# Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013 > `[00:00:00]` Thank you. `[00:00:00]` 謝謝。 > I have the privilege of saying this is my sixth Startup School and the first time as a presenter and today I\'m going to be sharing with you what I would have wanted to hear of the first five times while I was sitting in your seat. 我很榮幸地說，這是我的第六所創業學校，也是我第一次作為演講者。今天，我將與大家分享我坐在你座位上時想聽到的前五次。 > So I\'m going to start by telling you my story. 所以我先告訴你我的故事。 > The story of my entrepreneurial career starts while I was in college and I had the opportunity to do research in machine learning and sentiment classification and what I did was to try to use that technology to apply to the stock market. 我的創業生涯始于我上大學的時候，我有機會對機器學習和情感分類進行研究，我所做的就是嘗試將這種技術應用于股票市場。 > And so this is a article that Stanford magazine published while I was a junior at Stanford and talks about how they created a computer program that Poris through newspaper articles gauges how well a company is doing based on the amount of positive or negative language used to describe it invest accordingly. 這是我在斯坦福大學三年級時發表的一篇文章，講述了他們是如何創建一個計算機程序的，Poris 是通過報紙的文章來衡量一家公司做得有多好，依據的是用來描述公司投資的積極或消極的語言數量。 > So far so good. 到目前一切尚好。 > According to the article. 根據這篇文章。 > Well here\'s what was actually going on that year after I graduated focused entirely on this one startup by myself. 好吧，這是我畢業后的第二年發生的事情，我完全專注于一家創業公司。 > I was actually starting this company and this is the algorithm I used. 我實際上是在創辦這家公司，這就是我使用的算法。 > `[00:01:01]` Did a bunch of research dot dot dot profit. `[00:01:01]` 做了一堆研究點利潤。 > And we didn\'t quite achieve profit by we I mean me because I was by myself this is a graph that shows the amount of time between when I first wrote a line of code for this company and the time we got our first paying customer laughter for those in the back that\'s not eight months. 我們沒有實現利潤，我是說我，因為我是一個人，這是一個圖表，顯示了從我第一次為這家公司寫一行代碼到我們第一次為后面沒有八個月的客戶發笑的時間。 > `[00:01:25]` That\'s infinity months. `[00:01:25]` 那是無限月。 > `[00:01:28]` So this is a very valuable lesson for me in recognizing the value in having paying customers. `[00:01:28]` 對我來說，這是一個非常寶貴的教訓，讓我認識到擁有付費客戶的價值。 > And so I decided to stop working on sentiment solutions and go to Google and my goal of going to Google was to try to learn the skills that would make me successful as an entrepreneur. 所以我決定停止研究情感解決方案，去谷歌，我去谷歌的目的是努力學習那些能讓我成為一名企業家的技能。 > In particular I wanted to understand what to do in the dot dot dot. 特別是，我想知道在圓點上該做些什么。 > And today I\'m going to share with you what I learned both at Google and then several other startups. 今天，我將和大家分享我在谷歌和其他幾家初創公司學到的東西。 > Since. 從那以后。 > This is my algorithm at Google basically had opportunity to build some great products. 這是我在谷歌的算法基本上有機會建立一些偉大的產品。 > I was one of the first product managers on Google Chrome and so we built a product. 我是谷歌 Chrome 的第一批產品經理之一，所以我們制作了一款產品。 > Google Chrome. 谷歌 Chrome > A good strategy that Google has for distribution is to put the word google in front of the products they build and by doing that you end up getting about 100000 people trying your product right off the bat. 谷歌有一個很好的分銷策略，就是把谷歌這個詞放在他們生產的產品前面，這樣你就能讓大約 100000 人馬上試用你的產品。 > That was very valuable not only because if the product was any good you would grow much faster and you\'d be successful. 這是非常有價值的，不僅因為如果產品是好的，你會增長得更快，你就會成功。 > But because of the feedback that those people would provide as you\'re incrementally improving the product and this is the biggest lesson I learned was that Google as a product manager is the value of a feedback loop. 但是，由于這些人會在你逐步改進產品的過程中提供反饋，這是我學到的最大的教訓，谷歌作為產品經理是反饋回路的價值所在。 > This is one critical thing I was missing at sentiment solutions because I didn\'t have any customers to tell me what they liked or what they didn\'t like. 這是我在情感解決方案中錯過的一件關鍵事情，因為我沒有任何客戶可以告訴我他們喜歡什么或者不喜歡什么。 > I didn\'t even try to sell the products I had no idea what I actually should be building. 我甚至沒有試著去銷售我根本不知道該做什么的產品。 > `[00:02:43]` While I was at Google. `[00:02:43]` 我在谷歌的時候。 > I got lucky enough to be able to sneak in and see Barack Obama speak in November of 2007. 2007 年 11 月，我有幸溜了進來，看到了巴拉克·奧巴馬(BarackObama)的講話。 > `[00:02:51]` At the time he was a senator running for president he had won the Democratic nomination yet and he came to Google and he gave a talk that described how he wanted to take what we\'re doing at Google with evidence and science and feedback and data and bring that to the government. `[00:02:51]` 當他還是一名參議員競選總統時，他還贏得了民主黨的提名，他來到谷歌，做了一次演講，描述了他想如何用證據、科學、反饋和數據來看待我們在谷歌所做的事情，并將其提交給政府。 > After I saw this talk two weeks later I flew to Chicago and signed up as a volunteer. 兩周后，我看到了這個演講，然后飛往芝加哥，報名成為一名志愿者。 > And so I want to share with this audience a few short clips of what Barack Obama said in November 2007 at Google and what inspired me to quit my job fly to Chicago in the dead of winter and join his campaign. 所以我想和大家分享幾段關于巴拉克·奧巴馬 2007 年 11 月在谷歌說過的話，是什么激勵了我辭去工作，在嚴冬飛到芝加哥參加他的競選活動。 > `[00:03:30]` What is the most efficient way to sort of a million 32 bit integers. `[00:03:30]` 什么是最有效的方法來處理百萬 32 位整數。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > `[00:03:37]` Well I\'m sorry. `[00:03:37]` 我很抱歉。 > Maybe not. 也許不會。 > No no no no no. 不。 > I think that\'s not it. 我想不是這樣的。 > I think I think the bubble sort would be the wrong way to go. 我認為泡沫是錯誤的。 > I\'m not a big believer in reason and facts and evidence and science and feedback. 我不太相信理性、事實、證據、科學和反饋。 > `[00:03:56]` Everything that allows you to do what you do. `[00:03:56]` 一切允許你做你所做的事。 > That\'s what we should be doing in our name. 這就是我們應該以我們的名義做的事。 > Now I want I want people in technology I want innovators and engineers and scientists like yourselves I want you helping us make policy based on facts based on reason. 現在我要技術人員，我要創新者，工程師和科學家，像你們一樣，我想要你們幫助我們根據理性的事實制定政策。 > And `[00:04:18]` I think that many of you can help me. `[00:04:18]` 我認為你們中的許多人可以幫助我。 > So I want you to be involved. 所以我想讓你參與進來。 > Thank you so much everybody. 非常感謝大家。 > `[00:04:24]` Well he had me at bubble sort laughter and I decided to fly to Chicago and sign up as a volunteer. `[00:04:24]` 嗯，他讓我在泡泡式的笑聲中，我決定飛到芝加哥，注冊成為一名志愿者。 > And I was lucky enough to be able to join a team that was called the new media team. 我很幸運能夠加入一個被稱為新媒體團隊的團隊。 > And while I was there I got it opportunity to run several experiments called A B tests and those were quite successful so they gave me a job as the Director of Analytics and in this job my mission was to try to figure out how to use data to help make better decisions on the campaign. 當我在那里的時候，我有機會做了幾個叫做 A，B 測試的實驗，這些實驗非常成功，所以他們給了我一份分析主任的工作，在這份工作中，我的任務是找出如何利用數據來幫助我在競選中做出更好的決定。 > `[00:04:55]` Here\'s a picture of our team. `[00:04:55]` 這是我們隊的照片。 > We are part of the new media analytics team and new media was the phrase The campaign used to describe everything they didn\'t really understand. 我們是新媒體分析團隊的一員，而新媒體是這個運動用來描述他們真正不懂的東西的短語。 > So if it wasn\'t TV or radio you fit in new media. 所以，如果不是電視或收音機，你可以加入新媒體。 > And we had the most monitors per square inch of any part of the campaign. 在競選的任何部分，我們每平方英寸都有最多的監視器。 > Here\'s another photo of our team I\'m there in the middle with my back to the TV. 這是我們隊的另一張照片，我背對著電視站在中間。 > This is during the Democratic National Convention. 這是在民主黨全國代表大會期間。 > Well Bill Clinton is giving the keynote speech and broader new media team is watching. 比爾·克林頓(BillClinton)正在做主旨演講，更廣泛的新媒體團隊正在關注。 > I\'m busy setting up anA.B test comparing a picture of Bill Clinton to a picture of Barack Obama on. 我正忙著設置一個 A.B 測試，把比爾·克林頓的照片和巴拉克·奧巴馬的照片進行比較。 > This photo I please ask you to ignore all the bad lights. 這張照片請你不要理會所有的壞光。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > `[00:05:35]` And so the campaign I learned quite a bit. `[00:05:35]` 所以我學到了很多。 > I learned the value of a b testing. 我學到了 b 測試的價值。 > We used products like Google Web site optimizer Omniture test and target now Adobe tests and Target and got a ton of value out of those products. 我們使用了 GoogleWeb 站點優化器、Ombench 測試和目標值等產品，現在使用 Adobe 測試和 Target，從這些產品中獲得了大量的價值。 > But we were constantly bottlenecked on requiring developers to be part of the process. 但在要求開發人員參與這一過程時，我們經常遇到瓶頸。 > And so that pain was the original inspiration for starting optimizing. 所以疼痛是開始優化的最初靈感。 > It took me a while to come to that realization. 我花了一段時間才意識到這一點。 > We actually started several other companies before that and so I got to tell you those stories. 在此之前，我們實際上成立了其他幾家公司，所以我要告訴你們這些故事。 > After the campaign I came back to San Francisco. 競選結束后，我回到了舊金山。 > I convinced a good friend of mine Pete Cuman who is a product manager at Google as well to quit his job and to start a company with me. 我說服了我的一位好朋友皮特·庫曼(PeteCuman)，他也是谷歌(Google)的一名產品經理，他辭去了自己的工作，并與我 > `[00:06:14]` The first company we started together it was called carrot sticks and it was an online math game for kids. `[00:06:14]` 我們一起創辦的第一家公司叫做胡蘿卜棒，這是一個為孩子們提供的在線數學游戲。 > This made it easy for kids to learn math in a social way create an avatar field compete with one another and it was for us an opportunity to try to apply technology to something we really cared about which was education. 這使得孩子們很容易以一種社交的方式學習數學，創造一個相互競爭的化身領域，對我們來說，這是一個嘗試將技術應用到我們真正關心的東西上的機會，那就是教育。 > `[00:06:33]` This was a product we really were still very proud of it still exists out in the world. `[00:06:33]` 這是一個我們真的很自豪的產品，它仍然存在于世界上。 > You can go to care six ICOM and beat up on a bunch of small kids playing math and it slowly loses money over time and we learned a valuable lesson in building carrot sticks and this is the algorithm that describes the time on carrot sticks which was that we would basically build a product. 你可以去照顧六個 ICOM，和一群玩數學的小孩子打架，然后慢慢地賠錢，我們學到了制作胡蘿卜棒的寶貴經驗，這個算法描述了胡蘿卜棒上的時間，也就是說，我們基本上要制作一個產品。 > `[00:06:57]` Sell the product. `[00:06:57]` 出售產品。 > In this case we were selling it to parents. 在這種情況下，我們把它賣給了父母。 > Take their feedback and then try to make our company and our product better. 接受他們的反饋，然后努力使我們的公司和我們的產品更好。 > One challenge here was we were selling to several different constituents of which we were none of we were parents we weren\'t teachers and we weren\'t kids. 我們面臨的一個挑戰是，我們賣給了幾個不同的選民，我們都不是家長，我們不是老師，我們也不是孩子。 > And so this made it very difficult for us to know what to prioritize what to do and what not to do. 因此，這使得我們很難知道該做什么和不該做什么。 > And as a startup it\'s really really important to focus on the one or two things that make you really really valuable and unique so in that process we learned the value of the feedback loop we could get better over time but because we didn\'t really build a product for ourselves is very hard for us to understand how to prioritize. 作為一家初創公司，關注一兩件讓你真正有價值和獨特的事情是非常重要的，因此在這個過程中，我們學會了反饋回路的價值，隨著時間的推移，我們可以變得更好。但是，因為我們沒有真正為自己打造一個產品，所以我們很難理解如何確定優先級。 > We also had a really big challenge with distribution. 我們在分銷方面也面臨著很大的挑戰。 > It\'s very difficult to get parents and teachers to adopt our technology. 讓家長和老師采用我們的技術是非常困難的。 > And if you do you have to do it one at a time. 如果你這樣做了，你必須一次只做一次。 > There\'s no scale there\'s no leverage and distribution. 沒有規模，沒有杠桿和分配。 > And so here is a graph of our second venture Musak my second venture carrot sticks and this is the time between our first line of code and our first paying customer. 這是我們第二次創業的圖表 Musak，我的第二次冒險，胡蘿卜棒，這是我們的第一行代碼和我們的第一個付費客戶之間的時間。 > So we improved dramatically from infinity to six months. 所以我們從無窮大提高到了六個月。 > And in that we also had the opportunity to recognize that even though we were getting some customers the pace at which we were growing wasn\'t gonna justify a large impactful company. 在這一點上，我們也有機會認識到，盡管我們得到了一些客戶，但我們增長的速度并不能證明一家大而有影響力的公司是正當的。 > So we learned a lesson here which was it now we decided to try to build a product. 因此，我們在這里學到了一個教訓，那就是，現在我們決定嘗試制造一種產品。 > We wish we needed Ruesch we had in karats 6. 我們希望我們需要用克拉 6 的魯斯奇。 > And so that\'s when we started Spratley. 那就是我們開始斯普拉特利的時候。 > Spreadsheet was the company that we apply to Y Combinator in winter of 2010. 電子表格是我們在 2010 年冬天向 YCombinator 申請的公司。 > `[00:08:29]` And I want to share with you the short version of the demo video or the video we submitted in our Y Combinator application that describes our experience with distribution and carrot sticks. `[00:08:29]` 我想和大家分享我們在 Y 組合器應用程序中提交的演示視頻或視頻的簡短版本，其中描述了我們在分發和胡蘿卜棒方面的經驗。 > And then why we were inspired to start Spratley. 然后我們為什么會被激勵去啟動斯普拉特利。 > `[00:08:43]` High and he darn we\'re both former product managers at Google and studied a bunch of computer science in college. `[00:08:43]` 高中，我們都是谷歌的前產品經理，在大學里學過一堆計算機科學。 > I also worked a little bit on the Obama campaign and then the presidential transition doing a startup with people here in some Jusco called cassocks. 我還在奧巴馬競選團隊中做了一些工作，然后在總統換屆期間與 Jusco 的一些人一起創辦了一家名為“錫克”的公司。 > `[00:08:57]` So we started working on Keres six about four or five months ago. `[00:08:57]` 所以我們大約四五個月前就開始研究 Keres 了。 > And the biggest problem we ran into was distribution so getting people to use the software and getting people to talk about the software with their friends. 我們遇到的最大問題是分發，所以讓人們使用軟件，讓人們和他們的朋友談論軟件。 > And so we started thinking very hard about that problem and how we would try to solve it. 于是我們開始非常認真地思考這個問題，以及我們將如何解決這個問題。 > We came up with an idea that recalling spread the Strelley is very simply a discount a merchant can give to a customer if that customer is willing to tell their friends through Twitter or through Facebook through e-mail about the product that they\'ve just popped today. 我們想出了一個想法，如果顧客愿意通過 twitter 或通過 facebook 通過電子郵件告訴他們的朋友他們今天剛剛推出的產品，Strelley 很簡單，商家就可以給客戶打折扣。 > Lime and carrot sticks you can buy Scroope from the critics and if you do that you can get a discount if you tell your friends. 石灰和胡蘿卜棒，你可以從評論家那里買到卷軸，如果你這樣做，你可以得到一個折扣，如果你告訴你的朋友。 > `[00:09:30]` So this video I wanted to share with you because I think it shows a couple things. `[00:09:30]` 所以這個視頻我想和你們分享，因為我認為它展示了一些東西。 > One is that the human body can only withstand one presidential campaign. 一是人體只能承受一場總統競選。 > Here I had this image of me after gaining 50 pounds on the campaign from just eating deep dish pizza and drinking beer every night. 在這張照片中，我每天晚上只吃深盤比薩餅和喝啤酒，在競選中體重增加了 50 磅。 > So I wanted to share that. 所以我想和大家分享。 > And we also had the opportunity working. 我們也有機會工作。 > It spread. 它擴散了。 > We now wanted to really focus on this feedback loop and getting distribution for our own product. 我們現在想要真正專注于這個反饋循環，并得到我們自己的產品的分發。 > And so we built a product spreadsheet that enabled what we just described and it took us about a month to get our first paying customer. 因此，我們建立了一個產品電子表格，它啟用了我們剛才描述的內容，我們花了大約一個月的時間才得到我們的第一個付費客戶。 > We were also very critical and very focused on understanding whether or not this could be a big sustainable business as fast as we could. 我們也非常挑剔，非常專注于理解這是否能盡快成為一項可持續發展的大企業。 > And so that\'s part of the mantra of Y Combinator which is to build something people want and I\'ll show you in a second. 這是 YCombinator 咒語的一部分，那就是構建人們想要的東西，我馬上就會給你展示。 > The algorithm we use to do that for Smedley we realized after. 我們為 Smedley 所使用的算法是我們后來實現的。 > `[00:10:20]` Joining Y Combinator we got. `[00:10:20]` 加入 Y 組合器。 > This is the algorithm pretty straightforward. 這是一個非常簡單的算法。 > You get some money and you keep trying to build something people want you learn to improve constantly improve the product based off the feedback from trying to sell it and if it\'s no good if it\'s investing less than insanely great you come up with a better idea. 你得到了一些錢，你一直在努力制造人們想要的東西-你學會了不斷改進，根據試圖銷售它的反饋不斷改進產品。如果它的投資少于瘋狂的偉大，那么你會想出一個更好的主意。 > With spread early. 傳播得早。 > The one insight we got pretty quickly was that the the fundamental model didn\'t work. 我們很快得到的一個洞察力是，基本模型不起作用。 > `[00:10:43]` The social capital it took for somebody to spam their friends about a new product or service was almost always more always worth more than any amount of discount or incentive a business would be willing to pay to get them to do it. `[00:10:43]` 一個人為了推銷新產品或新服務而向朋友發短信所需的社會資本，幾乎總是比一家企業愿意支付的任何折扣或獎勵都更值錢。 > So fundamentally the product didn\'t work so after a month we started thinking about what are some other products we wish we would have had. 因此，從根本上說，這個產品不起作用，所以一個月后，我們開始考慮其他一些我們希望擁有的產品。 > This is a lesson we learned was friendly boy was easy it\'s friendly because we would have wanted that and carrot sticks and so we learned that with optimized optimizes the product. 這是我們學到的一個教訓，友好的男孩很容易，這是友好的，因為我們會想要它和胡蘿卜棒，所以我們學會了優化產品。 > I wish we had in 2008 to make it easy for anybody to doA.B testing. 我希望我們在 2008 年能讓任何人都容易做 A.B 測試。 > And so we started optimizing. 所以我們開始優化。 > And I remember the first time I even had a conversation about optimizing. 我還記得我第一次談論優化。 > We actually spoke to a person I worked with on the Obama campaign Andrew Bleeker. 我們實際上和我在奧巴馬競選活動中共事的一個人談過了安德魯·布里克。 > I called them on the phone while working on Spratley. 我在斯普拉特利工作的時候打電話給他們。 > And I pitched him the idea for something that would enable his team without technical resources to do a b testing the same stuff we did back in the Obama campaign. 我向他提出了一個想法，讓他的團隊在沒有技術資源的情況下可以做一個測試，和我們在奧巴馬競選時做的一樣。 > But with a visual interface one time implementation no technical resources and ability for them to continue to iterate and get better. 但是有了一個可視化的接口，一次實現，沒有技術資源，也沒有能力讓他們繼續迭代，變得更好。 > Over and over and over again. 一遍又一遍。 > And about 20 minutes into the phone call Andrew stopped me and he said that sounds great. 打完電話大約 20 分鐘，安德魯攔住了我，他說這聽起來很棒。 > Send me an invoice. 給我寄一張發票。 > He thought this was a sales call and I responded by saying how much do you think this is worth. 他認為這是一個銷售電話，我回答說，你認為這值多少錢。 > He said oh about a thousand dollars a month sounds right. 他說，哦，一個月大約一千美元聽起來是對的。 > Which is way more money than we ever made on carrot sticks and Freddy and so what we realized we had the time until our first paying customer was one day. 這比我們用胡蘿卜條和弗雷迪賺的錢還多，所以我們意識到我們有時間，直到我們的第一個付費客戶有一天。 > We actually had our first paying customer before we wrote a single line of code that Tuesday. 實際上，我們有了第一個付費客戶，然后我們在周二編寫了一行代碼。 > Thank you. 謝謝。 > So that weekend I built the first prototype and that Tuesday at dinner I showed it to Paul Graham and he looked at it got really excited pointed at this and said this is it. 所以那個周末，我制作了第一個原型，在周二的晚宴上，我把它給保羅·格雷厄姆看了看，他非常興奮地指著這個，說就是這個。 > This is it. 就是這個 > This isA.B testing for marketers. 這是營銷人員的 A.B 測試。 > Forget that other idea. 忘了另一個想法吧。 > Do this. 做這個。 > And so we followed his advice and we did this. 所以我們聽從了他的建議做了這件事。 > The first year of optimizing we grew to a team of four people and an annual run rate of point one million dollars. 在優化的第一年，我們成長為一個四人的團隊，年運轉率為一百萬美元。 > We did Y Combinator hired my brother as our first engineer and we were we had some great press on Tech Crunch top hacker news a couple times and this entire year we were focused on the product continually improving the product and it was so much easier to do that because we were building a product. 我們做了 Y Combinator，雇傭了我的兄弟作為我們的第一工程師，我們有幾次在 TechCrunch 頂級黑客新聞上有過很大的壓力，而今年我們一直專注于產品的不斷改進，這是非常容易的，因為我們正在開發一種產品。 > I would have wanted myself back in 2008 on the campaign and so we ran a pretty simple algorithm. 我希望自己回到 2008 年的競選活動中，所以我們運行了一個非常簡單的算法。 > We kept trying to sell the product. 我們一直在努力推銷這個產品。 > Me and my co-founder Pete were the main salespeople we kept selling it over and over again. 我和我的共同創始人皮特是主要的銷售人員，我們一遍又一遍地銷售。 > And then these conversations potential customers would ask us oh this is cool but can you do targeting. 然后這些對話，潛在的客戶會問我們，哦，這很酷，但你可以做目標。 > Can you do analytics integration. 你能做分析整合。 > Can you do traffic allocation. 你能做流量分配嗎。 > Can you do X Y and Z. 你能做 X Y 和 Z 嗎？ > And we would take that take that as input and initially we would respond well that we are not doing that right now but that might be something we do in the future and that pattern kept continuing until that phrase that response changed from 0 actually. 我們會把它作為投入，一開始我們會很好地回應，我們現在沒有這樣做，但這可能是我們將來要做的事情，這種模式一直延續到這個短語從 0 實際上變為 0。 > Great question. 問得好。 > Here\'s exactly how you do that. 你就是這樣做的。 > And we would show them in the interface. 我們會在界面上展示它們。 > Oh you want to do targeting here\'s how you do that and that tight feedback loop of listening closely to price prospective customers. 哦，你想在這里進行定位\是你如何做到的，以及密切傾聽潛在客戶價格的嚴密反饋回路。 > Knowing ourselves what we would have wanted in 2008 made this much much easier journey than carrots spread or even sentiment solutions. 了解我們自己在 2008 年會想要什么，這比胡蘿卜傳播甚至情感解決方案要容易得多。 > The next year we grew to a team of ten and an annual run rate of one point two million dollars but a 9 percent increase in revenue. 第二年，我們成長為一個 10 人的團隊，年運營率為 120 萬美元，但收入增長了 9%。 > And this year was first time we hired a salesperson. 今年是我們第一次雇傭銷售人員。 > So we had been doing all the selling for the first year and a half. 所以，在第一年半的時間里，我們一直在做所有的銷售工作。 > And one of the things I learned this year which I think is really valuable as you get bigger and bigger as a company. 而我今年學到的一件事，我認為這是非常有價值的，因為作為一個公司，你會變得越來越大。 > The most important thing for me is to focus on hiring. 對我來說，最重要的是專注于招聘。 > And so we had a pretty standard algorithm for hiring which was a good interview candidate and we would ask ourselves is this candidate better than the mean. 因此，我們有了一個非常標準的招聘算法，這是一個很好的面試候選人，我們會問自己，這個候選人是否比平均水平好。 > Are they better than the average people the average people who already work at optimizing. 他們是否比那些已經在優化工作中工作的普通人更好。 > And if we strive for this goal we will constantly get better or at least stay as good as we\'ve been when we first started. 如果我們為這個目標而奮斗，我們會不斷地變得更好，或者至少和我們剛開始的時候一樣好。 > And so this is the algorithm we use we said every candidate we hired but we would ask ourselves Are they better than the mean and if so we would hire them. 這就是我們使用的算法，我們說，我們雇用的每個候選人，但我們會問自己，他們是否比平均水平更好，如果是，我們會雇用他們。 > And as we actually got better at hiring we would improve the process in our startup. 事實上，隨著我們在招聘方面做得更好，我們將改進我們的創業流程。 > We really focused on continuous fruit. 我們真的把注意力集中在持續的水果上。 > We made not only a feedback loop in the product but a feedback loop in our hiring machine which was critical because in the next year we actually grew substantially by the end of the year we were 42 people and an annual run rate of seven point six million dollars. 我們不僅在產品中建立了反饋環，而且在我們的雇傭機器中建立了反饋環，這是至關重要的，因為在接下來的一年中，我們實際上在年底前實現了實質性的增長，我們只有 42 人，年運轉率為 760 萬美元。 > We also in this year had a huge opportunity when it comes to press 2008. 我們在今年也有一個巨大的機會，當談到 2008 年。 > We had a couple of stories that were really appealing to reporters. 我們有幾個對記者很有吸引力的故事。 > The first was the Obama campaign and the Mitt Romney campaign were in full swing and we are lucky enough to have both of them as customers. 第一個是奧巴馬的競選活動，米特羅姆尼的競選活動正如火如荼地進行，我們很幸運，他們都是我們的客戶。 > So the Obama campaign in 2008 came full circle and that was really gratifying and also very gratifying that the head of the digital team for the Romney campaign said that the hardest decision he had to make was to use optimized for a testing knowing the origin story of it coming from the Obama campaign. 所以奧巴馬 2008 年的競選活動是一個完整的循環，這是令人欣慰的，也是非常令人欣慰的，羅姆尼競選團隊的數字團隊負責人說，他必須做出的最艱難的決定是使用優化后的測試，知道它的起源來自奧巴馬競選團隊。 > So we\'re thrilled about that story which was really helpful early on on CNN. 所以我們對這個故事感到非常興奮，這在 CNN 早期是非常有幫助的。 > We got on a bunch of other main mainstream media outlets but then there\'s another story that was also really appealing to reporters especially tech reporters and that story was this David versus Goliath story spoon feed them this idea that we are the davit in this battle against Adobe the big evil Adobe who had the time had a product called Omniture Tessanne target which I used a lot in the Obama campaign. 我們接觸到了許多其他主流媒體，但還有另外一個故事對記者也很有吸引力，特別是科技記者，這個故事是大衛和歌利亞的故事勺子給他們灌輸了這樣的觀點：我們是這場對抗 Adobe 的戰斗中的匕首。Adobe 有時間開發了一款名為 OmkitTessanne Target 的產品，我在奧巴馬的競選中經常用到它。 > This story was very popular and it actually stoked some fires with Adobe which is we\'re really proud of. 這個故事非常流行，實際上它用 Adobe 引發了一些火災，這是我們非常自豪的。 > And it also gave us a lot of press and legitimacy and we had many of the customers who were beaten up and tired and frustrated with the incumbent move to us as a product and in some ways their response really validated our existence. 這也給我們帶來了很多壓力和合法性，我們有很多客戶被毆打、疲憊和沮喪，因為現任者將我們作為一種產品轉移到我們這里，在某些方面，他們的反應確實驗證了我們的存在。 > `[00:16:22]` And so that brings us to today. `[00:16:22]` 這樣我們就到了今天。 > So if you take this graph and you shrink it down and you add a couple more quarters you\'ll get to where we were this is where we were at the end of the year. 如果你拿著這張圖，把它縮小，再加上幾個四分之一，你就會得到我們現在的位置，這就是年底的情況。 > We had a team 42 and this is where we are today. 我們有一支 42 隊，這就是我們今天的狀態。 > `[00:16:37]` With have a team of 130. `[00:16:37]` 有一支 130 人的隊伍。 > We\'ve now launched and we have the product available in 10 different languages. 我們現在已經推出了這個產品，我們有 10 種不同的語言。 > My co-founder and I actually wrote a book to try to get distribution called A B testing the most powerful way to turn clicks into customers. 實際上，我和我的聯合創始人寫了一本書，試圖得到一本叫做“A-B 測試”的書，它是把點擊變成客戶的最有力的方法。 > And we really continue to focus on all of the things that made us great from the beginning constantly trying to improve in this year. 我們真的繼續專注于所有從一開始就讓我們變得偉大的事情，在這一年里，我們一直在努力改進。 > We also realize that our opportunity as entrepreneurs is not just to run the same algorithms every other startup or every other business runs but to define our own and in particular one thing we did in 2000 and 2013 that I think is pretty unique to the process we used to raise our Series A. 我們還意識到，作為企業家，我們的機會不僅僅是運行相同的算法，每一個其他的創業公司或其他的業務運行，而是定義我們自己的，特別是我們在 2000 年和 2013 年所做的一件事，我認為這是我們提高 A 系列的過程中非常獨特的。 > The process we use looks something like this we would host a mock board meeting with potential investors. 我們所使用的過程看上去就像這樣，我們將與潛在投資者舉行模擬董事會會議。 > So we had try it. 所以我們試過了。 > We actually spent three hours with each of the partners that we thought were finalists had them spend time with us have them send time with our management team and really put them through the paces of exactly what they would be like as board members for our company. 我們實際上花了三個小時與每一個合伙人，我們認為是決賽，讓他們花時間與我們，讓他們發送時間與我們的管理團隊，并真正地讓他們的步伐，他們將是什么樣的，他們會是什么樣的董事會成員，我們的公司。 > This is a completely different setting than most entrepreneurs have when they\'re working with an investor which is over dinner or it\'s a pitch meeting down on Tannahill Road. 這是一個完全不同的環境，當大多數企業家工作時，他們與一個投資者，而這是在晚餐，或這是一個在坦納希爾路的推銷會議。 > From this we realize what we really wanted an investor and in fact we found an investor. 由此我們意識到我們真正想要的是一個投資者，事實上我們找到了一個投資者。 > We never thought we would have won it from the beginning because he wasn\'t technical. 我們從未想過我們會從一開始就贏得比賽，因為他不是技術人員。 > He didn\'t have operational experience and he wasn\'t all of the things we thought we wanted in the board member. 他沒有操作經驗，他也不是我們認為我們希望成為董事會成員的所有東西。 > But what he did have was a very very good way of helping us get better which is in the feedback he gave us in the smart board meeting. 但他所做的是幫助我們變得更好的一種非常好的方式，那就是他在智能董事會會議上給我們的反饋。 > He focused on asking the right questions not prescribing the right answers. 他專注于提出正確的問題，而不是給出正確的答案。 > And that really impressed me and my co-founder Pete. 這給我和我的聯合創始人皮特留下了深刻的印象。 > And so we asked Peter Fenton from benchmark to join us on the board and we haven\'t looked back. 因此，我們請基準的彼得芬頓加入我們的董事會，我們沒有回頭。 > We\'ve been very happy with that decision. 我們對這個決定非常滿意。 > So this is what the product is today I\'ll show some quick screenshots today through this process of continuous improvement in innovation. 所以，這就是今天的產品，通過不斷改進創新的過程，我將在今天展示一些快速的屏幕截圖。 > We\'ve built a product that allows you to put in any you are rallying to our home page open up in a visual editor click on any part of that page make a change to it and then run an experiment to see whether that change improves your conversion rate. 我們已經建立了一個產品，讓你可以把任何你聚集到我們的主頁，打開在視覺編輯器，點擊該網頁的任何部分，對其進行更改，然后運行一個實驗，看看這個變化是否提高了你的轉化率。 > This fundamental model is the same model that now we\'re applying to other mediums as well and we\'re really excited to continue to grow Knabe enable every business to use data to make better decisions. 這個基本模型和我們現在應用于其他媒體的模型是一樣的，我們非常興奮地繼續發展 Knabe，使每個企業都能夠使用數據來做出更好的決策。 > The vision for our product is to enable the world to turn data into action and we think A B testing is a great first step toward that. 我們產品的愿景是使世界能夠將數據轉化為行動，我們認為 A、B 測試是實現這一目標的第一步。 > One of the things again that has helped us quite a bit as I said earlier is having customers who give us great feedback but not only great feedback but our customers who not only are delighted but our evangelists for our company. 正如我早些時候所說，其中一件事對我們幫助很大，那就是有客戶給我們很好的反饋，但不僅僅是很好的反饋，還有我們的客戶，他們不僅很高興，還為我們的公司傳道者。 > So we have a great sales team and optimize. 所以我們有一個偉大的銷售團隊和優化。 > But our real sales team in fact in fact our biggest secret to our success is the sales team of the 5000 happy customers who sing our praise wherever they go. 但我們真正的銷售團隊，事實上，我們成功的最大秘訣是 5000 名快樂客戶的銷售團隊，他們無論走到哪里，都會為我們喝彩。 > A word of mouth referral from the director of marketing of Starbucks is much more valuable than even the best sales guy at our building. 來自星巴克營銷總監的口頭推薦信比我們大樓里最優秀的銷售人員更有價值。 > So these are a bunch of algorithms. 這些是一堆算法。 > I just showed you a bunch of algorithms and some of you are probably computer science students here and you might be noticing a pattern. 我剛剛給你們展示了一堆算法，你們中的一些人可能是這里的計算機科學專業的學生，你們可能注意到了一種模式。 > This pattern is something that only recently realized. 這種模式是直到最近才意識到的。 > And this is what I\'m describing actually as in my mind the universal startup algorithm. 這就是我所描述的，在我心目中通用的啟動算法。 > This is an algorithm you can apply to almost any decision you have to make as an entrepreneur. 這是一個算法，你可以應用到幾乎任何決定，你必須作為一個企業家。 > And it\'s critical for you as a company to get better over time. 作為一家公司，隨著時間的推移，要想變得更好，對你來說是至關重要的。 > And this is what that simple algorithm is. 這就是那個簡單的算法。 > Everything you do get feedback use that feedback to make you better focus on continuous improvement. 你所做的每一件事都會得到反饋，利用這些反饋讓你更好地專注于持續改進。 > You\'re not going to make the right decisions are not going to do the right things in the beginning but constantly trying to get better is the only way you\'re gonna build a lasting company. 你不會做出正確的決定，也不會在一開始就做正確的事情，但不斷努力變得更好是你建立一家持久公司的唯一途徑。 > This is something that I\'ve seen now from hiring to raising our Series A to building a product and getting press. 這是我現在看到的，從雇傭到提升我們的 A 系列，到制造產品和得到媒體。 > This algorithm is fundamental to all of the greatest companies. 這個算法是所有最偉大的公司的基礎。 > They\'ve all focused on continuous improvement. 他們都專注于不斷改進。 > The second thing I\'ll say about this universal startup algorithm is that a common mistake many entrepreneurs make and I make this mistake all the time is they get trapped in something known as the activity trap. 關于這個通用的創業算法，我要說的第二件事是，許多企業家經常犯的一個常見錯誤就是他們陷入了所謂的“活動陷阱”。 > They think their job is to execute the algorithm constantly execute the algorithm. 他們認為他們的工作是不斷地執行算法。 > Your job as an entrepreneur is to write the algorithm. 作為一名企業家，你的工作就是編寫算法。 > Great example of this is Tesla. 特斯拉就是一個很好的例子。 > Tesla has decided that they\'re not going to do the same distribution model that every other car company in the world. 特斯拉已經決定，他們不會像世界上其他任何一家汽車公司那樣，做同樣的分銷模式。 > They\'re going to sell cars directly. 他們將直接出售汽車。 > They\'re not going to negotiate prices and they\'re going to cut out the middleman. 他們不打算談判價格，他們將取消中間商。 > Elon Musk defined the algorithm he wrote the algorithm for his company and now that\'s going to be a huge advantage for them as they continue to grow. 埃隆·馬斯克(ElonMusk)定義了他為自己的公司編寫的算法，隨著它們的不斷增長，這對它們來說將是一個巨大的優勢。 > `[00:21:00]` Thank you very much applaud. `[00:21:00]` 非常感謝你鼓掌。