens when you quit your job to start a company to rent out air beds. 那么，當你辭去工作，開始一家公司出租空氣床時，你認為會發生什么呢？ > This is air Beinn BS Web site. 這是 AIR Beinn BS 網站。 > When they first launched in 2007. 當他們在 2007 年第一次發射的時候。 > I mean look up there were they explain what they do it says to designers create a new way to connect the idea say conference I\'ve never even heard of that conference. 我的意思是，看看那里，他們解釋了他們做了什么，對設計師說，創造一種新的方式來連接這個想法，比如說會議，我從來沒有聽說過那個會議。 > And over on the left it says Lyster air bed. 左邊寫著 Lyster 空氣床。 > `[00:02:57]` Beds. `[00:02:57]` 床。 > I mean it\'s unbelievable. 我是說這太難以置信了。 > `[00:02:59]` This is not the sort of thing that you get a lot of external validation for. `[00:02:59]` 這不是你得到大量外部驗證的那種東西。 > Almost everyone is more impressed when you get a job at Google than if you make a Web site for people to rent out air beds for conferences. 當你在谷歌找到一份工作時，幾乎每個人都會給人留下更深刻的印象。 > And yet this is one of the most successful startups. 然而，這是最成功的創業公司之一。 > So even if you\'re Airbnb Inbee you\'re gonna start out looking like an ugly duckling to most people. 所以，即使你是 Airbnb In 蜜蜂，對大多數人來說，你也會看起來像只丑小鴨。 > Here are the Airbnb Inbee founders when they did Y C back in early 2009. 這里是 Airbnb In 蜜蜂的創始人，他們在 2009 年初做 YC 的時候。 > And at this point they\'d already endured tons of rejection. 在這一點上，他們已經忍受了大量的拒絕。 > You should check out Brian\'s talk from the 2010 Startup School it\'s a very inspirational story but by the time they came to us they had maxed out their credit cards. 你應該看看布萊恩在 2010 年創業學校的演講，這是一個非常鼓舞人心的故事，但當他們來找我們的時候，他們已經用完了他們的信用卡。 > They were eating leftover Captain McCain\'s cereal. 他們在吃麥肯上尉的麥片。 > They were at the end of their rope and everyone thought their idea was crazy. 他們處于困境中，每個人都認為他們的想法是瘋狂的。 > And I actually didn't. 其實我沒有。 > But they knew they were on to something. 但他們知道他們發現了什么。 > And during Lycee they made some key changes to their site. 在 Lycee 的時候，他們對他們的網站做了一些關鍵的改動。 > They talk to users. 他們和用戶交談。 > They set their goals and they measured everything and the graph started to go up. 他們設定了他們的目標，他們測量了一切，圖表開始上升。 > Remember the new ideas usually seem crazy at first but if you have a good idea and you execute well everyone will see it eventually. 記住，新的想法通常一開始看起來很瘋狂，但是如果你有一個好主意，并且執行得很好，每個人最終都會看到它。 > We funded Eric Makowski about two years ago when he was working on impulse the predecessor to the Pebble Watch. 大約兩年前，我們資助了埃里克·馬科夫斯基(EricMakowski)，當時他是“卵石觀察”(PebbleWatch)的前身。 > Eric was a single founder and these watches there have something in common. 埃里克是一個單一的創始人，這些手表有一些共同之處。 > That terrifies investors. 這讓投資者感到害怕。 > Their hardware. 他們的硬件。 > Poor Eric had a really hard time getting funding no one wanted to fund the hardware company. 可憐的埃里克很難獲得資金，沒有人愿意資助這家硬件公司。 > He met with more than like 30 investors who all said things like I love the idea but I can\'t fund a hardware company. 他會見了 30 多名投資者，他們都說我喜歡這個主意，但我不能為一家硬件公司提供資金。 > Some claim they just didn\'t fund hardware companies as a rule. 一些人聲稱，他們只是不按慣例為硬件公司提供資金。 > Others said that there are too many capital expenses upfront. 另一些人則表示，前期的資本支出太多了。 > They all said no when he showed them the concept but he\'d been building the pebble based on all this user feedback from impulse and he felt strongly that people wanted this product. 當他向他們展示這個概念時，他們都拒絕了，但是他一直在根據用戶的這些沖動反饋來建造鵝卵石，他強烈地覺得人們想要這個產品。 > So I remember he talked to Paul and they agreed he should just give up investors and put it on Kickstarter. 所以我記得他和保羅談過，他們同意他應該放棄投資者，把它放到 Kickstarter 上。 > His original goal was to raise a hundred thousand dollars to make a thousand watches and instead of a hundred thousand dollars pebble raised ten point two million dollars in 30 days the largest amount of money ever on Kickstarter. 他最初的目標是籌集 10 萬美元來制作一千塊手表，而不是 10 萬美元，鵝卵石在 30 天內籌集了 1，020 萬美元，這是 Kickstart 有史以來最大的一筆錢。 > Even a Y Combinator got rejected when we first started. 我們剛開始的時候連一個 Y 組合器都被拒絕了。 > This here is our first batch. 這是我們的第一批。 > Sitting at dinner in Cambridge Massachusetts back in 0 5. 坐在馬薩諸塞州劍橋的晚餐上。 > Now there are lots of organizations doing what we do. 現在有很多組織在做我們做的事情。 > But trust me when we first started people thought we were crazy or just stupid. 但相信我，當我們剛開始的時候，人們認為我們瘋了或者只是愚蠢。 > Even our own lawyers tried to talk us out of it. 甚至連我們自己的律師也試圖說服我們放棄。 > But eight teams of founders took a chance on Y Combinator and moved to Cambridge and got their twelve thousand dollars per team. 但是有八個團隊的創始人抓住了 YCombinator 的機會，搬到了劍橋，每個團隊得到了 1.2 萬美元。 > And I think they tell you they had a really great experience. 我想他們告訴你他們有很棒的經歷。 > We too knew we were onto something interesting. 我們也知道我們在做一些有趣的事情。 > So we focused on making something that a few people loved and we just expanded slowly from there. 所以我們專注于制作一些人們喜歡的東西，然后我們慢慢地擴展到那里。 > But it was a slow process when we came out to Silicon Valley in the winter of 06. 但是當我們在 06 年冬天來到硅谷的時候，這是一個緩慢的過程。 > We hardly knew anyone so we decided we\'d focus on meeting new investors to convince them to come to demo day. 我們幾乎不認識任何人，所以我們決定集中精力與新投資者會面，說服他們來演示一天。 > `[00:06:35]` I got an introduction to theNo.1 angel investor in the valley Ron Conaway and let me show you how he tried different brushes off so we get the introduction. `[00:06:35]` 我得到了第一位天使投資人羅恩·科納韋的介紹，讓我向你們展示他是如何嘗試不同的畫筆的，所以我們來介紹一下。 > And Ron says is this in Boston. 羅恩說這是在波士頓。 > I stick to local and I said no we\'re in Mountain View and we\'d love to have you come to demo day and he said. 我堅持當地，我說不，我們在山景城，我們希望你來演示一天，他說。 > So is this a chance to invest in your incubator. 所以這是一個投資于你的孵化器的機會。 > And I replied No we\'re not asking you to invest in us. 我回答：不，我們不是要你投資我們。 > We\'re asking you to invest in individual startups and he said. 我們要求你投資于個別初創企業，他說。 > Off to circle back to you. 回到你身邊。 > I\'m jammed up. 我被堵住了。 > We\'ve got the jammed up right now from Long car waves so embarrassing. 我們現在被汽車長波堵住了，太讓人尷尬了。 > Oh my gosh. 我的天啊。 > But it all worked out in the end. 但最終都成功了。 > Here\'s Ron. 羅恩來了。 > `[00:07:23]` A year later speaking to the winter 07 batch of founders he did wind up coming into demo day and he was impressed with what he saw. `[00:07:23]` 一年后，當他對 07 年冬季的一批創始人講話時，他終于進入了演示的一天，他對他所看到的印象深刻。 > Remember if you execute well eventually you\'ll win people over. 記住，如果你最終執行得很好，你就會贏得別人的支持。 > And by the way I should also point out that there\'s David Wu Sanco who\'s speaking later today and there\'s Harge to Garh. 順便說一句，我還應該指出，今天晚些時候有大衛·吳桑科(David Wu Sanco)發言，還有哈吉(Harge To Garh)。 > Is now partner NYC. 現在是紐約的合伙人。 > It was their batch. 是他們的批次。 > Remember there were two components to determination resilience and drive. 記住，決心、彈性和動力有兩個要素。 > We\'ve talked about why you need resilience because everyone will be down on you but you need drive to overcome the sheer variety of problems they\'ll face in a startup. 我們已經討論過為什么你需要彈性，因為每個人都會對你不滿，但你需要動力來克服他們在創業中將面臨的各種問題。 > Some of them are painfully specific like a lawsuit or a deal blowing up and some are demoralizing only vague like no one\'s visiting your site and you can\'t figure out why there\'s no playbook you can consult when these problems come up. 其中一些是令人痛苦的具體細節，比如訴訟或交易破裂；另一些則是令人沮喪的，就像沒有人訪問你的網站一樣，你無法弄清楚為什么當這些問題出現時，你沒有可以參考的劇本。 > You have to improvise and sometimes you have to do things that seem kind of abnormal. 你必須隨機應變，有時你不得不做一些看似不正常的事情。 > This is a picture of a job. 這是一張工作的照片。 > Sorry. 抱歉的 > He\'s the founder of ?lla cart you Lockheart lets restaurant customers order and pay through a tablet. 他是“手推車”的創始人，洛克哈特公司讓餐廳顧客通過平板電腦訂購和付款。 > He was a grad student atM.I.T. 他是麻省理工學院的研究生。 > when he started the company and he was so committed that he got a job as a waiter to learn what restaurants were like. 當他創辦這家公司時，他非常投入，于是找到了一份服務生的工作，來了解餐館是什么樣的。 > You see that air duct up there over his head that looks like a halo. 你看到他頭頂上的風管看起來像個光環。 > This is an example of a good founder. 這是一個很好的創始人的例子。 > Here are the Carlson brothers who founded stripe. 這是創建條紋的卡爾森兄弟。 > Patrick speaking right after me today actually they do payment processing online. 帕特里克今天跟在我后面，實際上他們在網上做支付處理。 > When these guys got started they were a pair of young programmers then no idea how to make deals with banks and credit card companies. 當這些家伙開始的時候，他們是一對年輕的程序員，然后不知道如何與銀行和信用卡公司做交易。 > So I asked Patrick how did you even convince these big companies to work with you. 所以我問帕特里克，你是怎么說服這些大公司和你合作的。 > And one Trickey told me that worked was he started with a phone call and then people would pay attention to their arguments without being distracted by their youth. 一位小精靈告訴我，他一開始打電話就成功了，然后人們就會注意到他們的論點，而不會被他們的青春分心。 > And by the time they met in person and the companies could tell how young they are they were already impressed. 當他們面對面見面的時候，公司就可以知道他們有多年輕了，他們已經印象深刻了。 > We funded the Lockard Tron guys back in the summer of 0 9. 我們早在 09 年夏天就資助了洛克德·特龍。 > That\'s them actually at their Y see interview a year afterwards. 這就是他們在 Y-見一年后的采訪-的實際情況。 > They were still figuring out their idea. 他們還在想他們的主意。 > They lived with the we pay guys and one day The Weepies were having a party for their investors. 他們和我們付錢的人住在一起，有一天，Weepies 一家為他們的投資者舉辦了一個聚會。 > And by that point the lock at trons were working on a product to lock your door with the iPhone. 到那時，Trons 的鎖正在開發一種產品，可以用 iPhone 鎖住你的門。 > They were able to impress one of the investors with their prototype and he asked to have 40 installed at some startup offices he owned. 他們能夠用他們的原型給一位投資者留下深刻的印象，他要求在他擁有的一些創業辦公室安裝 40 臺。 > The founders were totally psyched. 創始人們都很興奮。 > But the commercial locks they needed to use cost five hundred bucks a pop. 但是他們需要使用的商業鎖一次要花五百美元。 > They didn\'t have twenty thousand dollars to fulfill that order. 他們沒有兩萬美元來完成那項訂單。 > So they went around to local locksmiths and scrapyards buying broken locks for ten bucks apiece. 于是他們到當地的鎖匠和廢品場去買破鎖，每人十塊錢。 > They fixed them themselves and were able to deliver on that order. 他們自己修好了，并能夠交付這份訂單。 > Fast forward a few years later and these guys were ready to launch the newest version of the lock Tron and they decided to go on Kickstarter and guess what. 快進幾年后，這些家伙準備推出最新版本的鎖 Tron，他們決定去 Kickstarter 和猜猜什么。 > A day after lock Itron submit did their campaign. 一天后，伊特恩提交了他們的戰役。 > Kickstarter changed their policy about hardware companies and rejected them. Kickstarter 改變了他們對硬件公司的政策，并拒絕了他們。 > But the lock Itron guys decided to build their own Kickstarter and they did it in less than a week. 但是鎖具公司的人決定建造他們自己的 Kickstarter，他們在不到一周的時間里就完成了。 > They wondered if anyone would even come. 他們想知道是否有人會來。 > And not only did people come but they\'ve already sold close to 2 million dollars worth of Lockard trons that way. 而且，不僅人們來了，而且他們已經以這種方式賣出了價值近 200 萬美元的洛克德手槍。 > So let me give you just one last example. 讓我給你們最后一個例子。 > Whoops. 哇哦。 > There we go. 開始吧。 > Improvising. 即興發揮。 > These are the justin tv founders when they first got started and they were having a lot of scaling issues and one weekend their whole video system went down. 這些都是賈斯汀電視的創始人，他們剛開始的時候，他們有很多縮放的問題，有一個周末，他們的整個視頻系統都崩潰了。 > `[00:11:17]` Kyle was in charge of it but no one knew where Kyle was and Kyle wasn\'t picking up his cell phone. 凱爾負責這件事，但沒人知道凱爾在哪里，凱爾也沒有拿起他的手機。 > `[00:11:25]` This was like a video so it was pretty critical that this get fixed immediately. `[00:11:25]` 這就像一段視頻，所以非常關鍵的是，這件事必須馬上解決。 > So Michael seeable called Kyle\'s friends and found out that he was in Lake Lake Tahoe and got the address. 于是 Michael Seable 打電話給凱爾的朋友，發現他在 Tahoe 湖，并得到了地址。 > So here\'s a problem for you. 所以這對你來說是個問題。 > You know the address of where someone is and he\'s not answering his phone. 你知道某人的地址，他不接電話。 > How do you get a message to him immediately. 你怎么馬上給他留言。 > `[00:11:47]` Michael went on to yelp and looked for a pizza place near the house and called them up and said I want to have a pizza delivered but never mind about the pizza. 邁克爾接著叫了起來，在房子附近找了個比薩餅店，打電話給他們，說我要送披薩，但不要管披薩的事。 > Just send the delivery guy over and say these four words. 派送貨員過來說這四個字。 > The site is down. 網站已經關閉了。 > So the pizza place was like really confused by this and they send the pizza guy without a pizza. 所以比薩餅店對此感到很困惑，他們送披薩的人沒有比薩餅。 > Kyle answers the door to the delivery guys like the site is down. 凱爾給送貨員開門，就像網站掉了一樣。 > Kyle\'s like. 凱爾就像。 > Oh no. 哦，不 > And he fixed the site. 他修復了網站。 > It was down for less than one hour from start to finish. 從開始到結束都不到一個小時。 > `[00:12:32]` All right. `[00:12:32]` 好的。 > So now we\'re going to move on to another monster co-founder disputes. 因此，現在我們將繼續討論另一個怪物聯合創始人爭端。 > I think people underestimate how critical founder relationships are to the success of a startup. 我認為人們低估了創始人關系對創業成功的重要性。 > Unfortunately I\'ve seen more founder breakups than I care to even count. 不幸的是，我看到了更多的創始人分手，甚至比我想數的還要多。 > And when it happens it can crush a startup. 當這種情況發生時，它可能會粉碎一家初創公司。 > Be very careful when you decide to start a startup with someone. 當你決定和別人一起創業時，要非常小心。 > Do you know them well. 你了解他們嗎。 > Have you worked with them or gone to school with them. 你和他們一起工作過還是和他們一起去過學校。 > Don\'t just slap yourself together with someone just because they\'re available and seem good enough. 不要僅僅因為某人有空而且看起來很好就和他們在一起。 > You\'ll probably regret it. 你可能會后悔的。 > And if you start seeing red flags do something about it don\'t think it\'ll just go away. 如果你開始看到危險信號，不要以為它會消失。 > It\'s a red flag when you find yourself worrying whether your co-founder is trustworthy or whether he or she works hard enough or is competent when founders break up for whatever reason. 當你發現自己在擔心你的聯合創始人是否值得信任，或者他(她)工作是否足夠努力，或者當創始人因任何原因分手時是否勝任，這都是一個危險信號。 > It\'s a blow to the startups productivity and morale. 這對初創企業的生產力和士氣都是一個打擊。 > If there\'s three and one leaves it\'s not so bad. 如果有三個，一個離開，那就沒那么糟了。 > But if there\'s two and one leaves it\'s hard because now you\'re a single founder. 但如果有兩個人離開，那就很難了，因為現在你是一個單一的創始人了。 > Now we come to the investor monster. 現在我們來看看投資者怪物。 > Investors tend to have a herd mentality. 投資者往往有從眾的心態。 > They like you. 他們喜歡你。 > If other investors like you. 如果其他投資者喜歡你。 > So if no one likes you until others do. 所以如果沒有人喜歡你，直到別人喜歡。 > What happens when you talk to the first ones. 當你和第一批人交談時會發生什么。 > No one likes you. 沒人喜歡你。 > It\'s like the catch 22 of not being able to get a job because you don\'t have enough experience. 這就像因為你沒有足夠的經驗而找不到工作的第 22 條。 > You\'re except you\'re really starting off in a hole and you have to work your way out of it. 除了你真的是從一個洞里開始，你必須努力擺脫它。 > You have to meet with lots of investors and hear things like I\'d be interested once you get some more traction or who else is investing. 你必須與許多投資者見面，一旦你獲得更多的吸引力，或者是其他人在投資，你就會聽到像我這樣的事情。 > If you work hard enough you may be able to find a few people who are excited enough about you and the idea to fund you even though you don\'t have other investors yet. 如果你工作得足夠努力，你可能會找到一些人，他們對你和為你提供資金的想法非常興奮，即使你還沒有其他投資者。 > Then when you have a few investors you can start to make that herd mentality work for you instead of against you. 然后，當你有幾個投資者時，你就可以開始讓這種從眾心態對你起作用，而不是對你不利。 > Fundraising is hard and slow until it\'s fast and easy. 籌款是艱難而緩慢的，直到它變得又快又容易。 > But working to convince those first few investors can be really demoralizing. 但是，努力說服那些最初的幾個投資者確實會讓人士氣低落。 > It\'s a grind. 這是一場磨難。 > Investors also like to drag their feet left to their own devices. 投資者也喜歡把腳拖到自己的設備上。 > They\'ll just keep delaying there\'s no downside for them to delay whereas delay will kill you because while you\'re fundraising your company will grind to a halt. 他們只會繼續拖延，這對他們來說沒有壞處，而拖延會讓你喪命，因為當你籌集資金的時候，你的公司就會陷入困境。 > And by the way there are some really good investors who aren\'t like this. 順便說一句，有些真正好的投資者并不是這樣的。 > I\'m just talking about the median investor but it blows my mind how many successful startups had a hard time fundraising at first. 我只是在談論中位投資者，但讓我驚訝的是，有多少成功的初創企業一開始很難籌集資金。 > If you remember one piece of advice about investors it\'s that you\'ve got to create some type of competitive situation. 如果你還記得一條關于投資者的建議，那就是你必須創造某種競爭環境。 > I\'ll give you what is always stuck in my mind as the most amazing example of this. 我會給你一個永遠縈繞在我腦海中的東西，作為這方面最令人驚奇的例子。 > One of the founders of one of our more successful startups. 我們最成功的創業公司之一的創始人之一。 > Had a longstanding relationship with aV.C. 和 AV.C 有著長期的關系。 > So when the founder started the company and did we see this Fisi kept in touch for three months not really doing anything except kind of keeping a benevolent eye on the founder. 因此，當創始人創辦公司時，我們看到菲西保持了三個月的聯系，除了對創始人保持一種仁慈的關注之外，什么也沒做。 > The Veazey attended Demo Day but didn\'t invest. 維西參加了演示日，但沒有投資。 > After a few months the startup gets a term sheet from a procedure Veazey. 幾個月后，這家初創公司從一家程序公司獲得了一份學期表。 > And for those of you in the audience who don\'t know a term sheet is an offer to invest in your company. 對于那些不知道學期單的聽眾來說，他們愿意投資于你的公司。 > When the first Veazey heard about this he shifted into panic mode. 當第一個維西聽說這件事時，他就進入了恐慌的狀態。 > He faxed the founder a term sheet from his firm with the valuation blank and just said in whatever valuation you want and Worryin. 他傳真給創始人一份來自他公司的條款單，上面寫著“你想要的任何估價”和“煩惱”。 > And there are worse things investors can do than just delay. 而且，投資者還有比拖延更糟糕的事情可以做。 > Sometimes they say yes and then change their mind. 有時他們說是，然后改變主意。 > It\'s not a deal until the money is in the bank. 在錢存到銀行之前，這不是交易。 > And we\'ve seen some founders learn that the hard way. 我們看到一些創辦人通過艱難的方式學會了這一點。 > I could tell you a lot of horror stories to frighten you. 我可以給你講很多恐怖故事來嚇唬你。 > But just remember that fundraisings a bitch. 但別忘了募捐是個賤人。 > `[00:16:34]` Why see founders raise money under really good circumstances. `[00:16:34]` 為什么看到創始人在非常好的環境下籌集資金。 > And even for them it\'s a bitch. 即使對他們來說也是個婊子。 > `[00:16:42]` Sardis where one of the reasons fundraising can be so damaging to your company is that it\'s a distraction. `[00:16:42]` 薩戴斯，籌款會對你的公司造成很大損害的原因之一就是它分散了你的注意力。 > We warn everyone early on and why see that there\'s no need to be very careful about distractions and no one is stupid enough to play video games all day but the kind of distractions founders fall for are things that seem like a reasonable way to spend their time. 我們很早就警告每個人，為什么我們會發現沒有必要對分心非常小心，也沒有人會愚蠢到整天玩電子游戲，但創業者喜歡的那種分心行為似乎是一種合理的打發時間的方式。 > We tell people that during Y C there\'s three things that they should be focusing on. 我們告訴人們，在 YC 期間，他們應該關注三件事情。 > Writing code talking to users and exercising and maybe that\'s a little bit extreme but the point is early on. 寫代碼，和用戶交談，鍛煉-也許這有點極端，但問題還在早期。 > Nothing else for your startup matters. 對你的創業來說沒什么大不了的了。 > You need to figure out how to make something people want and do it well. 你需要弄清楚如何使人們想要的東西，并把它做好。 > Don\'t spend all your time networking don\'t hire an army of interns just build stuff and talk to users. 不要把你所有的時間都花在人際關系上，不要雇傭一支實習生大軍，只需要制作東西和用戶交談。 > And by the way fundraising is a distraction but it\'s a necessary ones. 順便說一句，籌款是分散注意力的，但這是必要的。 > Just try to spend as little time on it as possible. 盡量少花點時間在上面。 > One thing that isn\'t necessary and is a bad distraction is talking to corporate development people or corp dev. 有一件事是不必要的，也是一件令人分心的事情，那就是與公司開發人員或公司開發人員交談。 > These are people at big companies who buy startups so you get a call from a corp dev person and they want to learn more about what you\'re doing and explore possible ways of working together. 這些人都是大公司的人，他們會買下創業公司，這樣你就會接到一個公司開發人員的電話，他們想了解更多關于你們正在做什么的事情，并探索可能的合作方式。 > The founders thanks. 創始人謝謝。 > Oh boy. 哦天啊。 > This important company wants to work with me. 這家重要的公司想和我合作。 > I should at least take the meeting and I hate to sound harsh but what these meetings are really for is a way for them to see if they want to do anH.R. 我至少應該參加這次會議，我討厭聽起來很刺耳，但這些會議的真正目的是讓他們看看他們是否想做 H.R。 > acquisition. 購置。 > And anH.R. 和 H.R。 > acquisition means they\'re essentially trying to hire you. 收購意味著他們實際上是想雇傭你。 > And there\'s such a dangerous distraction that I\'ve given them their own little monster. 還有一個危險的分心，我給他們自己的小怪物。 > There\'s nothing wrong withH.R. H.R 沒什么問題。 > acquisitions if that\'s what you want to do. 如果這是你想做的話。 > But most founders don\'t start startups just to get a job at a big company for what essentially is a nice hiring bonus. 但大多數創始人并不是僅僅為了在一家大公司找到一份工作而創辦初創企業，這實際上是一筆不錯的招聘獎金。 > Talking to corp people early on isn\'t just a waste of time. 早早與公司員工交談并不是浪費時間。 > It\'s uniquely demoralizing. 這是唯一令人沮喪的。 > And I see the cycle happen over and over. 我看到循環一次又一次地發生。 > The founders go to meet with the corp dev people and think the meeting was great. 創辦人去見公司的開發人員，認為會議很棒。 > They\'re so friendly and enthusiastic and the founders delude themselves into thinking that their startup is going to be the one that gets bought for ten million dollars after only five months they start to think OK yeah we\'d kind of like to get acquired and they start to not work on their startup anymore and they lose momentum then they get the offer and it\'s essentially what they would have gotten if they\'d walked in off the street and gotten a job. 他們是如此友好和熱情，創始人們自欺欺人，以為他們的創業公司在短短 5 個月后就會以 1000 萬美元被收購，他們開始認為好吧，是的，我們有點想被收購，他們開始不再為他們的初創公司工作，他們失去了動力，然后他們得到了這個機會，這基本上就是他們想要的。如果他們從街上走進來找工作的話。 > But by then they\'ve gotten so accustomed to the idea of selling that they take it. 但到那時，他們已經習慣了銷售的想法，于是就接受了。 > So going down the corpse Evros seriously can deflate your ambitions. 所以把尸體放下來會讓你的野心灰飛煙滅。 > OK now we come to the fiercest monster of all the difficulty of making something people want. 好了，現在我們來到了最兇猛的怪物，所有的困難，使一些人想要的東西。 > It\'s so hard that most startups aren\'t able to do it. 這太難了，以至于大多數初創公司都做不到。 > You\'re trying to figure out something that\'s never been done before. 你想找出以前從未做過的事。 > Not making something people want is the biggest cause of failure we see early on with the second biggest being found or disputes in order to make something people want. 不制造人們想要的東西是我們早期看到的最大的失敗原因，我們發現了第二大原因，或者是為了讓人們想要的東西而發生爭執。 > Being brilliant and determined is not enough. 有才華和決心是不夠的。 > You have to be able to talk to our users and adjust your idea accordingly. 你必須能夠與我們的用戶交談，并相應地調整你的想法。 > Ordinarily you have to change your idea quite a lot even if you start out with a reasonably good one. 通常情況下，你必須改變你的想法，即使你從一個相當好的開始。 > Remember this Web site Air Bed and Breakfast was a rather narrower idea when they first launched. 記住，這個網站“空氣床”和“早餐”在他們第一次推出的時候是一個比較狹窄的想法。 > They started out as a site that let people rent out air beds to travellers for conferences. 他們最初是一個網站，讓人們把空氣床租給旅行者參加會議。 > Then they changed to renting out air beds. 然后他們又換了個空床出租。 > Then they changed to renting out a room or a couch. 然后他們換了一個房間或沙發。 > But the host had to be there to make breakfast. 但是主人必須在那里做早餐。 > Then they finally realized that there was all this pent up demand to rent out entire places. 然后，他們終于意識到，所有這些壓抑的需求出租整個地方。 > This evolution shows that you may begin with kind of a general vision of what your startup is doing but you often have to try several different approaches to get it right. 這一演變表明，你可能從一種對你的創業所做的事情的總體設想開始，但你經常需要嘗試幾種不同的方法才能使之正確。 > And sometimes you have to totally change your idea or order head which lets you order takeout on your cell phone was the founders 6th idea. 有時候，你必須完全改變你的想法或訂單頭，讓你在手機上訂購外賣，這是創始人的第六個想法。 > We funded them for the first thing I think they presented on demo day with the third and it wasn\'t until order ahead that they hit on their big idea. 我們資助了他們的第一件事，我認為他們展示了第三天的演示，直到訂單提前，他們才想到了他們的偉大想法。 > Even if you don\'t need to change the overall idea much you still tend to have to do lots of refinement and one of the best examples of this is Dropbox. 即使你不需要改變總體觀念，你仍然需要做很多改進，其中一個最好的例子就是 Dropbox。 > Here\'s a photo of Drew Housden during Lycee in the summer of 0 7. 這是 07 年夏天萊西的德魯？豪斯頓的照片。 > He had a rash were working on something that was obviously necessary but the reason it was hard to predict early on whether they\'d succeed is that there were lots of people doing this. 他的皮疹正在做一些顯然是必要的事情，但很難預測他們是否會成功的原因是有很多人這么做。 > The way to win in this world was to execute well and it didn\'t happen overnight. 在這個世界上獲勝的方法是執行好，而這不是一夜之間發生的。 > They had to get 1001 details right. 他們必須得到 1001 個細節正確。 > There were a lot of unglamorous schleps between that photograph and this one. 那張照片和這張照片之間有很多平淡無奇的雜亂無章的地方。 > Looks good between starting the company and being on the cover of Forbes. 在創辦公司和登上“福布斯”封面之間看上去不錯。 > You\'re going to have some dramatic ups and downs in a startup. 你將在一家初創公司中經歷一些戲劇性的起起落落。 > You don\'t have the damping that you\'d have as part of a larger organization circumstances just kind of fooling you about the process is often described as a rollercoaster because your up one minute and down the next. 在更大的組織環境中，你沒有足夠的阻尼，只是在某種程度上愚弄你的過程，通常被描述為過山車，因為你一分鐘上一分鐘，下一分鐘下來。 > Lots of rollercoaster stories that I know involve fundraising. 很多我知道的過山車故事都和籌款有關。 > And one of the most extreme ones happened to some people we funded in their previous startup. 其中最極端的一件事發生在我們在上一次創業時資助的一些人身上。 > It was based in Houston and they got a term sheet from a top tier Risi in Silicon Valley and one of the conditions was that they base their company in the valley. 該公司總部設在休斯頓，他們從硅谷的一家頂級企業 Risi 那里得到了一份學期表，條件之一是他們將公司設在硅谷。 > So they said fine. 所以他們說沒問題。 > They sold their houses. 他們賣掉了房子。 > They they moved their families into corporate housing in Houston until they found places in the valley. 他們把家人搬到休斯敦的公寓樓里，直到他們在山谷里找到了住處。 > The documents were already signed and the money was scheduled to be wired on Friday and they were going to start working on Monday. 這些文件已經簽署，這筆錢預定在周五電匯，他們將在周一開始工作。 > Out of the VCR is office. 錄像機外面是辦公室。 > So Friday comes around and for some reason the money was not wired. 所以星期五來了，由于某種原因，錢沒有匯過來。 > So they call the you to ask if they should still come out and the like. 所以他們打電話給你，問他們是否還應該出來等等。 > Absolutely. 絕對一點兒沒錯 > So they get into their minivan and they drive from Houston to Silicon Valley and they stop in Vegas to celebrate. 于是他們上了自己的小貨車，從休斯頓開車到硅谷，然后在拉斯維加斯停下來慶祝。 > This is the part of the rollercoaster. 這是過山車的一部分。 > So on my. 所以我的。 > They set up all their stuff in the conference room with a refund all six of their team there and by that Wednesday the money was still not wired so they had a board meeting planned for that day and they decide to invite theV.C. 他們把所有的東西都安排在會議室里，他們的六個團隊都得到了退款。到了那個星期三，這筆錢還沒有匯入，所以他們計劃在那一天召開董事會會議，并決定邀請 V.C。 > And in this meeting the CEO talked about how sign up numbers had gone down temporarily because they had changed the way they measured them. 在這次會議上，這位首席執行官談到了注冊人數是如何暫時下降的，因為他們改變了測量數據的方式。 > I think you know how this story story\'s going to turn out theV.C. 我想你知道這個故事的結局。 > had actually gotten buyer\'s remorse and he used this as an excuse to break the deal. 實際上，他得到了買家的悔恨，并以此為借口破壞了這筆交易。 > Remember they had signed all the documents sold their homes moved to Silicon Valley and were just waiting to get the 7 million dollars wired to them. 還記得他們簽了所有的文件，賣了房子，搬到了硅谷，只是在等著把 700 萬美元匯給他們。 > And instead theV.C. 取而代之的是 V.C。 > bales he kicks them out of their conference room. 他把他們踢出會議室。 > The founders had to call their wives back in Houston and go back with their tails between their legs and they had to lay everyone off. 創始人們不得不把妻子們叫回休斯敦，兩腿夾著尾巴回去，他們不得不解雇所有人。 > Can you imagine just a few days before they were celebrating in Vegas and now they have nothing incidentally to get to a story this extreme we had. 你能想象幾天前，他們在拉斯維加斯慶祝，現在他們沒有任何附帶的事情，我們有這么極端的故事。 > Here\'s an example of a startup we didn\'t fund because I don\'t think a would probably do this to a startup. 這里是一個我們沒有資助的初創公司的例子，因為我不認為一個人可能會這樣對待一家初創公司。 > We funded. 我們資助了。 > Now let me just tell you about the other half of the rollercoaster. 現在讓我告訴你過山車的另一半。 > We funded the code Kaddoumi team in the summer of 2011. 我們在 2011 年夏天資助了代碼 Kaddoumi 團隊。 > Their original idea didn\'t work and they kept exploring new ones. 他們原來的想法行不通，他們一直在探索新的想法。 > It wasn\'t until late July that they started working on their idea for teaching people to code online. 直到 7 月底，他們才開始研究教人們在線編碼的想法。 > They launched just three days before Demo Day and in those three days they got over 200000 users. 他們在演示日前三天發布，在這三天里，他們獲得了超過 200000 的用戶。 > I mean they only launched so they could get up on demo day and say that they were a launch company that Zach Sims they\'re presenting on demo day. 我的意思是，他們只是為了能在演示日站起來，說他們是 ZachSims 在演示日展示的一家發射公司。 > They never expected that in just three days they could go from a startup with a non launched idea and get up on stage and announce they had 200000 users which is just about the most exciting thing you can say to investors. 他們從未料到，在短短三天內，他們就能從一家沒有推出創意的初創公司走出來，站起來，宣布擁有 200000 用戶，這是你能對投資者說的最令人興奮的事情了。 > The theme here is how extreme things can be. 這里的主題是什么是極端的東西。 > Just remember that no extreme ever lasts. 記住，沒有任何極端會持續下去。 > Don\'t let yourself get immobilized by sadness when things go wrong. 當事情出錯時，不要讓自己被悲傷所束縛。 > Just keep putting one foot in front of the other and know it will get better but don\'t get complacent when things are going well. 只要把一只腳放在另一只腳前面，并知道它會變得更好，但當事情進展順利時，不要自滿。 > In reality things are never as bad or as good as they seem. 實際上，事情從來沒有看上去那么糟糕或那么好。 > And by the way what makes this rollercoaster even worse is that while you\'re on it there\'s this huge audience watching everything you do. 順便說一句，讓這場過山車變得更糟的是，當你在過山車上的時候，有大量的觀眾在觀看你所做的每一件事。 > You\'ll have trolls and reporters say outrageous things about you online so be ready for that and have a thick skin so everyone knows it. 你會有巨魔，而記者們會在網上說一些關于你的駭人聽聞的事情，所以要做好準備，擁有厚厚的皮膚，讓每個人都知道這一點。 > Startups are hard. 創業很難。 > Yet when we watch people do them they\'re always surprised. 然而，當我們看到人們這樣做的時候，他們總是感到驚訝。 > The reason they\'re surprised is that they don\'t realize how bad these specific problems can be. 他們之所以感到驚訝，是因為他們沒有意識到這些具體的問題會有多嚴重。 > I\'ve seen some very smart and talented people get so demoralized that they just gave up. 我見過一些非常聰明和有才華的人變得如此沮喪，以至于他們放棄了。 > Startups are not for the faint of heart. 創業并不適合那些膽小的人。 > And I realize that this is not new news but I wanted you to at least understand how their hard early on so that when you run into these specific monsters you\'ll know what to do. 我意識到這不是什么新消息，但我想讓你至少明白他們的努力是多么的艱難，這樣當你遇到這些特定的怪物時，你就會知道該怎么做了。 > Thank you. 謝謝。