# Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014 > `[00:00:03]` Larry buddy I actually work yes. `[00:00:03]` 拉里·巴迪，我確實工作過。 > `[00:00:12]` All right. `[00:00:12]` 好的。 > So this was us in 2005. 這就是 2005 年的我們。 > `[00:00:17]` We were just out of college. 我們剛從大學畢業。 > We packed ourselves into my civic and we drove up into Boston where we\'d just been accepted thankfully into the summer Founders Program. 我們把自己塞進了我的城市，然后我們開車去了波士頓，在那里，我們被錄取了，謝天謝地，參加了暑期創辦人項目。 > It\'s very first year our backup plan was to go live with our parents. 這是我們第一年的備用計劃就是和我們的父母住在一起。 > So that was great. 那真是太棒了。 > Both Justin and I were very relieved that we could get our own place albeit a little tiny bedroom in Roxbury which is all we could afford at the time. 賈斯汀和我都松了一口氣，因為我們可以找到自己的住處，盡管羅克斯伯里有一間小小的臥室，這是我們當時所能負擔得起的。 > And that summer was amazing. 那個夏天太棒了。 > I still to this day don\'t quite know what they saw on us to accept us because looking back on it we knew none of the things we needed in order to succeed in startups and we missed my first slide which is a big slide this says imagine in front of you. 直到今天，我仍然不知道他們看到了什么讓我們接受我們，因為回顧過去，我們不知道我們要在初創企業中取得成功所需要的任何東西，我們錯過了我的第一張幻燈片，這是一張大幻燈片，上面寫著：在你面前想象一下。 > Don\'t give up because that\'s the only important thing that I really had going in. 不要放棄，因為那是我真正要做的唯一重要的事情。 > When we started here was a determination not to give up because if you look back on it we kind of knew how to program. 當我們從這里開始的時候，我們決心不放棄，因為如果你回顧一下它，我們就知道如何編程了。 > We weren\'t very good. 我們不是很好。 > In retrospect we didn\'t really know what we were doing. 回想起來，我們并不真正知道自己在做什么。 > I thought that you had to use a database from Java. 我認為您必須使用 Java 的數據庫。 > I didn\'t understand that that was like a separate thing and that they had nothing to do with each other. 我不明白這是另一回事，他們之間沒有任何關系。 > I was we really really didn\'t know what we were doing we did not have make product decisions. 我真的不知道我們在做什么，我們沒有做產品決定。 > We to raise money to hire people. 我們要籌集資金雇人。 > But it certainly did not manage people and we had basically none of the skills. 但它當然沒有管理人員，我們基本上沒有任何技能。 > `[00:01:29]` All we had was a desire to make it happen and an amazing support network of people who were helping us make it happen. `[00:01:29]` 我們所擁有的只是一種實現它的愿望，以及一個令人驚奇的幫助我們實現它的人的支持網絡。 > And so we started our company Kigo calendar Mikiko calendar was a story in just repeated mistake and failure. 于是我們開始了我們的公司 Kigo 日歷 Mikiko 日歷是一個重復錯誤和失敗的故事 > `[00:01:45]` We were we were building basically Google calendar. `[00:01:45]` 我們基本上是在建立谷歌日歷。 > It wasn\'t called that at time because we were a calendar hadn\'t been released but we\'ve seen Gmail as had almost everyone else and we in about 9 other companies all had the same brilliant idea at the same time which is we should make a calendar that works like Gmail which is actually a pretty good idea. 因為我們的日歷還沒有發布，所以我們沒有這么稱呼它，但是我們看到 Gmail 和其他所有人一樣，我們在其他 9 家公司同時都有同樣的絕妙想法，那就是我們應該制作一個像 Gmail 那樣的日歷，這實際上是一個非常好的主意。 > Turns out but everyone had that same idea. 但每個人都有相同的想法。 > It probably wasn\'t a great start start at the time anyway. 無論如何，這可能不是一個好的開始。 > So not only do we have a kind of not so great idea but we couldn\'t stay focused on it for more than like five weeks in a row. 所以，我們不僅有一個不太好的主意，而且我們不能連續五個星期專注于這個問題。 > `[00:02:16]` So we had like this founder ADT we\'d go and we\'d work on Quico for about five weeks and they wouldn\'t it wouldn\'t explode overnight mysteriously for some reason and we get demoralized he would give up and we go build and launch some other product like a social network for families or a search engine for MySpace MySpace was big at the time not Facebook. `[00:02:16]` 所以我們有了這樣的創始人 ADT，我們將在 Quico 上工作大約 5 周，他們不會因為某種原因在一夜之間神秘爆炸，他會放棄，我們會去建立和推出一些其他的產品，比如家庭社交網絡或者 MySpace 的搜索引擎，那時 Facebook 并不是很大。 > `[00:02:36]` So just you know context and we\'ve actually had a listing called sounds app which was a imagin soundcloud but built by people who didn\'t have any idea or any vision for how to grow it from there. `[00:02:36]` 所以你只知道上下文，我們實際上有一個名為聲音應用的列表，它是一個 Imagin SoundCloud，但是由那些對如何在那里成長沒有任何想法和遠見的人創建的。 > And we we just we we did get a really great education in prototyping products like we built in launch I think no less than 6 start of ideas in a year and a half and we kept going back to Quico when that inevitably also failed to explode. 我們確實在原型產品方面得到了很好的教育，就像我們在發布時制造的一樣，我認為在一年半的時間里，至少有 6 個創意的開始，我們繼續回到 Quico，而這也不可避免地失敗了。 > And so we learned a lot that we learned a lot about how ADT definitely prevents you from succeeding. 所以我們學到了很多，我們學到了很多關于 ADT 是如何阻止你成功的。 > `[00:03:11]` We learned about how to program that was much better. `[00:03:11]` 我們學到了如何編寫更好的程序。 > By the end of that than I was at the beginning as was Justin we hired our first employees screwed up hiring our first employees and managing them but learning experience. 到了最后，比我開始的時候，我們雇傭了第一批員工，把第一批員工的招聘和管理搞砸了，但是學習了經驗。 > And then we sold them on eBay because Google Calendar been launched and we had no idea how to compete with that. 然后我們在易趣上賣了，因為谷歌日歷推出了，我們不知道如何與之競爭。 > `[00:03:27]` So that takes us to the next step. `[00:03:27]` 那就帶我們進入下一步。 > `[00:03:31]` So we we knew after we did that we wanted to keep doing startups. `[00:03:31]` 所以我們知道，在我們做完之后，我們想繼續做初創公司。 > We\'d sold it on eBay. 我們在易趣上賣的。 > About a quarter million dollars which at the time was like a inconceivably large amount of money we didn\'t keep all of that. 當時大約有 25 萬美元，這就像一筆難以想象的巨額資金，我們并沒有全部保留。 > Our investors got most of it but still it was it was seemed like sort of a win. 我們的投資者得到了其中的大部分，但這似乎是一場勝利。 > And we raised more money from Y C with this basic concept that we were going to build a reality television show around Justin\'s life. 我們從 YC 那里籌到了更多的錢，我們打算圍繞賈斯汀的生活建立一個真人秀節目。 > Again I\'m not sure that the decision making by Y see looking back now looks good but at the time I can\'t really understand what they were thinking so. 再說一次，我不確定 Y 做出的決定現在看起來不錯，但當時我無法真正理解他們是怎么想的。 > So we knew at the time we knew two things. 所以當時我們知道兩件事。 > We knew we were missing two really crucial skills in order to make a startup happen. 我們知道，為了使創業成為現實，我們缺少了兩項非常關鍵的技能。 > We needed someone who could keep us from just like meandering to build a third startup so we brought on our friend from college Michael Seibel to be the CEO and be B-R bureau our parent sort of you know keep us product focused guys from getting NTD and leaving the project and keep us on the straight and narrow. 我們需要一個能阻止我們像蜿蜒前行的人來創建第三家初創公司，所以我們把大學里的朋友邁克爾·塞貝爾(Michael Seibel)請來擔任首席執行官，成為 B-R 局-我們的母公司，你知道，讓我們這些專注于產品的人遠離 NTD，離開這個項目，讓我們保持直截了當的態度。 > And we promised him we\'d move to New York really quick it\'d be great. 我們答應過他我們會很快搬到紐約那會很棒的。 > You should just go out to Silicon Valley for us to launch it will raise some money and move to New York and that was that was all lies. 你應該去硅谷，讓我們啟動它，它會籌集一些資金，然后搬到紐約，這都是謊言。 > We never moved to New York. 我們從沒搬到紐約。 > I think we kind of intended to but not really. 我想我們是有意的，但不是真的。 > And so then we we brought on khyal our fourth co-founder because we needed someone who actually knew how to build hardware like we we were stopped we were smart but we were like kind of junior asked programmers at the time and definitely couldn\'t build what we thought we needed to build for justin tv to launch it to launch a live 24/7 reality TV television show. 于是，我們把第四位聯合創始人 khyal 請來了，因為我們需要一個真正懂得如何制造硬件的人，就像我們被叫停了一樣，我們很聰明，但我們當時就像是初級的被問到的程序員，我們肯定不能構建我們認為我們需要為 Justin TV 構建的東西來發布一個 24/7 直播的真人秀節目。 > You brought Kylen for that and this was our awesome foreperson founding team foreperson founding teams are generally a bad idea. 你帶來了凱倫，這是我們令人敬畏的領隊創建團隊，領隊創建團隊一般都是個壞主意。 > Hours worked. 工作了幾個小時。 > I don\'t generally recommend it but something about the way the team dynamics gelled made it function and we launched the show and it was our first time launching a show where we got the attention of the whole country. 我一般不推薦它，但是關于團隊動力如何使它發揮作用，我們啟動了這個節目，這是我們第一次在這個節目中引起全國的關注。 > I mean I mean not everybody but like a lot of people heard about us. 我是說，不是每個人都知道，但就像很多人聽說過我們一樣。 > We were on and carry on like the morning show. 我們就像早上的節目一樣繼續下去。 > We like we we built the thing that people outside of Silicon Valley cared about and that was really really cool and had this awesome spike of growth we had like 150000 uniques in the first month and then it turns out we have no idea what we\'re doing in terms of producing reality television. 我們喜歡建立硅谷以外的人關心的東西，這真的很酷，而且在第一個月里，我們有了 150000 個大學的驚人的增長，結果我們不知道我們在制作真人秀方面做了什么。 > We did not understand that and so we went back to what we knew about which was the technology in the platform the thing we spent the previous year and a half working on and we opened up the Justin TV platform to everyone and made it into the website. 我們不明白這一點，所以我們回到了我們所知道的平臺中的技術，我們花了一年半的時間在這個平臺上，我們向所有人開放了賈斯汀電視平臺，并把它放到了網站上。 > You may have actually visited at some point which is a platform for anyone to broadcast live video. 你可能真的在某個時候訪問過，這是一個平臺，任何人都可以播放現場視頻。 > `[00:06:16]` And so the one there you go. `[00:06:16]` 你去的那個。 > OK. 好的 > `[00:06:22]` So you can see just on TV being flat for a very long time as we had no idea we were doing and bumbled around with reality television show you can see that bend in the curve that\'s us figuring out oh yeah we should probably just not produce the content and let other people do it. `[00:06:22]` 所以你可以在電視上看到電視上很長一段時間是平的，因為我們不知道我們在做什么，在電視真人秀節目中胡亂轉，你可以看到曲線上的彎道，我們正在琢磨，哦，是的，我們可能不應該制作內容，讓其他人去做。 > It\'s really important that we didn\'t give up right so the the key thing that happened there is we had a failed project and a failed startup like it wasn\'t working. 真正重要的是，我們沒有放棄，所以關鍵是我們有一個失敗的項目和一個失敗的創業，就像它不起作用一樣。 > We were it was clearly going nowhere but rather than give up on it we decide okay how do we repurpose this how do we keep going. 很明顯，我們是無處可去，但我們沒有放棄，而是決定，好吧，我們如何重新定位這個問題，我們如何繼續前進。 > We somehow managed to raise money despite the fact that it was not a good idea before we opened the platform. 盡管在打開平臺之前，這不是一個好主意，但我們還是設法籌集了資金。 > People believed in us and give us an idea of our current theme here we convince people to believe in us and give us money before we actually have figured it out. 人們相信我們，給我們一個關于我們當前主題的想法，我們說服人們相信我們，在我們還沒有搞清楚之前給我們錢。 > And that\'s that was really really good for us because it let us let us keep going and not give up but we would have kept going anyway as I think we would. 這對我們真的很好，因為它讓我們繼續前進，而不是放棄，但無論如何，我們都會像我想的那樣繼續前進。 > We\'re all really committed even if we hadn\'t been on the draw draw a salary which we couldn\'t. 我們都很認真，即使我們沒有拿到薪水，但我們不能。 > For months in the middle we would have kept going. 在中間的幾個月里，我們會一直堅持下去。 > So then it\'s great. 那就太棒了。 > We got product market fit or we sort of thought we did. 我們已經適應了產品市場，或者說我們認為我們做到了。 > We didn\'t really but we hit something we\'d like stumbled accidentally into something people really wanted and the growth sort of speaks to that. 我們并沒有這樣做，但我們碰到了一些我們想要的東西，意外地撞上了人們真正想要的東西，而增長也說明了這一點。 > And so then you get to this period just to give you a history you have some growth. 所以你進入這個階段只是為了給你一個歷史，你有一些成長。 > And we\'re really excited and it\'s really just heads down. 我們真的很興奮，它真的只是頭朝下。 > I\'ve never scaled anything before so this is another skill we didn\'t have I had no idea how to run a Web service that got more than 3 users at a time. 我以前從來沒有縮放過任何東西，所以這是我們沒有的另一項技能，我不知道如何運行一次擁有超過 3 個用戶的 Web 服務。 > Another did Kyle and so we had a lot of downtime. 另一個是凱爾，所以我們有很多休息時間。 > A lot of downtime kept growing anyways and got a lot better at it. 很多停工時間一直在增長，而且做得更好。 > `[00:07:48]` Learn how to scale a web service and then the sad thing happened is we didn\'t understand what was generating our growth. `[00:07:48]` 學習如何擴展 Web 服務，但不幸的是，我們不知道是什么創造了我們的成長。 > `[00:07:59]` And so we couldn\'t cause it to keep going. `[00:07:59]` 所以我們不能讓它繼續前進。 > We hit some point and stopped growing and it was totally mysterious to us why this happened like we didn\'t we really. 我們到達了某個點，停止了生長，這對我們來說是完全神秘的，為什么會發生這樣的事情，不是嗎？ > If you\'d asked us why were you growing 3 months ago when you\'re not growing now you would not be able to tell you because we couldn\'t have told you why we started growing in the first place other than we made some changes and it seemed like it worked. 如果你問我們為什么你在 3 個月前成長，而現在你沒有成長，你就不能告訴你，因為我們不可能告訴你為什么我們一開始就開始成長，除了我們做了一些改變，而且它看起來很有效。 > So we kept going we kept going for four years we realized okay well we\'re not growing it\'s 2008. 所以我們堅持了四年，我們意識到，好吧，我們沒有在成長-2008 年。 > So if you cast your mind back the market has totally collapsed. 因此，如果你回心轉意，市場就完全崩潰了。 > There\'s no way to raise money. 沒有辦法籌集資金。 > You\'re like well we better start making some money and so we worked really hard on monetizing our site. 你就像我們最好開始賺錢，所以我們非常努力地賺錢，我們的網站。 > We cut costs and we clawed our way. 我們削減了成本，然后按自己的方式行事。 > I wouldn\'t call it profitability but at least we\'d staunched the bleeding and then we kind of found ourselves stuck in this place where what do we do now like we\'ve got this thing we could stay here where do we to make it profitable. 我不認為它是盈利，但至少我們已經止住了流血，然后我們發現自己陷入了這樣的境地：我們現在做什么，就像我們有了這樣的東西-我們可以留在這里，讓它盈利。 > We could work on it for a while. 我們可以好好研究一下。 > You know it\'s not really going anywhere. 你知道這不會有什么進展的。 > And so we had this moment real met up and we like we need to do something with this company and should have two schools of thought. 所以我們有了真正的相遇，我們喜歡和這家公司做點什么，應該有兩種想法。 > One of them was mobile at the time the iPhone was new and we saw it. 其中一個是移動的，當時 iPhone 是新的，我們看到了它。 > There\'s this real opportunity to build a mobile video. 這是制作移動視頻的真正機會。 > There was no good mobile video players in the space that that could be big. 在這個可能很大的空間里，沒有好的移動視頻播放器。 > And there is the sort of second idea run gaming which I was interested in primarily because it was the only content on Justin TV that I personally watched. 還有第二個想法，運行游戲，這是我感興趣的，主要是因為它是我個人觀看的賈斯汀電視的唯一內容。 > `[00:09:25]` And we actually said okay this time rather than just launch random features and see but I don\'t know just sort of guess whether they worked or not. `[00:09:25]` 這一次，我們實際上說好，而不是只是隨機發布特性，看看，但我不知道，只是猜測它們是否起作用。 > We\'re gonna set real goals for two projects one around mobile one around gaming and we\'re going to try to hit those goals and so we set up two teams internally one led by MichaelR. 我們將為兩個項目設定真正的目標，一個圍繞移動項目，一個圍繞游戲，我們將嘗試實現這些目標，因此我們在內部建立了兩個團隊，一個由 MichaelR 領導。 > then CEO which turned into Socialcam on getting spun off and then a second one led by me and in partnership with Kevin Lin who is our CEO and the two of us really believed in the gaming part mostly because were big gamers and I done some handwaving math about how IPN was big so maybe we could be too. 后來，首席執行官變成了社交攝像頭，在我的領導下，與我們的首席執行官凱文·林(KevinLin)合作，我們兩個人真的相信游戲部分，主要是因為他們是大玩家，我做了一些關于 IPN 有多大的揮手數學，也許我們也可以這么做。 > And we looked into it and so there\'s no really content issues with this. 我們對此進行了調查，因此對此沒有真正滿意的問題。 > We can we can go get the gaming content it\'s not incredibly expensive the way sports would be. 我們可以，我們可以去獲得游戲內容，它不像運動那樣昂貴。 > And we realized that advertisers are okay with gaming. 我們意識到廣告商對游戲沒意見。 > Okay great. 好吧太好了。 > All the market research has done. 所有的市場調查都做了。 > Let\'s go do it. 我們去做吧。 > That basically was in fact the center of market research. 這實際上是市場研究的中心。 > And so that was this project that was codenames Earth anyone who\'s ever worked with me knows I love code names. 因此，這是一個代號為“地球”的項目，任何曾與我共事過的人都知道，我喜歡代號。 > I will code name anything. 我會給任何東西起代號。 > Code name reorgs I will code name like moving the kitchen anything I love code name so our project code named for this was Zearth. 代碼名稱，reorgs，我將代碼名，像移動廚房，任何我喜歡的代碼名稱，所以我們的項目代碼命名為 ZEarth。 > Which no one else in the company loves but I really loved and actually really want to launch twitch as Earth but they wouldn\'t let me. 這是公司里沒有人喜歡的，但我真的很喜歡，而且真的很想像地球一樣發射抽搐，但他們不讓我這么做。 > So we had to go with the new name and the best thing about about the work we did then was that that was when that was when the light bulb went off. 所以我們不得不使用新的名字，而我們當時做的工作最好的地方就是燈泡熄滅的時候。 > That was when I finally should have I guess made the final step. 那時我終于應該邁出最后一步了。 > This is 5 16 years and as an entrepreneur and got the head put together all the skills I needed to actually run a company I could I could build products. 這是一個 5，16 年的時間，作為一名企業家，他把我所需要的所有技能集中在一起，真正地經營一家我可以制造產品的公司。 > I understood the engineering side. 我了解工程方面。 > I could manage. 我能應付的。 > People had spent years painfully making mistakes losing lots of employees. 多年來，人們一直在痛苦地犯錯誤，失去了很多員工。 > Sorry Eric sorry Tim you were learning experiences. 抱歉，埃里克，提姆，你在學習經驗。 > And we we I figured out how to do hiring we\'d figured out how to scale products if we needed to. 我們 > We knew I knew about how companies might make money you might lose money. 我們知道公司是如何賺錢的-你可能會虧本。 > And what I finally could do when we were when we were here is I finally got the extra bonus skill of figuring out how to talk to users. 當我們在這里的時候，我最終能做的是，我終于獲得了額外的額外技能，那就是弄清楚如何和用戶交談。 > So now you\'re all thinking I\'ve heard what you have to talk to users yay. 所以現在你們都認為我已經聽到了你們要和用戶交談的內容。 > Of course I talked to users and I thought I talked to users before we did before we did switch. 當然，我和用戶交談過，在我們切換之前，我想我已經和用戶談過了。 > I was wrong. 我錯了。 > I didn\'t actually understand how to talk to users and 80 percent of you when you go start your startup make the exact same mistake idea which is you go talk to some users and you\'ll think you\'ve done it right. 我真的不知道如何和用戶交談，當你開始創業的時候，80%的人都不懂，犯同樣的錯誤，那就是你去和一些用戶交談，你會認為你做得對。 > It\'s really hard. 這真的很難。 > `[00:12:13]` It\'s something that we you know we train product managers on Monday when they come into the company something that I think is really one of the key skills for a startup founder it certainly was for me one of the missing skills. `[00:12:13]` 我們知道，當產品經理進入公司時，我們會在周一對他們進行培訓-我認為這是初創公司創始人的關鍵技能之一-對我來說，這當然是我缺少的技能之一。 > And so we finally built things for our users. 所以我們最終為我們的用戶建造了一些東西。 > It was like we\'d been we\'ve been to bumbling around the dark trying to get across the room. 就像我們曾經在黑暗中笨手笨腳地試圖穿過房間一樣。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And if you go across the room that\'s product market fit. 如果你穿過房間，那就適合你的產品市場了。 > `[00:12:36]` And so we\'d be like Aha we know it\'s that way and then we\'d go oh step on a Lego but my foot into a chair and that\'s like that was building stuff was like you can make progress that way every time you hit something you back up and you go around and you get something else you back up you go around and eventually you get closer and closer to the direction you want to go in. `[00:12:36]` 所以我們會像啊哈一樣，我們知道它是那樣的，然后我們就會走到樂高上，但是我的腳踩到了椅子上，那就像建筑材料一樣，每次你撞到你背上的東西時，你都可以這樣做，然后你得到了其他的東西，你又回來了，最后你走得更近了。更接近你想要進入的方向。 > It was like I just turned the lights for oh I see there\'s some logos there in the chairs there and I should just like walk in this path and I\'ll get across the room. 就像我剛剛把燈打開了，哦，我看到椅子上有一些標識，我應該走在這條路上，然后我會穿過房間。 > And it was really it is really a magical experience. 這真的是一次神奇的經歷。 > You put all of those things 16 year accumulation of six years of experience together of basically more or less failing to do the right thing in a startup together and you finally got Twitch TV which we launched at E3 in 2011. 你把所有這些東西都放在一起 16 年積累了六年的經驗，基本上都沒能在初創公司一起做正確的事情，你終于得到了 TwitTV，這是我們 2011 年在 E3 上推出的。 > About nine months after the project started in about four months after I had this epiphany and this logo is not very good my designers are really very good. 大約在這個項目開始后的九個月，大約四個月后，我有了這個頓悟，這個標志不是很好，我的設計師真的很好。 > It\'s not bad when designers are unhappy with it after his he\'s not happy with it because I made him do it in 24 hours because I was like Oh right we need a logo we\'re launching in 24 hours make it. 當設計師們對它不滿的時候，他就不滿意了，因為我讓他在 24 小時內就這么做了，因為我想，我們需要一個標志，我們要在 24 小時內發布。 > And so we didn\'t actually think he did a pretty good job for a 24 hour logo. 所以我們并不認為他在 24 小時的標識上做得很好。 > And that was the whole thing of Twitch was like we basically just threw these like two or three things together like we didn\'t do that much work compared to the amount of work we\'d done for just in TV. 這就是特維奇的全部，就像我們把這些東西放在一起，就像我們沒有做那么多的工作，和我們在電視上所做的工作量相比。 > We applied it in the right places in the right directions because we finally knew what we were doing well enough to apply it apply our effort efficiently. 我們把它應用到正確的地方，在正確的方向上，因為我們最終知道我們做的足夠好，能夠有效地運用我們的努力。 > And that was that was twitch and actually from that point on the story gets like way more boring because we basically did the same thing over and over and over again. 那是抽搐，實際上從那一刻起，故事變得更無聊了，因為我們基本上一遍又一遍地做著同樣的事情。 > We went to talk to the users we\'d ask them like what do you want and we get to know what their net is what they wanted but like what their life goals were and like their experiences they have today how they made money today what their jobs were like what they wanted to do. 我們去和用戶交談，我們會問他們你想要什么，我們知道他們的網絡是什么，他們想要什么，但是喜歡他們的生活目標，喜歡他們的經歷，他們今天是如何賺錢的，他們的工作是什么樣的，他們想做什么。 > And we identified really importantly which users were the most important to us and that was the broadcasters we had to build a place that was amazing for people to broadcast gaming video. 我們確定了最重要的是哪些用戶對我們來說是最重要的，那就是我們必須建立一個讓人們能夠播放游戲視頻的地方。 > And we had to build a place that was amazing for gamers. 我們不得不建造一個對玩家來說很棒的地方。 > And so we would just cycle that we would talk to them we\'d go build stuff some of them would switch. 所以我們只需要循環，我們會和他們交談，我們會去建造一些東西，他們中的一些人會轉換。 > We\'d get enough leverage that through promotion that we could get more and bring more people onto the platform we started being able to do business development deals because we got bigger don\'t do business development deals or starting a company it\'s like useless you see big companies do it or even medium size start ups to it sometimes it can be quite effective later. 我們將獲得足夠的杠桿，通過推廣，我們可以得到更多的人，讓更多的人進入我們的平臺，我們開始能夠做商業發展交易，因為我們變得更大了，不做商業發展交易，或者創辦一家公司-你看到大公司做這件事，甚至中型企業開始做這件事-有時候，它可能會非常有效。 > Don\'t don\'t imitate them. 不要模仿他們。 > It doesn\'t work early. 它不起作用。 > Every time we tried to do a business devolvement dieldrin just on TV and we didn\'t have a product that was taking off. 每次我們試圖在電視上做一項業務發展活動時，我們都沒有一種正在騰飛的產品。 > It was a gigantic distraction and waste of time. 這是一個巨大的分散注意力和浪費時間。 > They only it\'s only beneficial once you get later on into the process. 只有當你以后進入這個過程時，它們才是有益的。 > At any rate so you\'ve probably seen this graph before. 無論如何，你可能以前見過這張圖。 > I think this graph was actually inspired by Justin TV because this is this is what it feels like doing a startup and this is what Justin TV and felt like the whole time which is this rush of excitement in the beginning is your first building something that you are really excited about this idea it\'s awesome we\'re taking it to the world this long period of like Payne where it doesn\'t work and you don\'t know what you\'re doing and you are probably screwing it up but you could probably if everyone was super skilled and knew everything you need to know from day one they might be well to enter that growth curve immediately. 我認為這張圖表實際上是受到賈斯汀電視的啟發，因為這就是賈斯汀電視創業的感覺，這也是賈斯汀電視的由始至終的感覺，這是你第一次建立起你真正興奮的東西，你對這個想法感到非常興奮，這太棒了，我們把它帶到世界上，就像佩恩一樣。如果它不起作用，你也不知道你在做什么，你可能搞砸了，但如果每個人都是超級熟練的，并且從第一天起就知道你需要知道的一切，那么他們很可能很快就能進入增長曲線。 > You just can\'t. 你就是不能。 > You have a massive learning experience and learning experience is specific to every startup. 你有大量的學習經驗，學習經驗是每個創業公司特有的。 > That\'s why I don\'t really think giving generic surfer advice usually works because even that business development advice I just gave that\'s wrong. 這就是為什么我不認為給泛型沖浪者的建議通常是有效的，因為即使是我剛才給出的商業發展建議也是錯誤的。 > Like some number of people that\'s that\'s actually completely the wrong advice. 就像很多人一樣，這實際上是完全錯誤的建議。 > You should actually go do biz dev deals before you even launch your company. 實際上，你甚至應該在啟動公司之前就去做 Bizdev 的交易。 > I don\'t know what stuff that would be for but there\'s got to be one out there that fits that pattern and so eventually it gets better. 我不知道這是為了什么，但必須有一個符合這種模式，所以它最終會變得更好。 > I think that\'s the real message eventually if you stick with it even if you have to change your idea even if you have to pivot. 我認為這是真正的信息，如果你堅持它，即使你必須改變你的想法，即使你必須轉向。 > The coal company in a different direction if you have to start over with a new product idea entirely. 如果你必須從一個新的產品想法開始，煤炭公司就會有不同的方向。 > You get there. 你去那里。 > Eventually you get something that is actually working on it. 最終，你會得到一些實際正在做的事情。 > It\'s a reflection of you as much as it is of learning about the domain and being a domain expert is valuable. 它反映了你對這個領域的了解，作為一個領域專家是很有價值的。 > But you also have to build the skills and we know when we started just in TV we started Kigo way back in 2005. 但是你也必須建立技能，我們知道，當我們剛開始在電視，我們開始的 Kigo 早在 2005 年。 > We didn\'t have the skills and it was only through sticking with it the entire time that we built them. 我們沒有這樣的技能，只有在我們建造這些技能的整個過程中，我們才能堅持下去。 > So don\'t give up and if you just keep at it you will get better and even if your first startup doesn\'t work. 所以，不要放棄，如果你堅持下去，你會變得更好，即使你的第一家創業公司不起作用。 > Maybe your second one will in my case it took three tries. 也許你的第二個會在我的情況下，它需要三次嘗試。 > Errantly a bit of a slow learner because the other people seem to have done it faster sometimes. 錯誤地說，學習速度有點慢，因為其他人有時似乎做得更快。 > But this was it was a great experience the whole time. 但這是一次很棒的經歷。 > And if you don\'t love it you won\'t make it through the long period of pain that is inevitable. 如果你不愛它，你將無法度過漫長的痛苦，這是不可避免的。 > So make sure that you take care of yourself during the process make sure that you take care of your mental health your physical health while you\'re doing it because it\'s a long road. 所以，確保你在這個過程中照顧好自己，確保你的心理健康，你的身體健康，當你這么做的時候，因為這是一條漫長的道路。 > I think earlier they\'re saying it takes an average of eight years. 我想早些時候他們說這平均需要八年時間。 > It took us eight years eight and a half and that\'s normal and fucked it up. 我們花了八年半的時間，這是正常的，而且搞砸了。 > It could\'ve easily taken longer. 很容易就會花更長時間。 > The Amazon deal kind of came out of nowhere we weren\'t really looking this all the company weren\'t expecting to and so it could have been 9 years 10 years before you saw any kind of exit or end of the road on that stuff. 亞馬遜的交易是從不知道的地方冒出來的，我們并沒有真正看到這一切，所有公司都沒有料到這一點，所以 10 年后，你才能看到任何形式的退出或道路的盡頭。 > And for me it isn\'t even the end of the road home. 對我來說，這甚至不是回家路的盡頭。 > Actually after eight years of this I love it. 事實上，在這八年之后，我喜歡它。 > I really like doing it. 我真的很喜歡這樣做。 > And for me it\'s nothing I want to keep doing going forward indefinitely into the future. 對我來說，這對我來說沒有什么意義，我不想一直做下去，直到未來。 > I really enjoy it. 我真的很享受。 > And so that\'s really the most important thing is stick with it all the way and don\'t give up. 所以這才是最重要的是堅持到底，不要放棄。 > And that\'s the most important thing. 這是最重要的。 > It\'s the only way to succeed in startups. 這是初創企業成功的唯一途徑。 > `[00:18:10]` Thank you. `[00:18:10]` 謝謝。