# Y Combinator Partners Q&A
> `[00:00:02]` I\'m Catman Yallock.
`[00:00:02]` I‘m Catman Yallock。
> I\'m a partner at Y Combinator and honestly one of my favorite parts.
我是 Y Combinator 的合伙人,老實說是我最喜歡的部分之一。
> One of the best parts of working at Y Combinator is getting to work with the other partners so I\'m really pleased right now to invite them all on stage.
在 YCombinator 工作的最好部分之一就是和其他合作伙伴一起工作,所以我現在很高興邀請他們上臺。
> And we\'re going to have them answer a bunch of the questions that you sent in to the startup school Y Combinator email.
我們會讓他們回答你發給創業學校 YCombinator 電子郵件的一系列問題。
> So.
所以
> Let\'s bring them on applause.
讓我們為他們鼓掌吧。
> `[00:00:33]` Telling me not to move this.
`[00:00:33]` 告訴我不要動這個。
> `[00:00:37]` All right.
`[00:00:37]` 好的。
> So I.
所以我。
> Am going to start I\'m going to let everyone.
我要開始我要讓每個人。
> So basically what we did was we got about 75 plus questions and we had to cull it down them down really fast.
基本上,我們得到了 75 個以上的問題,我們不得不很快地把它們剔除掉。
> So we have a time for about 10 of them.
所以我們有時間約有 10 人。
> And so the first question actually is was could you tell us about your role as a Y Combinator partner.
第一個問題是,你能告訴我們你作為 Y 組合合伙人的角色嗎?
> So I\'ll have each of you guys answer that and introduce yourselves.
所以我會讓你們每個人回答并自我介紹。
> You\'ve actually probably seen everyone on stage at this point so.
你可能已經看到舞臺上的每個人了。
> So I\'ll start I started at Y C as the director of outreach and part of one of the favorite my favorite parts of the job is a huge part of it is I get to travel around and I meet people every day who are working and building incredible things and are really passionate about what they do.
因此,我將從 YC 開始,作為拓展部主任,也是我最喜歡的工作之一的一部分,我最喜歡的部分是,我可以到處旅行,每天都會遇到一些人,他們在工作中創造著不可思議的東西,并且對他們的工作充滿熱情。
> So that\'s I think like honestly one of the best parts of my job and the other part is I help a lot with a lot of the press launches at Weiss\'s so I really love the storytelling piece helping craft a story around what is what everyone doing what what what the significance of what everyone does is.
所以我想,老實說,我工作中最好的部分之一是,我在 Weiss‘s 的新聞發布會上幫了很多忙,所以我真的很喜歡講故事的那篇,幫助制作一個關于每個人都在做什么,每個人所做的都是什么的故事。
> Whether it\'s Casser.
不管是卡塞爾。
> `[00:01:44]` A good listener when it was Casser we did OFSAA of I think you see what we of do.
`[00:01:44]` 當我們是卡賽爾的時候,一個很好的傾聽者,我想你知道我們在做什么。
> I help startups through office hours and group and individual office hours basically build their company.
我幫助初創企業度過辦公時間,小組和個人辦公時間基本上是他們的公司。
> My background is I\'m an engineer MBA.
我的背景是我是一名工程師 MBA。
> `[00:01:59]` Straightforward.
`[00:01:59]` 直截了當。
> My name is Kersti.
我叫克爾斯蒂。
> I\'m the financial and operational partner I guess so I work with the staff hopes to help with the financial questions and with questions like How do I hire my first employee.
我想我是財務和運營伙伴,所以我和員工一起工作,希望能幫助他們解決財務問題,并解決一些問題,比如我該如何雇傭我的第一位員工。
> How do I pay myself so I help more with that than with strategy and strategy or product.
我如何支付自己,所以我更多地幫助在這方面,而不是戰略,戰略或產品。
> And I think the favorite part of.
我覺得最喜歡的部分。
> My job is that.
我的工作就是。
> Every day is different.
每一天都不一樣。
> The questions we get are different.
我們得到的問題是不同的。
> The problems that startups have different the great things that happen to startups are different and so we wake up everyday not knowing what\'s going to happen that day which makes life really exciting.
創業公司面臨的問題是不同的-初創企業發生的大事是不同的,所以我們每天醒來,不知道那一天會發生什么,這讓生活變得非常令人興奮。
> `[00:02:43]` When it is just them.
`[00:02:43]` 當只有他們的時候。
> Before joining glaciated started a couple startups all funded by way C three times actually some kind of remedial student may have the same job as Gasset basically working advising and helping the store groups.
在加入冰川公司之前,啟動了幾家由 C 方式資助的初創企業,這些初創企業都是由 C 提供三次資助的,實際上,一些補習學生可能有著與 Gate 相同的工作,基本上是為商店集團提供咨詢和幫助。
> I think for me it\'s very exciting because it\'s always something new.
我認為這對我來說是非常令人興奮的,因為它總是新的東西。
> I really like things that are new and working with a lot of different companies is really fun for me.
我真的很喜歡新事物,和很多不同的公司一起工作對我來說真的很有趣。
> And.
和
> That\'s it.
就這樣了。
> `[00:03:14]` Pretty fun.
`[00:03:14]` 很有趣。
> So I\'m Pop who hates and I mainly just listen to people\'s ideas and then laugh at them.
所以我是個討厭的爸爸,我主要是聽別人的想法,然后嘲笑他們。
> `[00:03:22]` I can verify that yeah only.
`[00:03:22]` 我只能證實這一點。
> `[00:03:27]` I\'m just there for my own amusement.
`[00:03:27]` 我在那里只是為了消遣。
> I really.
我真的。
> It sounds you know how to put it I like I like to be in the place where history is happening.
聽起來你知道怎么說,我喜歡呆在歷史正在發生的地方。
> And.
和
> `[00:03:42]` I thinkP.G.
`[00:03:42]` 我想。
> is a very clever guy.
是個很聰明的人。
> He has a real insight into history and I think he he\'s never said it but I think he intentionally created this magnet for interesting.
他對歷史有真正的洞察力,我認為他從來沒有說過,但我認為他是故意創造了這個吸引人的磁石。
> People in interesting places.
人們在有趣的地方。
> So I just like to go hang around there.
所以我就喜歡在那里閑逛。
> I\'ve actually been.
我真的去過。
> Officially a partner since I left Facebook in 2010 but I started.
2010 年我離開 Facebook 后正式成為合伙人,但我開始了。
> Hanging around twice a year I think 2006 as soon as they came out to Mount View.
一年兩次,我想他們一到山景城,就會在 2006 年出游。
> Just because there\'s crazy people like this that I could.
就因為我能像這樣的瘋子。
> Talk to and they would tell me their ideas and I would laugh and they wouldn\'t get offended.
和他們交談,他們會告訴我他們的想法,我會笑,他們不會被冒犯。
> It `[00:04:18]` actually turns out to be a good filter to the people that thin skinned.
`[00:04:18]` 實際上,對于那些皮膚薄的人來說,這是一個很好的過濾器。
> So.
所以
> I basically just talked to founders.
我剛和創始人談過了。
> `[00:04:28]` So we\'ll kick it off with the next question.
`[00:04:28]` 所以我們將用下一個問題開始。
> So.
所以
> The next question and something we\'ve been seeing a lot on Twitter is that if you\'re starting a company where the main market is in a specific geographic region.
下一個問題,也是我們在 Twitter 上經常看到的一個問題是,如果你要創辦一家主要市場位于特定地理區域的公司。
> So for example if you\'re targeting UK customers would you still suggest moving to theU.S.
例如,如果你瞄準的是英國客戶,你還會建議搬到美國去嗎?
> or would you suggest moving.
還是你建議搬家。
> `[00:04:47]` I have a lot of thoughts on that and I could probably go on for hours and I have in the past but I really think that one of the event managers California is even if you\'re going to start your startup your market is somewhere else and you really want to continue your startup there.
`[00:04:47]` 我對此有很多想法,我可能會持續幾個小時,在過去也是如此,但我真的認為,加州的一個活動經理,即使你要啟動你的初創公司,你的市場在其他地方,而且你真的想在那里繼續你的創業。
> It\'s worth thinking about visiting California even if it\'s not through Lycee even if you just come for a little while because there is such a huge line network effect in California around story technology companies.
即使不是通過 Lycee 訪問加州,也是值得考慮的,即使你只是來一段時間,因為在加州,圍繞著故事科技公司存在著巨大的線網效應。
> There\'s people who can help you have done it before starting companies with massive scale.
在建立規模龐大的公司之前,有一些人可以幫你做到這一點。
> The googles and feest books there\'s a huge amount of capital that goes into funding technology companies but doesn\'t really exist outside of Silicon Valley.
谷歌(Googles)和嘉年華(Feest)的書籍有大量資金流入科技公司,但實際上并不存在于硅谷以外。
> So there\'s there\'s a lot of reasons to go even if you\'re even if your.
所以有很多理由去,即使你是你的。
> `[00:05:31]` Customers or you know their place and you should try to be close to your customers right you might move back and start your startup or continue startup in whatever your customers are.
`[00:05:31]` 客戶或者你知道他們的位置,你應該盡量接近你的客戶,你可以搬回來,開始你的創業或者繼續創業,不管你的客戶是什么。
> But I think it\'s worth thinking about visiting.
但我覺得還是值得一想的。
> `[00:05:44]` California at some point.
`[00:05:44]` 加利福尼亞在某一時刻。
> I was talking to some of the founders in between the bricks and somebody said there\'s a lot of energy you feel a lot of people here are interested in doing really interesting things and I think that\'s just.
我和一些在磚頭中間的創始人交談,有人說這里有很多能量,你覺得這里有很多人對做真正有趣的事情很感興趣,我認為這只是。
> Much more common in the valley.
在山谷里更常見。
> The first article is a Chicago.
第一篇是芝加哥。
> Chicago is a great cities that built great technology companies.
芝加哥是一個偉大的城市,建立了偉大的科技公司。
> But there is that it just feels very different when you go out and you tell somebody your founder that\'s not you know that\'s not like a strange thing.
但是,當你出去告訴別人你的創始人,你不知道這不是一件奇怪的事情時,感覺就很不一樣了。
> They really understand what that means and it can.
他們真的明白這意味著什么,而且它可以。
> And I think that somehow it emotionally feels good when you\'re feeling kind of part of the ecosystem part of the community.
我認為在某種程度上,當你感覺自己是社會生態系統的一部分時,你的情緒會很好。
> `[00:06:16]` And I think to bring it back to the UK as well.
`[00:06:16]` 我也想把它帶回英國。
> And the mentality you know the standard British mentality is oh that\'ll never work whereas the mentality over in California is oh that might just work.
你知道,英國的心態是:哦,永遠不會起作用,而加州的心態可能會起作用。
> And so that\'s that\'s where you\'re starting from you know you\'ve got a different base point.
這就是你開始的地方,你知道你有一個不同的基點。
> `[00:06:35]` Probably the most popular question we got probably maybe 25 of the questions were Are you starting a Y Combinator in blank.
`[00:06:35]` 也許我們得到的最流行的問題-大概有 25 個問題-是你在空白的情況下開始 Y 組合器(Y Combinator)。
> So a lot of them obviously were the UK.
很明顯,他們中的很多人都是英國。
> Are you starting them in Italy or are you going to Africa are you going to launch.
你是從意大利開始的,還是你要去非洲,你要發射。
> You know basically every country in the world does almost every country in the world is represented.
你知道,基本上世界上每個國家都有代表,世界上幾乎每個國家都有代表。
> So guys are we starting Y Combinator in Europe.
所以我們要在歐洲開始 Y 組合。
> No I think if we try to start a program in every country because would quickly get overwhelmed but we would like to find.
不,我想如果我們試著在每個國家開始一個項目,因為很快就會不知所措,但我們想要找到。
> `[00:07:07]` Companies in many many different countries and we do and we do.
`[00:07:07]` 許多不同國家的公司,我們做到了。
> We last batch had 25.
我們上一批有 25。
> `[00:07:13]` So this has bounders that were born in 27 different countries and the companies in this batch there\'s 85 of them now and nine of those companies were started outside theU.S.
`[00:07:13]` 這有 27 個不同國家的邊界,這批公司現在有 85 家,其中 9 家是在美國以外開辦的。
> So there\'s no founders from all over the world.
所以世界各地沒有創始人。
> Companies that have started in multiple countries.
在多個國家開辦的公司。
> It\'s you know it\'s definitely something we encourage.
你知道,這絕對是我們鼓勵的事情。
> `[00:07:32]` Yeah I think I mean really what that question is asking is like why Silicon Valley.
`[00:07:32]` 是的,我想我的意思是,這個問題實際上是問為什么硅谷。
> We were talking a little bit about this and there\'s kind of three things that exist in the Silicon Valley which are hard to replicate.
我們討論過這個問題,硅谷有三種很難復制的東西。
> First is just the talented and technical talent.
首先是人才和技術人才。
> I mean it is there are more engineers and probably a couple of buildings at Google than exist in entire states.
我的意思是,谷歌有更多的工程師,可能還有幾座建筑,這比整個美國都要多。
> And that is important when you\'re trying to build a technology company you\'re trying to find cofounders you\'re trying to find early team members.
這一點很重要,當你想要建立一家科技公司的時候,你要找的是聯合創始人,你要找的是早期的團隊成員。
> The second is the sophistication of the investors themselves.
二是投資者本身的老練。
> You know very early stage you have to see a lot of volume.
你知道,在早期階段,你必須看到大量的音量。
> You have to see patterns you just have to be exposed to a level of comfort.
你必須看到的模式,你只需要暴露在一個水平的舒適。
> A number of companies that you just won\'t see in other countries you know from Pakistan you\'re just there\'s a lot of tinder box on but there isn\'t that volume that you see in the Bay Area.
在其他你知道巴基斯坦的國家,你不會看到很多公司,你只會看到很多火藥桶,但你在海灣地區卻沒有看到這么大的數量。
> And the third is you have liquidity events you have acquirers.
第三,你有流動性事件,你有收購者。
> The ecosystem is probably in order of magnitude larger than any other in the world.
生態系統的規模可能比世界上任何其他生態系統都大。
> And that\'s probably an understatement.
這可能是個輕描淡寫的說法。
> I mean you can just drive down the 1 to 1 or drive down to it you will see hundreds of technology companies.
我的意思是,你可以沿著 1 比 1 行駛,或者開車去,你會看到數以百計的科技公司。
> And so it\'s very tough to replicate that in in another country another environment.
因此,在另一個國家、另一個環境中復制它是非常困難的。
> And so you know we see that start off actually in Boston.
所以你知道,我們看到這實際上是從波士頓開始的。
> It didn\'t start off in California moved to California.
它不是從加利福尼亞開始的,而是搬到了加利福尼亞。
> So it\'s not a dig on other cities or other countries but it\'s just that that current ecosystem exists and we want.
因此,這并不是對其他城市或其他國家的挖掘,而是當前生態系統的存在和我們想要的。
> The best ecosystem to help you guys succeed.
幫助你們成功的最佳生態系統。
> And I\'d like to add I think the really key thing is attitude toward risk.
我想補充一句,我認為真正關鍵的是對風險的態度。
> And it\'s very hard.
這很難。
> For people outside of the startup world to.
對于創業世界以外的人來說。
> Quite comprehend.
相當理解。
> `[00:09:06]` How crazy we are.
`[00:09:06]` 我們多瘋狂啊。
> And the reason is that.
原因是。
> It all works on a power law right.
這一切都適用于權力法的權利。
> Like I\'ll happily find a hundred stupid ideas.
就像我會很高興地找到一百個愚蠢的想法。
> If one of them turns out to be Google.
如果其中一個是谷歌。
> And that approach to risk is not something you get.
而這種冒險的方法不是你能得到的。
> If you\'ve been working in banking your whole life because if you\'re a banker the thing you want to do is avoid losses.
如果你一輩子都在銀行工作,因為如果你是一名銀行家,你想做的就是避免損失。
> But I already assume that most of my investments are going to be losses.
但我已經假定我的大部分投資將是虧損。
> I\'m just looking for you know maybe just an TVO be a big thing right.
我只是在找你,也許只要一個 TVO 是件大事,對吧。
> And that that mindset is very hard for people to get into if they haven\'t really lived it themselves.
如果人們沒有真正體驗過這種心態,那么他們就很難進入這種心態。
> So this might be a Kersti specific question but if.
這可能是 Kersti 特有的問題但是如果。
> If you have a cake company if you start a company in the UK do they need to reincorporate to be part of why.
如果你有一家蛋糕公司,如果你在英國成立了一家公司,那么他們需要重新組建公司才能成為原因之一。
> `[00:09:55]` We do require that you are a US company for us to be able to invest.
`[00:09:55]` 我們確實要求你是一家美國公司,我們才能投資。
> And that\'s not just for our convenience.
這不只是為了我們的方便。
> As you can hear from all of us we strongly believe that it makes sense to to start a company in theU.S.
正如我們大家所聽到的,我們堅信在美國成立一家公司是有意義的。
> And you know that\'s opening yourself up to many more investors who will only invest inU.S.
你也知道,這將向更多只會在美國投資的投資者敞開大門。
> companies because of the difficulties in investing in foreign companies.
公司由于在投資外國公司方面的困難。
> So.
所以
> We want to get you set up in the best way possible for you to take the company forward and we believe that that is being aU.S.
我們希望你能以最好的方式來推動公司的發展,我們相信這是一家美國公司。
> company.
連在一起。
> For companies that come to us like we\'re saying we have had companies in this current batch I think 9.
對于那些像我們說的那樣來找我們的公司來說,我想我們已經有了這一批公司了。
> You were saying that.
你剛才是這么說的。
> Have started a company in another country.
在另一個國家開了一家公司。
> And we actually help them to change the structure of that company so that they can have aU.S.
我們實際上幫助他們改變了公司的結構,這樣他們就可以擁有一個美國公司。
> parent company and then a.
母公司然后是。
> Subsidiary in theU.K.
在英國的子公司。
> or with a company from Turkey this time.
或者和一家土耳其公司在一起。
> And so we can we can help with you we can help you figure out what the best structure is how to deal with it.
所以我們可以幫助你們,我們可以幫助你們弄清楚什么是最好的結構是如何處理它。
> And we can we can do a lot of the work for you.
我們可以為你做很多工作。
> So obviously we don\'t know really anything about Turkish company law.
很明顯,我們對土耳其公司法一無所知。
> So in situations like that you do often need to get counsel from the country that you moving from as well.
因此,在這種情況下,你經常需要從你移居的國家得到咨詢。
> But we do as much as we can to help.
但我們會盡我們所能來幫助你。
> `[00:11:13]` So business.
`[00:11:13]` 這么說吧。
> Next question is probably one that I get the most often as I travel and meet founders and they want to know what is the most important quality that you look for in teams or founders.
下一個問題可能是我在旅行和會見創始人時經常遇到的問題,他們想知道你在團隊或創始人中尋找的最重要的品質是什么。
> Grit.
砂礫。
> Like determination that you meet people that certain people and it\'s not necessarily the smartest or not necessarily you know the coolest the most sociable or whatever it is people who are determined to do.
就像你遇到某些人的決心,它不一定是最聰明的,也不一定是最酷的,最善于交際的人,或者是決心做任何事情的人。
> `[00:11:40]` Something.
`[00:11:40]` 某樣東西。
> And if that case is building an early stage company that that\'s something that that\'s a person I really want to be.
如果這個案子正在建立一家早期公司,那就是我真正想成為的人。
> With.
和。
> For me one of the questions I\'m always asking.
對我來說,我一直在問的問題之一。
> And.
和
> It\'s very difficult to quantify this but it\'s.
這是很難量化的,但它是。
> Essentially.
本質上。
> `[00:11:55]` Can they actually see a little bit of reality.
`[00:11:55]` 他們真的能看到一點現實嗎?
> Like do they have.
就像他們有。
> Vision something that they\'re feeling at a visceral level or are they just chasing after a trend.
想象一些他們在內心深處感覺到的東西,或者他們只是在追逐一種趨勢。
> And we get this a lot of times where I\'ll ask someone how do you know this is a good idea.
很多時候,我會問別人,你怎么知道這是個好主意。
> And they say well there is a tech crunch article about it.
他們說,關于這件事,有一篇關于科技危機的文章。
> Like to me that\'s the opposite of evidence like so.
對我來說,這與證據相反。
> I want someone who\'s actually has experienced it for themself you know like if it\'s a founder where they\'ve actually had this problem they\'re solving their own problem or or or this is one of these crazy things where they have that gleam in their eyes that they just think that there\'s something real there and they just genuinely know at a visceral level.
我想要一個真正為自己經歷過的人,你知道,如果這是一個創始人,他們實際上在解決問題,他們正在解決自己的問題,或者這是一個瘋狂的事情,在他們的眼中閃爍著光芒,他們只是認為那里有一些真實的東西,他們只是從內心深處真正地知道了這一點。
> `[00:12:38]` If you don\'t I think you just give up like you really have to feel that this is a real problem that you\'re trying to solve because it\'s a tough road.
`[00:12:38]` 如果你不這么做,我想你就會放棄,就像你真的覺得這是你想要解決的一個真正的問題,因為這是一條艱難的道路。
> Yeah.
嗯
> And in particular again.
特別是再次。
> `[00:12:48]` The way our business works is that all of the money is essentially made off of really huge successes and the dream of course is yeah you\'re fun to Google or Facebook but you never get there.
`[00:12:48]` 我們的業務運作方式是,所有的錢基本上都是從巨大的成功中賺來的,當然,夢想是這樣的-你對谷歌或 Facebook 很有興趣,但你永遠也達不到這一目標。
> You don\'t become Facebook if you sell to Yahoo for a billion dollars.
如果你以 10 億美元賣給雅虎,你就不會成為 Facebook。
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> Not that a billion dollar is a bad thing.
不是說十億美元是壞事。
> But.
但
> To have that kind of.
有那種。
> Conviction necessary when you\'re hold Zucker was 22 years old.
當你持有祖克的時候,定罪是必要的,當時你 22 歲。
> Everyone in the world tells you.
世界上的每個人都告訴你。
> Come on man you\'re an idiot like you\'ve got to sell your company to Yahoo.
得了吧,伙計,你是個像你一樣的白癡,你得把你的公司賣給雅虎。
> It\'s like just a little small social network for college students.
對于大學生來說,這就像是一個小小的社交網絡。
> Like.
喜歡
> A billion dollars is a lot of money and he says no and then fires them all.
10 億美元是一大筆錢,他說不,然后把他們全部解雇。
> `[00:13:28]` Well that takes a special kind of madman.
`[00:13:28]` 好吧,這需要一種特殊的瘋子。
> So.
所以
> `[00:13:35]` The next question is how far along should a company be before applying to icee.
`[00:13:35]` 下一個問題是,在申請 icee 之前,一家公司應該走多遠?
> So I think that people often think that we\'re.
所以我認為人們經常認為我們。
> `[00:13:44]` On one end of the spectrum I actually hear both.
`[00:13:44]` 在光譜的一端,我實際上都聽到了。
> Either way he doesn\'t find early stage companies anymore or why he doesn\'t fund like companies that are as far along as I am.
不管是哪種方式,他都找不到早期公司了,或者他為什么不像我這樣的公司那樣投資。
> And the answer is that we actually fund companies that all different stages.
答案是,我們實際上為所有不同階段的公司提供資金。
> `[00:13:57]` You know some companies have raised some money seed round before they join Y C and some companies that just have an idea and a team and they don\'t really they haven\'t they haven\'t even really gotten their start yet.
`[00:13:57]` 你知道,有些公司在加入 YC 之前已經籌集了一些資金,有些公司只是有了一個想法和一個團隊,他們甚至還沒有真正開始。
> So we look for.
所以我們找。
> You know we really look for the people like smart people who are dedicated to doing something.
你知道,我們真的很喜歡聰明的人,他們致力于做一些事情。
> And that\'s that\'s I think.
這就是我想的。
> What we primarily consider and think about.
我們主要考慮和思考的是。
> Can you guys give two examples like an example of a team that was.
你們能舉兩個例子像一個團隊的例子。
> Really early stage and then a team that was a little bit further along and kind of.
非常早期的階段,然后是一支隊伍,那是一支更遠的隊伍,有點像。
> `[00:14:27]` Talk a little bit about that.
`[00:14:27]` 談談這個問題。
> The differences are.
不同之處在于。
> Probably one of the.
可能是其中之一。
> `[00:14:34]` Best examples of an early stage company is one of the most famous companies right.
`[00:14:34]` 早期公司的最好例子是最著名的公司之一。
> `[00:14:39]` They actually applied with some kind of bad idea I don\'t know what it was it was carved into my mobile menu or written here for the iPhone.
`[00:14:39]` 他們實際上是帶著某種不好的想法應用的,我不知道它是在我的手機菜單上刻的,也不知道是為 iPhone 寫的。
> `[00:14:50]` So this is like the disastrous mobile ecosystem that existed back then.
`[00:14:50]` 這就像當時存在的災難性移動生態系統。
> So they actually came in and the idea of Reddit they worked on together with Puji.
所以他們來了,他們和 Puji 一起研究 Reddit 的想法。
> So that\'s that\'s a very early stage example.
這是一個非常早期的例子。
> `[00:15:03]` Example of later stage of the current batches a company called Calypso which helps you sold your car and they\'ve already raised a seed round it kind of had a small team when they they came in the summer.
`[00:15:03]` 當前批次后期階段的例子是一家名為卡利普索的公司,它幫助你銷售你的汽車,他們已經在它周圍培育了一種子,當他們夏天來的時候,他們已經有了一支很小的團隊。
> So.
所以
> `[00:15:17]` What are your current thoughts on the solar founder and then well start there.
`[00:15:17]` 你目前對太陽創始人的想法是什么,然后從那里開始。
> So as you\'ve heard today startups are tough.
因此,正如你今天所聽到的,初創公司是艱難的。
> `[00:15:28]` And there\'s always a million and one things to do and time to do about five of them in a day.
`[00:15:28]` 每天總有一百萬件事要做,一天要做五件事。
> And so it\'s really hard to be a Cerrillo founder because you just can\'t do everything you could do sales or you can build products or you can fundraise whereas if you\'re in a team you can divide and conquer.
所以要成為 Cerrillo 的創始人真的很難,因為你不能做所有你能做的事情,銷售,你可以制造產品,或者你可以籌集資金,但是如果你是一個團隊,你就可以分而治之。
> So you know we really do think that being a solo founder is kind of just changing the probability for you slightly.
所以,你知道,我們真的認為,作為一個單獨的創始人只是稍微改變了你的概率。
> That being said we do fund solo founders.
盡管如此,我們確實為個人創始人提供資金。
> `[00:16:01]` We definitely fund them.
`[00:16:01]` 我們絕對資助他們。
> It\'s just you have to be about four times as good.
只是你必須是原來的四倍。
> But actually I think instict it was a telephone right.
但實際上,我認為這是一個電話權利。
> And that\'s a great company.
那是一家很棒的公司。
> Very were very happy to fun\'s over phoners.
很高興在電話上玩得開心。
> It\'s just it\'s really more for your benefit if you can possibly find someone.
如果你能找到一個人的話,對你的好處就更大了。
> It really does help.
真的很有幫助。
> `[00:16:17]` But take that very seriously.
`[00:16:17]` 但是要非常認真地對待這件事。
> Finding somebody.
找人。
> `[00:16:20]` Yeah I mean my personal view is it\'s so so difficult to do all these things.
`[00:16:20]` 是的,我的意思是,我個人的看法是,所有這些事情都很難做。
> Well alone they\'re very different skills.
好吧,獨自一人,他們的技能是非常不同的。
> Whether it\'s selling on building and selling a very very different because it\'s rare for one person to have that.
無論是建筑銷售還是銷售非常不同,因為只有一個人擁有這樣的產品是非常罕見的。
> And it\'s just I mean honestly you know a couple staffs.
我是說,老實說,你知道有幾個員工。
> It is more fun to have a crew like to have two or three people that you hang out with who are living with you and you just you know I remember distinctly one time we came back from investor pitch and it just had not gone well.
更有趣的是,有兩到三個和你住在一起的人,你知道,我清楚地記得有一次,我們從投資者的攤位回來,只是情況不太好。
> And our third co-founder was you know sitting at home and so me mean make up back and we said oh that was awful.
我們的第三位聯合創始人是,你知道,坐在家里,所以我的意思是補回來,我們說,哦,太糟糕了。
> And he\'s like whatever.
他就像什么一樣。
> And that like just having that perspective from that other co-founder was you know it\'s important.
就像從另一位聯合創始人那里得到這個觀點一樣,你知道這很重要。
> It\'s really really tough to do it all.
這一切都很難做到。
> `[00:17:04]` It\'s like my company would never have survived if I didn\'t have my cofounders.
`[00:17:04]` 如果沒有我的聯合創始人,我的公司就永遠也活不下去了。
> Not just because I couldn\'t have created it but also I wanted to quit.
不僅僅是因為我不能創造它,還因為我想退出。
> Every year I remember.
每年我都記得。
> And you know startups are like you know people say it\'s a rollercoaster.
你知道,創業公司就像人們說的那樣,是過山車。
> I think it\'s like a sine wave in your emotional state goes up and down and up and down and if you have too long of a protracted period of time when you\'re at a low state then you just give up.
我認為這就像一個正弦波在你的情緒狀態上升和下降,如果你有太長的一段時間,當你處于低狀態時,你就會放棄。
> But when you have cofounders it\'s like you\'re combining multiple waves and it balances.
但當你有共同創始人的時候,就像你合并了多個波浪,它就平衡了。
> Your kind of aggregate emotional status.
你那種總情感狀態。
> Not too long in that like low period and so it\'s much less likely that you\'re just kind of give up and die.
在這樣的低潮時期不會太久,所以你放棄死亡的可能性要小得多。
> `[00:17:45]` So while we\'re on the topic of founders someone asked what are the biggest co-founder dispute issues that you\'ve had to deal with and that is one of the biggest things we see break up early stage startups.
`[00:17:45]` 所以,當我們談論創始人的話題時,有人問你,你必須處理的最大的聯合創始人爭議問題是什么,這是我們看到的打破早期初創企業的最大問題之一。
> Co-founder dispute\'s so I\'ll let you guys.
聯合創始人之爭,所以我會讓你們。
> So I think I mean.
所以我想我是說。
> `[00:18:03]` Having a co-founder relationship is like having a marriage.
`[00:18:03]` 有共同創始人的關系就像結婚一樣。
> And it goes through good times and it goes through bad times and it\'s how you work things through.
它經歷了美好的時光,經歷了艱難的時光,這就是你如何處理事情的方法。
> And in the same way that communication is key in a marriage it\'s the same in a company.
同樣,在婚姻中溝通是關鍵,在公司也是如此。
> And so generally a lot of the disputes that we that we see amongst founders because communications have broken down for one reason or another and that could be that one founder is not as committed as the other.
因此,總的來說,我們在創始人之間看到了很多爭議,因為通信因某種原因而中斷,這可能是因為一位創始人不像另一位創始人那樣堅定。
> It could be that there\'s an imbalance of power between cofound is are causing problems.
這可能是因為兩者之間的力量不平衡正在造成問題。
> I mean there can be any number of reasons for it.
我的意思是這有很多原因。
> But often it does come back down to communicating and you know it\'s it\'s a pressurized environment doing a startup and so everything is magnified including your emotions.
但通常情況下,它回到了溝通,你知道,這是一個壓力環境,做一個創業,所以一切都放大,包括你的情感。
> And so.
而且如此。
> With co-founder disputes the key thing is to talk about it early and not to let it fester and turn into this really irreparable relationship which you know startups rarely recover from.
對于聯合創始人的爭議,關鍵是要盡早討論,不要讓它惡化,變成這種你知道的初創企業很少能從其中恢復過來的、真正不可挽回的關系。
> One explanation that was given to me by co-founder.
聯合創始人給我的一個解釋。
> Whose.
誰的。
> Co-founder relationship fell apart was.
聯合創始人關系破裂。
> That a good test is if you could travel around the world for a few months together.
這是一個很好的測試,如果你們能一起環游世界幾個月的話。
> `[00:19:20]` And not end up hating each other because he had actually done that with his co-founder and then they ended up hitting each other for a while but then they started a company anyway and they ended up hating each other.
`[00:19:20]` 而不是因為他真的和他的聯合創始人做了那樣的事,所以沒有互相憎恨,然后他們打了一段時間,但后來他們還是開了一家公司,最后他們互相憎恨。
> It\'s the same sort of thing where.
在那里也是一樣的東西。
> You\'re on top of each other all the time right.
你們一直都在彼此之上,對吧。
> People are essentially living together working together you know 24/7.
人們基本上是生活在一起,一起工作,你知道的,每周 24 小時。
> There\'s a lot of very stressful issues and so you have to be good at resolving differences and.
有很多壓力很大的問題,所以你必須善于解決分歧。
> `[00:19:45]` Not just hate the other person.
`[00:19:45]` 不只是恨另一個人。
> `[00:19:47]` You have the opposite of the one test that I had 4 4 4 talk when the NYC Company founded was my co-founder Mike.
`[00:19:47]` 當紐約公司成立的時候,你有一個相反的測試,那就是我的共同創始人邁克。
> I mean I genuinely enjoyed seeing Mike and like talking to him about companies and about startups.
我的意思是,我真的很喜歡見到邁克,喜歡和他談論公司和初創公司。
> It was great that we have complementary skills.
我們有互補的技能真是太棒了。
> That\'s kind of the ideal situation in terms of what what is difficult to do in a startup.
就創業難做而言,這是一種理想的情況。
> Getting the right cofounding team is.
找到合適的聯合創建團隊就是。
> One of the most difficult things.
最困難的事情之一。
> And if you get it wrong it\'s kind of like the foundation of your house.
如果你搞錯了,那就像你房子的地基。
> Is going to be very hard to build on.
是很難建立起來的。
> On top of that.
更重要的是。
> And it\'s part of the reason why we really emphasize the importance of equal equity.
這也是我們真正強調平等的重要性的原因之一。
> `[00:20:23]` If you want.
`[00:20:23]` 如果你愿意的話。
> You know when we look for teams that have like an equal balance of equity because that is part of a you know what starts a number of co-founder disputes.
你知道,當我們尋找那些擁有平等公平平衡的團隊時,因為這是其中的一部分,你知道是什么引發了許多聯合創始人的爭議。
> `[00:20:34]` Usually indicates people are in it together.
`[00:20:34]` 通常表示人們在一起。
> `[00:20:37]` Yeah and it should be right I I mean one common thing you\'ll hear is Well I said I had the idea.
`[00:20:37]` 是的,應該是對的,我是說,你會聽到的一件常見的事情是,我說我有這個主意。
> You know I get the idea.
你知道我知道的。
> So I deserve like 80 percent and he deserves 20 percent.
所以我應該得到百分之八十,他應該得到百分之二十。
> That\'s.
那.。
> Nonsense.
廢話
> The main reason it\'s nonsense is most of the work is well ahead of you.
它的胡說八道的主要原因是大部分的工作都遙遙領先于你。
> So it\'s like I just came up with something two weeks before you and therefore I deserve 10 percent more of the company or 20 percent more of the company is just not thinking about the relationship that is ahead of me which is a year.
所以這就像我在你們兩周前就想出了一些東西,因此我應該多得到公司的 10%,或者公司的 20%,我只是不去想在我面前的關系,也就是一年。
> I mean so one thing you should remove from Rhind is start ups are short and easy.
我的意思是,有一件事,你應該從雷德,是啟動是短而容易的。
> They\'re not there a long long long talk about five years seven years.
他們沒有長談五年七年。
> And so that\'s a path ahead of you and everyone\'s going to work just as hard so you should share that.
因此,這是一條前方的道路,每個人都會努力工作,所以你應該分享這一點。
> In that.
在那個。
> `[00:21:16]` Value.
`[00:21:16]` 值。
> So be wise.
所以要明智。
> They did an experiment where at a certain point we put out a note saying that we would take founders without an idea.
他們做了一項實驗,在某一時刻,我們發表了一份聲明,說我們將在沒有任何想法的情況下聘用創始人。
> And so the question is What is your opinion on b no idea founder experiment.
所以問題是你對 b 沒有概念的創始人實驗有什么看法。
> `[00:21:33]` So it was a great experiment.
`[00:21:33]` 所以這是一個偉大的實驗。
> `[00:21:35]` And what we learned is that we\'re not gonna do it anymore.
`[00:21:35]` 我們學到的是,我們不會再這樣做了。
> `[00:21:42]` It turned out.
`[00:21:42]` 事實證明。
> I mean like I\'m serious experiments are always worth trying even if they don\'t work.
我的意思是,就像我是認真的實驗,總是值得一試,即使它們不起作用。
> What we learn is that people who didn\'t have.
我們學到的是那些沒有。
> Ideas would continue not having ideas.
思想將繼續沒有想法。
> And it.
還有它。
> `[00:21:54]` Is a little bit counterintuitive because the reason we got into it was we noticed that we accepted a lot of companies who were then partway through a sea change to a different idea.
`[00:21:54]` 有點不合常理,因為我們注意到我們接受了很多公司,而這些公司當時正經歷著一場巨變,變成了另一種想法。
> They would do great.
他們會做得很好。
> So we thought why did you acquire the first idea.
所以我們想你為什么會有第一個想法。
> And it turns out I think that the first idea is an indication that they can come up with ideas.
事實證明,我認為第一個想法表明他們可以想出點子。
> If they don\'t have a First idea there may not have you know a second one or a third one.
如果他們沒有第一個想法,你可能不知道第二個或第三個。
> `[00:22:21]` So the next question is how do you turn down or say no to Apple cance after they\'ve interview you.
`[00:22:21]` 所以下一個問題是,在蘋果公司面試你之后,你如何拒絕或拒絕蘋果公司?
> `[00:22:30]` Well after we actually do send out a message and we describe why we didn\'t fund it it is I mean it\'s being on both sides of the table.
`[00:22:30]` 在我們確實發出了信息之后,我們描述了為什么我們沒有提供資金,我的意思是它在桌子的兩邊。
> We actually put a lot of effort into it.
我們為此付出了很大的努力。
> It is not a no not a trivial thing that we just copy and paste some form rejection and it\'s often after a very long day of interviews.
我們只是復制和粘貼某種形式的拒絕,這不是一件不重要的事情,而且經常是在漫長的一天面試之后。
> And I was very proud that the partners.
我為合伙人們感到驕傲。
> Spend that much time to give honest reasons.
花那么多時間給出誠實的理由。
> Because if you don\'t get that honest feedback and it\'s just like oh we\'re not interested in that market or you know some generic kind ofB.S.
因為如果你得不到誠實的反饋,這就像哦,我們對這個市場不感興趣,或者你知道一些普通的 B.S。
> talk that\'s that\'s pretty terrible because you came out.
說這句話很糟糕,因為你出來了。
> To interview and took time out of your time out of your life to talk to us.
從你的生活中抽出時間和我們交談。
> So yeah we we actually sent an e-mail with the reasons why we didn\'t.
所以是的,我們實際上發了一封電子郵件,原因是我們沒有。
> Fund.
基金。
> `[00:23:20]` And actually the thing that\'s I like the most is a lot of followers when she take the feedback they got from the interview and actually take it to heart like we\'ll tell them you don\'t have any customers and they\'ll go get customers and then they\'ll reapply.
`[00:23:20]` 事實上,我最喜歡的是很多粉絲,當她從面試中得到反饋,然后把它記在心上,就像我們會告訴他們你沒有顧客,他們會去找顧客,然后他們會重新申請。
> And we have.
我們也有。
> An every batch.
每一批。
> Quite a few startups that we had previously rejected.
我們之前曾拒絕過不少初創公司。
> Oftentimes they end up at or near the top of the batch so.
通常情況下,它們會在批次的頂部或附近結束,所以。
> Rejection is by no means a bad thing it\'s a temporary thing.
拒絕絕不是一件壞事,而是一件暫時的事情。
> And again people who are able to take that advice incorporate it and move forward.
同樣,那些能夠接受這一建議的人也會采納這一建議,并向前邁進。
> That\'s actually a really strong signal of a good founder.
這實際上是一個優秀創始人的強烈信號。
> `[00:23:56]` Drew is Drew from Dropbox is actually someone who has been rejected him and reapplied thankfully.
`[00:23:56]` 德魯是來自 Dropbox 的 Drew,他被拒絕了,謝天謝地重新申請了。
> `[00:24:02]` Yeah.
`[00:24:02]` 是的。
> Just think about that.
想想看。
> That\'s so true.
那是如此的真實。
> Drew is rejected.
德魯被拒絕了。
> It\'s a good thing too by the way.
順便說一句,這也是件好事。
> His original idea wasS.A.T.
他最初的想法是 S.A.T。
> test prep.
測試準備。
> So we actually believe it\'s harmful to accept people sometimes.
所以我們認為有時候接受別人是有害的。
> `[00:24:15]` With the wrong idea the wrong team.
`[00:24:15]` 錯誤的想法,錯誤的團隊。
> You know he may have worked on that dumb idea for years and they never started Dropbox.
你知道,他可能多年來一直在研究這個愚蠢的想法,但他們從未啟動過 Dropbox。
> `[00:24:22]` And I think I think people there seems to be a myth out there that applying to I see is a one time only chance.
`[00:24:22]` 我認為那里的人們似乎有一個神話,那就是,我認為,申請是唯一的機會。
> And like everybody has said it it\'s not you know we we do welcome reports applications.
就像每個人都說的那樣,你不知道我們歡迎報告申請。
> And you know so we take it very seriously.
所以我們非常認真地對待這件事。
> What we are telling people.
我們告訴人們的。
> But the other thing that we hear from founders who have been rejected and.
但我們從被拒絕的創始人那里聽到的另一件事。
> Then go on to reapply or maybe don\'t go on to report reapply is that they actually find the process of applying and completing the application form and answering the questions is actually a very very useful way for them to get their thoughts in order about their company.
然后繼續重新申請或者不繼續報告重新申請是因為他們實際上發現申請和填寫申請表的過程和回答問題對他們來說是一個非常有用的方法,讓他們對自己的公司有一個清晰的想法。
> And so you know.
所以你知道。
> The conclusion in all of this is you have nothing to lose from putting in an application and everything to gain you will be learning something you may get accepted.
所有這一切的結論是,你沒有什么可失去的,提交一份申請,你所獲得的一切都將是你可能被接受的東西。
> You\'ll be.
你會的。
> You may be getting some really useful feedback that you can action on.
你可能得到了一些非常有用的反饋,你可以采取行動。
> `[00:25:14]` So you should do it there anybody you know submit it it\'s actually great to do the applicant even if your current idea and then you\'re you know funded and Weiss\'s that.
`[00:25:14]` 所以你應該在你認識的人那里做
> It\'s actually great those questions are structured in a way to help you think about your company.
事實上,這些問題的結構很好,可以幫助你思考你的公司。
> Yeah I find it pretty useful in itself.
是的,我覺得它本身很有用。
> `[00:25:29]` We actually even had one company that somehow managed to raise money off of the rejected rejection you know and then we funded that for the next batch.
`[00:25:29]` 事實上,我們甚至有一家公司設法從被拒絕的拒絕中籌集資金,你知道,然后我們資助了下一批。
> `[00:25:39]` And so when some of those kind of co-founder relationships that there\'s questions in there about you know the faculty split and the cap table so if you haven\'t yet had that conversation with your co-founder as it\'s kind of a catalyst to do so you have to figure out those issues before you kind of turn in the application.
`[00:25:39]` 所以,當其中一些共同創始人的關系中有一些關于你的問題的時候,你知道教職員工的分裂和帽桌,所以如果你還沒有和你的聯合創始人進行那種談話,因為這樣做是一種催化劑,你必須在你提交申請之前先弄清楚這些問題。
> So yes and then the next question is how was the first round or how did the first round of nonprofit startups in Y see go.
所以是的,接下來的問題是第一輪怎么樣,或者第一輪在 Y 的非盈利初創公司是怎么發展的。
> `[00:26:05]` So for those of you that don\'t know we funded last batch a group of nonprofits and then a year ago we funded what C which was our first nonprofit.
`[00:26:05]` 對于那些不知道我們資助了最后一批非營利組織的人來說,一年前我們資助了 C,這是我們的第一個非盈利組織。
> And again it was another experiment.
這又是另一個實驗。
> I think the answer is that it\'s too early to tell.
我想答案是現在說還為時過早。
> And you know with any company with any startup probably a year is not long enough to pick out the real winners.
你也知道,對于任何一家有創業公司的公司來說,一年的時間可能不足以選出真正的贏家。
> So I guess watch this space and see.
所以我想看著這個空間看看。
> I would say that were interested in continuing to fund nonprofits.
我想說的是,他們有興趣繼續為非營利組織提供資金。
> Would encourage any of you guys out there who are interested in starting a nonprofit or are friends or interested to.
會鼓勵你們中任何有興趣創辦非營利組織,或者是朋友或感興趣的人。
> `[00:26:43]` Apply and reach out to us so might break a break.
`[00:26:43]` 應用并聯系我們,這樣就能打破一次休息。
> The question is Why do you fund nonprofits.
問題是你為什么要資助非營利組織。
> Some people might be thinking.
有些人可能在想。
> `[00:26:51]` Well we don\'t fund them for a start we don\'t need to them so.
`[00:26:51]` 我們不資助他們開始,我們不需要他們這樣做。
> So in a way it\'s a way of giving back to the world.
所以在某種程度上,這是一種回饋世界的方式。
> So you know it\'s it\'s our way of helping the world and we look for a specific type of nonprofits as well that we feel will have a really big impact.
所以你知道這是我們幫助世界的方式,我們也在尋找一種特殊的非營利組織,我們覺得這會產生很大的影響。
> `[00:27:09]` So the I think the root of the idea was that we realized that nonprofits actually had a lot of the same issues as the for profits in particular the ones we\'re looking for ones that are very scalable.
`[00:27:09]` 所以我認為這個想法的根源是,我們意識到,非營利組織實際上有許多與利潤相同的問題,尤其是我們正在尋找的那些非常具有可伸縮性的問題。
> So we\'re probably not going to fund like the local soup kitchen but something like Watsky essentially does all the same things that our regular companies do they have to acquire users they have a Web site.
所以我們可能不會像當地的湯廚那樣投資,但是像 Watsky 這樣的公司做的事情和我們的普通公司做的一樣-他們必須獲得用戶-他們有一個網站。
> The only difference is that they\'re a nonprofit.
唯一的區別是他們是非盈利組織。
> So a for profit.
所以為了利潤。
> It\'s actually turned out to be really great having them there.
事實證明,有他們在那里真的很棒。
> I think.
我認為
> They gained a lot in that.
他們從中獲益良多。
> I actually thought it just brings like a nice energy dynamic to the batch.
實際上我覺得它給這批人帶來了一種很好的能量動力。
> They\'re great to have.
他們很高興有。
> I think they benefit the for profit companies as well.
我認為他們也有利于營利性公司。
> `[00:27:53]` I really like this question it was why is it that all the way the founders seemed to sleep on the floor in tiny apartments.
`[00:27:53]` 我真的很喜歡這個問題,這就是為什么創始人們總是睡在小公寓里的地板上。
> `[00:28:02]` Someone who\'s done that.
`[00:28:02]` 做過那件事的人。
> It\'s practical to live together.
住在一起很實用。
> I mean is one of these pieces of advice I got before why he has to live with your co-founder if that\'s possible.
我的意思是,這是我之前得到的一條建議,如果可能的話,為什么他必須和你的聯合創始人一起生活。
> It was hugely beneficial for our company because when you\'re just around each other all the time energy and the point that you generally enjoy being around each other you think.
這對我們公司是非常有益的,因為當你們總是在一起的時候,能量和你通常喜歡和對方在一起的那一點,你都認為。
> `[00:28:21]` Like everything that we did we were like just talking about the company.
`[00:28:21]` 就像我們所做的一切一樣,我們只是在談論公司。
> To echo what\'s been said throughout the day the most productive kind of time in my life because you\'re just around people all the time and it\'s and it\'s not work.
重復我一生中最有效率的一段時間,因為你總是和別人在一起,而這不是工作。
> I guess it never felt to me like work it felt like.
我想這對我來說從來都不像是工作上的感覺。
> I don\'t know another experience that is not work.
我不知道另一種不是工作的經歷。
> I think one of the things that you know we look for is people who are.
我想你知道我們要找的人之一。
> `[00:28:44]` Frugal with their resources and we make good use of the resources they have in its source.
`[00:28:44]` 節約他們的資源,我們很好地利用他們的資源來源。
> When you don\'t have any money in the early days and that\'s something that carries on the DNA of the company as you move forward.
當你在最初的日子里沒有錢的時候,當你繼續前進的時候,這就是公司 DNA 的一部分。
> When we started justA.P my co-founder Mike was sleeping on the balcony actually because we didn\'t have a room.
我們剛開始的時候,我的聯合創始人邁克睡在陽臺上,實際上是因為我們沒有房間。
> So.
所以
> It was it was pretty you know we were doing it on a budget.
很漂亮你知道我們是按預算做的。
> But it was it was good for us.
但這對我們有好處。
> Because you were able to survive this major economic downturn in a couple years later off of not very much capital raised because it kind of like every dollar that we had.
因為你能夠在幾年后的經濟大衰退中幸存下來,因為籌集的資金不多,因為它有點像我們擁有的每一美元。
> We watched pretty carefully.
我們看得很仔細。
> `[00:29:21]` It\'s funny to hear the story but when you\'re actually doing it it\'s not that fun.
`[00:29:21]` 聽這個故事很有趣,但當你真的這么做的時候,就沒那么有趣了。
> So I think I think it\'s something about also like to reflect back or something because it is tough.
所以我認為這也是一些關于反思的事情,或者是一些事情,因為它很艱難。
> `[00:29:30]` I mean who you know when you\'re growing up what do you want to live with like two or three other people in a very small place because it\'s practical it\'s cheaperetc.
`[00:29:30]` 我是說,當你長大的時候,你知道誰,你想和其他兩、三個人一起住在一個很小的地方,因為它很實用,很便宜等等。
> `[00:29:38]` So I think we probably have time for one more so maybe to wrap it up.
`[00:29:38]` 所以我想我們可能還有更多的時間來結束它。
> What is your the one best piece of advice you could give to people who are looking to start a start up or apply to see.
什么是你最好的建議,你可以給那些想要開始創業或申請去看的人。
> `[00:29:52]` So do it now.
`[00:29:52]` 現在就做吧。
> I think I was talking to some founders earlier if you\'re like 30.
如果你 30 歲的話,我想我之前和一些創始人談過了。
> You have something like 400 months left in your life.
你生命中還有大約 400 個月的時間。
> Let that sink in for a bit.
讓它沉入其中一段時間。
> Out of that area here in your 20s you can do the calculation.
在 20 多歲的時候,你可以計算出這個區域。
> What\'s so striking about that concept that 400 months or whatever is that it\'s like very tangible I think to say like thousands of days or weeks or whatever it\'s very hard to understand.
這個概念有什么特別之處,以至于 400 個月或者其他什么東西都是非常有形的,我認為可以說是幾千天或幾周,或者任何難以理解的東西。
> `[00:30:18]` Like that\'s a real number.
`[00:30:18]` 這是一個真實的數字。
> That is counting down every single month and you don\'t get that time back no matter who you are.
那就是每一個月都在倒數,不管你是誰,你都得不到那個時間。
> So like take action just don\'t end.
所以,就像采取行動一樣-不要結束。
> And what that means more practically because you hear that generic advice all the time.
實際上,這意味著什么,因為你總是聽到這個一般性的建議。
> For me what it meant in my life was I was working at a company and I saved money and I saved money specifically so I could get a year\'s runway if I didn\'t get funded.
對我來說,這在我的生活中意味著我在一家公司工作,我特別省下了錢,如果我沒有資金的話,我就能拿到一年的時裝秀了。
> And about six months into it twice you know that was great.
大約六個月的時間,兩次,你知道那很棒。
> But like you have to take practical steps to try to see that if you don\'t do it it\'s not going to happen and then don\'t lie to yourself just like stop thinking about startups and do something else.
但是,就像你必須采取實際的步驟,試圖看到,如果你不去做,它是不會發生的,然后不要欺騙自己,就像停止思考創業,做其他事情一樣。
> I think my piece of.
我覺得我的那一份。
> `[00:30:54]` Advice would be that startups aren\'t for everyone.
`[00:30:54]` 建議是創業并不適合所有人。
> It takes a very specific type of person to be able to deal with the things that come with being a startup founder sleeping on people\'s floors and the pressures and everything else and you know.
作為一個創業公司的創始人,睡在別人的地板上,壓力和其他事情,你知道,這需要一個非常特定類型的人來處理。
> It\'s not for everyone and if it\'s not for you then then.
不是為每個人,如果不是為你,那么。
> That\'s fine too and you need to you need to make that decision and you need to decide if if it\'s the right thing for you to do.
那也沒關系,你需要做這個決定,你需要決定它是否對你是正確的。
> `[00:31:20]` One piece of advice that I always give people is Don\'t give up.
`[00:31:20]` 我總是給別人一個建議,那就是不要放棄。
> One of the things that we.
其中一件事就是我們。
> I was with my one of my cofounders and we were reminiscing when we started Mysie for justin tv we had.
我和我的一位聯合創始人在一起,我們回憶起我們為賈斯汀電視臺創辦 Mysie 的時候。
> We lived in this building with all these different startups.
我們住在這棟樓里,有很多不同的初創公司。
> It was sort of like scripted Dropbox and.
有點像劇本的 Dropbox 和。
> Discussant weebly and.
討論者和。
> My co-founder was saying man we knew a lot of really smart like people back then.
我的聯合創始人說,伙計,我們認識很多很聰明的人,就像當時的人一樣。
> They\'re all successful now.
他們現在都成功了。
> Like all those companies are worth like 8 or 9 or 10 figures.
就像所有這些公司一樣,它們的價值大約是 8、9 或 10 位數。
> And I was like No they were that smart.
我就像不,他們有那么聰明。
> They\'re just like stuck around because the fact is that the Internet is like a huge growth market right.
他們就像被困住了一樣,因為互聯網就像一個巨大的增長市場,是對的。
> Things that were even sort of very small niche market in 2007 grew up to be like very big companies because more and more people came online and became their customers.
2007 年,一些甚至很小的利基市場成長為非常大的公司,因為越來越多的人上網,成為他們的客戶。
> And so just by survive there\'s so many companies out there that I knew 70 years ago and it just by surviving even though they made no money for the first two or three or four years.
因此,只要生存下來,那里就有這么多公司,我在 70 年前就知道了,即使他們在最初的兩三年或四年里沒有賺到錢,他們也能生存下來。
> Eventually it turned into a big market.
最終,它變成了一個大市場。
> And so the only way you can get there is by not quitting even though you know all evidence might point to you wasting your time.
因此,你能做到的唯一方法就是不放棄,即使你知道所有的證據都可能表明你在浪費你的時間。
> I think my one bit of advice is.
我想我的一點建議是。
> `[00:32:32]` Make sure you\'re in contact with reality.
`[00:32:00]` 確保你與現實保持聯系。
> I see a lot of these startups where they\'ve been working for a long time and I\'ll say like how many users do you have.
我看到很多這樣的初創公司,他們在那里工作了很長時間,我會說,你有多少用戶。
> And they said well it\'s not ready yet.
他們說還沒準備好。
> I think that\'s terrible.
我覺得這很糟糕。
> Or like how many customers do you have customers.
或者你有多少客戶。
> They\'re building the product still.
他們還在生產這種產品。
> You should never build something until you have customers or users or something.
除非你有客戶、用戶或其他東西,否則你永遠不應該構建什么東西。
> Get the customer first.
先把顧客叫來。
> Sell them you know for something or sell sell a product and then you build it don\'t do it the other way around.
把你知道的東西賣給他們,或者賣給你的產品,然后你再生產它,而不是反過來去做。
> Otherwise you might build it and then no one wants it.
否則,你可能會建造它,然后沒有人想要它。
> And if a consumer thing still you can have a user have a handful of users.
如果消費者的東西還在,你可以讓一個用戶有幾個用戶。
> That you can really focus in on.
你可以把注意力集中在上面。
> And it\'s always remarkable how small and how.
它總是值得注意的是,它是多么的小和如何。
> You see that crappy of a product that you can give someone and get some kind of information out of them.
你看到了一個糟糕的產品,你可以給別人一些信息,從他們那里得到一些信息。
> Like.
喜歡
> For Gmail for me for myself.
為了我自己的 Gmail。
> I try to build the first version in a day and it\'s just the only thing it did was search over my e-mail.
我試著在一天內構建第一個版本,這只是它做的唯一件事,就是搜索我的電子郵件。
> But I still released it to other people.
但我還是把它給了別人。
> And the first feedback was just you know it\'s useful but it\'d be better if you searched over their e-mail set of mine.
第一個反饋是,你知道這很有用,但如果你查一下他們的電子郵件,那就更好了。
> `[00:33:39]` I had I had a really user feedback and I just iterated every single day.
`[00:33:39]` 我有一個真正的用戶反饋,我只是每天迭代。
> I would go talk to users.
我會去和用戶談談。
> And.
和
> `[00:33:48]` See what it would take in and the goal for quite a while was to get 100 happy users inside of Google so I would go to each person and say What is it going to take to make you a happy user.
`[00:33:48]` 看看它會帶來什么,并且相當長一段時間的目標是在 Google 內獲得 100 個快樂的用戶,所以我會去找每個人,然后告訴你,要讓你成為一個快樂的用戶需要做些什么。
> Because I actually had a list.
因為我有一份名單。
> And they would tell me and some of them might know this too hard.
他們會告訴我,他們中的一些人可能對此太了解了。
> And then I go to someone else it might be something easy and just working one person at a time.
然后我去找別人,這可能是件容易的事,一次只做一個人。
> He goes very unscalable but.
他很難適應,但是。
> But at an early stage that\'s what you have to do.
但在早期階段,這是你必須做的。
> Otherwise you can just be off floating in outer space building something that nobody will ever want.
否則,你就可以在太空中漂浮,建造一個沒有人會想要的東西。
> `[00:34:21]` All right.
`[00:34:21]` 好的。
> So we are you know there were so many good questions that were asked and we didn\'t have time to answer all of them.
所以我們,你知道,有那么多好的問題被問了出來,我們沒有時間回答所有的問題。
> But what we\'re going to do is we\'re gonna look through those questions and try to answer more and will release a blog post.
但我們要做的是,我們將仔細研究這些問題,并嘗試回答更多,然后發布一篇博客文章。
> So hopefully we\'ll get to your question if we didn\'t answer it or address it on stage.
所以,如果我們不回答你的問題,或者在舞臺上回答你的問題,希望我們能回答你的問題。
> But also we\'re going to be around for the next couple hours and the reception so please feel free to chat with us and ask us your questions.
但是,我們還將在接下來的幾個小時和接待處附近,所以請隨時與我們聊天,并問我們你的問題。
> You know face to face.
你知道面對面的。
> We love to hear from you.
我們很高興聽到你的消息。
> Too.
我也是。
> Thank you.
謝謝。
> That was.
那是。
> Claude.
克勞德。
- Zero to One 從0到1 | Tony翻譯版
- Ch1: The Challenge of the Future
- Ch2: Party like it’s 1999
- Ch3: All happy companies are different
- Ch4: The ideology of competition
- Ch6: You are not a lottery ticket
- Ch7: Follow the money
- Ch8: Secrets
- Ch9: Foundations
- Ch10: The Mechanics of Mafia
- Ch11: 如果你把產品做好,顧客們會來嗎?
- Ch12: 人與機器
- Ch13: 展望綠色科技
- Ch14: 創始人的潘多拉魔盒
- YC 創業課 2012 中文筆記
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2012
- Travis Kalanick at Startup School 2012
- Tom Preston Werner at Startup School 2012
- Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2012
- Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012
- Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012
- Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012
- David Rusenko at Startup School 2012
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School 2012
- 斯坦福 CS183b YC 創業課文字版
- 關于 Y Combinator
- 【創業百道節選】如何正確的閱讀創業雞湯
- YC 創業第一課:你真的愿意創業嗎
- YC 創業第二課:團隊與執行
- YC 創業第三課:與直覺對抗
- YC 創業第四課:如何積累初期用戶
- YC 創業第五課:失敗者才談競爭
- YC 創業第六課:沒有留存率不要談推廣
- YC 創業第七課:與你的用戶談戀愛
- YC 創業第八課:創業要學會吃力不討好
- YC 創業第九課:投資是極端的游戲
- YC 創業第十課:企業文化決定命運
- YC 創業第11課:企業文化需培育
- YC 創業第12課:來開發企業級產品吧
- YC 創業第13課,創業者的條件
- YC 創業第14課:像個編輯一樣去管理
- YC 創業第15課:換位思考
- YC 創業第16課:如何做用戶調研
- YC 創業第17課:Jawbone 不是硬件公司
- YC 創業第18課:劃清個人與公司的界限
- YC 創業第19課(上):銷售如漏斗
- YC 創業第19課(下):與投資人的兩分鐘
- YC 創業第20課:不再打磨產品
- YC 創業課 2013 中文筆記
- Balaji Srinivasan at Startup School 2013
- Chase Adam at Startup School 2013
- Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013
- Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013
- Diane Greene at Startup School 2013
- Jack Dorsey at Startup School 2013
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2013
- Nate Blecharczyk at Startup School 2013
- Office Hours at Startup School 2013 with Paul Graham and Sam Altman
- Phil Libin at Startup School 2013
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2013
- 斯坦福 CS183c 閃電式擴張中文筆記
- 1: 家庭階段
- 2: Sam Altman
- 3: Michael Dearing
- 4: The hunt of ThunderLizards 尋找閃電蜥蜴
- 5: Tribe
- 6: Code for America
- 7: Minted
- 8: Google
- 9: Village
- 10: SurveyMonkey
- 11: Stripe
- 12: Nextdoor
- 13: YouTube
- 14: Theranos
- 15: VMware
- 16: Netflix
- 17: Yahoo
- 18: Airbnb
- 19: LinkedIn
- YC 創業課 SV 2014 中文筆記
- Andrew Mason at Startup School SV 2014
- Ron Conway at Startup School SV 2014
- Danae Ringelmann at Startup School SV 2014
- Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014
- Eric Migicovsky at Startup School SV 2014
- Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014
- Jessica Livingston Introduces Startup School SV 2014
- Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014
- Kevin Systrom at Startup School SV 2014
- Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar at Startup School SV 2014
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014
- YC 創業課 NY 2014 中文筆記
- Apoorva Mehta at Startup School NY 2014
- Chase Adam at Startup School NY 2014
- Closing Remarks at Startup School NY 2014
- David Lee at Startup School NY 2014
- Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014
- Introduction at Startup School NY 2014
- Kathryn Minshew at Startup School NY 2014
- Office Hours at Startup School NY 2014
- Shana Fisher at Startup School NY 2014
- Zach Sims at Startup School NY 2014
- YC 創業課 EU 2014 中文筆記
- Adora Cheung
- Alfred Lin with Justin Kan
- Hiroki Takeuchi
- Ian Hogarth
- Introduction by Kirsty Nathoo
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar
- Patrick Collison
- Paul Buchheit
- Urska Srsen
- Y Combinator Partners Q&A
- YC 創業課 2016 中文筆記
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School SV 2016
- Chad Rigetti at Startup School SV 2016
- MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016
- Office Hours with Kevin Hale and Qasar Younis at Startup School SV 2016
- Ooshma Garg at Startup School SV 2016
- Pitch Practice with Paul Buchheit and Sam Altman at Startup School SV 2016
- Q&A with YC Partners at Startup School SV 2016
- Reham Fagiri and Kalam Dennis at Startup School SV 2016
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016
- 斯坦福 CS183f YC 創業課 2017 中文筆記
- How and Why to Start A Startup
- Startup Mechanics
- How to Get Ideas and How to Measure
- How to Build a Product I
- How to Build a Product II
- How to Build a Product III
- How to Build a Product IV
- How to Invent the Future I
- How to Invent the Future II
- How to Find Product Market Fit
- How to Think About PR
- Diversity & Inclusion at Early Stage Startups
- How to Build and Manage Teams
- How to Raise Money, and How to Succeed Long-Term
- YC 創業課 2018 中文筆記
- Sam Altman - 如何成功創業
- Carolynn Levy、Jon Levy 和 Jason Kwon - 初創企業法律機制
- 與 Paul Graham 的對話 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Michael Seibel - 構建產品
- David Rusenko - 如何找到適合產品市場的產品
- Suhail Doshi - 如何測量產品
- Gustaf Alstromer - 如何獲得用戶和發展
- Garry Tan - 初創企業設計第 2 部分
- Kat Manalac 和 Craig Cannon - 用于增長的公關+內容
- Tyler Bosmeny - 如何銷售
- Ammon Bartram 和 Harj Taggar - 組建工程團隊
- Dalton Caldwell - 如何在 Y Combinator 上申請和成功
- Patrick Collison - 運營你的創業公司
- Geoff Ralston - 籌款基礎
- Kirsty Nathoo - 了解保險箱和定價股票輪
- Aaron Harris - 如何與投資者會面并籌集資金
- Paul Buchheit 的 1000 億美元之路
- PMF 后:人員、客戶、銷售
- 與 Oshma Garg 的對話 - 由 Adora Cheung 主持
- 與 Aileen Lee 的對話 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Garry Tan - 初創企業設計第 1 部分
- 與 Elizabeth Iorns 的對話 - 生物技術創始人的建議
- 與 Eric Migicovsky 的硬技術對話
- 與 Elad Gil 的對話
- 與 Werner Vogels 的對話
- YC 創業課 2019 中文筆記
- Kevin Hale - 如何評估創業思路:第一部分
- Eric Migicovsky - 如何與用戶交談
- Ali Rowghani - 如何領導
- Kevin Hale 和 Adora Cheung - 數字初創學校 2019
- Geoff Ralston - 拆分建議
- Michael Seibel - 如何計劃 MVP
- Adora Cheung - 如何設定關鍵績效指標和目標
- Ilya Volodarsky - 初創企業分析
- Anu Hariharan - 九種商業模式和投資者想要的指標
- Anu Hariharan 和 Adora Cheung - 投資者如何衡量創業公司 Q&A
- Kat Manalac - 如何啟動(續集)
- Gustaf Alstromer - 新興企業的成長
- Kirsty Nathoo - 創業財務陷阱以及如何避免它們
- Kevin Hale - 如何一起工作
- Tim Brady - 構建文化
- Dalton Caldwell - 關于樞軸的一切
- Kevin Hale - 如何提高轉化率
- Kevin Hale - 創業定價 101
- Adora Cheung - 如何安排時間
- Kevin Hale - 如何評估創業思路 2
- Carolynn Levy - 現代創業融資
- Jared Friedman - 硬技術和生物技術創始人的建議