# Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013 > `[00:00:00]` So today I want to talk about good ideas or look like bad ideas. `[00:00:00]` 所以今天我想談談好主意或者看起來像壞主意。 > So there\'s a great. 所以有個很棒的。 > `[00:00:07]` Clickers not working. `[00:00:07]` 點擊不工作。 > `[00:00:14]` Technical problems OK thanks. `[00:00:14]` 技術問題好的，謝謝。 > So there\'s a greatP.G. 所以這里有個很棒的 P.G。 > blog post where he talks about Peter Teil came to talk. 他在博客上發表了關于彼得·泰爾的文章。 > `[00:00:26]` And he said basically there\'s two kinds of ideas. `[00:00:26]` 他說，基本上有兩種想法。 > There are good ideas and there are things that seem like bad ideas and most startups are in the sweet spot in the middle which are good ideas that seem like bad ideas. 有好的想法，有些東西看起來像是壞的想法，而大多數創業公司都處于中間的甜蜜地帶，而好的想法似乎是壞的想法。 > Today I\'m going to basically expound on this idea a little bit. 今天，我將對這個概念做一些基本的闡述。 > So why good ideas like bad ideas. 那么為什么好的想法和壞的想法一樣。 > The kind of the intuition is that good ideas that look like good ideas are already being worked on by academics governments and most of all kind of large companies. 這種直覺是，看起來像好主意的好主意已經被學術界、政府以及所有大公司所研究。 > So for example you know I want a smartphone that has 10x the battery life and a better screen and more apps and everything else. 例如，你知道我想要一部電池壽命 10 倍的智能手機，更好的屏幕，更多的應用程序等等。 > Apple and Samsung and everyone else are hard at work on that. 蘋果(Apple)、三星(Samsung)和其他所有人都在努力工作。 > So by definition you know we investors and entrepreneurs are kind of in the business of the leftovers of the things that everyone else thinks are bad ideas but that we think are you know we discover actually good ideas and I\'m going to give some me start some sort of high profile historical example so it\'s hard to to sort of imagine this now but back in I think it was 98 when Google first launched they were actually very late to the search engine world at the time. 所以從定義上來說，你知道我們投資者和企業家在某種程度上是在做其他人認為是不好的想法的剩菜，但我們認為我們發現了真正的好主意嗎？我會給一些我一個高調的歷史例子，所以現在很難想象這一點，但我認為。谷歌第一次推出的時候已經是 98 歲了，當時他們進入搜索引擎領域的時間已經很晚了。 > The search search was dominated by large portals like Yahoo and Lykos and excite and they actually thought of search as kind of a loss leader. 搜索被雅虎和 Lykos 這樣的大型門戶網站所主導，他們認為搜索是一種失敗的領導者。 > The real business was being a portal and and putting display ads everywhere. 真正的生意是一個門戶網站，到處都是展示廣告。 > In fact if you go back and look at all of the literature at the time people are sort of the media the press reports and things like this. 事實上，如果你回顧一下當時的所有文獻，人們都是某種程度上的媒體，媒體報道，諸如此類的東西。 > Everyone was talking about stickiness stickiness was kind of the key and it was like sort of today it would be like vitality or whatever some of the sort of things everyone is trying to have. 每個人都在談論粘性，這是關鍵，就像今天一樣，它會像活力，或者任何其他的東西，都是每個人都想要的。 > You want it sticking this mutable stuck on your Web site so that you can show them more ads. 你想讓它把這個可變的東西粘在你的網站上，這樣你就可以給他們看更多的廣告。 > Google was the opposite of it it was so incredibly good at finding the right search results that people would immediately leave the Web site and in fact there\'s a famous anecdote where the Google guys were trying to when they first started off trying to sell their technology for like a million dollars to one of the large portals in the city of large portal tried out like this works too well. 與之相反的是，谷歌非常擅長找到正確的搜索結果，以至于人們會立即離開這個網站。事實上，有一件著名的軼事是，谷歌的家伙們剛開始嘗試把自己的技術以 100 萬美元的價格賣給大門戶城市的一個大型門戶網站，這種做法效果太好了。 > The problem is people are going to leave my site. 問題是人們會離開我的網站。 > Can you make it work less well. 你能讓它不那么好用嗎？ > And like actually give me bad results is a true story. 就像實際給我的壞結果是一個真實的故事。 > And so the point is that Google came in. 所以重點是谷歌進來了。 > I mean obviously Google had an amazing technology but in some ways their insight was actually this very contrarian business idea of getting people off the Web site and that no one had any idea how they\'d make money. 我的意思是，谷歌顯然擁有一項令人驚嘆的技術，但在某些方面，他們的洞察力實際上是一個非常相反的商業想法，即讓人們離開網站，而沒有人知道他們是如何賺錢的。 > No oneV.C. 沒有單人越野車。 > who went to visit the house of the Google founders were staying there working. 他去拜訪了谷歌創始人的家，一直呆在那里工作。 > `[00:03:03]` They were kind of the garage and actually snuck out the back. `[00:03:03]` 他們是那種車庫，實際上是偷偷溜出后面的。 > So he wouldn\'t have to meet somebody who working on a search engine because you why such an obviously bad idea. 這樣他就不用去見一個在搜索引擎上工作的人了，因為你為什么會有這樣一個明顯的壞主意。 > `[00:03:11]` Another good example here is Airbnb Inbee which we all know now is one of the great successes of our modern startup era and because course came from my C and D when it first started off seemed to most people like this kind of weird niche kind of hipster activity something that maybe you\'d see in like the Missioner of Brooklyn or something like this you know like who\'s going to stay on someone else\'s couch you know. `[00:03:11]` 另一個很好的例子是 Airbnb In 蜜蜂，我們現在都知道它是我們現代創業時代的巨大成功之一，因為它起源于我的 C 和 D，當它剛開始的時候，對大多數人來說，似乎就像這種奇怪的利基式的嬉皮士活動-也許你會在布魯克林的傳教士那里看到，或者類似這樣的東西-你知道。你知道誰會呆在別人的沙發上。 > You know lots of great people investors who you know and sort of industry observers who\'ve been very smart about things all thought this is sort of this weird niche behavior and you know it\'s jury\'s still out but it seems as if it\'s on its way to being kind of almost a replacement to the hotel industry. 你知道很多很棒的人，你認識的投資者，還有一些行業觀察家，他們都認為這是一種奇怪的利基行為，你也知道這還沒有定論，但似乎它正在走向一個替代酒店業的道路上。 > `[00:03:53]` It is another one which maybe this crowd is a little bit going back in time but it\'s hard to imagine now but when they first came out the you know the Internet had just started. `[00:03:53]` 這是另一個人，也許這群人有點倒流，但現在很難想象，但當他們第一次出來的時候，你知道互聯網才剛剛開始。 > It just you know just been invented a few years ago and or at least commercialized a few years ago and to most people it looked like. 你知道，它是幾年前發明的，或者至少是幾年前商業化的，對大多數人來說，它就像。 > `[00:04:14]` Why would you want to go and take stuff out of your attic and stuff you\'d sell in a garage sale and sell it online like lawn gnomes and all this kind of stuff is basically. `[00:04:14]` 為什么你想把你閣樓里的東西拿出來，你在車庫里賣的東西，然后像草坪侏儒一樣在網上賣，所有這些東西基本上都是。 > So it seemed like one to be kind of a niche weird behavior too by the way that was before there were kind of these modern ways to do online payments like PayPal. 因此，這似乎也是一種利基怪誕的行為，就像以前有類似貝寶(PayPal)這樣的現代在線支付方式一樣。 > So you literally like the idea was I\'m going to put my long Gnome on the web someone to across in Florida or something is going to buy it and they\'re going to send me a check through the mail. 所以你真的很喜歡這樣的想法：我要把我的長 Gnome 放到網上，有人在佛羅里達橫穿它，或者有什么東西要買它，他們會通過郵件給我寄一張支票。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Which just seemed kind of like a preposterous thing and actually a funny side anecdote is the founder here Omidyar. 這看起來就像是一件荒謬的事情，其實有趣的是奧米迪亞的創始人。 > It was sort of a hobbyist who had a bunch of different interests. 這是一個有著不同興趣的狂熱者。 > And when he pitched easy he was showing his sort of personal homepage. 當他說的很簡單的時候，他是在展示他的個人主頁。 > And one of his interest was the Ebola virus. 他的興趣之一是埃博拉病毒。 > So from what I\'ve heard from that he sees that the pitch was you go to his site and there\'s Ebola virus and then eBay auction Web sites. 因此，從我聽到的消息來看，他看到的是你訪問他的網站，那里有埃博拉病毒，然后是 eBay 拍賣網站。 > You can imagine how that was received. 你可以想象它是如何被接收到的。 > `[00:05:06]` So then the question is if so how do you develop a good idea. `[00:05:06]` 那么問題是，如果是這樣，你如何發展一個好主意。 > `[00:05:14]` Looks like a bad idea as an entrepreneur. `[00:05:14]` 作為一名企業家，這看起來是個壞主意。 > And the answer is you need to know a secret and by secret here I mean secret in the kind of Peter Teil sense if you\'ve read his great class notes Blake Mazur\'s class notes about the course he taught which he defines as something you believe that most other people don\'t believe. 答案是，你需要知道一個秘密，在這里，我指的是彼得·泰爾的那種秘密，如果你讀過他偉大的課堂筆記，布雷克·馬祖爾關于他教授的課程的課堂筆記，他把它定義為你認為大多數人都不相信的東西。 > So then the question is how how do you develop a secret and I think there are a few ways and I\'ll talk about them here. 那么問題是，你如何發展一個秘密，我認為有幾種方法，我將在這里談論它們。 > One of the ways to know the tools better than anyone else usually in our business is sort of the software business the tools means knowing you know computer science and technology. 在我們的業務中，要比任何人更好地了解這些工具的方法之一是軟件業務，工具意味著知道您了解計算機科學和技術。 > Anyone else. 其他人。 > So example here is Dropbox actually knew Drew. 舉個例子，Dropbox 實際上知道 Drew。 > I started my first company was in Boston when he was in Boston and I actually was trying to recruit him for a long time which is great obviously genius. 當他在波士頓的時候，我創辦了我的第一家公司-波士頓，實際上我很長一段時間都在招聘他，這顯然是很棒的天才。 > `[00:06:05]` And he I remember he came in he was like look I want to do a cloud storage thing this is like I forget 2007 or something. `[00:06:05]` 他-我記得他進來了-他就像看，我想做一件云存儲的事情，這就像我忘記了 2007 年什么的。 > And. 和 > At the time that actually cloud storage had been a big trend in venture capital. 在那個時候，云存儲實際上是風險投資的一大趨勢。 > And so I remember looking with him added like a tech crunch article that was like literally like 100 cloud storage companies that launched the last two years half of whom had been venture funded you know and just sort of step back and like look at it from the big picture point of view it seemed like a you know a crazy thing to do like to enter such a crowded market I think my take on it is what he realized is that if you actually use that software the other competitor software it was like this totally janky like web thing and the like click on it and you wait 10 minutes and you download the file and you have to upload it with all you know is just totally like it was basically made by sort of business people who are like cloud storage the future and you know what he realized was that to do it right. 所以我記得我和他一起看了看，就像一篇科技危機的文章，簡直就像 100 家云存儲公司在過去兩年里創辦的，其中一半是風險投資的，你知道，只是后退一步，從宏觀的角度來看，這似乎是一件你知道的瘋狂的事情，想要進入這樣的市場。一個擁擠的市場，我想我的看法是，他意識到，如果你真的使用那個軟件，另一個競爭對手的軟件，它就像這個完全像網絡一樣的東西，點擊它，你等待 10 分鐘，你下載文件，你必須上傳它與你所知道的完全是完全一樣，它基本上是由排序。對于那些喜歡云存儲的商業人士來說，你知道他意識到的是做好這件事。 > You know you had to do like you had to feel like it was a local hard drive right it had to there which of course we all know from the way it works now which is actually a very non-trivial technical problem to do it reliably and like you know you got to do like the net hole punching in like sinking and making sure you know taking care of all these adverse conditions. 你知道，你必須像你必須要做的那樣，感覺這是一個本地硬盤，它必須存在，當然，從它現在的工作方式中我們都知道，這實際上是一個非常重要的技術問題，要可靠地做到這一點。就像你知道的那樣，你必須像打孔一樣鉆進去，就像下沉一樣，并確保你知道要照顧好所有這些不利的條件。 > It turned out to be actually like it made sense in the end that sort of anM.I.T. 事實證明，這實際上是有意義的，在最后，類似于 M.I.T。 > you know brilliant engineer was the one who kind of cracked that problem. 你知道聰明的工程師才是解決這個問題的人。 > `[00:07:32]` Another way to know a secret is to know the problems better than anyone else. `[00:07:32]` 了解秘密的另一種方法是比任何人都更好地了解問題。 > So an example here is Kickstarter. 這里的一個例子是 Kickstarter。 > Most people. 大多數人。 > You know who probably most of you first heard of Kickstarter probably around 2010 or so and they kind of got big. 你知道誰可能是你們中的大多數人第一次聽說 Kickstarter，大概在 2010 年左右，他們變得有點大了。 > `[00:07:48]` The founders were actually working on the idea for about 10 years and trying to raise money. `[00:07:48]` 創始人們實際上花了大約 10 年的時間來研究這個想法，并試圖籌集資金。 > The founder CEO Perry Chen he he he actually came from kind of the artistic community kind of one of the people that would be doing a project today on Kickstarter. 創始人佩里·陳，他實際上來自藝術界，是今天在 Kickstarter 上做一個項目的人之一。 > `[00:08:02]` He was living in New Orleans and at one point wanted to put together a music festival and had a bunch of people who wanted to go to a music festival willing to pay had musicians who were willing to play if they could do it. `[00:08:02]` 他住在新奧爾良，曾經想組織一個音樂節，有一群想去參加音樂節的人愿意付錢，有一些樂師愿意去演奏，如果他們能做到的話。 > It had no way to coordinate the two which you know as we know now is sort of a Kickstarter does he also was aware of being deeply into that community was aware of sort of the history of it all going back to like is on steadily like you know sort of a patronage model for the Arts and just sort of understanding this was a this was a normal behavior both among the kind of backers and the project creators but many many people who whose job it is to identify good ideas thought this was a very bad idea for a long time. 它沒有辦法協調這兩者，正如我們現在所知道的，這是一種 Kickstart，他是否也意識到深入到那個社區，意識到這一切的歷史可以追溯到，就像你知道的，一種藝術的贊助模式，而只是一種理解-這是一種正常的行為，無論是在支持者還是項目創建者之間，但是很多人，他們的工作是識別好的想法，他們認為這是一個很長時間以來都是一個非常糟糕的想法。 > So another way to go to come up with the secret is to draw from your own kind of life experience background ideas Tuckahoe myself my own experience here for a second. 因此，想出秘訣的另一種方法是從你自己的生活經歷中汲取背景思想，塔卡霍本人，我自己的經驗，在這里一秒鐘。 > So I started a company called site adviser back in 2004. 所以我在 2004 年創辦了一家叫做網站顧問的公司。 > This is when this was kind of I think of that as 2004 is kind of the worst period at least in the modern probably ever. 我認為 2004 年是最糟糕的時期，至少在現代可能是如此。 > `[00:09:03]` I think on the Web in terms of security problems if you remember for those of you who remember there was there you probably all of your friends were complaining about getting pop up ads and they were using Internet Explorer on aP.C. https://tmt.ap-beijing.tencentcloudapi.com/?Action=TextTranslate&Nonce=1234&ProjectId=1257710951&Region=ap-beijing&SecretId=AKIDPqCXo8hXckompwwu7EB4sWzTvJXboBh2&Source=en&SourceText=+%5C%5B00%3A09%3A03%5C%5D+I+think+on+the+Web+in+terms+of+security+problems+if+you+remember+for+those+of+you+who+remember+there+was+there+you+probably+all+of+your+friends+were+complaining+about+getting+pop+up+ads+and+they+were+using+Internet+Explorer+on+aP.C.&Target=zh&Timestamp=1538796591&Version=2018-03-21&Signature=Pos9cLSxz%2BvLDpamyveck94Ee84= > And it was like pads everywhere fishing everywhere. 就像到處釣魚的墊子。 > `[00:09:18]` It was kind of a mess. `[00:09:18]` 當時有點亂。 > The question then was why didn\'t all of the incumbent security companies like McAfee Symantec do anything about it. 當時的問題是，為什么像 McAfee Symantec 這樣的現有安保公司沒有采取任何行動。 > They. 他（她，它）們 > `[00:09:27]` The reason is that they saw Stacy there they saw their mandate as being salving kind of technical problems meaning making sure there isn\'t an exploit in the browser making sure there isn\'t you know whatever exploit or something. `[00:09:27]` 原因是他們看到了 Stacy，他們認為他們的任務是解決一些技術問題，意思是確保瀏覽器中沒有漏洞，確保沒有任何漏洞。 > And most of the problems that were happening then were what we what known as social engineering problems which means that that basically everything was all of the technical features were operating properly. 當時發生的大部分問題都是我們所謂的社會工程問題，這意味著基本上所有的技術特征都運行正常。 > `[00:09:54]` But you know users were tricked into doing things and in fact so their solution was to put out white papers that said you know users should be smarter about downloading software or something like this. `[00:09:54]` 但是你知道用戶是被騙去做事情的，事實上，他們的解決方案是發布白皮書，說明用戶應該更聰明地下載軟件或類似的東西。 > `[00:10:05]` And so we the idea here is I think where we had a kind of a unique advantages that we didn\'t kind of come to this from the security world. `[00:10:05]` 所以我們這里的想法是，我認為我們有一種獨特的優勢，那就是我們不是從安全世界來的。 > We came to it from the consumer Internet world where we didn\'t sort of see these kinds of religious boundaries between technical social engineering threats and so much more as a consumer Internet Person Would as let\'s just try to create a better user experience using whatever kind of means necessary. 我們是從消費者互聯網世界來的，在那里，我們沒有看到技術社會工程威脅之間的宗教界限，也沒有看到消費者互聯網的人會用任何必要的手段來創造更好的用戶體驗。 > And it\'s funny because like we went and talked to a lot of our investors went and talked to people at the incumbent security companies and they all said it was a terrible idea for the reasons I just said. 這很有趣，因為就像我們去和很多投資者交談一樣，他們都說這是個糟糕的主意，因為我剛才說的原因。 > `[00:10:35]` And I remember pitching and I pitched a ton of CS and it was this really frustrating thing where it felt like to us like it was as obvious as like you know whatever this bottle of water sitting on the table can you see this bottle of water. `[00:10:35]` 我記得投球和我投了一噸 CS，這是一件非常令人沮喪的事情，在我們看來，它就像你知道的，就像你知道坐在桌子上的這瓶水，你能看到這瓶水嗎？ > And they were like No I can\'t see what are you talking about and like is it a fishing tool or is it enticed by it like trying to put you in all these categories. 他們說：不，我看不出你在說什么，喜歡它是一種釣魚工具，還是被它誘惑，就像試圖把你歸入所有這些類別。 > And notice it like when you sort of think when you sort of really develop a secret it actually ends up being quite frustrating talking to the people that haven\'t. 注意它，就像當你在想，當你真的想出一個秘密時，它最終會讓你很沮喪地和那些沒有的人交談。 > Because you\'re just sort of trying to show them what you think is obvious but they can\'t see. 因為你只是想向他們展示你認為顯而易見但他們看不見的東西。 > `[00:11:10]` So now I want to just a little bit about some of the sort of high level characteristics of these kinds of good ideas look like bad ideas. `[00:11:10]` 現在我只想談一談這些好主意的高層次特性，看上去就像壞主意。 > One of them is that powerful people often dismiss them as toys so. 其中之一就是有權勢的人常常把他們當成玩具。 > `[00:11:26]` A very famous example here is the telephone which basically when the telephone was invented the incumbent company of the time was Western Union who used telegraph systems to you know primarily for people like railroads to communicate to communicate across the country. `[00:11:26]` 一個非常著名的例子是電話，基本上，當電話發明時，當時的公司是西部聯合公司，他使用電報系統，主要是讓像鐵路這樣的人在全國各地進行通訊。 > The telephone was first invented it can only go like a mile or something like this. 電話是第一次發明的，它只能行駛一英里或諸如此類的東西。 > And so you know what the Western Union said is this is this doesn\'t solve the problems of our customers. 所以你知道西方聯盟說的，這并不能解決我們客戶的問題。 > Also the idea of like voice applications like what are you going to do with voice like you can actually go back and it\'s kind of sounds funny now but you actually go back and read it and people are like what\'s the point of voice. 還有，類似語音應用程序的想法，比如你要用聲音做什么，就像你可以回去，聽起來很有趣，但是你真的回去讀它，人們就像聲音的意義所在一樣。 > We already can encode the information in Morse code. 我們已經可以用莫爾斯密碼對信息進行編碼了。 > And like there\'s nothing else you want to do. 就像你什么都不想做一樣。 > And so they had the opportunity to buy the technology very cheaply and didn\'t. 因此，他們有機會以非常低的價格購買這項技術，但沒有。 > And of course what they underestimated is kind of the classic Clay Christiansen thing where if you\'re familiar with his books innovator\'s dilemma. 當然，他們低估的是經典的克萊·克里斯蒂安，如果你熟悉他的書，創新者的困境。 > There\'s this famous curve which is sort of the rate at which technology gets better is sort of like this and the kind of demands on technology doesn\'t go up as fast and what that means is that the technology often quickly catches up and while it\'s at that kind of low point it often looks like a toy to a lot of people. 有一條著名的曲線，它是一種技術進步的速度，就像這樣，對技術的要求沒有那么快，這意味著技術往往會很快趕上，當它處于那種低谷時，對很多人來說，它往往就像玩具一樣。 > A modern example of this is Skype. 這方面的一個現代例子是 Skype。 > Years ago I looked back in 2003 I had the opportunity to actually work on. 幾年前，我回顧了 2003 年，我有機會實際工作。 > `[00:12:47]` As part of a team that worked on one of the early investments in skype and helped write one of the memos for the investment. `[00:12:47]` 作為致力于 Skype 早期投資之一的團隊的一員，并幫助為這項投資撰寫了一份備忘錄。 > `[00:12:53]` And our big kids it sounds funny now but all this stuff sounds funny in retrospect. `[00:12:53]` 我們的大孩子們現在聽起來很好笑，但回想起來，這一切聽起來都很有趣。 > Our big concern if you go back was that people most people don\'t have microphones in their computers. 我們最擔心的是，大多數人的電腦里沒有麥克風。 > And would they be willing to drive down to Best Buy. 他們愿意開車去百思買嗎？ > I mean is it actually in the memo you know like microphone options like the key issue. 我的意思是，它實際上在備忘錄中，你知道，就像麥克風選項一樣，關鍵問題。 > And so again like people all be willing to go and drive to Best Buy or whatever whatever and do that. 因此，再一次，就像人們一樣，所有人都愿意開車去百思買或其他任何地方，然后去做這件事。 > The other thing was the quality was lower of course they got better as bandwidth got better. 另一件事是質量較低，當然，隨著帶寬的改善，質量也越來越好。 > `[00:13:23]` I think that was another issue with broadband narrowband adoption will broadband ever get adopted I remember hearing McKinsey like the head of McKinsey explained to me that no one would ever adopt broadband or something. `[00:13:23]` 我認為這是寬帶窄帶采用的另一個問題-寬帶是否會被采納-我記得我聽到麥肯錫(McKinsey)的負責人向我解釋說，沒有人會采用寬帶或什么的。 > `[00:13:33]` So anyway so the the sky and the other at the time also if you move a vantage vantage was sort of the one that people were kind of more excited about Skype also had problems connecting to the pots or telephone system. 不管怎樣，當時的天空和其他地方，如果你移動一個有利的位置，人們對 Skype 的興奮程度會更高，連接到鍋子或電話系統也會遇到一些問題。 > But you literally if you go back you\'ll see people said it like all of the telephone companies said it was a toy using those words. 但是如果你真的回去的話，你會看到人們這么說，就像所有電話公司說的那樣，用這些話來說，這是個玩具。 > `[00:13:57]` So another key characteristic of good ideas like batteries is that they unbundle the functions done by others. `[00:13:57]` 像電池這樣的好主意的另一個關鍵特點是，它們可以解開別人所做的功能。 > So let me explain this for example newspapers. 讓我來解釋一下，例如報紙。 > So one way to think of newspapers is as sort of a collection of functions. 因此，把報紙看作是一種功能的集合是一種方式。 > There\'s the brand of the newspaper you know if I read The New York Times I\'m maybe more likely to trust that than if I read something else. 這是報紙的品牌，你知道，如果我看了“紐約時報”，我可能會更相信這一點，而不是看別的東西。 > There\'s a curatorial function which is you know the New York Times tells you what\'s important based on what it puts on the front page. 這里有一個館藏功能，你知道“紐約時報”根據頭版的內容告訴你什么是重要的。 > There\'s distribution. 有分布。 > You know prior to the Internet. 你知道在上網之前。 > The New York Times would print newspapers and drive around and deliver them classified ads you know back then was an important function. “紐約時報”(NewYorkTimes)會印刷報紙，開車四處發布分類廣告，那時你知道這是一項重要的功能。 > And so then you know what happened. 然后你就知道發生了什么。 > `[00:14:36]` Is over time each of those functions kind of got picked off one by one. `[00:14:36]` 隨著時間的推移，這些功能中的每一個都被一個接一個地摘掉了。 > So this is important like it doesn\'t happen a lot of these things like kind of in one fell swoop it happens piece by piece. 所以，這是很重要的，因為它不會發生很多這樣的事情，比如一次又一次的猛撲，它是一件地發生的。 > `[00:14:46]` And so first the Internet itself came along and you read the New York Times online. `[00:14:46]` 首先，互聯網出現了，你在網上閱讀了“紐約時報”(NewYorkTimes)。 > Suddenly what\'s the point to getting it printed and distributed to you right. 突然間，把它打印出來并分發給你的重點是什么？ > And then you know then Craigslist came along and you know it\'s a better way to do classifieds are all in the same placeetc. 然后你知道，Craigslist 出現了，你知道這是一種更好的方法，分類廣告都在同一個地方，等等。 > Right so that sort of picks off that function and then social came along you know Twitter and Facebook and you know just e-mail and whatever else. 是的，這類功能被剔除了，然后社交網站出現了，你知道 Twitter 和 Facebook，而你只知道電子郵件和其他任何東西。 > And suddenly a lot of people started getting to know what the curatorial function of what\'s on the front page became less and less important right. 突然間，很多人開始了解到，頭版上的館藏功能變得越來越不重要了。 > So far more people now you know what they read if they read the New York Times today and they read it that\'s determined by what\'s shared with him on Twitter Facebook et cetera. 到目前為止，更多的人知道，如果他們今天讀“紐約時報”，他們會讀到什么，這是由他在 Twitter、Facebook 等網站上分享的內容決定的。 > So then the curatorial function goes away and I would argue sort of the last function is starting to go away which is Nate Silver is an example which is you know the individual reporters now because of these other distribution mechanisms and Twitter and Facebooketc. 于是，策展人的功能就消失了，我想說，最后一個功能開始消失了，Nate Silverage 就是一個例子，你知道，現在每個記者都知道，因為有了其他的分發機制，Twitter 和 Faceboketc。 > are able to build up their own audiences which in some ways becomes you know the audience becomes more loyal to the individual contributor than to the organization. 能夠建立起自己的受眾，在某些方面，你知道，聽眾對個人貢獻者的忠誠度比對組織的忠誠度更高。 > `[00:15:48]` So an example here Mookie\'s Udacity is we\'re investors in. `[00:15:48]` 這里的一個例子是 Mookie 的 Udacity，我們是投資者。 > There\'s also Coursera. 還有庫瑟拉。 > So if you read a lot of the kind of. 所以如果你讀了很多這樣的書。 > Mainstream press about about nukes they\'ll say they\'ll say things like oh that doesn\'t replace you know the university experience and what they\'re missing is that it\'s not supposed to replace it. 主流媒體關于核武器，他們會說，哦，這并不能取代你，你知道，大學的經驗，他們所缺少的是，它不應該取代它。 > You should think of the university as a bundle of multiple functions so you know it\'s a social experience. 你應該把大學看作是多功能的集合體，這樣你就知道這是一種社會經驗。 > It\'s a credentialing service. 這是一個認證服務。 > You know you went to so-and-so school there\'s a credential. 你知道你去過某某學校，那里有證書。 > It\'s just it\'s coursework its tests. 這只是它的課程，它的測試。 > `[00:16:21]` It\'s maybe plays a job kind of recruiting function right. `[00:16:21]` 這可能是一種招聘職能。 > If what you should expect is that the the the same pattern that played out with newspapers have lost 20 years I believe will play out in education over the next 10 to 20 years. 如果你應該期待的是，與報紙一樣的模式已經失去了 20 年，我相信在未來的 10 到 20 年里，教育領域將會出現同樣的情況。 > But you\'ll see things happen layer by layer and because it happens layer by layer. 但是你會看到事情一層層地發生，因為它是層層發生的。 > All of the kind of mainstream pundits sort of look at each layer and they say that layer stupid you know it\'s only one part of it. 所有的主流專家都會對每一層進行觀察，他們說這一層很愚蠢，你知道這只是其中的一部分。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Which of course is the whole point of it and that\'s why they dismiss it as a bad idea. 當然，這就是問題的關鍵所在，這就是為什么他們認為這是個壞主意。 > So another key characteristic of these good ideas bad ideas is they often originate as hobbies. 因此，這些好主意的另一個關鍵特點是，它們往往起源于業余愛好。 > The kind of the mental model I use is that in the startup world we kind of have basically two constituencies we have business people and we have technical people and each of the two constituencies has a has a method of voting on what they think is interesting in the future business people\'s way of voting is by allocating money at the workplace. 我所使用的心理模型是，在創業世界里，我們基本上有兩個選區，我們有商人，我們有技術人員，每個選區都有一種投票方法，他們認為未來商業人士的投票方式是在工作場所分配資金。 > So that\'s you know now includes me as a venture capitalist includes a CEO of a company or a head of a department. 你知道的，這包括了我，作為一個風險投資家，包括一個公司的首席執行官或一個部門的主管。 > You know engineers I\'m simplifying the technical business people. 你知道工程師我在簡化技術人員的工作。 > But but the basic idea is that some of the smartest engineers they don\'t get to vote with their dollars but they do get to vote with their time. 但最基本的想法是，一些最聰明的工程師，他們不能用他們的錢投票，但是他們可以用他們的時間投票。 > And so they vote with their time by working on what they think the coolest stuff is on the weekends and at night. 所以他們用時間投票，在周末和晚上做他們認為最酷的事情。 > And this plays out. 然后這一切就結束了。 > I mean it\'s amazingly how how predictable predictive this kind of heuristic is going back to. 我的意思是，令人驚訝的是，這種啟發式的預測是多么的可預測。 > Obviously the Homebrew Computer Club with jobs and jobs jobs and whatnot aka. 很明顯，家釀電腦俱樂部有工作和諸如此類的東西。 > `[00:18:03]` Homebrew Computer Club with jobs and Bosnak. `[00:18:03]` 與喬布斯和博斯納克合作的家用電腦俱樂部。 > `[00:18:07]` Of course theP.C. `[00:18:07]` 當然是 P.C. > you know sort of a lot of the sort of things around theP.C. 你知道很多關于 P.C.的事情。 > originated blogs started out as hobbyists among hobbyists. 最初的博客起源于狂熱者中的狂熱者。 > The Web did a lot of you know Web page people creating websites and browsers and things like this. 網絡做了很多你們都知道的網頁，人們創建網站和瀏覽器之類的東西。 > So many opensource things started that way. 很多開源的東西都是這樣開始的。 > So today if you look around you\'ll see people working on what you know what is it like. 所以今天，如果你環顧四周，你就會看到人們在為你所知道的是什么而工作。 > I mean you guys I assume its bit coin and 3D printing and drones and the like whatever a whole bunch of interesting like you know big data frameworks and those that are kind of cool stuff. 我的意思是，我假設它的比特幣、3D 打印和無人機之類的東西，諸如此類的有趣的東西，比如大數據框架，以及那些很酷的東西。 > `[00:18:44]` So you know this stuff tends to get dismissed as a as bad idea by kind of the mainstream because oh that\'s a toy that\'s a hobbyist thingetc. `[00:18:44]` 所以你知道，這些東西往往會被主流認為是個壞主意，因為哦，那是個玩具，是個狂熱者的東西，等等。 > So just give an example get Hubb which you know a lot of I mean get have of course is based literally on an open source project get as you guys know. 舉個例子，你知道很多，我的意思是，GET 當然是基于開源項目 GET，就像你們所知道的那樣。 > `[00:19:01]` But but also I think you can think of it as one may think of it as sort of the work the work processes that get hub the Hub enables began in the hobbyist and the open source sort of hobbyist community where you had large distributed kind of nonhierarchical or semi hierarchical groups trying to work together and coordinate. `[00:19:01]` 但是我認為你也可以把它看作是一種工作過程，它可以作為獲得樞紐的一種工作過程，集線器啟用于愛好者和開源的愛好者社區，在那里你有大量分布的、非層次的或半層次的組試圖一起工作和協調。 > And it turns out I think we believe where investors get it but it turns out that you have a very same kind of work process within large organizations so if you look at it like an eBay or something and people working all over the place are semi structured the way the coordinates are just an example of kind of a tool and a process that began in the in the sort of hobbyist world and has made its way into the workplace. 結果，我想我們相信投資者是從哪里得到的，但事實證明，在大型組織中，你有著非常類似的工作流程，因此，如果你把它看作是 eBay 之類的東西，那么到處工作的人都是半結構化的，就像坐標只是一個工具的例子，也是一個開始于在這種狂熱的世界里，并已進入工作場所。 > Another characteristic of good ideas like bad ideas is that they often challenge social norms. 好主意和壞想法的另一個特點是，它們經常挑戰社會規范。 > So you know we talked about how people sort of got that kind of queasy feeling around everybody and be an eBay. 所以你知道，我們討論過人們是如何在每個人周圍都有這種不舒服的感覺的，并成為 eBay 的一員。 > `[00:20:04]` I think that you know that it\'s hard to think about and start to realize now but flicker flicker had many innovations. `[00:20:04]` 我想你知道現在很難思考和開始意識到，但是 Flicker 有很多創新。 > But one of the key ones was that it defaulted photos to being public. 但其中一個關鍵問題是，它默認公開照片。 > `[00:20:19]` So prior to flicker there were online photo repositories but they were all private ones like Shutterfly where you\'d upload your photos maybe share them with a few friends. `[00:20:19]` 所以在閃爍之前，有在線的照片儲存庫，但它們都是私人的，比如 Shutterflix，在那里你可以上傳你的照片，也許可以和幾個朋友分享。 > And it was really shocking to people that you would go into default into public eye what kind of behaviors that Facebook is another good example where you know we\'ve seen it repeatedly where Facebook made made various changes to sort of how sharing and other things were probably most famously with the change to the news feed where there\'s sort of an outcry and you know sort of challenge the social norms but now has become you know the things that the innovations Facebook made there have now become you know mostly just sort of standard UI devices and sort of all modern social software so to wrap it up a little bit. 令人震驚的是，你會成為公眾關注的默認行為，Facebook 是另一個很好的例子，你知道我們曾多次看到它，Facebook 做出了各種改變，比如分享和其他事情可能是最著名的，因為對新聞提要的改變會引起強烈的抗議，而你也知道這是一種挑戰。社會規范，但現在已經成為你知道的東西，Facebook 在那里所做的創新，現在你知道了，大部分只是一些標準的 UI 設備和一些現代的社交軟件，所以把它包裝一下。 > `[00:21:05]` So had I learned a secret not to be kind of sort of like cutely recursive but I sort of think of this presentation itself as a secret. `[00:21:05]` 所以我學到了一個秘密，不是那種可愛的遞歸，但我覺得這個演示本身就是一個秘密。 > `[00:21:15]` The way I learned this was like with all secrets sort of through direct experience just sort of both being a book Through My Eyes sort of my own startup\'s but then through angel investing I actually went back kind of systematically and looked at all of the investments the both that I\'d made and I probably just point out the thousands of investment pitches and made dozens of investments missed dozens of good investments and went through and kind of tried to look systematically at what the best predictor would have been. `[00:21:15]` 我學到這一切的方式，就像所有的秘密一樣，通過直接的經驗投資錯過了數十項好的投資，并經歷了一段時間，并試圖系統地研究什么是最好的預測因素。 > And this came out as by far sort of whether the founder had some technical expertise or a problem domain expertise or some kind of direct experience where they sort of learned a secret and then just I guess just wrapping it up I would say you know if I were this I assume a lot of people here are entrepreneurs or aspiring entrepreneurs. 這是因為到目前為止，創始人是否有一些技術專長或問題領域的專業知識，或者是某種直接的經驗，他們從中學到了一個秘密，然后我想，我只是想結束它，你知道，如果我是這樣的人，我假設這里的很多人都是企業家或有抱負的企業家。 > I would encourage you to think about. 我鼓勵你考慮一下。 > `[00:22:16]` I think there\'s one of two ways to develop startup ideas. `[00:22:16]` 我認為有兩種發展創業點子的方法。 > One is through direct experience whether it\'s direct experience with tools as I was talking about like technologies or direct experience with some problem or direct experiences that bring you to have some perspective. 一個是通過直接的經驗，無論是我所說的對工具的直接體驗，比如技術，還是直接的經驗，一些問題，或者直接的經驗，給你帶來一些視角。 > `[00:22:31]` And there\'s another way to develop them which is like through sort of abstract things like analyst reports and trends and analogies. `[00:22:31]` 還有另一種方法來發展它們，就像通過某種抽象的事物，比如分析報告、趨勢和類比。 > `[00:22:41]` You know I\'m going to do GNB for wire ruber for X or that kind of thing. `[00:22:41]` 你知道我會為 X 做 GNB 的線材或類似的東西。 > And I think I think that in my opinion the best ideas come from direct experience not abstract things and in fact sort of by definition because the abstract things tend to like if you go read whatever an analyst reports The New York Times it tends to just be an encapsulation of conventional wisdom. 在我看來，最好的想法來自于直接的經驗，而不是抽象的東西，事實上，從定義上來說，這是因為抽象的東西往往喜歡，如果你去讀任何分析家的報告，“紐約時報”，它傾向于只是對傳統智慧的一種概括。 > Whereas the opportunities tend to lie kind of in you know when you take your direct experience and diff it with the conventional wisdom. 然而，機會往往在某種程度上取決于你，你知道，當你拿出你的直接經驗，用傳統的智慧來改變它。 > `[00:23:12]` That\'s where the good startup ideas are. `[00:23:12]` 好的創業點子就在那里。 > Thanks. 謝謝