# Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014 > `[00:00:02]` Thank you for coming. `[00:00:02]` 謝謝你能來。 > Thank hope. 謝謝希望。 > Not much talking at all but I\'m going to just ask you sort of a strange thing. 一點也不說話，但我只想問你一件奇怪的事。 > I want you to sort of go through the chronology of the early days. 我想讓你看看早年的年表。 > Yeah. 嗯 > And talk about you really did have a lot of close calls and I\'d love for you to talk about them and how you got through them and said What do we call them the other day. 說到你真的有很多親密的電話，我很想讓你談談它們，以及你是如何度過它們的，并說我們前幾天怎么稱呼它們的。 > `[00:00:24]` Not near death experiences but defibrillator. `[00:00:24]` 不是接近死亡的經歷，而是除顫器。 > `[00:00:27]` Did you meet her. `[00:00:27]` 你見過她嗎。 > She had to resuscitate. 她必須復蘇。 > `[00:00:30]` Yeah. `[00:00:30]` 是的。 > And I\'ve literally never heard of so many so I\'d love for you to give us a little story because it was back in 1999 when we started the company. 我從來沒有聽說過這么多，所以我很想讓你給我們一個小故事，因為那是在 1999 年我們創辦公司的時候。 > `[00:00:39]` It was 1989. `[00:00:39]` 那是 1989 年。 > `[00:00:40]` I mean a lot of people don\'t know this but when we started we would sort of started working on the ideas and sort of 97 98 and 4 for lack of a better way to describe it we were trying to build Siri for mobile devices. `[00:00:40]` 我的意思是，很多人不知道這一點，但當我們開始的時候，我們會開始研究這些想法，比如 97，98 和 4，因為沒有更好的方法來描述它，我們試圖為移動設備構建 Siri。 > We\'ve been inspired by Palm and Nokia and all these folks that were sort of at the front of this this mobile device revolution and we thought why wouldn\'t it be great if you could talk to your phone. 我們的靈感來自 Palm 和 Nokia，以及所有這些處于移動設備革命前沿的人，我們想，如果你能和你的手機交談，那就太棒了。 > And that would sort of transform the user interface experience and all that. 這會改變用戶界面體驗等等。 > So we started with this kind of customer problem. 所以我們從這樣的客戶問題開始。 > And that\'s always when we\'ve been good and when we stayed away when we stray away from trying to solve the customer problem we sort of fall down. 當我們一直很好的時候，當我們偏離解決客戶問題的迷途時，我們就會陷入困境。 > There\'s been a few those along the way. 沿途有幾個。 > But you know and so very early on we were we were trying. 但你知道，這么早我們就在努力。 > We said okay voice would be a great way to interact with this. 我們說好的聲音將是一個很好的方式與這個互動。 > How do we make basically Siri this voice interaction layer on top of the operating system and will we set out to do that we realize everything we want to do is reach recognition wasn\'t going to work. 我們如何使 Siri 這個語音交互層建立在操作系統之上，并且我們將開始這樣做-我們意識到，我們想做的一切都是獲得認可是行不通的。 > And at the same time we sort of started to try to go raise money for this idea of a new way to interact with your device. 與此同時，我們也開始努力籌集資金，以一種新的方式與你的設備進行互動。 > And you know I see now it was harder for us to raise our first half a million dollars than it was for us to raise our first 200 million dollars. 你知道，我知道，現在我們要籌集我們的前 50 萬美元要比我們籌集我們最初的 2 億美元要困難得多。 > And it is because in those days people weren\'t in the valley they weren\'t so focused on mobile they certainly weren\'t thinking about mobile voice and we really needed to prove that we had everyone thought Yes there absolutely has to be a better way to interact with your device but what\'s your hook what\'s your advantage. 這是因為在那些日子里，人們不是在硅谷，他們不那么專注于移動，他們當然不考慮移動語音，我們真的需要證明我們每個人都認為，是的，絕對必須有一個更好的方式來與你的設備交互，但你的鉤子是什么，你的優勢是什么。 > What\'s that kind of breakthrough and where we ended up doing is inventing this noise cancellation technology that turned out to be the biggest breakthrough in mobile audio in 30 years and it was a sort of serendipitous back thing that we stumbled upon mostly because we were trying to solve this problem. 這種突破和我們最終所做的是發明了這種噪音消除技術，這是 30 年來移動音頻領域最大的突破，這是我們偶然發現的一件事，主要是因為我們試圖解決這個問題。 > And then when we did that we said wait this is bigger than making speech recognition work you get to the core of what people do on their phones which is talk at the time. 然后當我們這樣做的時候，我們說，等等，這比讓語音識別工作更重要-你進入了人們在他們的手機上所做的事情的核心，也就是當時的談話。 > Now we do lots of other things on our phones but in those days it was it was a lot about talking mostly about talking. 現在我們在手機上做了很多其他的事情，但是在那些日子里，很多事情都是關于聊天的。 > And so then we thought OK great. 所以我們覺得很好。 > You know a is going to want this there. 你知道 A 會想要這個的。 > Everyone that ever heard the demo where we do theseA.B tests with weed whackers and blenders and all this stuff and we still go on with their homes. 每一個曾經聽過演示的人，我們用除草機和攪拌機做這些測試，還有所有這些東西，我們仍然繼續他們的家。 > Wow I want to have my device as we said on this journey we started talking to all the handset manufacturers who were big at that time sort of Nokia and a role in the Korean guys Sony Ericsson Ericsson actually. 哇，我想要我的設備，就像我們在這段旅程中所說的，我們開始與當時規模較大的所有手機制造商進行交談，比如諾基亞，以及在韓國人索尼愛立信(Sony Ericsson)中扮演的角色。 > `[00:03:07]` And it was a real wakeup call. `[00:03:07]` 這是一個真正的喚醒電話。 > No one actually wanted to see this technology. 實際上沒有人想看這項技術。 > Yeah it\'s a neat demo. 是的，這是一個整潔的演示。 > `[00:03:13]` We think it\'s cool they love the demo but they love the demo but they didn\'t want to integrate the technology was too expensive to add additional microphones. `[00:03:13]` 我們認為他們喜歡這個演示很酷，但是他們不想集成這個技術太貴了，不能再增加麥克風了。 > `[00:03:21]` I was with somebody from Apple the other day who was telling me they now have six microphones I think in in an iPhone. `[00:03:21]` 前幾天，我和一個蘋果公司的人在一起，他告訴我，他們現在有六部麥克風，我想是在一部 iPhone 里。 > And at the time we were just trying to convince people to put an extra one in to support our technology. 當時我們只是想說服人們多放一個來支持我們的技術。 > It was just like wow I can imagine we would have been able to do audio quality with that. 就像哇，我可以想象我們可以用它來做音頻質量。 > But you know again we we were struggling to get our technology into that into that form factor in handset manufacturers were just sort of concerned about pennies so they didn\'t want to integrate what we had. 但你知道，我們還在努力使我們的技術進入這種形式，手機制造商只是有點擔心便士，所以他們不想整合我們所擁有的東西。 > So that\'s how we were struggling with you know how do we fund this how do we take the next level. 這就是我們是如何掙扎的，你知道，我們如何為這個項目提供資金，如何達到下一個水平。 > We know we had something pretty breakthrough and what did we do and so along came darba. 我們知道我們有了很大的突破，我們做了什么，于是達爾巴就來了。 > And that was a great thing for us. 這對我們來說是件很棒的事。 > `[00:04:05]` The Defense Department and the government government agency were a good deal. `[00:04:05]` 國防部和政府機構是一筆不錯的交易。 > We never thought we would do sort of work for the military industrial complex. 我們從未想過我們會為軍事工業綜合體做一些工作。 > What they wanted they wanted us to make our noise cancellation algorithms. 他們想讓我們做我們的噪音消除算法。 > `[00:04:18]` The foundation of their battlefield technology. `[00:04:18]` 他們戰場技術的基礎。 > And so we thought well great we have this kind of rough science how do we take that and productize it and use these government grants to really sort of work through all the issues and take that science into a form that could be delivered in a product. 所以我們認為很好，我們有這樣一種粗糙的科學-我們如何利用它并生產它，并利用這些政府撥款來真正解決所有的問題，并將科學轉化為一種可以在產品中實現的形式。 > And that was great. 那真是太棒了。 > You know it sort of kept the lights on. 你知道它能讓燈一直亮著。 > We were it engineers we I think we were after Dolby and Macromedia one of the earliest technology companies will technology companies in San Francisco moved up to San Francisco in 1999. 我們是工程師，我想我們是在追逐杜比和宏媒體，這是最早的科技公司之一，舊金山的科技公司將于 1999 年搬到舊金山。 > In those days there just weren\'t a lot of startups in the city. 在那些日子里，城里沒有多少初創公司。 > And it\'s funny now because I love it you walk around. 現在很有趣因為我喜歡你到處走動。 > You know we\'re on the same block as Zynga and MBB and Pinterest. 你知道我們和 Zynga、MBB 和 Pinterest 在同一個街區。 > Then we see a shared office with their baby and it\'s just it\'s so fun that there\'s this vibrant community there now it\'s Francisco wasn\'t like that. 然后我們看到一個和他們的孩子共享的辦公室，這太有趣了，以至于有了一個充滿活力的社區，現在的弗朗西斯科就不像這樣了。 > `[00:05:06]` Yeah I think to remind people we\'re talking 15 years at all cost. `[00:05:06]` 是的，我想提醒人們，我們談的是 15 年，不惜一切代價。 > It\'s like filling donee. 就像填飽了甜甜圈。 > But you know before I phones. 但你知道在我打電話之前。 > So. 所以 > So I want everyone to go back in their mine and we\'ll have these people were probably in grade school. 所以我希望每個人都回到他們的礦井里，我們會讓這些人可能在上小學。 > `[00:05:22]` Totally. `[00:05:22]` 完全。 > Let\'s hope they\'re all born. 希望他們都出生了。 > So then what happened you get this right. 那么發生了什么你說得對。 > We get to start up a grant. 我們可以啟動一筆贈款。 > `[00:05:29]` And the other thing that was really tough is it\'s so again also farseeing because so many of the ideas that were being kicked around in 1999 and I remember Larry and Serguei were like our teachers in computer science and Marissa was my you know we lived in the same freshman dorm ish is now on the job on board and so it was this crazy time in Stanford and Silicon Valley and all these interesting ideas and people. `[00:05:29]` 而另一件非常艱難的事情是，它又一次很有遠見，因為 1999 年發生的許多想法-我記得拉里和塞爾蓋-就像我們的計算機科學老師，而瑪麗莎是我的，你知道，我們住在同一個新生宿舍里，現在船上工作，所以這是一個瘋狂的時期。斯坦福和硅谷以及所有這些有趣的想法和人。 > But you had this huge run up everything all the infrastructure being laid out for the internet as it stands today and all these ideas like there was a lot of delivery services like insta card. 但你有這么大的增長，所有的基礎設施都在為互聯網建設，就像今天的情況一樣，所有這些想法，比如有很多的遞送服務，比如 insta 卡。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > But none of them survived. 但他們都沒活下來。 > And you know there were there were online specific e-commerce things for niches none of these things survived and they were just sort of too early there needed to be a lot either you know better internet connectivity more distribution of it whatever it was there was just there was just too early and so the ideas weren\'t bad they were just sort of ahead of their time. 你也知道，有專門的在線電子商務，這些東西都沒有幸存下來，它們只是太早了，需要有更好的互聯網連接，更好的分布，不管是什么，都太早了，所以這些想法并不壞，它們只是有點超前于他們的時代。 > And I think that\'s another important lesson that we learned is that you\'ve got to stay your course through that. 我認為這是我們學到的另一個重要的教訓，那就是你必須堅持你的路線。 > We thought mobile was going to be a big thing. 我們以為手機會是件大事。 > We thought that Palm devices would converge with smartphones. 我們認為 Palm 設備將與智能手機融合。 > They ended up doing it sort of ten years after we thought they would. 在我們認為他們會這樣做的十年后，他們最終還是這么做了。 > But they ended up doing that. 但他們最終還是這么做了。 > And so the early lesson we learned is if you believe in what you think is right and what you think is going to happen to customer experiences into the way people are going to interact with technology then stay that course and put yourself in a position to do that. 因此，我們早期學到的教訓是，如果你相信你認為正確的東西，你認為會發生在客戶體驗中的事情，那么人們就會與技術互動，然后保持這一過程，讓自己處于這樣的地位。 > That was the sort of first thing with darba we went to a really unconventional source of capital right where were you who had DARPAs funding at that time. 這是 DARPA 的第一件事，我們去了一個非常非傳統的資金來源，你當時在哪里得到了 DARPA 的資金。 > Very very very few of you I just found out recently that Inktomi did too. 你們中很少有人我最近才發現 Inktomi 也這么做了。 > You know it\'s not something that remembers Inktomi. 你知道這不是什么能記住墨水的東西。 > No they powered a lot of the infrastructure our internet the younger. 不，他們為很多基礎設施提供動力，我們的互聯網更年輕。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > So anyways when I haven\'t had a drop of funding is again that the whole technology industry had sort of cratered and it was impossible to raise money and I\'m a risk we used to go up announcing Sanyal road looking for money and people would say to us what\'s wrong with everyone who went to Stanford from 1983 to 2000 because of losses. 因此，不管怎么說，當我還沒有得到一點資金的時候，整個科技行業都有了一些裂痕，籌資是不可能的，我是一個風險，我們過去常常去宣布三洋之路，尋找資金，人們會對我們說，1983 年到 2000 年每一個因虧損而去斯坦福的人都有什么問題。 > Billions of dollars. 數十億美元。 > Go get jobs. 去找工作吧。 > We don\'t want to see you here. 我們不想在這里見到你。 > I mean it\'s funny because I still run into some of these people like you now. 我是說，這很有趣，因為我現在還會碰到像你這樣的人。 > `[00:07:47]` It\'s different. `[00:07:47]` 這不一樣。 > They don\'t tell me you\'ll get a job that they used to but you know. 他們不告訴我你會得到他們以前的工作，但你知道。 > `[00:07:52]` And so again it\'s interesting how the sort of time to change it was not a happy fun place full of new ideas and then the vibrancy wasn\'t there. `[00:07:52]` 所以再一次有趣的是，改變它的時間并不是一個充滿新想法的快樂的地方，然后它的活力就不在那里了。 > There was a really bad feeling around. 周圍有一種很不好的感覺。 > And so we had to figure out a way to keep going through that to believe that hey mobiles going to be a big thing. 因此，我們必須想出一種方法來繼續進行下去，這樣我們才能相信，移動電話將會是一件大事。 > And at the time the Valley wasn\'t the center of the mobile universe. 在那個時候，山谷并不是流動宇宙的中心。 > It is now for sure. 現在是肯定的了。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And so how did you get through it. 那你是怎么熬過來的。 > `[00:08:17]` You got since we had the type funding but that couldn\'t have lasted forever didn\'t last long. `[00:08:17]` 自從我們有了這種類型的資金，你就得到了，但這不可能永遠持續下去，不會持續太久。 > They couldn\'t it didn\'t really allow us to scale. 他們不能讓我們擴大規模。 > `[00:08:23]` Yeah huge way but it did allow us to kind of prioritize productize improve out what we had done and the next thing we did is we said okay how do we get this in a forum or a product that\'s going to go reach lots of people. `[00:08:23]` 是的，很大的一種方式，但是它確實讓我們有了優先的工作，改進了我們已經做的事情，接下來我們說，好的，我們如何在一個論壇或一個產品上得到這個，這個會影響到很多人。 > And we\'ve been in sort of licensing discussion because we wanted to be like Dolby we said you know anyone that has an audio problem we could be in the front end it will be kind of like Intel inside or Adobeetc. 我們一直在進行某種許可討論，因為我們想成為杜比，我們說過，任何有音頻問題的人，我們都有可能處于前端，就像英特爾內部或阿多比等等。 > and because of various economic constraints for these very for these guys and focusing on profits that no one wanted to pay us much to license our technology and the time we\'ve been talking to the big headset manufacturers drunk\'s and Jabra and we thought wow the technology we have in this space is really disruptive. 而且，由于這些人在經濟上受到的種種限制，他們把注意力集中在利潤上，沒有人愿意花很多錢來授權我們的技術，以及我們和大型耳機制造商-醉鬼和賈布拉-交談的時間，我們認為，哇，我們在這個領域擁有的技術是非常具有破壞性的。 > There hasn\'t been sort of a computing proposition there and we can really transform what\'s Sebel there. 這里還沒有一個計算命題，我們可以真正地改變 Sebel 的概念。 > And so we\'ve we\'ve been offered some deals from those guys we backed out and said you know we\'re going to go the course ourselves and we\'re going to go make our own hardware device. 所以我們從那些我們退出的家伙那里得到了一些交易，他們說我們要自己去做，我們也要自己做硬件設備。 > Wow. 哇 > So this is in kind of late 0 2. 所以這差不多是 0.2。 > And we thought we we can do this better and that\'s why we have hardware backgrounds at all. 我們認為我們可以做得更好，這就是為什么我們有硬件背景。 > `[00:09:28]` You know I\'d studied mechanical engineering as hairiness before there was a D school so we were kind of in the schools. `[00:09:28]` 你知道我在 D 學校之前學過機械工程，所以我們在學校里。 > `[00:09:33]` We knew a little bit about it and some electricals was we knew a little bit about how to make things better enough to be dangerous enough to think that we could do it. `[00:09:33]` 我們對這件事有一點了解，有些電子產品是，我們知道如何使事情變得更好，使之變得足夠危險，以至于我們認為我們能做到這一點。 > But knowing what I know now it\'s totally insane that we did it right. 但是知道我現在所知道的，我們做得對是完全瘋狂的。 > `[00:09:48]` And I can\'t believe that anyway. `[00:09:48]` 無論如何，我都不敢相信。 > That\'s so. 的確如此。 > I can\'t believe that people thought we might actually be able to do it right. 我不敢相信人們認為我們可能真的能做得對。 > And and so you know again long story short we kind of together some parts and were able to raise some capital to go build the horror device. 所以，你知道，長話短說，我們在一起，一些部分，能夠籌集一些資金，去建造恐怖裝置。 > `[00:10:05]` Now again in those days building consumer hardware as a start up was totally insane. `[00:10:05]` 現在，再一次，在那些日子里，建立消費硬件作為一種開始是完全瘋狂的。 > I think you know we did a study at that time the only other sort of venture funded consumer hardware company. 我想你知道，當時我們做了一項研究，這是唯一家風險投資的消費硬件公司。 > There\'s two had been apple right whenever that was in the late 70s and then palm. 在 70 年代末的時候，有兩個蘋果，然后是棕櫚樹。 > `[00:10:28]` Oh my God. `[00:10:28]` 哦，我的天啊。 > And Pompe didn\'t really stay around very long it became part ofU.S. 龐普并沒有真正停留很久，它成為了美國的一部分。 > Robotics even before they launched the company. 機器人技術甚至在公司成立之前就已經開始了。 > And so there had been no examples. 所以沒有任何例子。 > If you look and say OK this is something that we took the cycle built the product scale the build distribution got it out and then there was there was an exit so there was no sort of pattern that people could point to in talking to anybody I mean there was big failures I go in some of these when Bill Campbell\'s vote with that joint or these guys. 如果你看一看，然后說，好的，這是我們采取的周期，建立了產品的規模，產品的發行，得到了它，然后有一個出口，所以沒有一種模式，人們可以指出在與任何人交談，我的意思是，有重大的失敗，當比爾坎貝爾投票給那個聯席或這些家伙。 > And so just convincing people that we knew it was going to take to do that was really really hard and I remember when we raised venture capital in 2003 it was like when the only deals the firm at the time it Don. 因此，讓人們相信，我們知道要這么做是非常困難的。我記得我們在 2003 年籌集風險資本的時候，當時唯一的一筆交易就是“唐”(Don)。 > And it was insane to go build the stuff and then we set about going to build our first kind of consumer heads and that\'s when we started really think about design. 去建造這些東西是很瘋狂的，然后我們開始建造我們的第一種消費頭腦，那就是我們真正開始思考設計的時候。 > And before that you know in the valley design was a sort of thing that once you had a little momentum you might put like a cool case on something or a different color or whatever and if you wonder peel the women you made it pink and and is saw what people thought of design. 在此之前，你知道，在山谷里，設計是一種東西，一旦你有了一點動力，你可能會把一個酷的盒子放在什么東西上，或者換一種顏色，或者其他什么東西，如果你想要剝掉那些女人的皮，你就會把它變成粉紅色，然后看到人們對設計的 > The only other company that was really sort of saying that there is this intersection of technology design was Apple in 0 1 0 2 really with the iPod at a mass scale. 唯一家真正在說技術設計的交叉點的公司是蘋果公司(Apple in 0.0 2)，它與 iPod 的規模相當大。 > And so for us we were fortunate to have such a great you know kind of tip of the arrow in apples are going in cutting down the path in front of us. 所以對我們來說，我們很幸運，我們有這樣一個偉大的人，你知道，蘋果里的箭尖正在切斷我們前面的小徑。 > And again so long story short we we put these elements together and we we realize how hard it was to take these complex algorithms and to figure out all of the little details you needed to think about in order to make this product great. 長話短說，我們把這些元素組合在一起，我們意識到，要想把這些復雜的算法和所有你需要考慮的細節搞清楚，要想使這個產品更好，是多么困難。 > And you know sometimes I sort of sit and wonder. 你知道，有時候我會坐下來想知道。 > We make lots of products and I\'ve been fortunate ship tens of millions of things. 我們生產了很多產品，我有幸運送了數以千萬計的東西。 > But I look at you know Tesla makes cars and I think about all the details that we have to think about to get it right and I can\'t imagine how you can sort of process all of that all the time from you know there\'s just a million different things that can go wrong that you have to think about when you build a car. 但是我看你知道特斯拉制造汽車，我想出了我們必須考慮的所有細節，我無法想象你怎么能一直在處理這些事情，因為你知道，當你制造一輛汽車時，只有無數不同的東西會出錯。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And it\'s it\'s not dissimilar when you build these very complex consumer products where you\'ve got software interacting with hardware and now talking to the cloud and how do these things work. 當你構建這些非常復雜的消費產品時，你會發現軟件與硬件交互，現在與云對話，以及這些東西是如何工作的。 > There\'s very little patience people have for things not working anyway so kind of flash forward. 人們對不起作用的事情沒有耐心，所以就像向前看一樣。 > We ended up launching our first consumer product which was a headset and it was it. 最后，我們推出了我們的第一款消費產品，那就是耳機。 > And there was sort of a precursor where I knew that we might be going wrong on this. 有一種前兆，我知道我們在這件事上可能出了問題。 > This first product and I had the first time I was fortune of means Steve Jobs was in mid 2004 right before on Walton carers conference because we were going on stage to debut our product and it had been set up to meet him is the god of consumer electronics right. 這是我第一次獲得財富，史蒂夫·喬布斯在 2004 年年中的沃爾頓護理員大會上，因為我們將要登臺亮相我們的產品，它是為了滿足他而設的，是消費電子權利之神。 > `[00:13:17]` And I once saw him and it was for 45 minutes of absolute just I\'m not united Scriba we just got killed. `[00:13:17]` 我曾經見過他，那是 45 分鐘的絕對時間，只是我不團結，斯克里巴，我們剛剛被殺了。 > Absolutely killed on every single decision every single edge every single technology decision the crazy part is I knew everything that he said was right and we had known that deep in our hearts and we didn\'t because we were trying to meet a timetable and because we were trying to you know not run out of money and ship the thing on time we sort of made all these tradeoffs and we compromised a lot of things that we know it\'s knew better on. 在每一個決定中，每一個單一的決定，每一個技術的決定，瘋狂的部分是，我知道他所說的一切都是正確的，而我們內心深處就知道，我們并不是因為我們試圖遵守時間表，而是因為我們在努力，你知道，沒有耗盡資金，準時發貨，我們做到了這一切。權衡，我們妥協了很多事情，我們知道它是更好的。 > And for me it was a really galvanizing moment because I remember that hey you know this guy who\'s really good at this is telling me that that was wrong and we shouldn\'t compromise on what we know is true right. 對我來說，這是一個振奮人心的時刻，因為我記得，嘿，你知道，這個人非常擅長這一點，他告訴我這是錯誤的，我們不應該在我們所知道的真正正確的事情上妥協。 > `[00:14:07]` Was the first one is like shit we should have gone with our got sort of harsh but valuable feedback. `[00:14:07]` 是第一個，我們應該帶著我們得到的嚴厲但有價值的反饋而去。 > Totally okay. 完全沒問題。 > `[00:14:14]` It was unemotional but like brutal just really really really brutal. `[00:14:00]` 這不是情緒化的，而是殘忍的，非常殘忍的。 > You know just cutting like go down the only place I remember we were talking about like this thing was crazy and if anyone\'s ever certainly played on in this audience remembers it. 你知道，就像下去一樣，我記得我們談論的唯一的地方，就像這件事是瘋狂的，如果有誰在這個觀眾中演奏過，那就記住了。 > But it was a big head said and it connected to a clip on your belt and then it plugged into your phone and we were arguing about the clip and the guy at the time that we had hired was like Oh no. 但是它是一個大腦袋，它連接到你皮帶上的一個夾子上，然后插到你的手機上，我們在爭論那個剪輯，而我們雇傭的那個家伙就像哦，不。 > But you will clip this through your belt and Steve was like the only place they will ever clip that is in your mind. 但是你會把它從你的腰帶里剪下來，史蒂夫就像他們在你腦子里唯一的地方。 > `[00:14:47]` And he was right. `[00:14:47]` 他是對的。 > `[00:14:48]` He was right. `[00:14:48]` 他是對的。 > We probably saw more units sitting here right now than we did of that first brought it because it shipped it got all this great buzz. 我們可能看到更多的單位坐在這里，現在比我們做的第一次帶來它，因為它發運，它得到了這么大的轟動。 > We were products of the year and time magazine sort of and we saw five of them because it was because it had all these problems. 我們是年度和“時代”雜志的產品，我們看到了其中的五個，因為這是因為它有所有這些問題。 > We knew that it was this cool technology that was this really interesting intersection of wait we didn\'t stay true to the kind of customer experience and the problem that we\'re trying to solve for the user. 我們知道，正是這種很酷的技術，才是等待的真正有趣的交集，我們沒有忠實于客戶體驗和我們試圖為用戶解決的問題。 > We compromise all these things to meet all these schedule criteria. 我們妥協所有這些事情，以滿足所有這些時間表的標準。 > Funny and are real constraints. 有趣而且是真正的約束。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > `[00:15:21]` And when you follow your instinct didn\'t follow the gut that gut instinct we knew better and that was the hardest thing about my conversation with Steve and I did Sinnamon e-mail after that saying you were right on everything. `[00:15:21]` 當你跟隨你的直覺的時候，你的直覺并沒有跟隨我們更清楚的直覺，這是我和史蒂夫的談話中最難的事情，在那之后，我寫了一封信納蒙的電子郵件，說你是對的。 > I appreciate that you actually took the time to be honest with me because few people are. 我很感激你真的花時間對我說實話，因為很少有人這樣做。 > In. 在……里面 > And it was it was sort of he was always like that with us. 對我們來說，他一直都是這樣的。 > And then we launched several other products with Apple like the Jambox and up and all those things we had a great relationship with our company and continue to but we learned a lot from my experience. 然后，我們與蘋果推出了其他幾款產品，比如 Jambox 和 UP，以及所有這些我們與我們公司有著良好關系的東西，而且還在繼續，但我們從我的經驗中學到了很多。 > So going a little bit further on what happened. 所以對發生的事情再深入一點。 > We have launched this thing was totally stillborn didn\'t sell any. 我們已經推出了這東西，完全是死胎，一點也不賣。 > We ran out of money. 我們沒錢了。 > And now it was like oh my god what do we do. 現在我的天哪，我們該怎么辦？ > And again very long story short people at the time they were supporting us are investors sort of lost faith and they shut the company down. 同樣，長話短說，當他們支持我們的時候，他們是投資者，失去了信心，他們關閉了公司。 > People don\'t realize it\'s like almost shut down. 人們沒有意識到這幾乎是關閉了。 > All the employees were laid off. 所有的雇員都被解雇了。 > They literally chained the doors and they chain the doors in the chains locks the whole thing. 他們用鏈子把門拴起來，把門鎖在鎖鏈上，把整個東西鎖上。 > `[00:16:24]` I have a letter of says everyone we don\'t see any value in this thing with many all the employees it was gone right. `[00:16:24]` 我有一封信說，我們不認為這件事有什么價值，因為它的許多雇員都走了。 > Because in those days as entrepreneurs and founders it\'s a lot more friendly now than it used to be from investors like you actually get to control your company. 因為在那些時候，作為企業家和創始人，現在的公司比以前的投資者友好得多，因為你實際上可以控制你的公司。 > `[00:16:38]` Actually we were kicked off the board we weren\'t sure kicked off the board account password we didn\'t have a say in these kinds of competition it was like thanks very much for your ideas. `[00:16:38]` 事實上，我們被踢出了董事會，我們不確定是否取消了董事會賬戶密碼，我們在這種競爭中沒有發言權，這就像非常感謝你的想法。 > We\'ll take it from here. 我們從這里開始吧。 > `[00:16:48]` So well that\'s changed a lot. `[00:16:48]` 太好了，變化很大。 > So what shows up in their chains their chains of doors. 所以在他們的鎖鏈里出現了什么。 > `[00:16:53]` But the thing that I had in my Cofan really had as we still believed that we had created something special. `[00:16:53]` 但是我在我的 Cofan 中所擁有的東西，因為我們仍然相信我們創造了一些特別的東西。 > We still believed in the mission and we still believe that we could improve people\'s lives and that we could allow them to communicate better and that we could sort of push this step forward. 我們仍然相信這一使命，我們仍然相信我們可以改善人們的生活，我們可以讓他們更好地交流，我們可以推動這一步向前邁進。 > And so what we ended up doing is we\'re kind of wrestling back from those investors. 因此，我們最終所做的是，我們在某種程度上是那些投資者的反擊。 > I think it\'s a good plan. 我覺得這是個好計劃。 > We had 60 grand in the bank 600 grand dad. 我們在銀行里有 6 萬塊爸爸。 > We took another good Darboe contract and we focused it and said What are all those mistakes that we made that we knew better on. 我們又簽了一份好的 Darboe 合同，我們集中精力，說出了我們所犯的錯誤，我們更清楚這些錯誤是什么。 > And often failure is the best teacher that you can have right. 失敗往往是你能擁有的最好的老師。 > Because you learn so much more because you think about every single angle of 540 degrees you look at again and again and again and you look at what went wrong and why did that happen. 因為你學到的更多，因為你想到了每一個 540 度的角度，你再看一遍，你看到了哪里出了問題，為什么會這樣。 > `[00:17:39]` Are you using a pen at this point. `[00:17:39]` 你現在用的是鋼筆嗎？ > `[00:17:41]` Are your investors still in voir where they just sort of go they said Just go take it away or go to the board last time just go do whatever. `[00:17:41]` 你的投資者還在準備什么嗎？他們說，去拿去吧，或者上次去董事會，做什么都行。 > Okay. 好的。 > It wasn\'t even they were. 他們都不是。 > It wasn\'t even a considered decision was good you\'re starting with a blank slate blank slate. 這甚至不是一個經過深思熟慮的決定是好的，你是從一個空白的板子開始的。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > `[00:17:56]` And we had this cool technology that had all this promise and people resonated with it when they got in so we figured out that it had to get into the right package of the right form or the right way that people could access it and interact with it. `[00:17:56]` 我們有這樣一種很酷的技術，它有著所有的承諾，當人們加入的時候，人們對它產生了共鳴，所以我們發現它必須進入正確的形式或正確的方式，人們可以訪問它并與它交互。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And so we had failed on what I think about sort of is all what design is all about which is the attention to the right details and resolving those details to make the best possible experience for the customer. 所以我們在我的想法上失敗了-設計是什么-關注正確的細節，解決這些細節，為客戶提供盡可能好的體驗。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And we\'ve missed that. 我們已經錯過了。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And we\'ve missed it in a big way and it nearly put us out. 我們在很大程度上錯過了它，它幾乎把我們淘汰了。 > And so again you know we focus for the next two years we work for no salaries kept Darpas sort kept the lights on as did our friends and families. 因此，你知道，接下來的兩年里，我們將精力集中在無薪工作上，讓達帕斯繼續工作，就像我們的朋友和家人一樣，讓燈一直亮著。 > And then we focused on our first headset and that was when we started to think about wearable computing actually. 然后我們把注意力集中在我們的第一款耳機上，那時我們開始考慮可穿戴計算。 > And it\'s funny because now everyone talks about wearables everyday people every hour I get a question about wearables and where is it going and what\'s happening. 這很有趣，因為現在每個人每天都在談論可穿戴設備，我每小時都有一個關于可穿戴設備的問題。 > That\'s when we start to think about these things in your body that have all this computing power how are they going to try to services and all that stuff Sony as we plowed through that those two years of probably another you know two days of crazy stories. 就在那時，我們開始思考那些在你身體里有這么多計算能力的東西 > `[00:19:00]` Can you talk at all about the shipping. `[00:19:00]` 你能談談航運嗎？ > `[00:19:03]` You love the Celesio we went through two years no salaries. `[00:19:03]` 你愛西萊西奧，我們經歷了兩年，沒有薪水。 > We had you know Vienneau and David Weiden from Kosal ventures it helped us get a deal with AT&T to launch are you know kind of next generation Bluetooth headset and everything is lined up. 我們有來自科索沃風險投資公司的 Vienneau 和 DavidWeiden，他們幫助我們與 AT&T 公司達成了一項協議，推出了下一代藍牙耳機，一切都安排好了。 > `[00:19:20]` We have big customer we still can raise much capital to get it off the ground. `[00:19:20]` 我們有很大的客戶，我們仍然可以籌集大量的資金來實現這一目標。 > It was tough but Venona and David sort of solemn promise that kind of just advising us to see what would happen. 這是艱難的，但維諾娜和大衛的莊嚴承諾，只是建議我們看看會發生什么。 > And we were trying to launch it was late in December. 我們正試圖在 12 月晚些時候推出它。 > We had product in a dock in New York and the manufacturer wouldn\'t release it to us because we didn\'t have any money in the bank. 我們在紐約的一個碼頭上有產品，制造商不愿意把它給我們，因為我們銀行里沒有錢。 > We literally had like twenty seven hundred dollars in the bank and we had to figure out how to get those products released out ofU.S. 我們銀行里有大約 2700 美元，我們得想辦法把這些產品從美國出口出去。 > Customs they could deliver to AT&T Cingular. 海關可以送到 AT&T Cingular。 > `[00:19:53]` It\'s time to get into stores which are like Chris Chris Christmas and anyone that\'s launching your product like December 21st is not a good time entreprise for Christmas. `[00:19:53]` 是時候進入像克里斯·耶誕節這樣的商店了，任何像 12 月 21 日這樣發布你產品的人都不是圣誕節的好時機。 > It\'s kind of too late. 現在已經太晚了。 > So that was a whole nother story so we convince you to still take it in. 所以這是另一個故事，所以我們說服你仍然接受它。 > And then one of our earliest Angels is guys Chris Birch an awesome. 我們最早的天使之一是克里斯·伯奇，一個很棒的人。 > They gave us a letter of credit to unlock and I had to go to JFK to go flying the Customs people and figure out what the harmonized code was for this type of product and get them to release the stuff so it could get in to stores and Mossberg wrote about in the journal and it sold out in a few hours. 他們給了我們一張信用證來解鎖，我不得不去肯尼迪機場，讓海關人員飛過去，弄清楚這類產品的統一代碼是什么，然后讓他們發布這些東西，這樣它就可以進入商店了，Mossberg 在雜志上寫到，幾個小時內就賣完了。 > Wow. 哇 > `[00:20:33]` I think we went from zero to 70 million in revenue in the first year. `[00:20:33]` 我認為我們第一年的收入從零降到了 7000 萬。 > So that\'s the thing that I learned that I hope people take away is when you actually go focus on ruthlessly what those things are that you\'re trying to solve those problems. 這就是我學到的東西，我希望人們拿走的是當你真正去無情地專注于那些你試圖解決這些問題的東西。 > You can transform your business like that. 你可以這樣改變你的生意。 > The other stuff sort of you\'ve got to figure it out it\'s not easy but that\'s the core thing. 其他的東西，你必須弄清楚，這并不容易，但這是核心的事情。 > Right. 對啊。 > And if you don\'t do it everything gets really bad. 如果你不這么做，一切都會變得很糟糕。 > And if you do then you can build from there and things transform overnight like that. 如果你這樣做了，你就可以從那里建立起來，事情就會像這樣在一夜之間發生變化。 > `[00:21:03]` So literally it was like this it was like overnight overnight overnight. `[00:21:03]` 所以從字面上說，就像在一夜之間一樣。 > `[00:21:06]` Then what happened then we had to go build a business we had to scale we had to build a team we weren\'t fortunate in that situation where you know we would raised a bunch of money built out our team made the product. `[00:21:06]` 然后發生了什么，我們必須去建立一個企業，我們必須擴大規模，我們必須建立一個團隊，我們不是幸運的，在那種情況下，你知道我們會籌集到大量資金，我們的團隊制造了這個產品。 > It was a success that we could scale from that we had no infrastructure right so we went 070 million with a consumer hardware product with like at that moment in the beginning of December of 0 or sorry beginning of January 07 we had 16 people. 這是一個成功，我們可以擴大，我們沒有基礎設施的權利，所以我們購買了 07 億的消費硬件產品，就像在 012 月初的那個時刻，或者在 07 年 1 月初，我們有 16 個人。 > So we scaled that Ellisville revenue grew to like 22. 所以我們把 Ellisville 的收入增加到 22。 > And that\'s when you know the node and Marken Banten Benowitz American resellers cloud guys all kind of came in and we started to build the company and then you know we had this sort of streaming 2000 a business was growing growing growing and then all of a sudden you know you had the big meltdown of 2008 where Lehman Brothers exploded and we found ourselves with a million units on backorder and all of a sudden those orders just got canceled and we had like 70 million or 50 or 70 million dollars worth of inventory in China we had to go then learn to work that down and we spent a lot of 2009 working that down to zero did a big deal costs go to move it. 那就是當你知道節點和 Marken Banten Benowitz 美國經銷商云中人的時候，我們開始建立公司，然后你知道我們有這樣的流 2000 業務在增長，然后突然你知道你經歷了 2008 年的大崩潰，雷曼兄弟爆發了，我們發現我們有一百萬。這些訂單突然被取消了，我們在中國有大約七千萬或者五千萬到七千萬美元的庫存，我們不得不學習如何降低庫存，我們花了很多時間把它降到零，花費了很大的成本來轉移它。 > `[00:22:17]` So it was just you know all of these bumps and bruises and again we experience it in in the fall of 2011. `[00:22:17]` 只是你知道所有這些顛簸和瘀傷，我們在 2011 年秋天又經歷了一次。 > You know we had I had announced this product on stage this foray using all the stuff we learned about sensors and headsets and now translate it to health and it was this massive problem. 你知道，我已經在舞臺上宣布了這個產品，這個嘗試使用了我們學到的關于傳感器和耳機的所有東西，現在我們把它轉化為健康，這是一個巨大的問題。 > I literally debut the thing on stage at TED and we\'re like a billion media impressions around it. 我真的在 TED 的舞臺上首次登臺，我們就像一個十億的媒體印象圍繞著它。 > `[00:22:42]` And it was the most hype product. `[00:22:42]` 它是最炒作的產品。 > I still think it was the fastest selling third party product in the history of Apple Retail that fall and it was going out there and all of a sudden we were starting to hear issues of them breaking at scale and we didn\'t we couldn\'t even get units back to figure out what was wrong fast enough. 我仍然認為，這是蘋果零售史上銷量最快的第三方產品，當時它正在上市，突然間，我們開始聽到它們的規模縮小的問題，我們甚至沒能讓手機盡快找到出問題的地方。 > And here was this sort of incredibly hyped product. 這是一種令人難以置信的炒作產品。 > We had to try. 我們得試一試。 > We were thinking about levitating in that category even before we had learned how to crawl let alone walk. 我們甚至還沒有學會爬行，更不用說走路了。 > And you know all this hype and you don\'t even know what to do with respect to the consumer. 你知道所有這些炒作，你甚至不知道該如何對待消費者。 > I think we\'re fortunate because we\'ve been through some hard times. 我認為我們很幸運，因為我們經歷了一些困難時期。 > So there is a DNA in the organization that we could sort of take a step back and say you know what. 組織中有一個 DNA，我們可以退一步說，你知道嗎。 > Like let\'s just try to figure out what\'s happening first principle as it\'s make sure we take care of the customer make sure our users are happy that you know the first question I ask is are we doing any physical harm to people. 比如，讓我們試著弄清楚到底發生了什么，第一條原則是確保我們照顧客戶，確保我們的用戶高興，你知道，我問的第一個問題是，我們是否對人們造成了身體傷害。 > Anything wrong is it like hurting people. 有什么不對就像傷害別人一樣。 > Not okay. 不太好。 > What\'s happening. 發生了什么\。 > Fire is catching fire is burning people\'s risk. 火災正在燃燒著人們的風險。 > That happened one of our competitors. 我們的競爭對手之一。 > Not good. 不太好。 > So you know you know I think that you got to sort of go from there. 所以你知道，我認為你應該從那里開始。 > We had been fortunate that we\'ve been through hard times it was never the sort of straight shot of success. 我們很幸運，我們經歷過困難時期，這從來不是成功的直接機會。 > And I often tell people like look the problems that you see appearance when you\'re five people with you know a you know tens of thousands of dollars in the bank versus when you\'re you know worth billions in market value and hundreds of millions of dollars in big channels because they are no less existential or nerve racking. 我經常告訴人們，當你是五個人的時候，你會看到你所看到的問題，你知道銀行里有數萬美元，而你知道，你知道價值數十億的市值，在大渠道里有數億美元的價值，因為它們同樣是存在主義和神經質的折磨。 > They\'re just a different scales. 他們只是一個不同的尺度。 > And so if you learn to sort of persevere through those things and you focus on the things that matter you\'ll carry those skills with you through the whole journey. 因此，如果你學會了堅持這些事情，并且專注于那些重要的事情，你將在整個旅程中隨身攜帶這些技能。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And don\'t forget those lessons of of what it was like to be on the ground with you know kicked your teeth kicked in and they saw their blood and how you go through it and then what we ended up doing with up is we we figured out that we had an issue. 別忘了那些教訓，你知道，踢你的牙齒，他們看到了他們的血，然后我們做了最后的事情，我們發現我們有了問題。 > And I sat down and wrote a letter and said to people that I\'m sorry we made a mistake and we screwed up and give you your money back and keep the product. 我坐下來，寫了一封信，對人們說，我很抱歉我們犯了一個錯誤，我們搞砸了，把錢還給了你，并保留了產品。 > And you know we\'ll take you through it and we\'re gonna go fix this stuff and we back in. 你知道，我們會帶你度過難關的，我們要去修理這些東西，然后再回去。 > And when we came back consumers embraced us and you know people I was surprised because the reaction the letter went from I was getting death threats on Twitter to literally my life to you know some people saying wow like that\'s the example of how you treat customers and all we were we weren\'t trying to think about that we were just like what\'s the right thing to do. 當我們回來的時候，消費者擁抱了我們，你知道的人，我很驚訝，因為這封信從我在 Twitter 上收到的死亡威脅到我的生活，你知道，有些人說，哇，就像你對待顧客的例子，我們沒有試著去想，我們只是想做正確的事情。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > `[00:25:15]` So I feel like I\'d tell people never to start a competitor to a job or any of your products like the toughest founder he\'s been through. `[00:25:15]` 所以我覺得我會告訴人們，不要像他所經歷過的最強硬的創始人那樣，開始競爭一份工作或你的任何產品。 > So my bed never survive. 所以我的床再也活不下去了。 > So we have a couple more minutes. 所以我們還有幾分鐘時間。 > I know there\'s so much I wanted to get through. 我知道我很想通過。 > `[00:25:29]` Hopefully that was the good news. 希望這是個好消息。 > `[00:25:31]` We talked about some of the Near Death fans that I love. `[00:25:31]` 我們談論了一些我喜歡的瀕臨死亡的粉絲。 > You talk about how hard it is to take software and hardware and data and bring them together. 你會談論把軟件、硬件和數據結合在一起有多難。 > `[00:25:41]` So it\'s well I mean what we\'re doing now is I feel like everything over the last 14 years has been a preparation for it. `[00:25:41]` 我的意思是，我們現在所做的是，我覺得過去 14 年里的每件事都是為它做的準備。 > I feel like we\'ve been going to school where we learn how to build these great high design products. 我覺得我們已經去了學校，在那里我們學習如何制造這些偉大的高設計產品。 > And we\'ve been fortunate to be sort of recognized for it. 我們很幸運被認可了。 > And one of the things that was interesting about the first launch is we had built our own application from scratch. 第一次發布的有趣之處之一是我們從零開始構建了自己的應用程序。 > We\'d never done that before. 我們以前從沒這么做過。 > You know in 2011 Begaye 2011 we didn\'t have an application team. 你知道，在 2011 年，Begaye，2011 年，我們沒有一個應用團隊。 > We had to build that from scratch. 我們必須從頭開始建造。 > And so one of the things that the hardware defects matched was how crap our apples. 所以硬件缺陷匹配的原因之一就是我們的蘋果有多爛。 > It was really bad. 真的很糟糕。 > A lot of my friends like Zork and all these little guys said What are you doing making software. 我的許多朋友，像佐克和所有這些小家伙都說，你在做什么做軟件。 > We\'ve always made software just that the algorithm level for more analyst stuff but you know it was a really tough learning experience to get people who come from the application world to work with people who work in hardware and not to have them work in silos. 我們一直在制作軟件，這只是更多分析師的算法水平，但你知道，要讓來自應用程序世界的人與硬件工作人員一起工作，而不是讓他們在筒倉工作，這是一種非常艱難的學習體驗。 > And then some magical point for it all to come together you realize that doesn\'t actually work. 然后，一些神奇的觀點，讓所有的一切走到一起，你會意識到，這實際上是行不通的。 > And so I used a lot of 2012 the kind of rip it all down and say look it what we learn in hardware\'s you have to make stuff that people will pay you more than what it costs you to make which is a really interesting discipline because you end up being really focused on is this good enough that someone would take a dollar out and pay you for it. 所以我用了很多 2012 年的時間-把它全部撕下來，然后說，看看我們在硬件上學到的東西-你必須制造出人們付給你的東西，而不是你所花的錢-這是一門非常有趣的學科，因為你最終會真正專注于這樣一個好東西-有人會拿出一美元，并為此付錢給你。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > In App development in lots of Web Volm and mobile apps people don\'t have that discipline because you don\'t everything is free and it just sort of moves quickly and so people iterate and you just figure out stuff but there isn\'t that discipline of like is it good. 在很多 Web、Volm 和移動應用程序的應用程序開發中，人們沒有這種規則，因為你不是所有的東西都是免費的，它只是移動得很快，所以人們就會迭代，你就會發現一些東西，但是沒有那種類似的規則，它好嗎？ > Are we solving that problem. 我們能解決這個問題嗎。 > Will people pay us for it. 人們會為此付出代價嗎。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And so we took that sort of a sensibility from the hardware team and we kind of tried to get our software guys to think about their experiences in that way around trying to resolve it to a point where yeah we\'re making decisions and we\'re making judgments on where this is going to go and how it comes together. 所以我們從硬件團隊那里獲得了這種感覺，我們試著讓我們的軟件人員思考他們的經驗，試圖解決這個問題，我們正在做出決定，我們正在對這件事的走向和它是如何結合起來的做出判斷。 > But then we got the speed at which the software guys could iterate sort of infuse our hardware it seems as though they tried to get the best of each of these things were and then ultimately what it is I organize it against the user problem and I said we are solving this customer problem and we were going to use these things as tools whether it be the software app or we\'re going to solve that hardware or going to solve in the cloud with data. 但是我們得到了軟件人員可以迭代的速度，好像他們試圖從每一件事情中得到最好的結果，最終，我針對用戶問題組織了它，我說我們正在解決這個客戶問題，我們將把這些東西作為工具使用，不管它是什么軟件應用或者我們要解決硬件問題，或者用數據解決云中問題。 > That was another new thing for us is to build the whole data science team. 這對我們來說是另一件新的事情，那就是建立整個數據科學團隊。 > I think we have a world class when we start to publish a lot of those results. 我認為，當我們開始發布大量這些結果時，我們就擁有了一個世界級的水平。 > I measured as world class because Google and Facebook and these guys are trying to recruit out of our team which I think is a sign that you\'ve arrived when the big shots are trying to steal your people. 我之所以被評為世界級，是因為谷歌和 Facebook 以及這些家伙正試圖從我們的團隊中招募人才，我認為這是一個跡象，表明當大人物試圖竊取你的員工時，你已經到達了。 > But you know putting all those elements together and getting them all talk to each other because they speak different languages is really difficult and I think that\'s the new tip of the arrow right and I think this comes back to that advantage that we have against people who have traditionally been successful in CS CS totally different than what it was. 但你知道，把所有這些元素組合在一起，讓它們彼此交流，因為它們說不同的語言是非常困難的，我認為這是箭頭的新尖，我認為這又回到了我們對抗那些傳統上在計算機控制領域取得成功的人的優勢。 > There are a lot of these dumb boxes their boxes where the application experience and software is just as important as what you physically touch. 有很多這些愚蠢的盒子，它們的盒子里，應用程序的體驗和軟件和你實際接觸到的東西一樣重要。 > And there\'s a there\'s a melding of those lines I tell people when we think of design in mobile applications it\'s something between three dimensions and two dimensions. 當我們想到移動應用程序中的設計時，我告訴人們，這是一種介于三維和二維之間的東西。 > It\'s not like just a little visual thing you\'ve got it you\'ve got to interact with and that\'s not quite three dimensions where you can feel the button but it\'s something in between and we\'re sort of putting this piece together but again it\'s all about here\'s the problem we\'re trying to solve and how do these pieces how do you move around actually go solve that. 它不只是一個視覺的東西，你需要與它互動，這不是一個你能感覺到按鈕的三維，但它是介于兩者之間的東西，我們把這個東西放在一起，但這又是關于我們想要解決的問題，以及這些碎片是如何移動的，如何真正解決這個問題。 > `[00:29:12]` Well sadly we are over. `[00:29:12]` 很遺憾，我們已經結束了。 > Thank you. 謝謝。 > Congratulations on all of your hard won second half. 恭喜你下半場辛苦地贏了。 > `[00:29:19]` I\'m obsessed with my Jambox many thank you for coming today. `[00:29:19]` 我對我的占卜盒很著迷，非常感謝你今天能來。