# Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014 > `[00:00:02]` Thank you for coming to get started. `[00:00:02]` 謝謝你的到來。 > I wanted to just ask you about how LinkedIn got funded so let\'s see. 我只想問你 LinkedIn 是如何獲得資金的，讓我們看看。 > `[00:00:13]` I\'ll give this even. `[00:00:13]` 我會把這個給你的。 > I know it come back on time. 我知道它會準時回來。 > The slightly longer answer because it\'s entertaining. 稍長一點的答案，因為它很有趣。 > So in September of 2000 Peter Teil Max Levchin Loopt Nosik and I did an off site at my grandparents house and Gualala California where were like Okay how do we say PayPal because in August of 2009 burned 12 million dollars in one month without any revenue with an exponentiation cost line. 所以在 2000 年 9 月，彼得·泰爾·馬克斯·萊文·洛普·諾西克和我在我祖父母的房子和加州的瓜拉拉做了一個場外的網站，我們怎么說貝寶呢？因為 2009 年 8 月，貝寶在一個月內就消耗了 1200 萬美元，沒有任何收入，并且有指數成倍的成本線。 > And that worked out fortunately that was day one. 幸運的是，那是第一天。 > Day two was if this blows up we will have created a mushroom cloud of 200 million plus in venture capital going to zero. 第二天，如果這一幕破滅，我們將創造出一個 2 億多萬的蘑菇云，風險投資將降至零。 > And so you know we might as well do something together. 所以你知道我們最好一起做點什么。 > `[00:00:50]` So we pitched each other our best ideas and an earlier version of LinkedIn was one of them for me. `[00:00:50]` 所以我們互相推介自己最好的想法，而早期版本的 LinkedIn 就是其中之一。 > And then they three went on for a hike and then before we come back to work. 然后，他們三個繼續徒步旅行，然后在我們回來工作之前。 > `[00:01:03]` And then what happened is we sold PayPal to eBay in October of 0 2 and Silicon Valley had gone crazy then which is they\'d basically concluded that consumer unit the classic pattern for investing in the last few decades had been you have one big tech wave and everyone runs out to get the big companies the most tech ways and then that tech wave goes away and there\'s a new one whether it\'s networking equipment you know you know medical staff or enterprise software or clean tech or anything else and anyone including consumer and it was over. `[00:01:03]` 發生的事情是，我們在 02 年 10 月把貝寶賣給了 eBay，硅谷瘋了，他們基本上得出結論，過去幾十年里，傳統的投資模式-消費單元-只有一次大科技浪潮，每個人都跑出去，讓大公司以最先進的技術手段，然后科技浪潮消失了，有一個新的，無論是網絡設備，你知道，醫療人員或企業軟件或清潔技術或其他任何東西，包括消費者，這一切都結束了。 > `[00:01:39]` Right. `[00:01:39]` 對。 > So they said I was on Google eBay you know Yahoo. 所以他們說我在谷歌易趣你知道雅虎。 > These are dead that we read on that net now anyway. 不管怎么說，我們現在網上讀到的這些都是死的。 > And what I realized was actually in fact the consumer and it was just starting. 事實上，我意識到的是消費者，這才剛剛開始。 > And in fact the social platforms were kind of a key thing and so I said well actually in fact the links and ideas that works so as opposed to taking a year off I took three weeks off and then started working on Linka. 事實上，社交平臺是一件很關鍵的事情，所以我說得很好，事實上，鏈接和想法是有效的，而不是放一年的假，我放了三個星期的假，然后開始研究 Linka。 > `[00:02:03]` What about that idea about the particular idea Lincoln had made you sure at least highly convicted enough that it was going to work in this world where everyone had given up on consuming it. `[00:02:03]` 林肯讓你確信至少在這個人人都放棄消費的世界里，它會奏效。 > `[00:02:14]` Well so I actually think that if you have had a m at the back of the napkin stage you have a high conviction that\'s going to work you\'re mostly deluding yourself. `[00:02:14]` 那么我實際上認為，如果你在餐巾紙舞臺的后面有一個 m，你有一個很高的信念：你會工作的，你大部分是在欺騙自己。 > But self-delusion is a positive attribute in many entrepreneurial circumstances. 但在許多創業環境中，自我妄想是一個積極的因素。 > `[00:02:31]` And so for me it was I tend to think in terms of economic ecosystems like how the world should be out frequently a mistake and plans as well. `[00:02:31]` 所以對我來說，我傾向于從經濟生態系統的角度來思考，比如世界應該如何經常外出-這是一個錯誤，也是一個計劃。 > If all you know hundreds millions people using it as this product would be awesome. 如果你知道數億人把它當作這個產品使用，那就太棒了。 > The real question is how you get the first million Muza because if you don\'t get the first million then the hundreds of millions that it never happens. 真正的問題是你如何得到第一個百萬的穆薩，因為如果你沒有得到第一個百萬，那么數億它永遠不會發生。 > Now being said is like OK. 現在被說成是好的。 > Everyone should have a public professional identity. 每個人都應該有一個公開的職業身份。 > That should all be open and transparent. 這一切都應該是公開和透明的。 > That should be a platform by which you navigate how you work and your work life that should exist. 這應該是一個平臺，你可以通過這個平臺來導航你的工作方式和你應該存在的工作生活。 > And there are a bunch of cultural things against it. 還有很多文化因素反對它。 > There\'s a bunch of people just kind of. 有一群人只是有點。 > When you explain that idea even today they scratch their head and go oh I didn\'t really think about it that way. 當你解釋這個想法的時候，即使是今天，他們也會撓頭而去，哦，我不是這么想的。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And so what gave me conviction was because there was a lot less noise back then that one could start a idea like this where most people even today don\'t really fully understand how to use the tool. 因此，讓我確信的是，當時的噪音要小得多，當時人們可以開始這樣的想法，即使是在今天，大多數人也不完全理解如何使用這個工具。 > Then you can slowly build and ramp to that which is much harder in an environment where it\'s noisy and tons of things are happening. 然后，你可以慢慢地建造和坡道，在一個嘈雜和大量事情正在發生的環境中，這要困難得多。 > `[00:03:37]` How did you get the first million or even the first thousand users Rillington. `[00:03:37]` 你是如何得到第一個百萬，甚至是第一個 1000 個用戶的里靈頓？ > `[00:03:41]` So first thousand was easy. `[00:03:41]` 所以第一千是容易的。 > We just sent out like 13 people who are working at the company at the time kind of sent out invitations. 我們剛發出了 13 個人，他們當時在公司工作，發出邀請函。 > And that ended up at a rate of 2000 per week which of course is nothing them. 每周以 2000 美元的速度結束，這當然不算什么。 > In it. 在里面。 > Probably the key thing that we innovated we were the first people to do this. 可能是我們創新的關鍵，我們是第一個這樣做的人。 > That then caused the growth curve to change was upload your address book and see who else you knew was on LinkedIn. 于是增長曲線發生了變化，上傳你的通訊錄，看看你在 LinkedIn 上認識的其他人。 > `[00:04:11]` Because what we\'re thinking about what was the problem that people were trying to solve when they showed up. `[00:04:11]` 因為當人們出現時，我們正在思考的問題是什么。 > Is this an interesting place. 這是個有趣的地方。 > Are there interesting people here as you know should I be here. 就像你所知道的，這里有趣的人，我應該在這里。 > Well one of the primary questions is who else is here. 最主要的問題之一是還有誰在這里。 > And so that was the quickest way to do that. 所以這是最快的方法。 > Once they went Oh Sam\'s here and so forth then they go OK. 一旦他們去了，哦，薩姆，等等，然后他們就可以走了。 > Let me invite some other people let me check this out. 讓我邀請其他人讓我看看這個。 > `[00:04:30]` And so that essentially changed our growth curve and without that we probably would have we would be here we had that off site when PayPal was burning tautly dollars a month. `[00:04:30]` 因此，這基本上改變了我們的增長曲線，如果沒有這些，我們可能會在這里，當貝寶(PayPal)一個月燒緊美元的時候，我們就會離開這里。 > An explanation an expert that was 12000 in August. 一個專家在八月份 12000 歲的解釋。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And you pitched LinkedIn as your best startup idea what WiMax and Peters best ideas. 你還把 LinkedIn 說成是你最好的創業點子，就像 WiMax 和 Peters 的最佳創意。 > `[00:04:49]` Laughter I\'m not allowed to say. `[00:04:49]` 笑聲我不能說。 > I\'ll take the Fifth. 我要第五輛。 > `[00:04:57]` All right. `[00:04:57]` 好的。 > `[00:04:59]` You know we\'re talking a little bit before we started about some of the current myths of Silicon Valley entrepreneurship and I thought that was really interesting so maybe you could talk about some of those. `[00:04:59]` 你知道，在我們開始討論硅谷創業的一些目前的神話之前，我們正在談論一些，我認為這真的很有趣，所以也許你可以談談其中的一些。 > `[00:05:07]` So there\'s a bunch of means going around in the valley in the last three to five years that I think were actually harmful. `[00:05:07]` 所以在過去的三到五年里，山谷里有一堆我認為是有害的東西。 > So how you think about these things. 所以你是如何看待這些事情的。 > So for example one of them is let\'s start with that actually a open capital market is a good thing for entrepreneurs. 例如，其中之一是，首先，開放的資本市場對企業家來說是一件好事。 > `[00:05:30]` And by the way it\'s not and it\'s a terrible thing. `[00:05:30]` 順便說一句，這不是一件可怕的事。 > But as entrepreneurs. 但作為企業家。 > Basically if the problem of an open capital market is they always think about in terms just my startup like me. 基本上，如果一個開放的資本市場的問題是，他們總是用術語來思考，就像我一樣，我的創業公司。 > So there\'s more capital that\'ll make my job easier. 所以有更多的資本可以讓我的工作更輕松。 > The problem is is if you now have is a function of open capital market 5 x the number of companies competing with you. 問題是，如果你現在有一個函數開放的資本市場，5 倍的公司與你競爭。 > Not just for your actual products but for talent for relevancy for breaking signal through the noise and all the rest of it. 不僅是為了你的實際產品，也是為了你的相關人才，因為它可以通過噪音和其他所有的聲音來打破信號。 > Actually in fact if you do a historical analysis over the last 50 years and you say when are the majority of the of the game changing companies founded there actually in downturns because they have enough time to have a ramp to agree to a whole bunch of stellar talent around the time starting and so forth. 事實上，如果你對過去 50 年的歷史進行分析，你會說，什么時候大多數的游戲都在改變，而這些公司實際上是在衰退中成立的，因為他們有足夠的時間在開始的時候同意一大群優秀的人才，以此類推。 > And so actually open capital markets are actually not the ideal time to be starting company unless you have an idea that you or your you know you simply couldn\'t get finance otherwise. 因此，事實上，開放的資本市場并不是創辦公司的理想時機，除非你有一個你或你自己知道的想法，否則你就無法獲得資金。 > And you know look you start the company when you want to start the company. 你知道，當你想創業的時候，你就創辦公司。 > `[00:06:31]` Another myth would be that before we leave that one what should founders do if they\'re starting a company in times like these to best counteract that. `[00:06:31]` 另一個神話是，在我們離開這個公司之前，如果創始人在這樣的時候創辦了一家公司，他們應該怎么做才能最好地抵消這一點。 > `[00:06:40]` So there\'s two or three strategies. `[00:06:40]` 所以有兩三種策略。 > So one of them is you really have to think about how do you break through the noise. 其中之一就是你必須考慮如何突破噪音。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > So the number of companies that really matter every year is probably between zero and 5 right in terms of like the industry change. 因此，每年真正重要的公司數量可能在 0 到 5 之間，就像行業的變化一樣。 > So if you look at an audience like this which is what 14 other people. 所以，如果你看看這樣的觀眾，這是其他 14 個人的作品。 > Seventeen hundred people. 一千七百人。 > You say it\'s an average of two founders per. 你說平均每人有兩位創始人。 > Companies presume everyone\'s doing it. 公司認為每個人都在這么做。 > You get 850 in the room. 房間里有 850 塊。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And so then that\'s only the people who here let alone everything else. 所以，那就只有在這里的人，更不用說其他的人了。 > And so the question is is how do you break through the noise is a really really key thing whether it\'s financing talent aggregation go to marketetc. 因此，問題是，你如何突破噪音是一個真正關鍵的事情，它的融資，人才聚集，走向市場。 > so that then becomes a central problem. 因此，這就成了一個核心問題。 > So one of them is is to say well do something very contrary. 其中之一就是說得好，做一些完全相反的事情。 > Do something that is kind of like not like where people say well you know it\'s it\'s it\'s Air B and B but for dogs right. 做一些不像人們說的那樣的事情，你知道它是空氣 B 和 B，但對狗來說是對的。 > `[00:07:34]` You know that kind of thing is not the kind of thing to do generally right. `[00:07:34]` 你知道這類事情一般都是不對的。 > `[00:07:39]` As a very rare that does ever become the big company. `[00:07:39]` 成為大公司的一件非常罕見的事。 > `[00:07:41]` Yes extremely rare. `[00:07:41]` 是的，非常罕見。 > The second thing would be is to look quare really look where there\'s one of the reasons why both you and I are fans of Peter\'s question of you know what do you believe that other people don\'t. 第二件事是，看看你和我都是彼得的粉絲的原因之一，你知道你相信別人不相信什么。 > But look where other people really aren\'t right whether it\'s you know hard science or if it was two and a half years ago Bitcoin you knowetc. 但是，看看其他人真的不對的地方，不管是你知道硬科學，還是兩年半前的比特幣，你都知道。 > You know those sorts of things were actually something could be really bigger because by the way if you end up being right you end up having access to the town. 你知道，這些事情實際上可能會更大，因為順便說一句，如果你是對的，你最終會有機會進入這個小鎮。 > That\'s really that\'s really focused on that you have a ramp to actually get a whole bunch of stuff and get a big headstart from other possible competitive efforts and these sorts of things. 這就是你真正關注的問題，你需要從其他可能的競爭努力和諸如此類的努力中獲得一個很大的優勢。 > `[00:08:23]` And then I think the last is to really focus on the not while like my earlier comment about self-delusion is one of the paradoxes entrepreneurship as you do these kind of two things that are in contradiction in balance. `[00:08:23]` 然后我認為最后一件事是真正專注于“不”，就像我早些時候對自我妄想的評論一樣，創業精神是一種悖論，因為你做了這兩件矛盾的事情，在平衡中是矛盾的。 > `[00:08:40]` So `[00:08:40]` one of them is you actually want to have some self-delusion like yes I\'m sure I can make it work. `[00:08:40]` 所以`[00:08:40]` 其中之一是，你真的想有一些自我妄想，比如是的，我確信我能讓它發揮作用。 > On the other hand you want to be asking yourself everyday. 另一方面，你想每天問自己。 > Every week is my confidence is going up or down and if it\'s not going up what do I need to do and learn and pivot in order to get in order to have it and doesn\'t have to be that goes up every week. 每周我的信心都在上升或下降，如果沒有上升，我需要做些什么，學習和支點才能得到它，而不是每周都在上升。 > Pape how linked in. 爸爸是怎么聯系在一起的。 > We\'ve had weeks every valuable startup has a has. 我們每一家有價值的初創公司都有好幾周的時間。 > Weeks and months of Valley of the shadow which is why did I ever think this was a good idea. 幾周幾個月的陰影谷，這就是為什么我曾經認為這是一個好主意。 > And so that happened. 就這樣發生了。 > So the conference can go down that\'s fine but you get the part of the reason you\'re asking the question is in order to know what problem do I need to tackle aggressively to think that I\'m on the right path. 所以會議可以進行下去，但你知道你提出這個問題的部分原因是為了知道我需要積極地解決哪些問題，才能認為我走在正確的道路上。 > `[00:09:23]` All right so back to the myths. `[00:09:23]` 好吧，回到神話。 > `[00:09:24]` OK. `[00:09:24]` 好的。 > So like another one frequently tends to be so entrepreneurs tend to treat financing rounds as a combination of. 因此，就像另一種情況一樣，企業家往往會把融資輪看作是一種組合。 > Well the highest possible valuation is the most expression of I\'m succeeding and or I\'m loved and valued and the absolute most amount of capital. 那么，最高可能的估值是 I‘m 成功和或我被愛和價值的最充分的表達，也是絕對的、最多的資本。 > Because you know why isn\'t two dollars better than one dollar kind of thing. 因為你知道為什么兩美元比一美元好。 > Both of those are subtle mistakes. 這兩個都是微妙的錯誤。 > It\'s not to say that valuation doesn\'t matter. 這并不是說估值不重要。 > Not to say that the amount of dollars doesn\'t matter. 并不是說美元的數量不重要。 > But let\'s take the dollars 1 for some dollars one the kind of question is frequently what you really want to do is you want to raise more money than you think you need in order to get to a milestone where that milestone makes a very big difference in the company. 但讓我們以美元 1 美元為例-通常情況下，你真正想要做的是，你想籌集比你認為需要的更多的資金，以達到一個里程碑，在這個里程碑上，這個里程碑對公司產生了很大的影響。 > I have yet to see the company that it\'s actually like literally anywhere in all of my experience where if you weighs way too much capital you actually get ineffective in the way you operate it. 我還沒有看到這家公司，在我所有的經驗中，它實際上就像任何一個地方，如果你的資本太重，你的運營方式實際上就會變得無效。 > It changes a certain level of sharpness and the way you think and so you don\'t want to go like if you said well I need 10 Rayson 15 or 20 is fine don\'t raise 50. 它改變了一定程度的敏銳和你的思維方式，所以你不想去，如果你說，我需要 10，雷森，15 或 20 是好的，不要提高 50。 > `[00:10:32]` The track record of these companies they raise these like 30 million dollar rounds is their first casualty. `[00:10:32]` 這些公司的業績記錄-他們籌集了大約 3000 萬美元-是他們的第一個犧牲品。 > Awful. 糟透了。 > `[00:10:37]` Yeah it\'s completely. `[00:10:37]` 是的，完全是這樣的。 > Every single one trainwreck. 每一輛火車失事。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And so it\'s kind of like yes I need this amount of money and I\'ll do it I\'ll give myself some cushion but that\'s it. 所以這有點像，我需要這么多錢，我會給自己一些緩沖，但僅此而已。 > And then I really focus and the whole team is UNILORIN not because one of the problems it happens is not just you as a founder it\'s your whole team going oh you got an extra 20 or 30 in the bank so it\'s ok. 然后我真的很專注，整個團隊都是 UNILORIN，不是因為問題之一不僅僅是你作為一個創始人，而是你整個團隊都在前進，哦，你在銀行里多出了 20 或 30 美元，所以沒關系。 > This month the metrics and our confidence didn\'t go up so we got a lot of time to figure this out. 這個月的指標和我們的信心沒有上升，所以我們有很多時間來解決這個問題。 > We don\'t right because the money isn\'t what actually gives you the time it\'s the market. 我們不正確，因為錢不是真正給你時間的東西，而是市場。 > `[00:11:06]` There\'s the question of time how much did Lincoln raise in its first round. `[00:11:06]` 林肯在第一輪中籌集了多少錢，這是一個時間問題。 > `[00:11:09]` We raised four point seven million or so. `[00:11:09]` 我們籌集了大約 470 萬英鎊。 > `[00:11:13]` And was there a particular milestone you were trying to hit with that. `[00:11:13]` 你想用它來達到一個特殊的里程碑嗎？ > `[00:11:16]` Yes. `[00:11:16]` 是的。 > That particular milestone that we were ironic because part of what you do in a financing strategy is when you\'re raising money. 我們之所以具有諷刺意味，是因為你在融資策略中所做的部分是在你籌集資金的時候。 > `[00:11:21]` And I you know you published a series B decoupling in some of us if you have not seen this read published his series bedeck for LinkedIn and we make all we see founders raising be around look at it you should definitely check it out. `[00:11:21]` 你知道你在我們中有些人出版了 B 系列脫鉤-如果你沒看過這本書，出版了他為 LinkedIn 做的系列文章，我們讓我們看到的所有創始人都在身邊，看看吧-你應該去看看。 > `[00:11:32]` So part of what you when you\'re doing this round of finance and you need to be thinking about the next round of financing. `[00:11:32]` 所以當你做這一輪融資的時候，你需要考慮下一輪的融資。 > And part of that is what condition what range of outcomes can I get to then make that next round of financing work. 部分原因在于，我可以獲得什么樣的結果，然后讓下一輪融資發揮作用。 > And for us it was when we raised our series A It was during a time Friendster and so everyone was like okay you\'re kind of like Friendster but for business and we don\'t really get what you are. 對我們來說，那是當我們提出我們的 A 系列的時候，它是在一個時間友誼，所以每個人都是好的，你有點像 Friendster，但在商業上，我們沒有真正得到你是什么。 > `[00:11:54]` Well we wanted to be as our top goal which we got to was we wanted to clearly establish a separate category of professional network from Friendster that we were the market leader in. `[00:11:54]` 我們想成為我們的首要目標，我們必須明確地建立一個與 Friendster 不同的專業網絡類別，我們是市場的領先者。 > `[00:12:06]` We actually knew that even though our classic thing is well you revenue. `[00:12:06]` 事實上，我們知道，即使我們的經典之處是“好你”的收入。 > We said no we\'re going to punt on revenue we\'ll do revenue post series B. 我們說不，我們要押注收入，我們要做 B 系列的收入。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > They said well you should have really really clear use cases is that we should have some inroads. 他們說，好吧，你應該有真正清楚的用例，那就是我們應該有一些進展。 > But but we don\'t have to have them all we only have to have some of them in terms our. 但是我們不需要擁有所有的東西，我們只需要用我們的術語來擁有其中的一些。 > And so we get really focused on this is what we\'re gonna do because if we can solve that problem no other problem worked. 所以我們要把注意力集中在這個問題上，因為如果我們能解決這個問題，其他的問題就沒有用了。 > So which problem really matters. 所以哪個問題才是最重要的。 > That then raises the confidence from us and from the investors and then we can do a good series B. 這就提高了我們和投資者的信心，然后我們就可以做一個很好的 B 系列了。 > `[00:12:37]` Any other myths you want to talk about before we move on to the next topic. `[00:12:37]` 在我們進入下一個話題之前，你想要談論的任何其他神話。 > `[00:12:43]` Let\'s say there\'s a stack. `[00:12:43]` 讓我們說這里有一堆。 > And here\'s one that I think is actually pretty good irrelevant since what I\'m normally asked to invest in. 這里有一個我認為是很好的不相關的，因為我通常被要求投資。 > I say networks are marketplaces because those are the kinds of things that I know very well. 我說網絡是市場，因為這些都是我非常了解的東西。 > `[00:12:53]` And I think there\'s still a ton of opportunity in them. `[00:12:53]` 我認為他們還有很多機會。 > `[00:12:56]` However one of the things that people frequently think is network equals network effect. `[00:12:56]` 然而，人們經常認為網絡等于網絡效應。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > They say it is a network and I can describe it as a network. 他們說這是一個網絡，我可以把它描述為一個網絡。 > It has a network effect. 它有網絡效應。 > That\'s actually not true right now in terms of a tautology and equations statement. 從重言式和等式的陳述來看，這是不正確的。 > And the reason is is precisely what makes something of the network effect is the more nodes that you have in the system. 究其原因，正是網絡效應產生的原因在于系統中的節點越多。 > In this case usually people that it raises the value of the system in a super linear value proposition that then makes leaving more and more you know like oh this is the place I do this this is really what it\'s valuable to do that marketplaces ah ah ah I think the clearest example of this because essentially is like well I\'m offering this kind of good for sale or for rent or anything else and and all the buyers who are looking for the broad distribution what\'s possible are coming here. 在這種情況下，人們通常認為它在一個超線性的價值命題中提高了系統的價值，這使得離開越來越多，你知道，哦，這就是我做的地方，做這個市場是很有價值的，啊，我認為這是最明顯的例子，因為本質上來說，我提供的是這樣的好東西供出售。或者租房或其他任何東西，所有尋找廣泛分布的買家都會來到這里。 > Will you go to where the distribution of buyers are the buyers go to where the sellers are the seller go with the buyers. 你會去哪里，哪里的買家才是買家，哪里是賣方，哪里是買家。 > And so it becomes very difficult to trade off in that I think payment networks can have. 因此它變得非常困難，因為我認為支付網絡可以做到這一點。 > I think you know social networks don\'t have that. 我想你知道社交網絡是沒有的。 > `[00:14:04]` I think there\'s all but but just because you say I have a network doesn\'t mean you have a network at I want to talk a little bit about you as an investor and sort of what you mentioned a few things throughout this but you know a founder says I want Reid Hoffman to invest in my startup. `[00:14:04]` 我認為這一切，但僅僅因為你說我有一個網絡，并不意味著你有一個網絡，我想談談你作為一個投資者，以及你在整個過程中提到的一些事情，但你知道，一位創始人說我希望里德·霍夫曼(Reid Hoffman)對我的創業公司進行投資。 > What do you need to get convinced of. 你需要說服什么。 > `[00:14:25]` So let\'s see. `[00:14:25]` 讓我們看看。 > It\'s always a little bit idiosyncratic. 總是有點特別。 > So for example I\'m always more interested in that great idea that I haven\'t thought of. 所以，例如，我總是對那個我沒有想到的好主意更感興趣。 > So we might say networks in marketplaces those are things I\'m interested in but it\'s it\'s really a fact a great entrepreneur with a really fascinating idea. 因此，我們可能會說，市場上的網絡是我感興趣的東西，但這確實是一個事實，一個偉大的企業家，有一個非常迷人的想法。 > Frequently it\'s cannot get to the scale of millions to hundreds of millions of people. 通常情況下，它無法達到數百萬到數億人的規模。 > Does it actually in fact when it defines that desire to find a new aspect of human human ecosystem that changes individuals lives and the groups lives in a positive vector. 事實上，當它定義了尋找人類生態系統的一個新方面的愿望時，它是否改變了個人的生活，而這些群體生活在一個積極的載體中。 > And is it the way the world should be. 世界應該是這樣的嗎？ > Then you get to okay. 那你就沒事了。 > Does the initial plan for how to possibly get a strong shot on that goal work and are the is the team and the founders the people that you know have a good shot at that. 最初的計劃是如何在這個目標上獲得一個強有力的機會，是團隊和創建者，你知道的人在這方面有很好的機會。 > That\'s roughly what the shape of it looks like. 這大概就是它的形狀。 > And it\'s the more that it has the like for example when I started LinkedIn and I went to Almight because you should go to all your smart friends and ask them when I went all my smart friends and ask them. 而且它有更多的相似之處，例如，當我創建 LinkedIn 的時候，我去了阿爾瓦，因為你應該去找你所有的聰明朋友，問他們我什么時候去了我所有的聰明朋友，問他們。 > They basically two thirds of them said I was an idiot. 他們中三分之二的人說我是個白癡。 > Starting him it was like a crazy idea. 對他來說這是個瘋狂的想法。 > That\'s um that\'s a good signal right. 那是個很好的信號對吧。 > And the reason it\'s a good signal is because of 100 percent of people think it\'s good that\'s almost always problems that you\'re not seeing and that among other people think it\'s good too that the competition pile around it is here. 它之所以是一個好信號，是因為百分之百的人認為它是好的，它幾乎總是你看不到的問題，而且在其他人當中，競爭也是很好的。 > So I like the fact that you say Why would smart people think this is not a good idea. 所以我喜歡你說為什么聰明人會認為這不是個好主意。 > But actually in fact there\'s something that makes it a good idea even despite that what was that then what did most people think. 但事實上，有一些東西使它成為一個好主意，盡管如此，那是什么，那時大多數人是怎么想的。 > `[00:15:58]` Why did most people think it was a dumb idea. `[00:15:58]` 為什么大多數人認為這是個愚蠢的主意。 > `[00:16:00]` Most who I thought was a dumb idea because all of the problems digitally linked in are critically you have to get to a critical mass. `[00:16:00]` 我認為大多數人都是個愚蠢的主意，因為所有與數字有關的問題都是關鍵的，你必須達到一個臨界的質量。 > And so the question is you have an imitation product where you have no value proposition 8 critical mass. 所以問題是，你有一個仿制產品，你沒有價值命題，8 臨界質量。 > So you join Alington no value. 所以你加入了阿靈頓沒有價值。 > Until then you invite me. 在那之前你邀請我。 > We had already no value either. 我們也已經沒有價值了。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > So how do you get to the first million people is the key thing. 所以，如何才能接觸到第一個百萬人是關鍵。 > `[00:16:20]` Got it for specific to specific examples I want to talk about for investing Facebook first. `[00:16:20]` 我想先談談 Facebook 投資的具體例子。 > Could you talk about how your investment Facebook happened. 你能談談你的投資 Facebook 是怎么發生的嗎？ > `[00:16:29]` Yes so I tracked Facebook when it was in Boston. `[00:16:29]` 是的，當 Facebook 在波士頓的時候，我跟蹤了它。 > That\'s a super interesting project but because I was very busy with windows I well you know it\'s in Boston. 這是一個非常有趣的項目，但因為我非常忙于窗戶，所以你知道它在波士頓。 > We\'ll see how it plays out. 我們會看看結果如何。 > `[00:16:41]` And then Sean Parker called me and said it\'s really interesting investment opportunity at Facebook Gabz in Boston. `[00:16:41]` 然后肖恩·帕克打電話給我，說在波士頓的 Facebook Gabz，這是一個非常有趣的投資機會。 > I don\'t know how to help them. 我不知道如何幫助他們。 > Now over here they\'ve rented a house you know and I was like Oh that\'s great. 現在這里，他們租了一所房子，你知道的，我就像哦，那太好了。 > And at the time yeah it was maybe a little bit more enthusiastic than that. 當時，是的，也許比這更熱情一些。 > `[00:17:02]` But at the time I had been a little beleaguered because I\'d gotten a lot of pushback from the investment and friends group saying well you try to have your cake and eat it too because you\'re doing too even though I view social professional networks to be very different. `[00:17:02]` 但是在那個時候，我受到了一些困擾，因為我受到了投資和朋友團體的強烈抵制，他們說，好吧，你試著吃蛋糕，因為你做得太過了，盡管我認為社會職業網絡是很不一樣的。 > And one of the things about integrity is not only important that you have integrity but also that you that you seem to have integrity like the substance that the appearance matters as well as the substance. 正直的其中一件事不僅重要的是你有正直，而且你似乎有正直，就像外表和物質一樣重要的物質。 > And so I go look I don\'t want to lead this investment as great as it is and all the rest of them. 所以我去看看，我不想領導這項投資，因為它是偉大的，所有的其他人。 > I think Peter should lead the investment and I will actually in fact you know follow in. 我認為彼得應該領導這項投資，事實上我會的，你知道的。 > `[00:17:39]` And so it\'s a very expensive example of integrity. `[00:17:39]` 所以這是一個非常昂貴的正直的例子。 > `[00:17:42]` I think it\'s probably one of the most expensive examples of integrity I know. `[00:17:42]` 我認為這可能是我所知道的最昂貴的正直的例子之一。 > But since you know Peter\'s a close friend it\'s all good. 但既然你知道彼得是個親密的朋友，一切都很好。 > `[00:17:50]` And so Parker Zork Peter about core and I met because Matt was working for me at the time going down and. `[00:17:50]` 帕克·佐克·彼得和我見面是因為馬特當時在為我工作。 > And we\'re like this is you know there\'s a lot there\'s a lot that can go wrong with his was very early was still in some number colleges like 10 or 12 or some small number of colleges. 我們是這樣的，你知道，有很多事情可能會出錯，他很早就在一些數字學院，比如 10 或 12 所大學，或者是少數幾所大學。 > `[00:18:13]` But one of the pieces of conviction that I had which is the reason why New that Facebook was awesome even before that specific meeting was that I knew that social network as a platform was intrinsic. `[00:18:13]` 但是我的信念之一-這也是為什么在那次會議之前 Facebook 就很棒的原因-是因為我知道社交網絡作為一個平臺是固有的。 > Now isn\'t that I had an idea for how it came about and the internal part there was a bunch of things I learned from how they\'re thinking about that. 現在不是我對它是如何發生的有一個想法，而內在的部分-我從他們的思考中學到了很多東西。 > But the notion that your identity and your network is a platform for the apps that transform your life that was something that I already had. 但是你的身份和你的網絡是改變你生活的應用程序的平臺，這是我已經擁有的。 > And so once like Facebook started saying look we were already on track for that. 因此，就像 Facebook 開始說的那樣，看，我們已經走上了這條道路。 > That was pretty. 太漂亮了。 > `[00:18:44]` It was probably one of the most straightforward investment decisions we had been thinking about this since you started a company called The Social Network in 1997 right. `[00:18:44]` 自從你在 1997 年創辦了一家名為“社交網絡”的公司以來，這可能是我們一直在考慮的最直接的投資決策之一。 > Yes social social net. 是的社交網絡。 > Yeah okay. 好吧。 > How did did that experience that why you knew so much like that in you prepared for us. 為什么你對我們的了解如此之深，這是如何為我們做好準備的呢？ > `[00:19:02]` And when I started when I started social net because part of a macro level what I think of myself as doing is helping found build invest in design human ecosystems using principally software technology Internet technologies and medium and so social that had a bunch of errors. `[00:19:02]` 當我開始社交網絡的時候，在宏觀層面上，我認為自己所做的就是幫助建立投資于人類生態系統的設計，主要是軟件技術、互聯網技術和媒體等，這些都有很多錯誤。 > One of them was not understanding that your distribution has to be organic right. 其中之一就是不明白你的分配必須是有機的。 > So organic morality is a natural organic ASIOs organic was a set of these techniques that are natural organic techniques and was six degrees that actually saw six degrees hotter. 因此，有機道德是一種自然有機的 ASIO，有機是這些技術的集合，這些技術是自然的有機技術，是六度，而實際上是六度。 > Oh my god that brilliant. 哦，天哪，真是太棒了。 > Like that\'s what we should be doing. 就像我們應該做的那樣。 > And so I\'d had the idea of everyone establishing an identity and then having this this electronic space transforming their lives. 于是我想到了每個人都要建立自己的身份，然后讓這個電子空間改變他們的生活。 > But I didn\'t have the concept of a network. 但我沒有網絡的概念。 > I didn\'t have the concept of real identity. 我沒有真實身份的概念。 > I didn\'t have a concept of all of these things being a Malkmus when I started social media was still cyber space right. 當我開始使用社交媒體的時候，我并沒有把所有這些東西都當成馬爾克摩斯的概念，那就是網絡空間是正確的。 > `[00:19:59]` You go through cyber space right. `[00:19:59]` 你穿過網絡空間是對的。 > And now it\'s like know this is actually the way we live. 現在就像知道了這就是我們的生活方式。 > This is this is this is part of our life. 這是我們生活的一部分。 > And that was that. 就是這樣。 > `[00:20:07]` Those are the things that are how social and had already had me thinking about this category but also to recognize which things would work. `[00:20:07]` 這些都是社交的方式，已經讓我思考了這個范疇，但也認識到哪些東西會起作用。 > `[00:20:16]` When I got to the second phase I saw them from you many many years ago where you had said that the most important thing Facebook had done that was new and innovative was really identity separately from everything that had done before. `[00:20:16]` 當我進入第二階段時，我在很多年前從你那里看到了他們，你說 Facebook 做的最重要的事情是新的和創新的，那就是真正的身份，和以前做過的所有事情都不一樣。 > Do you still believe that. 你還相信嗎。 > `[00:20:29]` I think real identity was one of the really we had been doing real identity too and and Bransford been doing a version real identity is definitely part of it. `[00:20:29]` 我認為真實身份也是我們一直在做的真實身份之一，而 Bransford 一直在做一個版本，真實身份肯定是其中的一部分。 > The other part of it is that they had gotten the accidents of it started and were also super useful was that it got to a high trust and real identity by strolling in colleges like I don\'t think Facebook could have established where I got to it hadn\'t started in colleges. 另一個原因是他們發現了它的意外，而且也非常有用，因為它通過漫步在大學里獲得了高度的信任和真實的身份，就像我認為 Facebook 不可能確定我在大學里沒有開始的地方)。 > Everyone\'s like resemble an early days on Facebook which of course doesn\'t happen anymore for obvious reasons people would post their cell phone numbers to their profiles. 每個人都像 Facebook 上的早期一樣，當然，由于明顯的原因，人們會把自己的手機號碼張貼到個人資料中，這種情況不會再發生了。 > Because like this is a trusted community like you know no one\'s going to get me nothing weird by my posting my cell phone to my profile and so they would do that. 因為就像你所知道的那樣，這是一個值得信賴的社區，沒有人會把我的手機貼到我的個人資料上，不會讓我覺得奇怪，所以他們會這么做。 > Now that doesn\'t happen as much anymore probably right. 現在這種情況不再發生了，也許是對的。 > `[00:21:08]` Right. `[00:21:08]` 對。 > And then the other example front investment you made is can you talk about how you ended up investing in Zinga. 另外一個例子是你所做的正面投資，你能談談你是如何在 Zinga 投資的嗎？ > `[00:21:14]` Yeah. `[00:21:14]` 是的。 > So Facebook launched the FIA platform and their description was where social utility. 因此，Facebook 推出了國際汽聯(FIA)平臺，他們的描述正是社會效用所在。 > It\'s a social graph and there\'s a whole stack of applications built on top of it. 這是一張社交圖，上面有一堆應用程序。 > The question is which of the applications going to be most most applicable. 問題是哪一項申請最適用。 > And also which are the applications that are going to be that are essentially going to like. 還有，哪些應用程序將成為本質上會喜歡的應用程序。 > There\'s always a tension between apps and platform in terms of the primacy to the user which which apps are going to be the most important ones on the platform now. 在用戶的首要地位上，應用程序和平臺之間總是存在緊張關系，而這些應用程序將是目前平臺上最重要的應用程序。 > Photo sharing was clearly one of them but Facebook isn\'t safe. 照片分享顯然是其中之一，但 Facebook 并不安全。 > We all know that we\'re talking allow anything else in that. 我們都知道我們說的是允許任何其他東西。 > And so what are the other ones. 其他的是什么。 > Now the primary one that I thought Facebook was this is an unimportant app is not we care about we care about utility and productivity and much other things was games and the intersection of having Pincus who is massively creative. 我認為 Facebook 最主要的一點是，這是一個不重要的應用程序，我們不關心效用和生產力，還有很多其他的東西是游戲和讓 Pincus 擁有巨大創造力的交叉點。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And it\'s kind of like an idea a minute kind of like what is this what about this what about this. 這有點像一個想法，一分鐘，這是怎么回事？ > One of the best. 最棒的人之一。 > Which is awesome. 太棒了。 > This is kind of this space in games. 這是游戲中的空間。 > And the fact that Facebook was like yeah games without games is irrelevant. 而 Facebook 就像沒有游戲的游戲是不相關的。 > We don\'t care about games gave you an opportunity to build a really serious company on top. 我們不關心游戲給了你一個機會在上面建立一個非常嚴肅的公司。 > And so it was this is the kind of thing you know people it\'s a social network people care about the social experience how you share entertainment share connection Incat lightweight entertaining ways is one of the things that matters the users. 所以，這就是你認識的人，它是一個社會網絡，人們關心社會經驗，如何分享娛樂，分享，Incat 輕量級娛樂方式，是關系到用戶的事情之一。 > `[00:22:37]` Pincus and his crew understand morality well within the Facebook platform and games is actually one of things that if you innovate and business model while you can actually make really interesting cash and so all of that put it together to making a very straightforward question Why do you think Facebook has such a blind spot in games. `[00:22:37]` 平卡斯和他的團隊很好地理解了 Facebook 平臺上的道德，而游戲實際上是一種東西，如果你能創新和商業模式，而你實際上可以賺到真正有趣的現金，那么所有這些都是為了提出一個非常直截了當的問題，為什么你認為 Facebook 在游戲中有這么一個盲點。 > `[00:22:54]` Oh I think it\'s you know hopefully doesn\'t mind things on camera but I think Zuckerberg is not himself a game player. `[00:22:54]` 哦，我想你知道的，我希望他不介意鏡頭里的東西，但我認為扎克伯格自己并不是一個游戲玩家。 > Like I like what he\'s really trying to do is figure out how to make the world more open and transparent and to actually have efficiency of information and connection and communication flows. 就像我喜歡的那樣，他真正想要做的就是弄清楚如何讓這個世界變得更加開放和透明，并使信息、連接和交流的效率更高。 > And so he thinks a lot about those sorts of things. 所以他想了很多這類事情。 > And so games are like that\'s not the kind of thing he does. 所以游戲是這樣的\不是他做的那種事。 > And so he\'s like Man that doesn\'t that like not it\'s bad it just doesn\'t matter right. 所以他就像人，不喜歡，不好，只是不重要。 > I think that was the primary one that now obviously they\'ve seen a lot of the utility of how to build games or the thing the right way so that\'s now got married in the corpus if you were going to start a new company today. 我認為這是最主要的，很明顯，他們已經看到了如何構建游戲或正確的方式的許多功用，如果你今天要成立一家新公司，那么現在已經在語料庫中結婚了。 > `[00:23:31]` Any thoughts on what you would start. `[00:23:31]` 任何關于你將要開始的事情的想法。 > `[00:23:34]` Well since I\'m pretty focused on LinkedIn and pretty focused on the the investments I made it Graylock I don\'t spend a lot of time computing that particular question. `[00:23:34]` 既然我非常專注于 LinkedIn，也非常專注于我所做的投資，Graylock，我不會花太多時間計算這個特定的問題。 > `[00:23:47]` I do think that people still probably underrate where the ubiquity of everyone having a phone means in terms of networks in marketplaces. `[00:23:47]` 我確實認為，人們可能仍然低估了市場中每個人擁有電話的普遍存在意味著網絡的普遍存在。 > Now that being said probably two years ago I might have done something in bitcoin but it\'s too late and I don\'t think it\'s too late. 這么說大概是在兩年前，我可能用比特幣做了點什么，但為時已晚，我不認為為時已晚。 > But it\'s not a secret anymore. 但這不再是秘密了。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Amongst the intelligent folks is a whole bunch of stuff going on. 在那些聰明的人當中，有一大堆事情在發生。 > So you have to have a very angled shot so if you\'re showing up saying I\'ve got another wallet or I\'ve got another merchant processor I\'ve got another one of those. 所以你必須有一個非常角度的拍攝，所以，如果你出現說我有另一個錢包或我有另一個商人處理器，我有另一個這樣的。 > The likelihood that that\'s going to play out well is low. 結果很好的可能性很小。 > `[00:24:21]` Do you have high conviction that bitcoin will be big. `[00:24:21]` 你相信比特幣會很大嗎？ > `[00:24:24]` I have high convention conviction that a big coin isn\'t zero. `[00:24:24]` 我有很高的傳統信念：一枚大硬幣不是零。 > It will be big but Bitcoin is not zero it\'s not zero. 它將是大的，但比特幣不是零，它不是零。 > `[00:24:30]` We\'ve got it. `[00:24:30]` 我們拿到了。 > So I think it\'s a very high data outcome. 所以我認為這是一個非常高的數據結果。 > Now I think the most interesting question of all the questions that people ask about bitcoin is is is it the first or last crypto currency and what this means is not of course because of course there\'s you know what is now referred to. 現在，我認為在人們提出的關于比特幣的所有問題中，最有趣的問題是比特幣是第一種或最后一種密碼貨幣，而這意味著什么當然不是，因為當然，你知道現在提到的是什么。 > I\'m always entertained by how doggy coin becomes dogecoin. 我總是被狗幣變成狗食的樂趣。 > You know these kinds of things you know. 你知道這些你知道的事情。 > There\'s a whole stack of these things and it\'s very possible because of you know new better ideas or different ideas and rails. 有一堆這樣的東西，這是很可能的，因為你知道新的更好的想法或不同的想法和鐵路。 > Now overall I think one of things that\'s going on with big companies I think big coin is largely adding more wallets per game per week than the other coins have in Walton told in total. 總的來說，我認為大公司正在進行的事情之一，我認為大硬幣在很大程度上是每周增加更多的錢包，比其他硬幣在沃爾頓告訴總計。 > Right so network effects have a kind of a runaway kind of characteristic. 所以網絡效果有一種失控的特點。 > But the question is first or last cryptocurrency last one super interesting because that will be interesting crypto currencies. 但問題是第一個還是最后一個密碼貨幣，最后一個超級有趣，因為那將是有趣的密碼貨幣。 > `[00:25:25]` First one. `[00:25:25]` 第一個。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Well then how. 那是怎么做的。 > That\'s interesting. 這很有趣。 > `[00:25:30]` All right. `[00:25:30]` 好的。 > Closing question since you brought it up earlier what is one thing that you believe that most people don\'t. 既然你早些時候提出了這個問題，那么你認為大多數人不相信的一件事是什么。 > `[00:25:35]` So obviously Peter and I talk about this question a lot and it\'s worth reading Peter is 0 1 book it\'s you know there\'s a bunch of pretty good things in that. `[00:25:35]` 很明顯，彼得和我經常談論這個問題，值得一讀，彼得是一本書，你知道，這里面有很多很好的東西。 > Laughter Well I\'d say that there\'s great thinking just to respond. 笑，好吧，我會說，有偉大的想法，只是為了回應。 > But there are some things where Peter and I have differences of views on some of the things but that\'s great. 但有一些事情，彼得和我在一些事情上有不同的看法，但那是偉大的。 > I mean that\'s part of thinking and having you know clear bold you know sometimes contain thoughts. 我的意思是，這是思考的一部分，讓你知道清楚，大膽，你知道，有時包含思想。 > The key nuance on that question that I have is against which audience right because there\'s is against the world against theU.S. 這個問題的關鍵之處在于我反對哪些觀眾是對的，因為他們反對世界反對美國。 > against. 反對。 > Now I\'m going to answer that question again Silicon Valley because I think there\'s at least two threads that are classically Silicon Valley threads that I have a different point of view on. 現在，我要再次回答這個問題，硅谷，因為我認為至少有兩個線程是經典的硅谷線程，我有不同的觀點。 > One of them is the role of government. 其中之一是政府的作用。 > So basically Silicon Valley tends to go oh government is this large cruddy bureaucratic impossible to deal with thing that you should just run around and badly. 所以，基本上，硅谷傾向于去，政府是這個龐大的，粗糙的官僚，不可能處理的事情，你應該跑來跑去，糟糕。 > Yes yes yes yes. 是的，是的。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > That\'s not saying no. 那不是拒絕。 > I don\'t see those things. 我看不見那些東西。 > But it is actually in fact what creates the platform environment that we operate in. 但事實上，正是它創造了我們在其中運行的平臺環境。 > It\'s what creates the legal structure. 正是它創造了法律結構。 > It\'s what creates the set of services which creates the educational environment which creates the financing law right. 正是它創造了一套服務，創造了教育環境，創造了財政法律權利。 > `[00:26:52]` There\'s a whole stack of services that are part of the. `[00:26:52]` 有一個完整的服務堆棧，它們是 > It\'s like we\'re fish in an aquarium we say who needs water and you like the water is important but it\'s important that the water is cleaner than dirtier it\'s more like there\'s a set of things and so actually in fact I think there\'s a set of things that we should be thinking about how do we help positively impact government. 就像我們在水族館里釣魚，我們說誰需要水，你喜歡水是很重要的，但重要的是水比臟水更干凈，它更像是一套東西，所以實際上，我認為有一套東西，我們應該考慮如何幫助積極影響政府。 > `[00:27:11]` You can imagine these services as a you know as a prize and government as a platform that can hold a set of different things but we are the fish that are in this aquarium and we need it is a collectively all of our responsibility to make the aquarium better and it\'s not just a Oh that\'s a nasty problem. `[00:27:11]` 你可以把這些服務想象成一個獎品，把政府想象成一個平臺，可以容納一系列不同的東西，但我們是這個水族館里的魚，我們需要它是我們共同的責任，讓水族館變得更好，這不僅僅是一個糟糕的問題。 > And think about that. 好好想想。 > Second one related is now I\'m pretty sure that it\'s difficult to teach entrepreneurship peer out I think you can teach skills that help entrepreneurship. 第二個相關的問題是，我現在很確定，教創業是很困難的，我認為你可以教授有助于創業的技能。 > And this woman\'s a lot of what I see. 這個女人就是我看到的很多東西。 > I think entrepreneurship clearly can be learned. 我認為創業精神顯然是可以學到的。 > Right now I think there\'s always a doing component. 現在，我認為總是有一個正在做的部分。 > Now that being said I think you think that government can add things that are that are positive to entrepreneurship so entrepreneurship is much better in where networks have dense connections. 話雖如此，我認為你認為政府可以增加一些有利于創業精神的東西，所以在網絡連接緊密的地方，創業精神要好得多。 > It\'s another thing I like about Weiss\'s. 這是我喜歡韋斯的另一件事。 > How do you create density of connections to facilitate financing talent understanding markets getting advisors the building the network around the around the entrepreneurs in the companies governments can facilitate that. 你如何創造密集的聯系，以便于融資，人才，了解市場，得到顧問，建立網絡周圍的企業家在公司，政府可以促進這一點。 > There\'s a bunch of different things they can do. 他們可以做很多不同的事情。 > They can say okay we will help entrepreneurship is not just a number of days to form a formulated company. 他們可以說，好吧，我們將幫助創業，而不僅僅是在幾天內形成一家公司。 > It\'s not just labor laws. 這不僅僅是勞動法。 > It\'s not just bankruptcy laws and these kind of things. 這不僅僅是破產法之類的事情。 > I think a number of positive things that governments can do also that this deal facilitate entrepreneurship and those are two contrarian from Silicon Valley. 我認為政府也可以做一些積極的事情-這一交易有利于企業家精神-這是硅谷的兩件相反的事情。 > `[00:28:33]` Great. `[00:28:33]` 太好了。 > Thank you so much for coming spend some time with us. 非常感謝你的到來，花點時間和我們在一起。 > Thank you. 謝謝。 > Klaus. 克勞斯。