# Ron Conway at Startup School 2013 > `[00:00:00]` Morning. `[00:00:00]` 早上好。 > `[00:00:01]` Mike Mike works. `[00:00:01]` 邁克工作。 > `[00:00:03]` Okay well thanks for coming along. `[00:00:03]` 好的，謝謝你能來。 > Delighted to have you here. 很高興你能來。 > We\'re going to jump right into things I wanted to talk about Twitter first because Jack Dorsey is coming here later and they\'re going public they\'re doing so well. 我們將直接進入我想首先談論 Twitter 的事情，因為杰克·多爾西(JackDorsey)稍后會來這里，他們要上市了，他們做得很好。 > I want you to take me back to when you first invested in what you signed on and how you first invested. 我要你帶我回到你第一次投資于你的簽約和你第一次投資的時候。 > `[00:00:24]` Sure. `[00:00:24]` 當然。 > I got to know Evan Williams because back in 1998 we invested in Google and so we knew Google from the early days and Google acquired blogger from Evan that\'s the company that Evan founded. 我之所以了解埃文·威廉姆斯，是因為在 1998 年我們投資了谷歌，所以我們從早期就認識了谷歌，谷歌從埃文那里收購了博主-埃文就是埃文創建的公司。 > And so I got to know Evan through that and then over time Evan left Google and went to start an incubator called obvious core and Odeo was one of the companies that that was incubated it ObviousCorp. 于是我認識了埃文，后來埃文離開了谷歌，創辦了一個名為“顯而易見的核心”的孵化器，Odeo 就是其中一家孵化它的公司。 > and Odeo was in the podcasting space which was very interesting to people at the time. Odeo 在播客的空間里，當時人們對此非常感興趣。 > And I invested in Odeo Odeo ended up not doing well the podcasting space did not blossom and. 我投資了 Odeo，結果做得不好，播客空間沒有開花。 > Have To his credit felt so bad about Odeo going out of business. 他對 Odeo 破產感到很難過。 > It was second startup. 這是第二家創業公司。 > He gave all the investors their money back which was pretty amazing and I said you don\'t need to do this. 他把錢還給了所有的投資者，真是太棒了，我說你不需要這么做。 > You know investors are big people who know that you can lose money 40 percent of all of our startups go out of business completely we don\'t get a nickel out of them. 你知道，投資者都是大人物，他們知道你可能會虧本，我們所有的初創公司中，有 40%會完全倒閉，我們不會從他們那里得到一分錢。 > I said you\'re just in that bucket. 我說你就在那個桶里。 > Don\'t worry about it he said no I feel so bad. 別擔心，他說不，我覺得很難過。 > I want to pay the investors back and I said fine. 我想還投資者錢，我說好的。 > But whatever you do next I\'m investing 75 k in that and the next startup was Twitter. 但無論你下一步做什么，我都會投資 75，000 美元，下一家創業公司就是 Twitter。 > And so you lucked out there. 所以你很幸運。 > `[00:02:04]` What was it about there that made you say you know I\'m in the next one just count me. `[00:02:04]` 是什么讓你說你知道我在下一個，只要算上我。 > Well `[00:02:09]` it was that he had such amazing human feelings about feeling bad about going out of business. 嗯，`[00:02:09]` 他有著如此令人驚奇的人類感情，因為他對停業感到不快。 > And I tried to help sell ODEIO we tried to get ODEIO to a soft landing and I can\'t remember maybe we did but he he felt bad about it and I said wow what what a great person. 我試圖幫助銷售 ODEIO，我們試圖讓 ODEIO 實現軟著陸，我不記得我們做了什么，但他對此感到很難過，我說：哇，真是個了不起的人。 > You know at SFE age we invest in the people first. 你知道，在 SFE 時代，我們首先投資于人民。 > And when you have somebody do something is impressive is that. 當你讓別人做某事時，令人印象深刻的是。 > You want to invest in the next to an end. 你想在最后的時候投資。 > When they said Twitter I said. 他們說推特的時候我說。 > Hey I don\'t care what it does here\'s the money. 嘿，我不管它做什么，這是錢。 > `[00:02:50]` So when he said Okay Ron here\'s what we\'re doing here is what you\'re investing in. `[00:02:50]` 所以當他說好的，羅恩，這就是我們在這里做的，這就是你所投資的。 > What did you think. 你怎么想的。 > `[00:02:56]` Well he was nice enough to say you should go talk to Jack Dorsey because Jack you know Twitter came out of the mind of Jack Dorsey and so have said hey one of our partners at obvious corp is Jack and he has he has this product vision for Twitter. `[00:02:56]` 他說你應該去和杰克·多爾西談談，因為杰克-你知道的-Twitter 是從杰克·多爾西的腦海中冒出來的，所以他說，嘿，我們公司的合伙人之一就是杰克，他對 Twitter 有一個產品愿景。 > And this is going to be the next company that we all spend a lot of time on. 這將是下一家我們都花了很多時間的公司。 > There were other companies in obvious corp as well. 顯而易見的公司中也有其他公司。 > But Twitter was the one they took the spotlight off of ODEIO put it on Twitter and I went and had lunch with Jack over in South Park in San Francisco and I just said hey I\'m investing. 但 Twitter 是他們把注意力從 ODEIO 轉移到 Twitter 上的那個人，我和 Jack 一起去舊金山的南方公園吃午餐，我只是說我在投資。 > Tell me what it is. 告訴我是什么。 > And. 和 > `[00:03:36]` What did what did you think when he said here\'s what it is 140 characters. `[00:03:36]` 當他說這是 140 個字時，你是怎么想的？ > Well reaction my reaction was hey great let\'s see if it works and. 嗯，反應，我的反應很好，讓我們看看它是否有效。 > `[00:03:48]` And with any product. `[00:03:48]` 和任何產品。 > It\'s do the users like it. 它是用戶喜歡的。 > So if the product takes off it\'s a good product. 因此，如果該產品起飛，它是一個很好的產品。 > And like Facebook and Snapchat so many of these others it started taking off right away. 就像 Facebook 和 Snapchat 一樣，許多其他網站也開始迅速起飛。 > And the big problem Twitter had was keeping up with the growth the fail whale became more prominent than the bird. Twitter 的最大問題是跟上增長，失敗的鯨魚比鳥更加突出。 > `[00:04:14]` Speaking of Snapchat and Pinterest and all in Facebook you invested in all of these early before they were big I\'d love for you to remember back to what the founders were like or what you thought about the product. `[00:04:14]` 說到 Snapchat 和 Pinterest，以及 Facebook 上的所有這些，我希望你能回想起創始人是什么樣的，或者你對這個產品的看法。 > Way back when they started I guess snapchat is newer but the other two were there. 早在他們開始的時候，我想 Snapchat 是比較新的，但是其他的兩個在那里。 > `[00:04:33]` So Facebook Twitter page Pinterest. `[00:04:33]` 那么 Facebook 推特頁面 Pinterest。 > So while I feel like we\'ve talked about Twitter Facebook so Facebook I started with Sean Parker because we invested in Napster than we were the first investors in Plaxo. 因此，當我覺得我們談論了 Twitter、Facebook 和 Facebook 時，我從肖恩·帕克(SeanParker)開始，因為我們投資于 Napster，而不是柏拉圖的第一批投資者。 > That was Sean Parker second company. 那是肖恩·帕克第二家公司。 > And so when Sean became the president of Facebook he came to me and said hey you know come and mentor me and Mark. 所以，當肖恩成為 Facebook 的總裁時，他來找我說嗨，你知道的，來指導我和馬克。 > And I said Great. 我說的很好。 > And so the first time I met. 所以我第一次見面。 > Mark and Sean. 馬克和肖恩。 > Funny enough it was just a few weeks after they had moved to California and the Facebook metrics were were already like this going straight up just just like Twitter. 有趣的是，就在他們搬到加州幾周后，Facebook 的指標已經像推特一樣直線上升。 > A few years later and you never argue with the metrics so the amazing thing about Zuck is is the vision and confidence that he had. 幾年后，你從來沒有和指標爭論過，所以 Zuck 令人驚奇的地方在于他的遠見和自信。 > Not arrogance but confidence that this thing is going to keep growing. 不是傲慢，而是對這件事會持續增長的信心。 > And at the end of the first meeting I said hey how many users is this thing going to have in a couple of years. 在第一次會議結束時，我說，嘿，這個東西幾年后會有多少用戶。 > And he looked me in the eye and said 300 million. 他看著我的眼睛說了 3 億。 > And it ends up he was off by 700 million because Facebook has over a billion users today. 最后，他的收入減少了 7 億，因為 Facebook 現在擁有超過 10 億的用戶。 > But he was thinking big then. 但他當時的想法很大。 > `[00:06:00]` I feel like you with Facebook. `[00:06:00]` 我覺得你和 Facebook 在一起。 > I know you\'ve told me that you\'re a little bit skeptical about the social networking thing at first. 我知道你告訴我你一開始對社交網絡有點懷疑。 > But you must have seen something special in Mark. 但你一定在馬克身上看到了什么特別的東西。 > `[00:06:12]` Well what what what what what got me excited at Facebook was the growth you know the user adoption and engagement the amount of time that people were spending on the site. `[00:06:12]` 在 Facebook 上讓我興奮的是用戶的成長，用戶的接受和參與，人們在網站上花費的時間。 > So even though I\'m not a big Facebook user myself even today you never argue with the users. 因此，即使我本人并不是 Facebook 的大用戶，即使在今天，你也從未與用戶爭論過。 > And Facebook was picking up users you know very very quickly. 臉譜網很快就找到了你認識的用戶。 > So if you look at. 所以如果你看看。 > You know we invest in people first so Facebook I was investing in Sean Parker\'s reputation and then learning about Mark with Twitter. 你知道，我們首先投資于人，所以我在 Facebook 上投資肖恩·帕克(SeanParker)的名聲，然后在 Twitter 上了解馬克的情況。 > It was I was investing in Ev and learning about Jack. 這是我投資電動汽車和了解杰克。 > And then fast forward till you know a year ago we see snapchat now with Snapchat. 然后快速前進，直到一年前，我們看到 Snapchat 現在與 Snapchat。 > I can see the pattern recognition you know so Facebook Twitter you have Instagram in there even though we didn\'t invest and then you have snapchat. 我可以看到你知道的模式識別，所以 Facebook，Twitter，你有 Instagram，即使我們沒有投資，然后你有 Snapchat。 > So Snapchat is one that we said wow this is probably going to be a big gap because there is this phenomenon happening right now. 所以 Snapchat 是我們說的，哇，這可能會是一個很大的差距，因為現在正在發生這種現象。 > We\'re human. 我們是人類。 > Where were applications and social apps in particular are changing the way people behave and how they communicate with each other. 應用程序，特別是社交應用程序，正在改變人們的行為方式和彼此之間的溝通方式。 > Facebook Twitter and Snapchat and Instagram prove that. Facebook、Twitter、Snapchat 和 Instagram 都證明了這一點。 > And so there\'s a huge opportunity for more companies in this space. 因此，對于更多的公司來說，這是一個巨大的機會。 > `[00:07:41]` Any idea what this will be. `[00:07:41]` 任何知道這將是什么的人。 > `[00:07:43]` I don\'t because I\'m not a founder but I\'m sure people out there have ideas on what what is the next social app. `[00:07:43]` 我不是因為我不是創始人，但我確信外面的人對下一個社交應用程序有自己的想法。 > Because social apps are changing the way people communicate. 因為社交應用正在改變人們的溝通方式。 > Facebook adding photos was huge. Facebook 添加照片的規模很大。 > People started communicating with photos. 人們開始用照片交流。 > And now you have Snapchat which is really just photo messaging. 現在你有了 Snapchat，它實際上只是照片信息。 > I mean who would have predicted that even three years ago. 我是說，即使在三年前，誰也會預測到這一點。 > `[00:08:12]` Do you think the Founders knew they were going to just explode like they did because all all of these stories have that in common. `[00:08:12]` 你認為創建者知道他們會像他們一樣爆炸，因為所有這些故事都有相同之處。 > Can\'t argue with that. 對此，我是無可辯駁的。 > The user growth. 用戶的增長。 > `[00:08:21]` Well there are a lot of companies though that didn\'t explode in these spaces. `[00:08:21]` 雖然有很多公司在這些空間里沒有爆炸。 > But but I think every founder thinks their company is going to explode. 但我認為每個創始人都認為他們的公司會爆炸。 > The founders whose company don\'t explode and they keep iterating until it does. 創始人的公司不會爆炸，他們會不斷地迭代，直到公司爆發。 > Ah ah ah ah really unsung heroes. 啊，真是無名英雄。 > `[00:08:41]` That\'s a good segway actually and Silbermann of Pinterest was here last year and I loved his story because it was a really long road for them both with users and with getting investments. `[00:08:41]` 這是一個很好的片段，Pinterest 的 Silbermann 去年也在這里，我很喜歡他的故事，因為這對他們來說是一條很長的路，不管是用戶還是獲得投資。 > Do you remember when you first met. 你還記得你們第一次見面的時候嗎。 > And what made you think they were good. 是什么讓你覺得他們很棒。 > `[00:08:56]` Yes. `[00:08:56]` 是的。 > Bend\'s Ben and Pinterest is a great example of a founder where it didn\'t explode right away like Twitter Facebook or Instagram. 彎曲的 BenandPinterest 是創始人的一個很好的例子，它沒有像 Twitter、Facebook 或 Instagram 那樣馬上爆炸。 > Ben Silverman had to keep iterating for a year and a half which we heard about when he spoke last year. 本·西爾弗曼(BenSilverman)不得不在一年半的時間里不斷迭代，這是我們去年在他講話時聽到的。 > But here\'s a guy who is very persistent and stayed close to his users. 但是這里有一個人，他非常執著，并且一直和他的用戶保持著親密的關系。 > He had focus groups mainly with groups of women that he that he would bring together in a coffee shop. 他有重點小組，主要與婦女團體，他將聚集在一家咖啡店。 > And then he would call them the next day to make sure they were still using the product and keep getting feedback. 然后他會在第二天打電話給他們，確保他們還在使用該產品，并不斷得到反饋。 > In iterating until the product took off. 直到產品起飛。 > In the case of Pinterest you didn\'t discover the product at SPV angel we meet once a week for four hours I chair that meeting because lots of people think I\'m not involved in NSV angel or some thing because I\'m involved in philanthropy and civic engagement. 在 Pinterest 的例子中，你沒有發現 SPV 天使的產品，我們每周見面一次，持續四個小時，我主持那個會議，因為很多人認為我沒有參與 NSV 天使，或者其他的事情，因為我參與了慈善事業和公民參與。 > But but no 80 percent of my time is still spent on investing and helping companies. 但我沒有 80%的時間花在投資和幫助公司上。 > But I\'m not the picker the rest of our team or pickers and a couple of years ago David Lee and Kevin Carter said Hey Ron listen up. 但是我不是挑選者，而是我們球隊的其他人，或者是挑選者。幾年前，大衛·李和凱文·卡特說，嘿，羅恩，聽著。 > This is an app that we think is going places Pinterest and Pinterest is in its infancy and we co-invest Rashaan officier on the east coast and there is nothing like a woman\'s intuition. 我們認為這是一個應用程序，我們認為 Pinterest 和 Pinterest 還處于起步階段，我們在東海岸共同投資 Rashaan 的官員，沒有什么比女人的直覺更好了。 > Shana Fisher was barking in our ear as well saying hey this app is really really cool. 沙娜·費舍爾也在我們耳邊咆哮著說，嘿，這個應用程序真的很酷。 > It\'s where people pin their aspirations and so so I didn\'t discover Pinterest the S V Angel team and Shana Fisher discovered it. 這是人們把自己的愿望寄托在那里的地方，所以我沒有發現 Pinterest、SV 天使隊和 ShanaFisher 發現了它。 > But I went to meet Ben and what I saw was a very unusual entrepreneur because a lot of you all typewriters are outspoken and aggressive. 但我去見了本，我看到的是一位不同尋常的企業家，因為你們中的很多人-打字機-直言不諱，咄咄逼人。 > So entrepreneurs are type A or. 所以企業家是 A 型或者。 > Or you\'re in the Ben Silverman category a very shy soft spoken but very cerebral and thoughtful. 或者你是本·西爾弗曼一類的人，很害羞，說話柔和，但很有頭腦，很體貼。 > And so the first time I met Ben was it was in Mountain View and I think we chasing an allocation for the next round. 所以我第一次見到本是在山景城，我想我們在追求下一輪的分配。 > So saying hey Ben what can I do to help you which is how ASV Angel operates. 所以說，嘿，本，我能做些什么來幫助你，這就是 ASV 天使的運作方式。 > We just go to the entrepreneur and say give us a hard project and fix it. 我們只是去找企業家說，給我們一個艱難的項目，并修復它。 > And all startups have hard projects so bent gave me a few projects and off we went. 所有的初創公司都有艱難的項目，所以我們放棄了一些項目。 > But what I noticed about him is he\'s a founder that actually has a calming effect. 但我注意到的是，他是一個真正有鎮靜作用的創始人。 > So there\'s a lot of founders who. 所以有很多創始人。 > At the Friday. 在星期五。 > Team meetings wind up their team in the case of Ben Silverman. 在本·西爾弗曼的案子中，團隊會議結束了他們的團隊。 > He winds up the team in a cerebrally way by actually making everybody calm. 他以一種大腦的方式結束了團隊，實際上讓每個人都平靜下來。 > `[00:11:59]` And I noticed that it\'s now it\'s very cool. `[00:11:59]` 我注意到現在很酷。 > `[00:12:02]` It\'s amazing. `[00:12:02]` 太棒了。 > And his rifle focused on the product. 他的步槍集中在產品上。 > And entrepreneurs like Zach and Jack Dorsey and Ben Silverman are successful because they didn\'t care about the outside world. 像扎克、杰克·多爾西和本·西爾弗曼這樣的企業家之所以成功，是因為他們不關心外部世界。 > All they cared about. 他們關心的都是。 > In the early days and today as well it is is the product the best it can be. 在早期和今天，它是最好的產品。 > And our users loving it. 我們的用戶也很喜歡。 > And I don\'t want to do a press interview. 我不想接受媒體采訪。 > I don\'t want to be distracted. 我不想分心。 > I just want to keep building a great product and those end up being becoming great. 我只想繼續創造一個偉大的產品，而這些最終會變得很棒。 > `[00:12:38]` Big companies. `[00:12:38]` 大公司。 > Are you able to tell us any of the hard projects that he asked you to do with the but were they all really has to be on three things here. 你能告訴我們他讓你做的任何困難的事情嗎，但是如果他們真的必須在這里做三件事。 > `[00:12:51]` You know with Pinterest lots of introductions. `[00:12:51]` 你知道 Pinterest 有很多介紹。 > Hey let me introduce you around at Apple. 嘿，讓我在蘋果向你介紹一下。 > Let me introduce you around at various companies where they didn\'t have relationships and that can bootstrap growth. 讓我向你介紹一下不同的公司，在那里他們沒有關系，而且可以引導公司的發展。 > If if the iPhone is your first platform and we can help get you in front of people at Apple because Apple respects your judgment that that will help a company grow. 如果 iPhone 是你的第一個平臺，我們可以幫助你在蘋果的人們面前，因為蘋果尊重你的判斷力，這將有助于公司的發展。 > `[00:13:24]` I ask because I actually have sort of inside knowledge on all of the hard problems or most of the hard problems that Ron has helped the Y Combinator startups fix. `[00:13:24]` 我問你，是因為我對羅恩幫助 Y 組合創業公司解決的所有困難問題或大部分困難問題都有一些內在的了解。 > And most of them can\'t even be told well and most don\'t ask you to solve our problem. 而且他們中的大多數人甚至不能很好地被告知，而且大多數人也不要求你解決我們的問題。 > `[00:13:38]` Most are MAFF to do with with funding. `[00:13:38]` 大多數是與資金有關的 MAFF。 > So most of the a lot of the hard projects are funding or in a lot of cases emeny transactions were where we don\'t publicize the activity. 所以大部分困難的項目都是資助的，或者在很多情況下，Emeny 交易是我們不宣傳活動的地方。 > But but with Pinterest we\'ve with all of our companies in general we always help with a series A round. 但是，有了 Pinterest，我們和我們所有的公司都在一起，我們總是在一系列的 A 輪中提供幫助。 > And then if the company wants it with the on going rounds of financing as well we probably can\'t get into that one even though there is a great one from a hotel room. 然后，如果公司也想要這一輪融資的話，我們很可能無法進入這一輪，盡管酒店房間里有一家很棒的公司。 > Yes. 是 > With with Air B and B that that one\'s been discussed. 關于 B 和 B 空氣，這一問題已經討論過了。 > `[00:14:15]` What are they. `[00:14:15]` 他們是什么？ > Okay well let\'s talk about fundraising because I did have a question for you on that. 好吧，那我們談談籌款吧，因為我有個問題要問你。 > I mean it jumped to that quickly. 我是說它跳得那么快。 > What do you see with the founders what are the biggest mistakes that founders make in fundraising and what are some of the best qualities of people showing their fundraising. 你對創始人的看法是什么，創始人在籌款中犯的最大的錯誤是什么，以及展示他們籌款的人的一些最好的品質是什么。 > `[00:14:35]` Well I guess the biggest mistake I see with founders and fundraising is founders are not focusing enough on finding the investor who can add the most value. `[00:14:35]` 嗯，我想我在創始人身上看到的最大的錯誤就是創始人沒有足夠的精力去尋找能增加最大價值的投資者。 > `[00:14:49]` A lot of founders are worried and concerned about valuation and delusion. `[00:14:49]` 許多創始人對估價和妄想感到擔憂和擔憂。 > And I think valuation in dilution is secondary to if you can bring in a top tier investor who adds value to this space that you\'re in that\'s worth that\'s worth millions and millions. 我認為，估值稀釋是次要的，如果你能引進一個頂級投資者，誰增加了價值，你在這個空間價值數百萬美元。 > To your valuation you know in the case of Air B and B that a host of investors trying to invest this is you know it\'s heresy because we had the negotiation in a hotel room when we should have had it where Brian Chesky was staying which is at an Air B and B host location. 對于你的估值，你知道，在 B 和 B 航空的案例中，很多投資者試圖投資，你知道這是異端邪說，因為我們在酒店房間里進行了談判，而當時我們應該有布萊恩·切斯基(Brian Chesky)住在 B 航空公司和 B 航空公司所在地的地方。 > But but what Brian Chesky got that night was oh no we should go with the investor who adds the most value. 但那天晚上布萊恩·切斯基得到的是，哦，不，我們應該和增加價值最多的投資者一起去。 > So Andriessen Horowitz invested a multi billion dollar valuation but there were other investors who even wanted to pay more. 因此 AndriessenHorowitz 投資了數十億美元的估值，但還有其他投資者甚至希望支付更多。 > And I said to Brian that night hey I think Jeff Jordan at Andreessen Horowitz could do a lot for this company and Brian Chesky for the next year. 那天晚上，我對布萊恩說，嘿，我認為安德森-霍洛維茨公司的杰夫·喬丹(JeffJordan)可以為這家公司做很多事情，而布賴恩·切斯基(BrianChesky) > Every conversation we had which is often he started with thank you and I go What are you thanking me for. 我們的每一次談話，他經常以謝謝開始，我走了，你在感謝我什么。 > Thank you for Andriessen Horowitz and Jeff Jordan because Jeff did this this and this today to pick the right investor and not pick a value added investor. 感謝 Andriessen Horowitz 和 Jeff Jordan，因為 Jeff 今天這么做是為了選擇正確的投資者，而不是選擇增值投資者。 > `[00:16:21]` The other thing is keep the process moving quickly for sure. `[00:16:21]` 另一件事是確保進程快速進行。 > Get one term sheet a sap. 得到一份學期表。 > So you have a forcing function because investors really don\'t like making decisions as quickly as an entrepreneur needs them to make a decision. 所以你有一個強迫的功能，因為投資者真的不喜歡像企業家需要他們做決定那樣快地做出決定。 > So if you can get a forcing function which is basically a term sheet out of anyone then you can truthfully call the other investors and I can call them on your behalf and say we have a term sheet we\'re going to accept in 24 hours. 所以，如果你能得到一個強迫函數，它基本上是任何人的一個術語表，那么你可以如實地給其他投資者打電話，我可以代表你打電話給他們，說我們在 24 小時內會接受一個條款表。 > Do you have a term sheet. 你有學期表嗎。 > You better hurry up and submit it. 你最好快點把它交出來。 > `[00:16:56]` And we did this during the year BMB financing. `[00:16:56]` 我們在 BMB 融資的一年里做到了這一點。 > There was all kinds of disarray and we just said Hey today\'s the day everyone submit your term sheet by 5:00 or you\'re not in the running but if you get one term sheet you can do that. 有各種各樣的混亂，我們剛才說，嘿，今天，每個人都在 5 點之前提交你的學期報告，或者你沒有在競選，但如果你得到一個學期表，你可以做到這一點。 > So so keep the pace so don\'t lose momentum. 所以，保持節奏，不要失去動力。 > And then once you get any inkling of an agreement send an email that commits the investor to that agreement. 然后，一旦你對協議有了任何了解，就發送一封電子郵件，讓投資者遵守協議。 > Very very important. 非常重要。 > `[00:17:25]` So you\'re not being annoying to follow. `[00:17:25]` 這樣你就不會很煩人了。 > `[00:17:28]` Yeah `[00:17:28]` it\'s just a short e-mail just confirming dot dot dot. `[00:17:28]` 是的`[00:17:28]` 這只是一封簡短的電子郵件，只是確認點。 > You know and it\'s just confirming that that well in the case of some commitment I am delighted that you committed to invest at 100 million valuation. 你知道，而且它只是證實了這一點，在某些承諾的情況下，我很高興你承諾以 1 億美元的估值進行投資。 > My lawyer\'s going to call you tomorrow. 我的律師明天會給你打電話。 > `[00:17:45]` Then it\'s in writing that that investor has committed. `[00:17:45]` 那么投資者承諾的是書面形式。 > Have you seen over the years we have seen memories many many transactions that fail because somebody doesn\'t remember what they said Think of it happens even more on our emanate transactions. 你有沒有見過，多年來，我們看到了很多交易失敗的記憶，因為有人不記得他們說了什么，在我們的發散交易中發生得更多。 > You know if we\'re trying to get a company a soft landing and we get the soft landing committed those are the ones that people will try and wiggle out of and a soft landing is when someone gets acquired early on. 你知道，如果我們試圖讓一家公司實現軟著陸，而我們又得到了軟著陸的承諾，那么人們就會努力擺脫這些軟著陸，而軟著陸則是在人們很早就被收購的時候。 > `[00:18:20]` Yeah. `[00:18:20]` 是的。 > `[00:18:20]` Basically where hey this is not going to be the next Facebook let\'s but we have a great product. `[00:18:20]` 基本上這不是下一個 Facebook，而是我們有一個很棒的產品。 > Let\'s take that product and make it part of Facebook. 讓我們把這個產品變成 Facebook 的一部分吧。 > And when you put Facebook user base with it you know we can fulfill the dream of the product. 當你把 Facebook 的用戶基礎放在一起的時候，你就知道我們可以實現這個產品的夢想。 > `[00:18:38]` And that\'s where we see people not confirming and getting into trouble. `[00:18:38]` 那就是我們看到人們不確認和陷入麻煩的地方。 > `[00:18:41]` Yeah. `[00:18:41]` 是的。 > Correct because there\'s there\'s optionality on transactions like that. 正確，因為這樣的交易是有選擇性的。 > And in the case of the company the startup needs that transaction to happen so they don\'t end up with the pressure ofPhil. 就公司而言，初創公司需要完成這筆交易，這樣他們就不會受到菲爾的壓力。 > `[00:18:56]` Yeah. `[00:18:56]` 是的。 > `[00:18:56]` You don\'t have a whole lot of leverage but I imagine you how you get that area I guess we help out a lot to dig down a little bit in founders again. `[00:18:56]` 你并沒有太多的影響力，但我想你是如何得到這個領域的，我想我們可以幫助你在創始人身上再挖一點東西。 > But what are the promising signs that you see when you meet all these people. 但是當你遇到這些人的時候，你看到了什么有希望的跡象呢？ > `[00:19:14]` Well I think product focus is really really important and I didn\'t realize this probably to the last of an angel investing since 1994 only an Internet software companies and then we invest in people we invest buy in tuition but it\'s in the last five years that I\'ve really looked for I\'ve found founder qualities that say that their rifle focused on the product the quality of the product. `[00:19:14]` 我認為專注于產品是非常重要的，我沒有意識到這可能是 1994 年以來最后一次天使投資-只有一家互聯網軟件公司-然后我們投資于我們在學費上投資的人，但在過去的五年里，我發現創立者的品質表明他們的步槍專注于產品的質量-產品的質量。 > You know Ben Silverman Jack Dorsey. 你認識本·西爾弗曼·杰克·多西。 > It\'s just crucial. 這很關鍵。 > So when when we see that that they don\'t want to be distracted because they just want to focus on the product and we have lots of bloggers and press people who call us and say hey get Ben Silverman to talk to me. 所以，當我們看到他們不想分心，因為他們只想專注于產品，我們有很多博客和媒體的人打電話給我們說嗨，讓 BenSilverman 和我談談。 > And Ben Silverman. 還有本·西爾弗曼。 > No no no. 不不不。 > Eventually you say hey why don\'t we talk to this guy from Fortune. 最后你說，嘿，為什么我們不和“財富”雜志的這個家伙談談呢？ > Because I\'d rather work on the product. 因為我寧愿在產品上工作。 > I\'d rather get a million more happy users than talk to somebody at Fortune magazine. 我寧愿擁有更多快樂的用戶，也不愿與“財富”雜志的某個人交談。 > That\'s a great entrepreneur. 那是個偉大的企業家。 > It\'s on the way to building a big company. 它正在建設一家大公司的路上。 > The other factor that we look for is decisiveness. 我們尋找的另一個因素是果斷。 > It is so important to make decisions and keep momentum in growing your company. 在你的公司成長過程中，做決定和保持動力是非常重要的。 > And you know founders make lots of decisions about the product. 你知道，創始人對這個產品做了很多決定。 > You know let\'s change this on the product and we\'ll get better metrics. 您知道，讓我們在產品上改變這一點，我們將得到更好的度量。 > You need to use the same skillset for building your team and deleting from your team. 您需要使用相同的技能集來構建您的團隊和刪除您的團隊。 > You need to hire fast and you need to fire fast because if there\'s deadwood in your company everyone in the company already knows it. 你需要快速招聘，你需要快速解雇，因為如果你的公司里有死胡同，公司里的每個人都已經知道了。 > If you know it everybody else knows it and you can actually make morale go up if you make a decision that hey. 如果你知道的話，其他人都知道，如果你做出這樣的決定，你就能鼓舞士氣。 > That person\'s not working out even if they\'re a co-founder. 即使他們是創始人之一，這個人也不能正常工作。 > You\'ve got to make those decisions. 你必須做出那些決定。 > `[00:21:17]` And imagine you see people struggle with that a lot because it\'s hard to. `[00:21:17]` 想象一下，你看到很多人都在掙扎，因為這很難。 > `[00:21:20]` Yes sire confounded and that\'s why I\'m talking about it. `[00:21:20]` 是的，陛下，這就是我談論它的原因。 > You got to be decisive yeah you have to have a clear vision. 你必須果斷，是的，你必須有一個清晰的視野。 > When I\'m talking to an entrepreneur I\'m saying are other people going to work for him when. 當我和一位企業家交談時，我說的是其他人會在什么時候為他工作。 > He or she tries to hire somebody. 他或她試圖雇傭一個人。 > Are you a team builder or are you a leader. 你是團隊建設者還是領導者。 > So even though these companies are young and only have five people. 因此，即使這些公司還很年輕，只有五人。 > When I\'m talking to an entrepreneur I\'m saying wow can can this person manage a thousand people and there are types of people were where I\'d nod to myself and say yeah that person can manage a thousand people. 當我和一位企業家交談時，我會說，哇，這個人能管理一千個人嗎？有些類型的人我會向自己點頭，說是的，那個人能管理一千個人。 > `[00:22:00]` What if someone when they\'re first starting really can\'t manage a thousand people. `[00:22:00]` 如果一個人第一次開始的時候真的不能管理一千個人，那該怎么辦呢？ > Are you able to say this person can grow or have you seen examples of people who\'ve grown into that role. 你能說這個人可以成長嗎？或者你見過那些已經成長為這個角色的人的例子。 > Well yeah I think I think in the early early days of Twitter. 嗯，是的，我想在 Twitter 的早期。 > I think Jack Dorsey had trouble managing and Jack Dorsey. 我認為杰克·多爾西在管理和杰克·多爾西方面都有困難。 > `[00:22:23]` Thought about his shortcomings and went and made Twitter better then left Twitter invented square you know how obvious plugging a a credit card reader in to you know the earplug of an iPhone. `[00:22:23]` 考慮到他的缺點，他走了，讓推特變得更好，而不是離開推特發明的正方形，你知道把信用卡讀卡器插在里面有多明顯-你知道 iPhone 的耳塞。 > I got the very first demo of square from Jack. 我從杰克那里得到了正方形的第一個演示。 > And watched him build square flawlessly hiring a management team that did that if he has a deficiency. 并看著他完美地打造了廣場，聘請了一支管理團隊，如果他有缺陷的話，就會這樣做。 > He makes sure to hire somebody really powerful in that area. 他一定會雇傭那個地區真正有權勢的人。 > So recognizing the deficiency and then building your team around that with everyone recognizing what everyone\'s deficiencies are. 因此，認識到不足，然后圍繞這一點建立團隊，讓每個人都認識到每個人的缺點。 > Yeah that\'s growing and maturing. 是的，那是在成長和成熟。 > `[00:23:17]` You know while you\'re building these great companies they think we have time for two more questions. `[00:23:17]` 你知道，當你建立這些偉大的公司時，他們認為我們還有時間再問兩個問題。 > `[00:23:23]` I know it went so quickly I think even tell me if these are good because we\'re going to end on a high note. `[00:23:00]` 我知道事情進展得如此之快，我想甚至告訴我這些是否好，因為我們將以高調結束。 > You\'ve been doing this for like 20 years. 你這么干已經有 20 年了。 > What has changed and what has been the same since when you first started now. 自從你剛開始的時候，什么已經改變了，什么是一樣的。 > `[00:23:36]` Well a lot of things have changed. `[00:23:36]` 很多事情都變了。 > If you think back to when I started my first company Alto\'s computer in 1979 in order to I know this is unbelievable but it\'s important for this group to know it in 1979 to get your company funded. 如果你回想一下，1979 年我創辦了我的第一家公司 Alto 的電腦，為了讓我知道這是令人難以置信的，但對于這個團隊來說，在 1979 年了解它以獲得貴公司的資金是很重要的。 > You had to be growing you had to be doubling every year and you had to be at least 20 percent pre-tax profitable. 你必須成長，你必須每年翻一番，而且你必須至少有 20%的稅前利潤。 > `[00:24:05]` So investors basically would only invest if you are already successful. `[00:24:05]` 所以投資者基本上只會在你已經成功的情況下進行投資。 > So it wasn\'t really venture capital. 所以這不是真正的風險投資。 > If you go today just the cost of starting a company is tiny and there\'s lots of people willing to take risk in invest. 如果你今天去，創辦一家公司的成本很低，而且有很多人愿意冒險投資。 > So the climate for starting a company is significantly better today. 所以今天創業的環境要好得多。 > The other thing is mobile. 另一件事是移動的。 > Watching King the Internet convert from. 觀看國王的互聯網轉換。 > The web to mobile. 網絡到移動。 > You know this. 你知道的。 > This thing is not a phone that\'s in your pocket it\'s a computer. 這東西不是你口袋里的手機，而是一臺電腦。 > And what we have some of these social apps that are running on the phone first. 我們有一些社交應用程序是先在手機上運行的。 > It\'s so so so different from everyone writing for the web. 這和為網絡寫作的每個人都有很大的不同。 > Now everyone\'s working on mobile apps. 現在每個人都在開發移動應用程序。 > Companies are moving to cities. 公司正在遷往城市。 > I think that\'s really interesting too. 我覺得這也很有趣。 > There\'s this migration especially of the social companies to cities. 尤其是社會公司向城市的遷移。 > Another phenomenon is you know you go back you know when Google started in 1998 the algorithm was the intellectual property. 另一個現象是，你知道你回去，你知道，當谷歌在 1998 年成立時，算法是知識產權。 > Today it\'s the user design and the user interface that leverages an application. 今天，利用應用程序的是用戶設計和用戶界面。 > So the world has shifted from algorithm IP to design and user interface IP being the most important. 因此，世界已經從算法 IP 轉向了設計，用戶界面 IP 是最重要的。 > `[00:25:34]` Does that mean lots of lots of big big changes. `[00:25:34]` 那是否意味著有很大的變化？ > `[00:25:38]` What about last question in all these years what have you been surprised by. `[00:25:38]` 這么多年來你最后一個問題是什么？你感到驚訝的是什么？ > The biggest surprise and satisfaction for me is watching entrepreneurs mature at the speed of light. 對我來說，最大的驚喜和滿足感是看著企業家以光速成熟。 > `[00:25:55]` When they have to. `[00:25:55]` 必要的時候。 > So if you pick Larry Page at Google Jack Dorsey Zuckerberg Ben Silverman. 所以如果你選擇谷歌的拉里·佩奇，杰克·多爾西·扎克伯格本·西爾弗曼。 > These companies take off those founders have got to mature. 這些公司的騰飛那些創始人已經成熟了。 > Manage thousands of people and keep their product focus and all four of those examples they met the expectations. 管理成千上萬的人，并保持他們的產品重點，所有這些例子，他們都達到了預期。 > But think about what happens when they go home at night. 但是想想他們晚上回家后會發生什么。 > You know their companies are hiring 10 people a day and they\'re force to mature and adapt to that growth. 你知道，他們的公司每天雇傭 10 名員工，他們強迫自己成熟并適應這種增長。 > And these entrepreneurs are doing it. 這些企業家正在做這件事。 > And watching that happen and helping them do it is the most satisfying thing you\'ll ever do. 看著這一切發生并幫助他們做這件事是你所做過的最令人滿意的事情。 > Which is why I\'m not retired. 所以我才沒退休。 > `[00:26:49]` Well awesome thank you so much for. `[00:26:49]` 哦，太棒了，謝謝你。