# Andrew Mason at Startup School SV 2014 > `[00:00:02]` That was a really good intro for making it up just then. `[00:00:02]` 這真是一個很好的介紹，正好在那時。 > It definitely sounded like that like it was bad in the way jazz is bad. 聽起來就像爵士樂不好一樣。 > `[00:00:10]` Well you\'re you\'re dodging the question of that wonderful music we\'re just listening tail from your album hardly workin. `[00:00:10]` 好吧，你在回避美妙音樂的問題，我們只是在聽你專輯中的尾聲，這很難奏效。 > Please check it out. 請檢查一下。 > It\'s awesome. 太棒了。 > It\'s on iTunes you can buy it. 它在 iTunes 上你可以買到。 > I\'m not sure what song was that that was. 我不知道那是哪首歌。 > `[00:00:27]` Look no further. `[00:00:27]` 別再看了。 > Yeah. 嗯 > And it\'s about how you can find. 這是關于你如何找到。 > `[00:00:33]` You don\'t need to be reading like business books or anything like that in order to learn how to be great at business. `[00:00:33]` 你不需要像讀商務書之類的東西去學習如何在商業上表現出色。 > You can find beauty in witnessing the birth of an octopus for example or other such natural wonders. 例如，你可以在見證章魚的誕生或其他類似的自然奇觀中找到美。 > `[00:00:47]` I had specifically requested risin apostrophe above the pack because that\'s my favorite. `[00:00:47]` 我特別要求把冒號放在包上，因為那是我的最愛。 > But anyway that\'s one of my favorites Sam. 但不管怎么說，這是我的最愛之一，山姆。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > `[00:00:57]` Thank you for coming. `[00:00:57]` 謝謝你來。 > I\'d love to spend a few minutes before we get into Groupon. 在我們進入 Groupon 之前，我想花幾分鐘時間。 > I know the audience is probably excited to hear about Groupon but to hear about before Groupon you started a company called The point I\'d love to hear a little bit about that specifically. 我知道觀眾們聽到 Groupon 的消息可能很興奮，但在 Groupon 之前，你創辦了一家名為“觀點”的公司，我很想專門聽一些這方面的內容。 > `[00:01:14]` Like just just how you came up with the idea and what went wrong with it why it didn\'t work. `[00:01:14]` 就像你是如何想出這個主意的，以及它出了什么問題，為什么它不起作用。 > `[00:01:22]` You know how you got started that kind of thing because it led to Groupon and led to Groupon. `[00:01:22]` 你知道你是如何開始這種事情的，因為它導致了 Groupon 和 Groupon。 > So I think it\'s this an awkward looking way to sit in a chair. 所以我覺得這是一種尷尬的坐在椅子上的方式。 > I feel extremely awkward. 我覺得很尷尬。 > Kathleen back that\'s for sure. 凱薩琳回來了，那是肯定的。 > `[00:01:35]` So maybe just you do look a little uncomfortable. `[00:01:35]` 也許只是你看起來有點不舒服。 > `[00:01:40]` OK so so I had the idea for this website called the point when I was a grad student at University of Chicago in public policy and the idea was it was going to be the social platform that would that would allow people to come together in order organize to either take some kind of collective action or give money toward something but only once they hit a tipping point of participation that got everybody to that everybody knew that their effort would be worthwhile. `[00:01:40]` 好吧，當我還是芝加哥大學公共政策專業的研究生時，我對這個網站有了一個想法，那就是它將成為一個社交平臺，讓人們聚在一起，組織起來，采取某種集體行動，或者為某件事提供資金，但只有當他們遇到問題時，才會這樣做。參與的臨界點讓每個人都知道他們的努力是值得的。 > `[00:02:10]` So it\'s kind of like a precursor to things like Kickstarter and others. `[00:02:10]` 所以它就像是像 Kickstarter 和其他東西的前兆。 > `[00:02:16]` Indigo Yeah. `[00:02:16]` 靛藍是的。 > And why did you guys fund them. 你們為什么要資助他們。 > No she spoke today. 不她今天說了。 > `[00:02:22]` Oh OK. `[00:02:22]` 哦，好的。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Fabulous talk. 精彩的談話。 > `[00:02:26]` So so so I had been a developer before I went back to grad school and. `[00:02:26]` 這么說，在我回到研究生院之前，我已經是一名開發人員了。 > `[00:02:33]` And somebody that I had worked with heard about the idea through a mutual acquaintance and called me up one day and said I want to give you a million dollars to for you to drop out of school and work on this idea. `[00:02:33]` 和我一起工作的人通過一個相互認識的人聽說了這個想法，有一天打電話給我，說我想給你一百萬美元，讓你輟學，為這個想法工作。 > And at the time this was 2006 I guess I didn\'t know anything about starting a tech company we were in Chicago like I didn\'t even I didn\'t know anything about. 而在 2006 年的時候，我想我對創辦一家科技公司一無所知，我們在芝加哥，就像我甚至不知道任何事情一樣。 > `[00:02:56]` I wasn\'t really like a student of the game so to wait it was like an inbound inbound haul. `[00:02:56]` 我并不是真正喜歡這個游戲的學生，所以等待它就像一次進站的收獲。 > Yeah. 嗯 > You had William Dollar. 你有威廉·杜拉。 > `[00:03:04]` I mean it wasn\'t on the phone like a bunch of things that a bunch of things happened between the million dollars and the phone call but the phone call was can you come to my office and pitch this thing to me. `[00:03:04]` 我的意思是，我的意思不是電話里有一大堆事情發生在百萬美元和電話之間，但電話是，你能來我的辦公室把這件事介紹給我嗎？ > Okay. 好的。 > And then a week later it was a million dollars. 一周后，是一百萬美元。 > `[00:03:16]` And so you really didn\'t know what you were doing at this point in terms of starting a startup. `[00:03:16]` 所以你真的不知道現在你在啟動一家公司的時候在做什么。 > No. 否 > `[00:03:20]` And at later points as well it turns out. `[00:03:20]` 后來也證明了這一點。 > `[00:03:27]` So so that\'s how it got started. `[00:03:27]` 就是這樣開始的。 > `[00:03:30]` So we started I guess in the beginning of 2006 launched the point in September 2006 floundered for about a year before pivoting into Groupon. `[00:03:30]` 所以我們開始了-我想是在 2006 年初-在 2006 年 9 月發布了這個觀點，掙扎了大約一年，然后才轉向 Groupon。 > `[00:03:43]` So it\'s like the high level arc and I can dive in on any of those parts that did you just get this million dollars in funding before you did Groupon. `[00:03:43]` 所以這就像一個高水平的弧線，我可以潛入其中的任何部分，你在 Groupon 之前就得到了這一百萬美元的資助。 > `[00:03:53]` No we then we then after launching the point we raised money from NEA. `[00:03:53]` 不，我們提出這個觀點后，我們向 NEA 籌集了資金。 > `[00:03:58]` Okay. `[00:03:58]` 好的。 > So another like four or 5 million dollars. 所以另一個像四五百萬美元。 > Okay so you were floundering at what point did you realize like this isn\'t working and it\'s time to do something else because I think you know we heard a lot of advice today like you have to believe in your idea. 好吧，你在什么時候掙扎，你意識到這不管用，現在是時候做點別的事情了，因為我想你知道我們今天聽到了很多建議，就像你必須相信你的想法一樣。 > Even if all your friends say it stinks like at what point did you say time2. 即使你所有的朋友都說它很臭，你說的時間是什么時候呢？ > `[00:04:19]` Yeah I mean I can tell you some low points in that period in kind of the summer of 2007. `[00:04:19]` 是的，我的意思是，在 2007 年夏天的那個時期，我可以告訴你一些低谷。 > But honestly like there was never a point when I was like This isn\'t going to work. 但老實說，當我這樣做的時候，我從來沒有說過這樣的話是行不通的。 > We started Groupon as a side project and we\'re running at launch Groupon in about 30 days and we were running it at the same time that we were running the point. 我們將 Groupon 作為一個附帶項目啟動，大約 30 天后我們就會啟動 Groupon，我們在運行 Groupon 的同時也在運行這個項目。 > `[00:04:40]` And I was able to kind of shift my attention to Groupon without ever admitting to myself that the point is like coming to that conclusion. `[00:04:40]` 我能夠把我的注意力轉移到 Groupon 身上，而沒有向自己承認這一點就像是得出了這個結論。 > I think I\'m a little bit more nimble about that the sort of decisions now in balancing the kind of resolve and stubborn stubbornness that you need while still accepting when something\'s just not working. 我想我在這方面要靈活一些-在平衡你所需要的那種決心和頑固的固執時，當某些事情不起作用的時候，我還是會接受的那種決定。 > `[00:05:03]` But at the time it wasn\'t so. `[00:05:03]` 但當時并非如此。 > So we just did them both at the same time. 所以我們只是同時做了這兩件事。 > `[00:05:09]` There were some in that period after we launched Everyday we\'d we\'d have maybe a thousand visitors to the Web site. `[00:05:09]` 在我們每天發布后的那段時間里，我們可能會有一千人訪問這個網站。 > And like sometimes we would get some press or something and it would peak but it would always come right back down and we were trying everything I remember at one time we started trying. 就像有時我們會得到一些新聞或什么的，它會達到頂峰，但它總是會回來，我們嘗試了我記得的每一次，我們開始嘗試。 > `[00:05:29]` We started trying to search engine marketing and we had a number of campaigns on the points in each one of these campaigns where around like a social issue typically that we were trying to drive traffic to and we thought well if we can get people to join these campaigns then they\'ll become users and then they\'ll they\'ll spread it and join other campaigns and this is how we can kind of get things going. `[00:05:29]` 我們開始嘗試搜索引擎營銷，在每一項活動中，我們都做了一些活動，這些活動就像一個社會問題，我們試圖把流量吸引到那里，我們認為如果我們能讓人們加入這些活動，他們就會成為用戶，然后他們就會傳播它，加入其他運動，這就是我們如何才能讓事情發展起來。 > And so one there is one campaign that we found that we could get really cheap subscribers to and it was the legalize weed campaign. 因此，有一個運動，我們發現，我們可以得到真正便宜的訂戶，這是合法的大麻運動。 > And there was a community of people that really rallied around this particular issue. 有一群人真的聚集在這個特定的問題上。 > Now you know what. 現在你知道嗎。 > `[00:06:10]` They\'re called juggalos. `[00:06:10]` 他們叫朱加洛斯。 > You don\'t Juggalos are you know Juggalos are so Juggalos are are insane insane clown posse fans. 你不知道胡加洛斯，你知道嗎，胡加洛斯是那么的瘋狂小丑群的球迷。 > And I mean you shouldn\'t you should check them out on YouTube or something like this a group of people that takes pride in being stupid and they\'re just enormous trolls. 我的意思是，你不應該在 YouTube 或類似的網站上查看他們-一群以愚蠢而自豪的人，他們只是巨大的巨魔。 > `[00:06:32]` So they ended up trolling not just like they did what we wanted them to do which was which was kind of in fact the site only instead of infecting it with joy and like you know high value customers that we could you know sell to advertisers or something like that. `[00:06:32]` 所以他們最終不只是像我們想要他們做的那樣做了-事實上，這只是網站，而不是快樂地感染它，就像你知道的，高價值的客戶，我們知道，可以賣給廣告商或諸如此類的東西。 > It they infected it was just trolling us. 他們感染了它只是在玩弄我們。 > So they would go to all these other great campaigns and just troll everybody that was joining them and so it was awful. 所以他們會參加所有其他偉大的競選活動，只會對所有加入他們的人進行騷擾，所以這太可怕了。 > `[00:07:01]` Wow. `[00:07:01]` 哇。 > `[00:07:02]` Did not know that Jaglom story if I think back on that time and I think if I ever wanted to make a movie or a documentary about how hard it was how how intense and irrational it is to build a startup I think I would go and find the people who who quit companies like the point in that phase or any other startup because most startups have this phase when things just aren\'t working. `[00:07:02]` 我不知道 Jaglom 的故事，如果我回想起那段時間，我想如果我想拍一部電影或紀錄片，說明創業有多么艱難和不合理，我想我會去找那些離開公司的人，就像那個階段或者任何其他創業公司，因為大多數初創公司都是如此。當事情不順利的時候，就有這個階段。 > `[00:07:32]` And I can tell you at least for the point what you would find is they were completely like rational awesome people and they were quitting for the most awesome reasons. `[00:07:32]` 我至少可以告訴你們，你們會發現，他們完全像理性的、令人敬畏的人，他們辭職是出于最令人敬畏的理由。 > Like if you went back and interviewed them they would say Andrew was insane like he had no idea what he was doing like we were there was there was no real strategy. 比如，如果你回去采訪他們，他們會說安德魯瘋了，好像他不知道自己在做什么，就像我們一樣，沒有真正的策略。 > It was shifting every other day. 它每隔一天改變一次。 > I like it. 我喜歡它。 > It have made perfect sense to anyone that they told the story that those people quit. 他們講述那些人辭職的故事，這對任何人來說都是非常有意義的。 > And it\'s the people who for whatever reason didn\'t have that perfect sense that stuck around and turned this thing into something that turned out to be huge. 正是這些人，不管出于什么原因，并沒有那種完美的感覺，堅持了下來，把這件事變成了一件大事。 > `[00:08:09]` So I don\'t know what the lesson there. `[00:08:09]` 所以我不知道那是什么課。 > `[00:08:12]` Got to be a little bit crazy and a believer you know to be in a startup. `[00:08:12]` 一定是有點瘋狂，而且是你所知道的在創業中的信徒。 > So let\'s talk about Groupon. 那么讓我們談談 Groupon 吧。 > You said users started it simultaneously with the point why and how did you get the idea. 你說用戶同時開始它的時候，為什么和你是如何得到這個想法的。 > Sort of what happened. 有點像發生了什么。 > `[00:08:27]` So the why is because it was clear to us that the point wasn\'t working. `[00:08:27]` 所以，原因是因為我們清楚地知道，這一點是行不通的。 > Our investors were starting to hint that they wanted to take their money back. 我們的投資者開始暗示他們想收回他們的錢。 > `[00:08:36]` And `[00:08:38]` so we were just trying everything we could think of and you know the story of how I had the idea for Groupon was just well we know that group buying is one potential business model for this. `[00:08:36]` 和`[00:08:38]` 所以我們只是在嘗試我們能想到的一切-你知道我是怎么想到 Groupon 的-我們知道團購是一種潛在的商業模式。 > We know that people have been trying to do. 我們知道人們一直在努力。 > We know that people have been trying to do group purchasing campaigns using the points where you get a group of people together that try to negotiate with their with a local business in order to get a discount. 我們知道，人們一直在嘗試進行集體采購活動，使用的方法是讓一群人聚在一起，試圖與當地企業談判，以獲得折扣。 > `[00:09:11]` Why don\'t we just go out and do that and why don\'t we do like a local version of it like it was a Web site that we all liked. `[00:09:11]` 為什么我們不出去做那件事呢？為什么我們不喜歡它的本地版本，就像我們都喜歡的網站一樣。 > And this deal a day thing really seemed really seemed compelling so. 今天的交易看起來真的很有說服力。 > So that\'s what we did. 所以這就是我們所做的。 > `[00:09:26]` And I had a hard time getting the rest of the team excited about doing this little like coupon side project. `[00:09:26]` 我很難讓團隊的其他成員對做這個類似優惠券的小項目感到興奮。 > And I knew how to code well enough that I could build a template for WordPress. 我知道如何編寫足夠好的代碼，這樣我就可以為 WordPress 構建一個模板。 > So we built a custom template for WordPress. 所以我們為 WordPress 構建了一個定制模板。 > We bought get your Groupon dot com. 我們買了 GET 你的 Groupon 網站。 > And everyday we would have a new post and embedded in that post would be a little widget that included all the e-commerce guts of the point. 每天，我們都會有一個新的帖子，在那篇文章中嵌入了一個小部件，它包含了所有電子商務的核心內容。 > But like the first version of the point of group online excuse me when you when you bought a deal you would get an e-mail that said Thanks for joining this campaign on the point. 但是，就像在線團購版的第一版一樣，請原諒我，當你買了一筆交易時，你會收到一封電子郵件，上面寫著感謝你在這一點上參加了這次活動。 > For 20 for ten for 20 at Motel Bar or something like that. 在汽車旅館酒吧付 20 英鎊買 10 英鎊，或者諸如此類的。 > Like it was totally hacked together but it was enough to show that it was something that people really wanted. 就像它是完全被黑在一起的，但這足以證明它是人們真正想要的東西。 > `[00:10:15]` And so we were just running to try to keep up with demand pretty much from that first. `[00:10:15]` 所以我們只是試圖從一開始就跟上需求。 > `[00:10:21]` From that first deal do you remember what the first Groupon actually like. `[00:10:21]` 從第一筆交易開始，你還記得第一張 Groupon 到底喜歡什么嗎？ > `[00:10:25]` Yeah it was a a business that was in the ground floor of our building called motel bar that that had was a bar. `[00:10:25]` 是的，在我們大樓的底層，一家叫做汽車旅館的酒吧曾經是一家酒吧。 > But they sold pizza. 但他們賣披薩。 > `[00:10:34]` So we did two for one pizza deal that we negotiated with them up until the last minute it was going to be an E a local e-commerce company that sold sports themed garter belts. `[00:10:34]` 所以我們做了兩件比薩餅生意，我們和他們談判了到最后一分鐘，它將是一家當地的電子商務公司，銷售運動主題的吊帶。 > `[00:10:49]` And that wasn\'t a joke. `[00:10:49]` 那可不是開玩笑。 > It was it wasn\'t us trying to be like funny. 不是我們想要變得有趣。 > `[00:10:53]` We had way too much of the fear of death and us to think about being funny at that time. `[00:10:53]` 我們對死亡的恐懼太多了，我們當時根本沒有想過自己是個有趣的人。 > It was it was they were the only people that we could convince to take us seriously. 是因為他們是我們唯一能說服我們認真對待我們的人。 > `[00:11:07]` So you watch this and you say Wait we might be on to something. `[00:11:07]` 所以你看這個，你說等待，我們可能會發現什么。 > So at what point did you realize whoa all of this is taking off. 你是在什么時候意識到，哇，這一切都在起飛。 > `[00:11:16]` Like when did it really start to go up. `[00:11:16]` 就像什么時候它真的開始上升一樣。 > `[00:11:20]` Pretty soon it was. `[00:11:20]` 很快就到了。 > After a couple of weeks it was clear that it was clear that we were on to something. 幾周后，很明顯我們發現了一些事情。 > And. 和 > `[00:11:30]` After a couple of months we would start doing kind of extrapolations where projections of well if this continues this is how big this thing is going to be and we\'d look at those numbers and all kind of shake our heads and say there\'s no way like this would make us the fastest growing company in history. `[00:11:30]` 幾個月后，我們開始做一些推斷，如果這種預測持續下去，這件事會有多大，我們會看看這些數字，然后搖頭說，這樣的話，我們不可能成為歷史上增長最快的公司。 > `[00:11:49]` And then it was. `[00:11:49]` 然后是。 > `[00:11:52]` Yeah. `[00:11:52]` 是的。 > So tell me. 那就告訴我。 > `[00:11:54]` Like you\'re the fastest growing company in history. `[00:11:54]` 和你一樣，你是歷史上成長最快的公司。 > A couple things I want to ask about that. 我想問幾件事。 > First of all usually fast growing companies are like sort of disastrous internally or having some disasters go on internally. 首先，通常情況下，快速增長的公司在內部就像是災難性的，或者有一些災難發生在內部。 > `[00:12:07]` Can you talk about some of the stuff that broke within Groupon as you\'re trying to keep up with that growth in the in the early days. `[00:12:07]` 當你試圖跟上早期的增長時，你能談談 Groupon 內部的一些突破嗎？ > Yeah OK. 好的，好的。 > `[00:12:16]` In the early days I mean everything. `[00:12:16]` 在早期，我是指一切。 > `[00:12:22]` Laughter We were I\'m trying to think of a good specific example of something that broke. `[00:12:22]` `[00:12:22]` > `[00:12:32]` I mean for the first six months we were getting the way that we were generating the actual Groupon vouchers was a FileMaker app like we would export all the data from from the production database to a FileMaker database and then email them through life by creating a script that opened individual emails in mail dot app and would pause every every 30 emails to make sure that we didn\'t crash the computer. `[00:12:32]` 我的意思是，在最初的六個月里，我們所獲得的實際 Groupon 優惠券是一個 FileMaker 應用程序，就像我們將所有數據從生產數據庫導出到 FileMaker 數據庫，然后通過創建一個腳本，在郵件點應用程序中打開單獨的電子郵件，然后每隔 30 封電子郵件就暫停一次，以確保我們沒有使計算機崩潰。 > It was really just held together with with tape and then as we expanded internationally I mean I don\'t know how many that the maximum number of different platforms like completely independent technology platforms we were on but it was maybe like 7 or 10 or something like that. 它真的是和磁帶結合在一起的，當我們在國際上擴張的時候，我的意思是，我不知道有多少個不同的平臺，比如我們所使用的完全獨立的技術平臺，但是它可能是 7 或 10 個，或者類似的。 > So it was a very competitive environment. 所以這是一個競爭非常激烈的環境。 > And because of that and we thought that first mover advantage made a big difference. 正因為如此，我們認為先發優勢帶來了很大的不同。 > `[00:13:30]` So we moved very very fast and tended to push off anything that could be pushed off. `[00:13:30]` 所以我們移動得很快，并且傾向于推開任何可能被推開的東西。 > `[00:13:39]` So first mover advantage so many people Coppedge you like the most Koppy Web site ever. `[00:13:39]` 所以先行者優勢如此之多，你喜歡科佩奇最喜歡的網站。 > Why do you think that. 你為什么認為。 > What made you guys win. 是什么讓你們贏了。 > `[00:13:51]` Because it is easy to copy. `[00:13:51]` 因為它很容易復制。 > I mean we built Groupon in a month it was basically like a newsletter right. 我是說，我們在一個月內就建立了 Groupon，這基本上就像一份時事通訊。 > And then you have to get people to go out and negotiate one deal a day in order to be in a city. 然后，你必須讓人們每天出去談判一筆交易，這樣才能進入城市。 > So getting started is not hard at all. 所以起步并不難。 > Scaling it ended up being difficult providing a consistently good customer experience proved to be difficult. 事實證明，提供持續良好的客戶體驗是很困難的。 > `[00:14:10]` But a lot of people it\'s not hard to get started at least so back to the scaling thing again Sorry I\'m jumping but I know you have all these questions. `[00:14:10]` 但是很多人 > Can you give any advice out there that would be for the people out there about scaling any of their thoughts on like what you need to be thinking about like what mistakes don\'t make it here. 你能不能給外面的人提供一些建議，讓他們把自己的想法擴展到你需要思考的事情上，就像錯誤不會在這里發生一樣。 > `[00:14:32]` If you\'re trying to scale a company quickly. `[00:14:32]` 如果你想迅速擴大一家公司的規模。 > `[00:14:36]` Well I certainly wouldn\'t do what we did in less. `[00:14:36]` 好吧，我肯定不會做我們做得更少的事。 > `[00:14:40]` You\'re in like I can\'t imagine your business is going to be in a similar competitive environment to ours. `[00:14:40]` 你所處的環境就像我想象不到的那樣，你的生意會和我們的一樣，處于一個競爭的環境中。 > `[00:14:48]` But the reason that we we we were adding for example when we launched in in Europe I think we went from 50 people in the first month to a couple hundred people in the third month to 1000 people by the 6 month or the ninth month or something like that. `[00:14:48]` 但是我們加入的原因，例如，當我們在歐洲推出的時候，我想我們從第一個月的 50 人增加到第三個月的幾百人，到 6 個月或第 9 個月就增加到 1000 人，或者諸如此類的事情。 > Like we\'re adding people so fast that the tendons that usually form to hold a culture together didn\'t really have time. 就像我們把人加得太快一樣，通常用來維系一種文化的肌腱沒有足夠的時間。 > So that\'s just one of the costs that you incur. 所以這只是你要付出的代價之一。 > And it ended up making it very difficult to to have a kind of a global value system that people just intrinsically understood how we think about customers. 最后，這使得我們很難有一個全球性的價值體系，人們只是從本質上理解我們如何看待客戶。 > `[00:15:36]` So I would guess I\'m saying what I wouldn\'t do that we did what we did that worked really well was we identified like a unit a group on unit which was each city and then we came up with a playbook that we could just rinse and repeat over and over and over again. `[00:15:36]` 所以我想說的是我不愿意做的事，我們做過的事情，我們做得很好，就像一個單位，一個小組，每個城市，然后我們想出了一個劇本，我們可以一遍又一遍地沖洗和重復。 > So when we decided we wanted to be in in 30 markets after we already had three markets where we were working we kind of said OK we know what we need for each market what is our org chart look like when we when we\'re in 30 cities let\'s work backwards and start hiring. 因此，當我們決定要進入 30 個市場時，我們已經有三個市場在工作了，我們說，好吧，我們知道每個市場需要什么，當我們在 30 個城市時，我們的組織結構圖是什么樣子的，讓我們向后工作并開始招聘。 > And that to some degree we\'re thinking about it the same way at detour which is also a local model like once we feel like we have product market fit. 在某種程度上，我們在繞道的時候也是這樣想的，這也是一種本地模式，就像我們一旦感覺到產品市場適合我們就會這樣。 > It\'s gonna be a similar kind of rinse and repeat model. 這將是一種類似的漂洗和重復模式。 > `[00:16:24]` So how do you expand internationally while keeping the culture in mind. `[00:16:24]` 那么，你是如何在牢記文化的同時，在國際上擴張的呢？ > `[00:16:30]` Koury. `[00:16:30]` Koury. > How do you make sure that you don\'t measure company company culture. 你如何確保你沒有衡量公司文化。 > `[00:16:36]` That\'s a good question. `[00:16:36]` 這是個好問題。 > I mean I\'m probably the wrong person to ask because I don\'t think we really succeeded at it. 我的意思是我問錯人了，因為我不認為我們真的成功了。 > `[00:16:45]` I can tell you what I would do differently is is make sure that the problem. `[00:16:45]` 我可以告訴你們，我會做不同的事情，就是確保問題。 > `[00:16:53]` Let me let me tell you about how we expanded and take a step back if that\'s OK. `[00:16:53]` 讓我來告訴你們，如果可以的話，我們是如何擴展的，并后退一步。 > `[00:17:00]` We know when we announced our funding I think in 2009 9 maybe 2010 from from Excel we knew that we\'d been intentionally keeping a low radar because we knew the business was easy easily copyable so that was like the first time we were ever in tech crunch and we knew at that point that everybody was going to start copying us. `[00:17:00]` 我們知道，當我們宣布我們的資金時，我認為在 2009 年，9，也許是 2010 年，我們知道我們一直在故意保持低雷達，因為我們知道這個業務很容易被復制，所以這就像我們第一次處于技術危機中，我們當時知道每個人都會開始模仿我們。 > And that\'s what happened. 事情就是這樣的。 > And so there was a lot of urgency to figure out our international strategy at that point and we started off by just interviewing people like you know executives that we would basing like Amsterdam or London or whatever. 因此，在那個時候，我們迫切需要制定我們的國際戰略，我們一開始只是采訪像你這樣的人，知道我們會在阿姆斯特丹、倫敦等地工作的高管。 > `[00:17:38]` Who who would build our international operation from scratch. `[00:17:38]` 誰會從零開始建立我們的國際業務。 > And as we were doing these interviews we were seeing even faster than we anticipated clones popping up. 當我們進行這些采訪時，我們看到的速度甚至比我們預期的要快。 > And so we said God we really need to talk to these people and this was for me personally one of the most difficult growth moments because I hated the clones and I mean like I didn\'t hate them. 所以我們說，上帝，我們真的需要和這些人交談，這對我個人來說是最艱難的成長時刻之一，因為我討厭克隆人，我的意思是我不恨他們。 > From a business perspective. 從商業角度來看。 > I hated them as human beings. 作為人類我恨他們。 > `[00:18:05]` Like I just found I still like to be honest. `[00:18:05]` 就像我剛發現的那樣，我仍然喜歡誠實。 > `[00:18:09]` Like find it so foul like the reasons that I got into building startups and then comparing that to the reasons I like to think that somebody I mean an important lesson now because it\'s incredibly demoralizing when someone just blatantly rips you off. `[00:18:09]` 就像我創建初創公司的原因一樣，我覺得這是如此的骯臟，然后把它與我認為我現在是一個重要的教訓的原因進行比較，因為當有人公然地攻擊你時，這是令人難以置信的士氣低落。 > Yeah. 嗯 > `[00:18:29]` So so I kind of sucked it up and we started bringing people to Chicago to meet with them and meet with these different clones. `[00:18:29]` 所以我把它吸了起來，我們開始帶人們到芝加哥去見他們，和這些不同的克隆人見面。 > I remember I remember the first one kind of sitting in my office I was going to meet them downstairs at Motel Bar where we did that deal. 我記得第一次坐在我的辦公室，我打算在樓下的汽車旅館酒吧和他們見面，我們在那里做了這筆交易。 > I remember sitting in my office and kind of trying to get my stuff in a Zen like state and try to think about like even the worst human beings you know they have there. 我記得坐在我的辦公室里，試著把我的東西放在一個禪宗的狀態中，試著去思考，即使是最壞的人，你知道他們在那里。 > If you try to see if you can see the world through their eyes like it makes a lot of sense. 如果你試著看看你是否能通過他們的眼睛看到世界，那就很有道理了。 > People aren\'t usually evil crazy or stupid. 人們通常不邪惡、瘋狂或愚蠢。 > So I was there and I went downstairs to meet them and instead of getting right into business I was just like so let\'s just talk to each other as as humans. 所以我在那里，我下樓去見他們，而不是直接做生意，我就像這樣，讓我們像人類一樣彼此交談。 > `[00:19:07]` Man like what are you into. `[00:19:07]` 你喜歡什么樣的人。 > `[00:19:10]` What are your hobbies. `[00:19:10]` 你的愛好是什么？ > And he was like well I collect coins and I thought to myself That\'s stupidest hobby that I can but I said Come on Andrew. 他就像我收集硬幣，我想這是我能做的最愚蠢的愛好，但我說，得了吧，安德魯。 > `[00:19:26]` Open mind and then I said Well like why do you collect. `[00:19:26]` 開誠布公，然后我說，就像你為什么要收藏一樣。 > Why do you collect coins and. 你為什么要收集硬幣。 > And he was like Do you like to like hold them and think about all the hands that they\'ve passed through or like you know think about the history or something. 他說，你喜歡握著他們，想想他們走過的所有的手，或者像你們所知道的那樣，想想歷史什么的。 > `[00:19:39]` My dad collects coins like applause. `[00:19:39]` 我爸爸像掌聲一樣收集硬幣。 > All right well. 好吧。 > `[00:19:47]` Let me I\'m sure there are good reasons to collect coins laughter but this guy didn\'t have one. `[00:19:47]` 讓我相信有充分的理由收集硬幣笑聲，但這家伙沒有一個。 > So what he said was I like to I like to I like to sit on my couch on the weekend and I open my safe and I take it out and I think about how valuable it is. 所以他說，周末我喜歡坐在沙發上，打開保險柜，拿出保險箱，想一想它有多值錢。 > And I was like exactly that\'s exactly who I thought you would be. 我就像我想的那樣\就是我想你會成為的那個人。 > So we didn\'t do that deal. 所以我們沒有做那個交易。 > But then but then we met the Samier brothers who we ended up doing a deal with. 但是后來我們遇到了薩米爾兄弟，最后我們和他們做了交易。 > `[00:20:14]` And they were just like super super smart. `[00:20:14]` 他們就像超級聰明。 > Like clearly savvy and we it was clear that these guys were going to like if we wanted to play in Europe then we were going to play with them or we could just put it off and do something later. 很明顯，如果我們想在歐洲踢球，那么我們就會和他們一起踢球，或者我們可以推遲比賽，然后再做點什么。 > `[00:20:30]` But they sort of have a bad reputation for copying people like why did you buy them. `[00:20:30]` 但是他們有個壞名聲，因為他們模仿別人，就像你為什么要買他們一樣。 > `[00:20:39]` Well I think the copying thing is just emotional. `[00:20:39]` 嗯，我認為復制的東西只是情緒化的。 > `[00:20:44]` They also they have a bad reputation for like building unsustainable businesses and that would be a better reason to question my judgment. `[00:20:44]` 他們也因為建立不可持續的企業而聲名狼藉，這將是質疑我判斷的更好的理由。 > `[00:20:53]` I did. `[00:20:53]` 我做了。 > I think I read they had like huge turnover in employees and didn\'t really care about the user experience which seemed opposite to Groupon. 我想我讀到他們的員工流失率很高，并不在乎用戶體驗，而用戶體驗似乎與 Groupon 截然相反。 > `[00:21:03]` So so what I\'d say if I was doing it again I think I would be I would be very thoughtful about making sure that if I am going to do an acquisition that the people that are running the show across the pond would be 100 percent values aligned with me because as the company gets bigger like part of the reason we did an acquisition is because we were still in a knife fight in theU.S. `[00:21:03]` 所以我要說的是，如果我再做一次，我想我會非常仔細地確保，如果我要進行一次收購，那么負責整個節目的人將百分之百地與我保持一致，因為隨著公司變得越來越大，就像我們進行收購的原因一樣，這是因為在美國，我們還在針鋒相對。 > like we think that we would be able to pay any attention overseas. 就像我們認為我們能夠在海外給予任何關注一樣。 > So we really needed to have somebody that we would be able to trust. 所以我們真的需要一個我們可以信任的人。 > And you can align with them on things from time to time but it\'s the million little decisions that you\'d never that are never even brought up to your attention that really make the difference between success and failure. 你可以不時地在事情上與他們保持一致，但真正決定成功與失敗的真正區別的是那些你從未被吸引過的小小的決定，而這些小小的決定卻從來沒有引起過你的注意。 > `[00:21:53]` So so so that\'s why it\'s so important that you find people who you\'re really aligned with on a on a values level. `[00:21:53]` 所以，這就是為什么你能在價值觀層面上找到你真正與之一致的人，這就是為什么它如此重要的原因。 > `[00:22:00]` Speaking of acquisitions Groupon almost got acquired. `[00:22:00]` 說到收購，Groupon 幾乎被收購了。 > Can you talk a little bit about that story. 你能談談那個故事嗎。 > `[00:22:09]` Sure. `[00:22:09]` 當然。 > So I think it started with Yahoo. 所以我認為它是從雅虎開始的。 > Approaching us unsolicited. 主動接近我們。 > If I remember correctly and they offered they made kind of over the transom offer they kind of hinted that they would they would buy us for something like 2 billion dollar range in a million dollar range. 如果我沒記錯的話，他們提出的建議是，他們的出價有點過了，他們暗示他們會以 20 億美元的價格在 100 萬美元的范圍內買下我們。 > Yeah. 嗯 > So somewhere around there. 所以在附近的某個地方。 > And and I really did not want to sell to Yahoo. 我真的不想賣給雅虎。 > I didn\'t want to sell at all. 我根本不想賣。 > I really didn\'t want to sell to Yahoo. 我真的不想賣給雅虎。 > And the board the board was interested. 董事會對此很感興趣。 > As is the board\'s responsibility to be interested in stuff like that. 董事會有責任對這樣的事情感興趣。 > `[00:22:55]` So I managed to get a meeting with with Google with the thought being that if we can get them interested that\'s a better place to end up than than Yahoo. `[00:22:55]` 所以我設法和谷歌開了個會，我的想法是，如果我們能讓他們感興趣，那將是一個比雅虎更好的地方。 > `[00:23:06]` And laughter. `[00:23:06]` 和笑聲。 > `[00:23:07]` And that went really well. `[00:23:07]` 這件事進行得很順利。 > At the same time that was happening. 同時也發生了這樣的事情。 > It was it was getting into the holiday season and the business was just taking off on a level that we had never seen before. 這是進入假日季節和業務剛剛起飛的水平，我們從來沒有見過。 > So it kind of fortuitously just as that conversation was happening you know we were looking at our numbers and the board sat down and said it would be it would be foolish to sell at this point we think this company can be much more much more valuable independently. 所以，就在那次談話發生的時候，你知道我們正在看我們的數據，董事會坐下來說，在這個時候出售股票是愚蠢的，我們認為這家公司可以獨立地賣得更有價值。 > And so we kept going. 所以我們繼續前進。 > `[00:23:41]` You didn\'t want to sell. `[00:23:41]` 你不想賣。 > You were happy to keep working. 你很樂意繼續工作。 > `[00:23:44]` Yeah I didn\'t want to sell you know I don\'t know why. `[00:23:44]` 是的，我不想賣，你知道我不知道為什么。 > `[00:23:48]` Meaning I\'m meaning I don\'t know. `[00:23:48]` 意思是我不知道。 > `[00:23:53]` I really don\'t know if I have a just deep like kind of sense of ownership around these things and I don\'t want anybody else to own the company or if I didn\'t think it was the right thing for the business. `[00:23:53]` 我真的不知道我是否對這些事情有一種深刻的主人翁感，我不想讓其他人擁有這家公司，或者我不認為這對公司來說是正確的。 > `[00:24:10]` My my point of view on it now like I\'ve I\'ve come to think are how we think about it with like with like detour and what I\'m trying to do by building a business is I think of a business as an opportunity to inject an idea into the world that hopefully makes a difference somehow. `[00:24:10]` 我對這件事的看法是，我現在開始思考的是，我們是如何繞道看待它的，而我試圖通過建立一家企業來做的事情是，我認為企業是一個機會，可以把一個想法注入世界，希望它能帶來一些不同的結果。 > `[00:24:30]` And whether that actual business persists or like is kind of secondary to whether or not the idea has had an impact whether it\'s through your own company or somebody else\'s company. `[00:24:30]` 無論是通過你自己的公司還是其他人的公司，這個想法是否已經產生了影響，這是次要的。 > So that\'s how I that\'s how I think about building businesses now. 所以我現在就是這么想做生意的。 > `[00:24:51]` OK. `[00:24:51]` 好的。 > And I\'m running out of time. 我已經沒時間了。 > I\'m going to take a few extra minutes because I have a couple more questions and I want to get to detour but just very quickly. 我要多花幾分鐘時間，因為我還有幾個問題要問，我想繞道但很快。 > Any advice for founders in this audience thinking of going public some day. 有什么建議給這群想有一天上市的創辦人嗎？ > `[00:25:08]` Going public is awful. `[00:25:08]` 上市太糟糕了。 > It\'s really the worst thing that that I think we ever did. 這是我認為我們做過的最糟糕的事情。 > `[00:25:15]` And I think Groupon would be different if it hadn\'t gone public. `[00:25:15]` 如果 Groupon 沒有上市的話，我認為 Groupon 會有所不同。 > `[00:25:23]` Let me tell you laughter let me tell you a couple. `[00:25:23]` 讓我告訴你笑聲，讓我告訴你幾個。 > `[00:25:29]` I don\'t know why you\'re clapping. `[00:25:29]` 我不知道你為什么鼓掌。 > Why. 為什么 > `[00:25:31]` Why are you clapping because one person to clap. `[00:25:31]` 為什么你因為一個人鼓掌而鼓掌？ > Tell me why you clapped. 告訴我你為什么鼓掌。 > Is it because it\'s like nice to hear me admit that. 聽我承認是因為我很高興。 > Or is it because like honesty. 還是因為誠實。 > `[00:25:39]` OK so here\'s here\'s what it is like. `[00:25:39]` 好的，這就是它的樣子。 > `[00:25:44]` I think at the at the very least 10 percent of your time and for a company like group on 50 percent of your time will now be sucked up by doing something that has nothing to do with building a great company. `[00:25:44]` 我認為你至少有 10%的時間，對于一個像你這樣的公司來說，你 50%的時間都會因為做一些與建立一家偉大的公司毫無關系的事情而被吸收掉。 > It is so tragic. 太悲慘了。 > It\'s like the reason you\'re doing what you\'re doing what you\'re doing now and you\'re slaving away now like you\'re gonna be doing something entirely different that just feels like complete bullshit. 這就像是你做你現在所做的事情的原因，你現在就像你將要做的完全不同的事情一樣，完全是胡說八道。 > `[00:26:09]` Every second that you\'re doing it in less your a sociopath you\'re going to be like I hate this why do I have to do this. `[00:26:09]` 每一秒鐘，你所做的都不是你的反社會者，你會像我一樣討厭這個，為什么我要這樣做呢？ > `[00:26:19]` The other thing is the incentives to think short term are so unbelievably strong the incentives to think quarterly are too strong for any company to resist. `[00:26:19]` 另一件事是，認為短期的動機是如此強烈，認為季度的動機太強，任何公司都無法抗拒。 > I don\'t care what any public company CEO tells you they are making short term tradeoffs all the time. 我不在乎任何上市公司的 CEO 告訴你，他們一直在做短期的權衡。 > And I just think it\'s bad. 我只是覺得這很糟糕。 > I think it\'s bad for for for for business and entrepreneurship. 我認為這對商業和創業都是不利的。 > I don\'t know why anybody would want to do that. 我不知道為什么會有人想這么做。 > So I guess my advice for you is don\'t get consumed by this because you\'ve got to be successful first. 所以我想我對你的建議是，不要被這一切所消耗，因為你必須首先成功。 > But to the degree that you can be thinking about what you can do to set yourself up to to never go public or put it off as long as possible you\'ll be doing it you\'ll you\'ll thank yourself down the road. 但是，在某種程度上，你可以考慮你能做些什么，讓自己永遠不上市，或者盡可能地推遲它，你會這樣做的，你會感謝你自己。 > I mean we were engineered from Verilli very early on because of the way that we were financed to go public relatively quickly and it\'s probably the worst thing. 我的意思是，我們是很早就從 Verilli 設計出來的，因為我們的融資方式是相對迅速地上市的，這可能是最糟糕的事情。 > `[00:27:18]` So avoid going public that I mean it\'s no support. `[00:27:18]` 所以不要公開，我的意思是沒有支持。 > And I also feel like we were a particular brand of shit show. 我也覺得我們是一個特殊品牌的狗屎秀。 > Like let me let me be clear. 讓我說清楚。 > You know like there\'s all kinds of other shit that I did that I could have avoided because we grew so fast. 你知道，就像我做過的其他事情一樣，我本可以避免的，因為我們成長得太快了。 > But I\'m I\'m kind of self-aware enough to I think I\'m objective enough about this to be able to be able to make this judgment universally and say that it\'s we\'re just like the worst example. 但我有足夠的自我意識，我認為我對這件事足夠客觀，能夠做出普遍的判斷，并說我們就像最壞的例子。 > `[00:27:45]` OK. `[00:27:45]` 好的。 > Finally I know I\'m going over to talk about detour quickly and any sort of we actually don\'t like I don\'t want you to think that the only way I agree to do this is to go to plug my new company I want to hear about it I\'ve been wanting to talk to you about deja forever. 最后，我知道我要去快速地談論繞道，任何類型的我們實際上都不想讓你認為我同意這樣做的唯一方法就是去推銷我的新公司-我想聽你說我一直想和你談 Deja 的事。 > `[00:27:59]` OK well then just you know even if you\'re going ask a question about it make sure it\'s one that does feel like it\'s in my I\'ve heard about this really cool company called me. `[00:27:59]` 好吧，那你就知道，即使你要問一個問題，也要確保它確實是我聽說過的一個很酷的公司叫我的公司。 > What I want to know is what does detour and what lessons are you now applying now that you have this blank slate. 我想知道的是，既然你有了這張白板，你現在要學的是什么“繞道”，以及你現在申請什么課程。 > Again you\'re doing a new startup. 再一次，你在做一家新的創業公司。 > What are you doing differently. 你在做什么不同的事。 > `[00:28:21]` GS so detour is their location aware audio walks you put your phone in your pocket and we have these awesome stories that walk you through San Francisco they take about 45 minutes. `[00:28:21]` 所以繞道是他們的位置，音頻步行，你把你的手機放在你的口袋里，我們有這些令人敬畏的故事，帶你穿過舊金山，它們大約需要 45 分鐘。 > They they tell you where to turn. 他們會告訴你在哪里轉彎。 > You can take them in groups. 你可以分組帶他們去。 > It\'s awesome. 太棒了。 > Like I\'m I\'m super proud of it. 好像我對此感到非常驕傲。 > It\'s the most fun thing I\'ve ever done. 這是我做過的最有趣的事。 > And I think everybody\'s really going to love it when they have a chance to use it. 我認為每個人在有機會使用它的時候都會喜歡它的。 > `[00:28:50]` Lesson\'s so many there\'s actually a lot of value value. `[00:28:50]` 課程太多了，實際上有很大的價值。 > `[00:28:59]` One thing that someone said to me we did an off site last week and one thing that somebody said to me that I hadn\'t even thought of is there is a certain amount of like big company structure that I\'m bringing to detour like we have 90 day company goals. `[00:28:59]` 有人對我說，我們上周在場外做了一件事，還有一件事，有人對我說，我甚至沒有想過，有一種類似于大公司的結構，我正在繞道而行，就像我們有 90 天的公司目標一樣。 > We do postmortems on things like nothing that\'s just just stuff to make that makes startups unnecessarily chaotic. 我們做后世的事情，就像什么都不做，只會讓初創公司變得毫無必要的混亂。 > We\'re not doing that stuff. 我們不會那么做的。 > `[00:29:25]` I think the other thing is that the biggest. `[00:29:25]` 我認為另一件事是最大的。 > There\'s certain values that you really have to like. 有一些你必須真正喜歡的價值觀。 > `[00:29:38]` I think what you\'re the definition of values is there the behaviors or principles that you religiously adhere to within your company. `[00:29:38]` 我認為你對價值觀的定義是，在你的公司里，你虔誠地遵守的行為或原則。 > `[00:29:46]` When we say religious I mean that no amount of data will sway you. `[00:29:46]` 當我們說宗教的時候，我的意思是沒有多少數據會動搖你。 > It is from those principles and the degree to which that you have the courage to maintain your conviction around those ideas is the degree to which you\'re going to be successful over the long term. 正是從這些原則和你有勇氣保持你對這些想法的信念的程度，你將在長期內取得成功。 > And I think there are things like around the type of people that you work with around starting with the customer and working backwards that I see startups that at Groupon We rationalized making exceptions. 我認為，在你工作的人周圍，有一些東西，從客戶開始，然后向后工作，我看到在 Groupon 的初創公司，我們理順了例外情況。 > `[00:30:18]` I see why see startups rationalizing exceptions all the time because it\'s it\'s really really hard. `[00:30:00]` 我明白為什么創業公司總是把例外合理化，因為這真的很難。 > `[00:30:26]` And everybody everybody thinks they\'re doing it. `[00:30:26]` 每個人都認為他們在做這件事。 > We thought we were doing it like I thought I was doing and I thought I was consistently starting with the customer and working backwards. 我們認為我們是這樣做的，就像我認為我正在做的一樣，我認為我一直以來都是從客戶開始，然后向后工作。 > `[00:30:34]` And when I wasn\'t I always had a really good excuse that I could explain to someone. `[00:30:00]` 當我還在的時候，我總是有一個很好的借口，我可以向別人解釋。 > But it didn\'t matter. 但這不重要。 > And I feel like those are the biggest mistakes. 我覺得這是最大的錯誤。 > And so like the biggest difference is just having the courage to stick to those convictions. 因此，就像最大的區別就是有勇氣堅持這些信念。 > `[00:30:48]` And it feels so good when you see them pay off and that\'s awesome. `[00:30:48]` 當你看到他們得到回報的時候，感覺好極了，那太棒了。 > Great way to end. 結束的好方法。 > I\'m sorry we went when everybody was too loud applause. 很抱歉，當大家掌聲太大時，我們都去了。