# Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014 > `[00:00:02]` So this is really cool. `[00:00:02]` 所以這真的很酷。 > This is the first time we have had a founder and a board member up here together and I think it\'ll be a really interesting talk for that. 這是我們第一次有一個創始人和一個董事會成員在這里，我認為這將是一個非常有趣的談話。 > It\'s also the first time these two guys have ever spoken. 這也是這兩個人第一次說話。 > Actually like other potential landfall. 實際上就像其他可能登陸的地方一樣。 > So there is a lot to talk about here. 所以這里有很多要討論的話題。 > This is you know one of the most exciting startups of the last many years. 你知道，這是過去幾年中最令人興奮的初創公司之一。 > But before we jump into what happened on WhatsApp I want to talk a little bit about Yan\'s background and so maybe you talk about sort of growing up in Ukraine and how that influenced your thoughts about coming to Silicon Valley and startups and what\'s up. 但在我們開始討論 WhatsApp 上發生的事情之前，我想談一下燕的背景，也許你會談論一下在烏克蘭長大的經歷，以及這是如何影響你進入硅谷和創業公司的想法的。 > `[00:00:35]` Sure. `[00:00:35]` 當然。 > So thanks for sharing. 謝謝你的分享。 > Thank you for coming here. 謝謝你來這里。 > Exciting to see so many people here. 看到這么多人真讓人興奮。 > Yeah I grew up in Ukraine and I came to United States in 1992. 是的，我在烏克蘭長大，1992 年來到美國。 > I was 16 at a time and I left my dad stayed in Ukraine and they\'ve left a lot of friends and people I went to school with. 我 16 歲的時候，我離開了爸爸，留在了烏克蘭，他們給我留下了很多朋友和我一起上學的人。 > And so part of it part of what I experienced was it was really hard trying to keep in touch with people back then like Think back to 1992. 因此，我所經歷的部分原因是，想要和人們保持聯系是非常困難的，那時候，就像回想 1992 年那樣。 > There is no internet there\'s no emails there\'s no skydives there is nothing you just you just have a phone you don\'t even have a cell phone. 沒有互聯網，沒有電子郵件，沒有跳傘，沒有任何東西，只有手機，甚至連手機都沒有。 > `[00:01:05]` For the most part you just have a look at this landline and you know to call somebody else like sign up as MCI or AT&T and it was just like all this us like we\'re weird international dialing stuff to do it. `[00:01:05]` 大多數情況下，你只要看一下這個固定電話，你就知道給別人打電話，比如注冊為 MCI 或 AT&T，就像我們所有的人一樣，我們都是奇怪的國際撥號設備。 > And I think part of it is part of that influenced me. 我認為這部分影響了我。 > `[00:01:19]` And then I think also growing up in a country where educational is so valuable and there was a lot of kind of focus on just learning and studying influenced me like I came here and I was able to quickly start learning about computers and computer science and also growing up in a country which didn\'t have a whole lot of advertising we were going to clean very basic live and then you actually have a slide of this thing called we got Yanzu resmi. `[00:01:19]` 然后我想，我也是在一個教育很有價值的國家長大的，那里有很多關于學習和學習的關注，就像我來到這里一樣，我能夠迅速地開始學習計算機和計算機科學，并且成長在一個沒有大量廣告的國家。基本生活，然后你實際上有一張幻燈片，這個東西叫做我們有延祖雷米。 > `[00:01:56]` Wow. `[00:01:56]` 哇。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > `[00:01:59]` So you have a somewhat non-traditional path to starting a company or at least in the current world I think this is probably happened for a long time and you spent it looks like nine years nine years. `[00:01:59]` 所以你有一種非傳統的方式來創辦一家公司，或者至少在當前的世界里，我認為這可能發生了很長一段時間，你花了 9 年的時間。 > Yeah. 嗯 > And you also dropped out of college to join Yahoo. 你還從大學退學加入雅虎。 > You had in common. 你們有共同之處。 > Yeah. 嗯 > Well I think it is like WhatsApp. 我覺得就像 WhatsApp。 > So I was wondering if you could talk about sort of your path from how you decided to drop out of college and go to Yahoo and then how your experience at Yahoo shaped WhatsApp and how you came together with Brian there. 所以我想知道你能不能從你決定從大學退學到雅虎，然后你在雅虎的經歷如何塑造 WhatsApp，以及你是如何和 Brian 在一起的，來談談你的道路。 > `[00:02:31]` Sure. `[00:02:31]` 當然。 > Actually a funny story about me and Brian that we met even before I joined Yahoo because he technically intrigued me. 事實上，在我加入雅虎之前，我們就認識了一個關于我和布萊恩的有趣故事，因為他在技術上吸引了我。 > He was my co-founder was like someone is people going through me back in 1998. 他是我的聯合創始人，就像 1998 年有人通過我。 > `[00:02:42]` And I think well some had earlier when I worked at this interesting young auditing auditing company I was doing like computer security audit. `[00:02:42]` 我想，早些時候我在一家有趣的年輕審計公司工作時，我做過一些類似于計算機安全審計的工作。 > And so I was actually recruited into Yahoo by one of the founders at Yahoo. 因此，我實際上是被雅虎的一位創始人招募到雅虎的。 > David phyla who I worked with for a long time and who was a big role model and a mentor in many ways. 大衛·菲拉，我和他一起工作了很長一段時間，他在很多方面都是一個很大的榜樣和導師。 > Because when I joined Yahoo. 因為當我加入雅虎的時候。 > It was a pretty small company we had like maybe 500 servers or 400 servers and over nine years we grew to thousands of servers and so to see that gross and to experience all the technical issues that you have to deal is when it comes to scaling the company was was extremely useful and we ended up starting WhatsApp because we didn\'t have to make the same mistake twice. 這是一家規模很小的公司，我們有大約 500 臺服務器或 400 臺服務器，在過去的 9 年里，我們發展到了數千臺服務器，因此要看到這一點，并體驗到所有你必須處理的技術問題-當涉及到擴大公司規模時-是非常有用的，我們最終啟動 WhatsApp 是因為我們不需要犯兩次相同的錯誤。 > We were able to basically look at what worked at Yahoo and what didn\'t work at Yahoo. 我們基本上能夠看到什么在雅虎起作用，什么在雅虎不起作用。 > And we were also able to tap into our network. 我們還可以利用我們的網絡。 > `[00:03:36]` We had a really good network of very skilled very senior server engineers who joined us with what\'s up some who already left Yahoo at a time some who were still at Yahoo that we were able to recruit and convince them to to join us and we were able to have a very small team of engineers supporting obviously a lot of users outside because we learned so much about scaling and managing servers and so that experience in that mentorship from David and Geria at Yahoo was really valuable to us. 我們有一個非常好的網絡，由非常熟練的非常高級的服務器工程師組成，他們加入了我們的行列很多關于擴展和管理服務器的工作，所以雅虎的 David 和 Geria 在這方面的經驗對我們來說是非常有價值的。 > `[00:04:05]` How many engineers do you have at the time of the WhatsApp acquisition. `[00:04:05]` 在 WhatsApp 收購時，你有多少工程師。 > `[00:04:10]` Engineers probably. `[00:04:10]` 可能是工程師。 > `[00:04:12]` 2025 is supporting about 400 million active users. `[00:04:12]` 2025 年支持大約 4 億活躍用戶。 > Yeah that\'s pretty incredible. 是啊，真是太不可思議了。 > `[00:04:18]` Just a couple quick anecdotes about his resume. `[00:04:18]` 只是一些關于他簡歷的趣聞軼事。 > He did know we\'re going to present it today. 他知道我們今天要展示它。 > This was in the Sequoia archives we collect resumes at times and try to share with the portfolio. 這是在紅杉檔案中，我們有時收集簡歷，并試圖與投資組合分享。 > But a lot of you are thinking about starting a company which is wonderful but I also think you took a different path. 但是你們很多人都在考慮創辦一家很棒的公司，但我也認為你們走了一條不同的道路。 > He actually joined a great company during their growth years and I think learned a great deal from David. 實際上，在他們成長的年代，他加入了一家偉大的公司，我認為他從大衛那里學到了很多東西。 > And there\'s the whole experience that much of the approach to leadership that I think John embraced it WhatsApp was formed at Yahoo. 我認為約翰很大程度上接受了 WhatsApp 成立于雅虎的全部經驗。 > He was a Yahoo hire hundreds of engineers every month and realized a lack of focus was creating challenges for the company. 他是雅虎的一員，每月雇傭數百名工程師，并意識到缺乏關注給公司帶來了挑戰。 > And then over time Yahoo. 然后隨著時間的推移雅虎。 > As they look to monitise as a public company he spent a lot of energy on advertising which created a distraction if you will for the consumer and I think John\'s passion around simplicity and no advertising and also the approach to focus came from that experience at Yahoo. 當他們將 Monitise 視為一家上市公司時，他花費了大量精力在廣告上，如果你愿意的話，這會分散消費者的注意力。我認為，約翰對簡單而不做廣告的熱情，以及專注于雅虎的那種方式，都來自于雅虎的經歷。 > I want to share one final anecdote for those of you that are looking at crucible moments. 我想分享最后一個軼事給那些正在看坩堝時刻的人。 > Yohn was seen as a statement killer science class and finally called him and said. Yohn 被視為殺手科學課的陳述，最后打電話給他說。 > `[00:05:22]` Where the fuck are you. `[00:05:22]` 你他媽的在哪？ > And John said while I\'m in class and David said Get your ass in here. 約翰說，我上課的時候，大衛說，給我滾進來。 > And that was a crucible moment that I think set you on this wonderful journey and I think it\'s great to have kind of file in a mixin. 那是一個坩堝的時刻，我認為這讓你踏上了這段美妙的旅程，我認為在一個混合文件中有這樣的文件是很棒的。 > `[00:05:37]` She doesn\'t remember that it were happening. `[00:05:37]` 她不記得發生了什么。 > I think that was what drove it me to drop out. 我想這就是促使我輟學的原因。 > I was like well okay I guess I have a real job to do. 我很好，好吧，我想我有一份真正的工作要做。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > `[00:05:46]` You thought you were working while you were still a student. `[00:05:46]` 當你還是個學生的時候，你以為你在工作。 > I was trying to do both. 我想兩者兼得。 > I was trying to go to school part time and work full time. 我試著去學校做兼職和全職工作。 > And that only lasted for about two weeks and I was like well said I really like working at Yahoo. 這只持續了大約兩周，我說得很好，我真的很喜歡在雅虎工作。 > `[00:05:55]` So using a freebie as the operating system which was a really was and still am really passionate about and it was like a dream job for me and the learning experience that I was getting there was just like mind blowing. `[00:05:55]` 所以使用一個免費的操作系統，它曾經是，現在仍然是一個充滿激情的操作系統，對我來說就像一份夢寐以求的工作，而我在那里獲得的學習經歷就像在發人深省。 > `[00:06:06]` Can you tell us about the moment that you decided to start this company. `[00:06:06]` 你能告訴我們你決定創辦這家公司的那一刻嗎？ > `[00:06:12]` So the interesting thing is I don\'t think I ever decided to start a company. `[00:06:12]` 有趣的是，我從來沒有決定過要開一家公司。 > In fact now that I look back I was like wow I never thought that I\'ll be starting a company. 事實上，現在我回想起來，我就像哇，我從來沒有想過我會創辦一家公司。 > `[00:06:21]` I thought I was just building a product. `[00:06:21]` 我以為我只是在制造一個產品。 > And I think a lot of great companies actually start out that way people just want to build a product and I\'m thinking of starting a company because starting a company requires that you have a general consul and biz dev team and a char and they have to look for office space and make sure your employees are getting paid. 我認為很多偉大的公司實際上都是這樣開始的，人們只是想制造一種產品，而我正在考慮創辦一家公司，因為創建一家公司需要有一個總領事、一個專業開發團隊和一個 char，他們必須尋找辦公空間，并確保您的員工獲得報酬。 > It\'s a lot of kind of complicated and you\'ve been there you\'ve done that. 這很復雜，你去過那里-你做過那件事。 > `[00:06:41]` It\'s very not that exciting as compared to building a product. `[00:06:41]` 與生產產品相比，它并不那么令人興奮。 > So we started out just trying to build a messaging app. 所以我們一開始只是想建立一個即時通訊應用程序。 > And you know now looking back it must have been so naive to think that I couldn\'t build an app that millions of people would use. 你知道，現在回想起來，想到我不能開發出一款數以百萬計的人會使用的應用程序，那一定是太天真了。 > I was just like oh yeah it\'s easy to do this. 我就像哦，是的，這很容易做到。 > `[00:06:59]` Turns out it\'s not so easy. `[00:06:59]` 事實證明，這并不容易。 > Well a lot of challenges during the day on our way. 在我們的路上有很多挑戰。 > But it basically started out as me buying an iPhone in January of 2009. 但基本上是我在 2009 年 1 月買了一部 iPhone。 > I took a year off after Yahoo and a kind of travel and spent a lot of time just figuring out what to do. 在雅虎(Yahoo)和一種旅行之后，我休了一年假，花了很多時間思考該做什么。 > And in January of 2009 about an iPhone and this was literally like three or four months after STK for AOL came out and people were trying to figure out what they can do was it. 2009 年 1 月，關于一部 iPhone，這簡直就像是 AOL STK 上市后的三四個月，人們正試圖弄清楚他們能做些什么。 > And we started just playing around was was the fallen and as you began trying to build an app and our original idea was actually not messaging our original idea was established and to get out enough people know about this but because we\'ve built all this quality code that could figure out who your contacts are who you are your. 當你開始嘗試開發一個應用程序時，我們最初的想法實際上不是發短信，而是讓足夠多的人知道我們的想法，但是因為我們已經建立了所有的質量代碼，可以知道你的聯系人是誰。 > `[00:07:44]` Friends are based on your contact list. `[00:07:44]` 朋友是根據你的聯系方式。 > We\'re able to pivot into messaging because already had that foundation we had a separate piece written and we had a client code written for iPhone and so in the summer of 2009 when when the status thing wasn\'t working out so well for us were like well let\'s try messaging. 我們能夠轉向消息傳遞，因為我們已經有了這個基礎，我們已經編寫了一篇單獨的文章，我們有一個為 iPhone 編寫的客戶端代碼，所以在 2009 年夏天，當狀態的事情對我們來說不太好的時候，我們就像我們試著發送消息一樣。 > We were able to just kind of put the end piece and drop it in and just go from there. 我們可以把最后的部分放進去，然后從那里開始。 > `[00:08:08]` So I figured exactly when you two met each other and decided to work together. `[00:08:08]` 所以我想，你們倆什么時候見面，決定一起工作。 > But I know it happened relatively quietly and there weren\'t a lot of people in it. 但我知道這件事發生得相對平靜，而且里面沒有多少人。 > I\'d love to just hear the story of how you guys met and decided to partner together. 我很想聽聽你們是如何相遇并決定一起合作的。 > `[00:08:22]` Well to be clear I think Yanto was interested in talking to anybody in the investment community nor anybody in the carrier community including CEOs or handset manufacturers including CEOs. `[00:08:22]` 顯然，我認為延藤有興趣與投資界的任何人交談，也不愿與運營商中的任何人交談，包括首席執行官或手機制造商，包括首席執行官。 > He essentially ignored those e-mails and he had phenomenal focus on any customer female but certainly my initial e-mails were rebuffed without a reply no response at all. 他基本上忽略了那些電子郵件，他對任何客戶女性都有驚人的關注，但當然，我最初的電子郵件被拒絕了，沒有回復，沒有任何回應。 > `[00:08:46]` Clearly there were enough people at Yahoo. `[00:08:46]` 雅虎顯然有足夠的人手。 > `[00:08:51]` I think we collectively knew together along with Brian where we eventually were able to secure a brief interaction at the Red Rock Cafe. `[00:08:51]` 我想我們共同知道，在紅巖咖啡廳，我們最終能夠獲得短暫的互動。 > For those of you that are in Mountain View and Yon was in a beanie in his first. 對于你們中那些在山景城的人來說，Yon 在他的第一次被發現的時候，是在一個小豆子里。 > `[00:09:06]` Stair it was a bit intimidating and I didn\'t get him to smile for maybe five minutes and I thought I\'m definitely in trouble. `[00:09:06]` 樓梯有點嚇人，我大概五分鐘都沒讓他笑，我想我肯定有麻煩了。 > `[00:09:15]` I remember Redrock that definitely happened and I remember laughter they have an amazing coffee by the way. `[00:09:15]` 我記得紅石確實發生了，我記得笑聲，順便說一下，他們有一杯很棒的咖啡。 > And yeah I remember of our interactions and were trying to figure out. 是的，我記得我們的互動，并試圖找出。 > Me and Brian has always kind of focused on building a company and building a product that can sustain itself. 我和 Brian 總是把精力集中在建立一家公司和建立一種能夠自我維持的產品上。 > `[00:09:36]` And we\'re actually getting revenue is up already because our iPhone app was paid and our hours of platforms were free. `[00:09:36]` 事實上，我們的收入已經增長了，因為我們的 iPhone 應用程序是付費的，我們的平臺時間也是免費的。 > We were actually doing like Brand Nokia. 實際上我們做的就像諾基亞品牌。 > I don\'t think we had Android at that point yet but we\'re probably one of the few companies that decided to build up for Blagg brain kids a time and I think that gamble paid off for us because a lot of those people who were using Nokia five years ago who were WhatsApp users are now using Android or AOL Icelanders. 我認為那時我們還沒有 Android，但我們可能是少數幾家決定為 Blagg Brain 的孩子們打造的公司之一，我認為這場賭博為我們帶來了回報，因為五年前使用諾基亞的很多人都在使用 WhatsApp 用戶，現在他們正在使用 Android 或 AOL 冰島人。 > They\'re keeping. 他們在保存。 > Are still using whatsapp because of the connections and group chat to the app. 還在使用 WhatsApp，因為它與應用程序的連接和群聊。 > But I think. 但我覺得。 > We were able to. 我們能做到。 > Choose our partnership and our investors because we were able to monetize our IPO Asaph or actually having revenue and we were able to pay for electricity and pay for servers and base salaries to somewhere early employees and so we weren\'t in this situation we\'re like while we need to raise money. 選擇我們的合作伙伴和我們的投資者，是因為我們能夠將我們的首次公開募股(Asaph)貨幣化，或者實際上我們有了收入，而且我們能夠支付電費，支付服務器和基本工資給一些早期的員工，所以我們沒有在這種情況下，我們需要籌集資金。 > Otherwise we\'re going to go out of business tomorrow so we were able to kind of leverage. 否則，我們明天就會倒閉，這樣我們就能有某種杠桿作用了。 > Our situation and take our time and make sure that we careful and partner with the people who we think will support us in building what were set out. 我們的情況，并采取我們的時間，確保我們小心和合作的人，我們認為誰將支持我們在建設所制定的。 > `[00:10:43]` And do you remember what about Jim and Sinclair made you want to partner with them. `[00:10:43]` 你還記得吉姆和辛克萊讓你想和他們合作的事情嗎？ > `[00:10:48]` I think I think nervous laughter from Jim in general is it first of all that have been an amazing partner for us. `[00:10:48]` 我認為吉姆的神經質笑聲，首先是我們一個令人驚奇的伙伴。 > `[00:10:58]` But I think in general if you look at the history of Sequoyah you know I\'ve supported companies like Cisco Apple and Google and Yahoo. `[00:10:58]` 但是總的來說，如果你看看 Sequoyah 的歷史，你知道我曾經支持過思科、蘋果、谷歌和雅虎這樣的公司。 > And I think growing up in Silicon Valley and I lived here for 22 years there is there is this heritage that Sequoia has that and pedigree is that a lot of other venture funds don\'t have. 我認為在硅谷長大的我和我在這里生活了 22 年，紅杉有這樣的傳統，而血統是很多其他風險基金所沒有的。 > `[00:11:25]` And I remember I remember sitting after we got a few different term sheets. `[00:11:25]` 我記得我們有幾張不同的學期表后坐著。 > `[00:11:30]` I remember sitting and talking to Brian and I was like trying to figure out what to do. `[00:11:30]` 我記得我坐著和布賴恩聊天，我就像想找出該做什么。 > I was like Brian look like five years ago I\'ve somebody it\'s all about who would how would term sheets from Sequoia and we were starting this company we would be like nobody would believe us we wouldn\'t believe this ourselves and now has this opportunity we should just we should just do it and go for it. 我就像五年前的布萊恩，我有了一個人 > And so. 而且如此。 > `[00:11:51]` We also got some advice. `[00:11:51]` 我們也有一些建議。 > Mean Jeff Ralston who is one of our course co-workers at Yahoo. 杰夫·拉斯頓是雅虎的同事之一。 > I remember I mean Brian drove over to Jeff Ralston\'s house. 我記得我是說布萊恩開車去了杰夫·拉斯頓的家。 > `[00:12:00]` It was like Colwin and it was like a scene from a James Bond movie because nobody knew about us and we didn\'t want to tell anybody as we were raising we didn\'t want to getting our attention and we got to have Schuyler\'s at 11:00p.m. 這就像科溫，就像詹姆斯·邦德電影里的一幕，因為沒人知道我們的事，我們也不想在我們提出的時候告訴任何人，我們不想引起我們的注意，我們得在晚上 11 點讓斯凱勒來。 > when everybody was asleep on like Jaroff was kind of looking at various options like Square companies I was a quiet company and we were like Okay well that makes us kind. 當每個人都在睡覺的時候，就像 Jaroff 在看各種各樣的選擇，比如 Square 公司，我是一個安靜的公司，我們就像好的，好吧，這讓我們很善良。 > `[00:12:19]` And Jim what about WhatsApp made you so excited at that point. `[00:12:19]` 吉姆，WhatsApp 在這一點上讓你如此興奮，那是怎么回事？ > `[00:12:23]` Well look we were looking at the messaging space we were at the time we had built a system we called earlybird that was tracking the activity on the app stores and WhatsApp had become dominant globally not theU.S. `[00:12:23]` 看，當我們建立一個名為“早起鳥”的系統時，我們看到的是我們當時所處的信息空間，它跟蹤應用商店的活動，WhatsApp 已經在全球而不是美國占據了主導地位。 > in fact they were well down the charts in theU.S. 事實上，他們在美國名列前茅。 > but in maybe 35 60 countries Romanones time they were one or two and we had been looking at the messaging space and group messaging and it concluded that this pay model that they had crafted and just the utility experience it reminded me and many of my partners are chrome just as simplicity. 但在大約 3560 個國家，羅馬人的時間是一兩個，我們一直在觀察信息傳遞空間和群發信息，我們得出的結論是，他們制作的這種付費模式，以及它提醒我和我的許多合作伙伴的實用體驗，都是同樣簡單的。 > `[00:12:59]` And then for the next few months it was all about trying to get to John and Brian because they didn\'t have an address that was publicly available. `[00:12:59]` 接下來的幾個月里，這一切都是為了找到約翰和布萊恩，因為他們沒有公開的地址。 > There was no signage on the building. 大樓上沒有標牌。 > I knew that they were in Mountain View but where we literally walked the streets of Mountain View to see if we could intersect with these guys that you actually had people just acquired partners what we have on the street it was actually the partners walking around. 我知道他們在山景城，但我們在山景城的街道上走來走去，看看我們能不能和這些人交匯-實際上，人們只是找到了我們在街上擁有的伴侶-實際上是伙伴們在四處走動。 > Yes but I\'ll say this about Brian and Yon\'s being too modest the level of focus we all talk about focus but the level of focus that John had at WhatsApp to the product and to the client is absolutely shocking I\'ve ever had an entrepreneur as focus as John and whether it was executives from various companies or CEOs or partners from various firms Yohn ignored the vast majority of that activity including the PR inbound and stayed focused on the product. 是的，但我會這樣說，布萊恩和楊太謙虛了，我們都在談論焦點，但約翰在 WhatsApp 上對產品和客戶的關注程度是絕對令人震驚的，我曾經有一位企業家像約翰一樣專注，不管是來自不同公司的高管，還是來自不同公司的 CEO 或合伙人，Yohn 忽略了絕大多數人。該活動，包括公關入境，并保持對產品的關注。 > And I think that serve the cultural incredibly well. 我認為這能很好地服務于文化。 > `[00:13:52]` We just didn\'t have time we were such a small team. `[00:13:52]` 我們只是沒有時間，我們是一支如此小的隊伍。 > You know Brian and me would spend hours answering customer support e-mails right. 你知道我和布萊恩會花幾個小時回復客戶支持的電子郵件。 > So you know he\'s fine how long did that last. 所以你知道他很好那持續了多久。 > `[00:14:00]` How many users did WhatsApp have the last time you answered regularly answered customer support e-mails. `[00:14:00]` WhatsApp 上一次定期回復客戶支持電子郵件的用戶有多少？ > `[00:14:04]` I still do a little bit today I was late and spent hours answering customers e-mails and about people who write into me to somehow find my e-mails. `[00:14:04]` 我今天還有點遲到，花了好幾個小時回復顧客的電子郵件，以及那些給我寫信的人，不知怎么找到了我的電子郵件。 > `[00:14:12]` Right. `[00:14:12]` 對。 > And I try to answer and try to help. 我試著回答和嘗試幫助。 > And I still runs iPhone data programs to this day. 我至今還在運行 iPhone 數據程序。 > So but I think at around. 所以我想在周圍。 > 150 200 million was started hiring dedicated customers folks. 一億五千萬人開始雇傭忠實的顧客。 > `[00:14:24]` Laughter And we actually have a lot. `[00:14:24]` 笑聲，我們實際上有很多。 > `[00:14:29]` We\'ve focused a lot on our customer support and localization our customer support team is probably one of the most diverse teams. `[00:14:29]` 我們非常重視客戶支持和本地化，我們的客戶支持團隊可能是最多樣化的團隊之一。 > That is because we have to support Italian French Turkish Arabic Hebrew. 這是因為我們必須支持意大利語、法語、土耳其語、阿拉伯語、希伯來語。 > All these languages and they help users and that translates at the same time. 所有這些語言，他們幫助用戶，并在同一時間翻譯。 > `[00:14:48]` So this is actually something I want to dig in. `[00:14:48]` 這實際上是我想要挖掘的東西。 > You know Whatsapp had this approach that was very different than most startups. 你知道 Whatsapp 有著與大多數初創公司截然不同的方法。 > You know like ignoring Stickley I mean most startups do ignoring the presses and that\'s me most startups do charging for a consumer product. 你知道，就像忽略 Stickley 一樣，我的意思是，大多數初創企業都忽略了印刷機，而這就是我，大多數初創公司都會為消費產品收費。 > I remember in Nike 2011 or whatever people would still say well what\'s app is never going to work because they charge a dollar. 我記得在耐克，2011 年，或者其他人仍然會說，什么\的應用是永遠不會工作，因為他們收取一美元。 > And it\'s a viral app and that\'s just going to killer right there. 這是一款病毒應用程序，它就會在那里殺人。 > `[00:15:11]` So how how did this sort of culture of being sort of likeA.I. `[00:15:11]` 那么，這種文化是如何像 A.I 一樣的呢？ > sort of Silicon Valley standards come about. 硅谷的標準來了。 > `[00:15:18]` And how important was that to the company. `[00:15:18]` 這對公司來說有多重要。 > `[00:15:21]` I think what first all I mean are engineers so by definition we just hate meetings behind our computer. `[00:15:21]` 我想首先我指的是工程師，所以從定義上說，我們只是討厭電腦后面的會議。 > If I can work right. 如果我能正常工作的話。 > `[00:15:28]` Thank you. `[00:15:28]` 謝謝。 > `[00:15:30]` Don\'t make us go to meetings with what you have to meet Brasserie you have to meet other people and it takes you away from being in front of a computer or getting work done. `[00:15:30]` 不要讓我們去開會，你必須遇到其他人，這會讓你遠離在電腦前或完成工作。 > And when when you\'re writing add 80 to 90 hours a week speed and all you do is want to work. 當你寫作時，每周增加 80 到 90 個小時的速度，而你所做的只是想工作。 > `[00:15:48]` You don\'t have a lot of time to take meetings. `[00:15:48]` 你沒有太多的時間去開會。 > The thing about charging is actually very interesting. 收費的問題其實很有趣。 > `[00:15:55]` We used this lever to charge structuralist slower growth. `[00:15:55]` 我們用這個杠桿來推動結構主義者較慢的增長。 > And I know it sounds very counterintuitive because like well why would you want to slow your growth will want it to slow growth so we could better support our existing users so we could build servers that don\'t crash so that we could build product that doesn\'t drop messager so that we could answer to their customer support e-mails and not a lot of people were telling us what you\'re doing it wrong you should really be growing as fast as he can and we\'re like no no no no we want to build the infrastructure first and then it\'s very similar to a little bit of Facebook in early days. 我知道這聽起來很違背直覺，因為就像你為什么要放慢你的增長速度一樣，我們希望它能減緩增長，這樣我們就可以更好地支持我們現有的用戶，這樣我們就可以建立不崩潰的服務器，這樣我們就可以生產出不需要發送消息的產品，這樣我們就可以對他們的客戶支持的電子郵件負責，而不是很多人告訴我們什么。你做錯了，你真的應該像他那樣快速增長，我們不想，我們想先建設基礎設施，然后它非常類似于 Facebook 早期的一點點。 > They were doing colleges online and they weren\'t open to the entire world and that that\'s kind of similar to what we did. 他們在網上做大學，對整個世界都不開放，這和我們的做法有點相似。 > `[00:16:34]` We wanted to slower growth so we could really focus on existing users and wanted to make sure that the Hower existing users happy and that when people sign up they have a great experience and that the app works and it\'s fast and the servers are up and running all the time. `[00:16:34]` 我們希望放慢增長速度，這樣我們才能真正關注現有用戶，并確保 Hower 現有用戶感到高興，并確保當人們注冊時，他們有很好的體驗，應用程序運行迅速，服務器一直在啟動和運行。 > `[00:16:48]` And that\'s part of why we charge for IAW and sometimes Woodlark promotions at the end of the year which would make it free and have like an implied new influx of new user. `[00:16:48]` 這也是我們對 IAW 收取費用的原因之一，有時還會在年底向 Woodlark 促銷，這將使其免費，并有一個隱含的新用戶涌入。 > `[00:16:58]` But overall we\'re just kind of wanted to standardize radar which is why I would have been depressed. `[00:16:58]` 但是總的來說，我們只是想標準化雷達，這就是為什么我會沮喪的原因。 > `[00:17:04]` We felt that. `[00:17:04]` 我們感覺到了。 > Why did you want to Standardbred. 你為什么想要標準的。 > `[00:17:06]` Right. `[00:17:06]` 對。 > `[00:17:07]` So we felt that even if people were talking about us writing about us from the press it\'s a distraction to employees. `[00:17:07]` 所以我們覺得，即使人們在談論我們，從媒體上談論我們，也會分散員工的注意力。 > `[00:17:13]` It will be distraction to me and Brian because we would have to comment on it internally. `[00:17:13]` 這會分散我和布萊恩的注意力，因為我們必須在內部發表意見。 > Or you know do something about it. 或者你知道做點什么。 > `[00:17:22]` And we just felt that if you if we don\'t talk to the press which we tried not to do for the most part we would be able to focus on a product. `[00:17:22]` 我們只是覺得，如果你不和媒體談話，而我們大部分時間都不這么做的話，我們就能把注意力集中在一種產品上。 > And that was our strategy and I think that worked for us because we really were able to focus on what. 這就是我們的策略，我認為這對我們有效，因為我們真的能夠專注于什么。 > `[00:17:37]` So I think there\'s no marketing inside of WhatsApp right. `[00:17:37]` 所以我認為 WhatsApp 的內部沒有市場營銷。 > I don\'t believe there is in finance individual or organization. 我不相信金融界有個人或組織。 > `[00:17:45]` There are essentially two people who are in non-technical roles. `[00:17:45]` 本質上有兩個人在非技術角色中。 > One is right here in Iran. 其中一個就在伊朗。 > I think we describe his role as business operations and over time with regulatory issues we begrudgingly or yond begrudgingly hired a wonderful GC. 我認為，我們把他的角色描述為業務運作，隨著時間的推移，我們在監管問題上勉強或勉強地聘請了一位出色的 GC。 > So this is a company that\'s very rare in terms of its functional structure and one of our challenges a Sequoia was to avoid encouraging on to go hire a marketing team or follow up on that tech crunch request because the authentic Yone. 因此，這是一家在功能結構上非常罕見的公司，而紅杉公司面臨的挑戰之一是避免鼓勵它聘請營銷團隊或跟進技術危機的要求，因為它是真正的 Yone。 > `[00:18:12]` And Brian was a very different Antich ballet company in a number of ways. `[00:18:12]` 布賴恩在許多方面都是一個非常不同的安蒂克芭蕾舞團。 > `[00:18:18]` Related to this approach other than deciding the charge. `[00:18:18]` 除決定指控外，與此方法有關。 > Could you talk about you know the best or one of the best product decisions you made that sort of is somewhat counterintuitive. 你能談談你知道最好的產品還是你做出的最好的產品決策嗎？這有點違背直覺。 > `[00:18:26]` Or was it the time man there are so many I think the two biggest ones that people couldn\'t wrap their mind their head around were to First we chose not to do user names. `[00:18:26]` 或者說是時候了，男人有那么多人，我認為，人們無法思考的最大的兩件事是，首先，我們選擇了不做用戶名。 > `[00:18:42]` We wanted to use phone number and we had a lot of people asking us to do usernames and I was like wow why would you want to introduce an extra layer of handshake between two people when you already have our phone number and your address book. `[00:18:42]` 我們想使用電話號碼，我們有很多人要求我們做用戶名，我想哇，為什么你想在兩個人之間多介紹一層握手，因為你已經有了我們的電話號碼和你的通訊錄。 > Well look we always looked at as a mass as this very simple way for people to communicate and stay in touch. 好吧，你看，我們總是把它看作是一種非常簡單的方式，人們可以通過這種方式進行交流和保持聯系。 > And you know by actually growing up in Russia and Ukraine I would go visit every couple of years and I would like I remember going back to Ukraine in 2004 and 2005 when my basic everybody was using this mass and then I came back to United States and I was told my friends about and are like What is this. 你知道，在俄羅斯和烏克蘭長大，我每隔幾年去一次，我想記得 2004 年和 2005 年，當我的基本每個人都在使用這個彌撒的時候，我回到了美國，我被告知我的朋友們，這是怎么回事。 > That\'s right. 那是正確的。 > And so we wanted to have that simplicity of of just using the phone numbers like if you know somebody\'s phone number and it\'s in your address book you probably calls me Prahlad tags. 所以我們想簡單地使用電話號碼，比如，如果你知道某人的電話號碼，而且它在你的地址簿上，你可能會叫我普拉拉德標簽。 > Well you should also be able to what\'s them. 你也應該知道他們是什么。 > And the second one was that we didn\'t want to use usernames to think think the ability to tap into your address book and use that as a graph to build a network and not to use usernames was probably the biggest one. 第二個問題是，我們不想使用用戶名來認為點擊你的地址簿并使用它作為一個圖表來建立一個網絡而不使用用戶名的能力可能是最大的。 > `[00:19:43]` Yeah. `[00:19:43]` 是的。 > At the time I remember no one else was using the phone book yeah yeah. 當時我記得沒有其他人在用電話簿，是的。 > And then remind us now what the worst product decision is a worse product. 然后提醒我們，最糟糕的產品決定是更糟糕的產品。 > `[00:19:52]` Susan and I have all like we try was ever released to get rid of a feature that we don\'t think that useful or get rid of the settings that are on. `[00:19:52]` 蘇珊和我都像我們曾經嘗試過的那樣，發布了一個我們認為沒有用的特性，或者去掉了設置。 > It\'s not that you solve the problems like when you have the number of people that we have. 這并不是說你解決的問題就像我們有這么多人一樣。 > `[00:20:08]` You can\'t just like easily remove stuff because there is always like a million people or 2 million people to find something useful and so while you don\'t want to sound like a small percentage point one percent absolute numbers it\'s a lot. `[00:20:08]` 你不能就像輕易移除東西一樣，因為總有一百萬人或兩百萬人在尋找有用的東西，所以當你不想聽起來像一個小的百分點-百分之一的絕對值時，它就會很大.=。 > `[00:20:20]` And so I think there are probably a couple of things that I think are not that great. `[00:20:00]` 所以我認為可能有幾件事情我認為沒有那么好。 > `[00:20:26]` We have this broadcast feature that we can probably improve on or maybe at some point get rid of it altogether or maybe improve it probably is the better thing to do. `[00:20:26]` 我們有這個廣播功能，我們也許可以改進它，或者在某個時候完全擺脫它，或者改進它，也許是更好的做法。 > `[00:20:36]` The smartest thing we have. `[00:20:36]` 我們擁有的最聰明的東西。 > `[00:20:37]` You know we started with that site like be very negative about it because that\'s how I was started by the status functionality is there it\'s legacy. `[00:20:37]` 你知道，我們從那個網站開始，好像對它非常消極，因為這是我從狀態功能開始的方式，它的遺產在那里嗎？ > But I don\'t think anybody uses it. 但我不認為有人會用它。 > At some point we really need to clean it up. 總有一天我們真的需要把它清理干凈。 > `[00:20:50]` And then three people asked me you asked this this morning why did you choose our line. `[00:20:50]` 然后有三個人問我，你今天早上問我，你為什么選擇我們的隊伍？ > `[00:20:58]` It\'s one of those I was intuition intuition thing. `[00:20:58]` 這是那種我是直覺的東西。 > I knew nothing about Erlang. 我對 Erlang 一無所知。 > And when we actually still don\'t have a lot of engineers who do laugh and we actually have like a really small surging we really have like seven or eight people supporting our entire user base on a backhand core insanely brilliant who wake up in the middle of the night and fix servers. 當我們還沒有很多工程師笑的時候，我們真的有一個非常小的高潮，我們真的有七八個人支持我們的整個用戶基礎在反手的核心，瘋狂的聰明誰半夜醒來，并修復服務器。 > The thing about Erlang is that I was looking for an open source chat server to drop into these back end up with Bill that could identify which of your contacts were WhatsApp users and I would think I could get well we can probably use someP.P. 關于 Erlang 的問題是，我正在尋找一個開源聊天服務器，讓它進入這些后端，最終由 Bill 來識別您的聯系人中哪些是 WhatsApp 用戶，我想我會很好，我們也許可以使用一些 P.P。 > which was. 曾經是。 > An open protocol for messaging and I was looking for an open source company server and I couldn\'t find what was written and see what it was like how dated there was unwritten purling I knew that wouldn\'t be able to scale. 一種開放的消息傳遞協議，我正在尋找一臺開源公司服務器，我找不到所寫的內容，也看不出它是如何過時的，我知道它是不成文的，我知道它無法擴展。 > And then like I came across Earling I\'m like What is this. 然后我遇到了厄林，我就像這是什么。 > And I was like at first the first time I heard of it. 我第一次聽說它的時候就覺得。 > So I started researching it and it turned out probably what was the best engineering decision we ever made by just we were forced to because there was nothing else to use. 所以我開始研究它，結果很可能是我們做出的最好的工程決定，我們被迫這樣做，因為沒有其他的東西可以使用。 > `[00:22:08]` It allowed us to scale Rala while it\'s like build for what when you do it. `[00:22:08]` 它允許我們在你做的時候就像為什么而建造一樣的拉臘。 > `[00:22:12]` It\'s a functional programming language. `[00:22:12]` 這是一種函數式編程語言。 > It has message passing it lets you like cluster servers into nodes and you have just like Gevalia database built into it call them newsier that is really cool like synchronizes all the data across the servers and we obviously tweeted a lot internally. 它有消息傳遞，它可以讓您喜歡集群服務器到節點中，您也有類似于 Gvalia 數據庫的內置在其中的消息，它稱為新的，非常酷，像同步服務器上的所有數據一樣，我們在內部很明顯地發了很多推文。 > `[00:22:30]` We have a couple of guys who specialize in tuning Erlang but part of it was just like we had no choice there was only one available at a time and it worked really well for us. `[00:22:30]` 我們有幾個專門調諧 Erlang 的人，但其中的一部分就像我們別無選擇，一次只有一個，對我們來說效果很好。 > `[00:22:41]` OK. `[00:22:41]` 好的。 > `[00:22:42]` So I want to talk about the Facebook acquisition and how that all came to be. `[00:22:42]` 所以我想談談 Facebook 的收購，以及這一切是如何發生的。 > But I actually have another slide all right on this is that a third. 但實際上我有另一張幻燈片，這是第三張。 > `[00:22:54]` That\'s your car. 那是你的車。 > `[00:22:56]` This is the night before the final signing yon it sent me a picture we had just left Fenwick and West and Mountain View and for the prior four days we were kind of cooped up 18 20 hours a day because we had no finance function and we were responsible for all the diligence materials and we left around 230a.m. `[00:22:56]` 這是最后一次簽約的前一天晚上，它給我發了一張我們剛剛離開芬威克、西和山景城的照片，在前四天里，我們每天被關起來 18，20 小時，因為我們沒有財務職能，我們負責所有的勤務材料，我們大約在凌晨 230 點離開。 > after things were wrapped up and Yeun on his way home didn\'t have a flat tire blew out at 75 miles per hour. 事情結束后，Yeun 在回家的路上沒有爆胎，每小時 75 英里。 > He almost died that night. 那晚他差點死了。 > And this is the exchange thankfully Yarm was able to pull over and change the tire. 這是交換，謝天謝地，亞姆能夠停車并更換輪胎。 > But this is one of those little things that happened in the deal dynamics when people talk about the deal almost blow up. 但當人們談論這筆交易時，這是在交易動態中發生的小事情之一。 > Yes it did actually. 是的實際上是的。 > `[00:23:42]` Laughter. `[00:23:42]` 笑聲。 > So if you could rewind a little from this start of the you know very end of the deal. 所以，如果你能從這一開始向后退一小步，你就會知道這筆交易已經結束了。 > How did that conversation first begin with you and Mark and how did you think about that and becoming part of another company. 那次談話是如何從你和馬克開始的，你是怎么想的，成為另一家公司的一員。 > `[00:23:54]` We met probably two years ago and you know as time went on we got to know each other and realize that Facebook has kind of gone through a lot of stuff that we would probably have to go through like going IPO or something and it also builds us tremendous infrastructure. `[00:23:54]` 我們大概是在兩年前認識的，你知道，隨著時間的推移，我們認識了對方，并意識到 Facebook 經歷了很多我們可能要經歷的事情，比如 IPO 或者什么的，它也為我們建立了巨大的基礎設施。 > `[00:24:12]` And they have a lot of people doing things like finance that we didn\'t have and they have an amazing legal team and I have a busy corp dev and biz dev team and when me and Mark would talk we realized that we we share a lot of kind of common goals and common vision. `[00:24:12]` 他們有很多人在做我們沒有的事情，比如金融，他們有一個了不起的法律團隊，我有一個忙碌的公司開發和專業開發團隊，當我和馬克交談的時候，我們意識到我們有很多共同的目標和共同的愿景。 > Our Facebook mission is to make the world more open and more connected. 我們的 Facebook 使命是讓這個世界更加開放，更加互聯。 > `[00:24:33]` And when you think about what WhatsApp is doing it\'s helping people to stay in touch it\'s helping people to stay connected. `[00:24:33]` 當你想到 WhatsApp 在做什么的時候，它就是幫助人們保持聯系，幫助人們保持聯系。 > `[00:24:39]` And the other thing that would kind of realize that you know we would always talk about is how a lot of companies are very focused on building product for Silicon Valley and kind of thinking about well if I can build a product that will take off in Silicon Valley or maybe even can have users in United States Markkula says this like vision about while there is 6 billion people in the world which is why he has taken initiative was enshrined at all because he wants to have everybody connected. `[00:24:39]` 還有另一件事，你知道我們會一直在談論的是，很多公司都非常專注于為硅谷開發產品，并在想，如果我能開發出一種在硅谷騰飛的產品，或者甚至可以讓用戶在美國使用，Markkula 說的就像在硅谷的時候一樣。世界上有 60 億人，這就是他之所以采取主動的根本原因，因為他希望每個人都能聯系起來。 > And we always grew internationally really fast in the early days and we still continue to do that. 在早期，我們在國際上的發展非常快，而且我們仍然在繼續這樣做。 > And so we always kind of had this like world view of our products and so it made sense as we got to know each other and kind of shared our visions to merge. 所以我們總是對我們的產品有類似的世界觀，所以這是有意義的，因為我們認識了彼此，分享了我們的愿景。 > `[00:25:19]` And now that slide gone. `[00:25:19]` 現在幻燈片不見了。 > `[00:25:22]` Yeah. `[00:25:22]` 是的。 > And the night before the announcement obviously as Jim said I had a little accident. 就像吉姆說的那樣，在宣布的前一天晚上，我出了點小意外。 > `[00:25:28]` Were there other are there were there other companies that you would have sold. `[00:25:28]` 如果有其他公司，你會賣掉其他公司嗎？ > What was it that their particular vision matched with market that made you want to do this. 是什么使他們的特殊愿景與市場相匹配，使你想要這樣做。 > `[00:25:34]` I think we just really decided that we wanted to do it together. `[00:25:34]` 我想我們只是真的決定要一起做。 > I think it was a really good fit philosophically and than just cultural wise as well. 我認為這是一個非常合適的哲學和文化智慧，以及。 > `[00:25:42]` I mean they are so focused on what they\'re doing and we\'re always been so focused on our mission that it just makes sense for us to do it together how the conversation between you to go as you were thinking through that well I think you know a lot of a lot of people talk about tend to focus on guns and numbers. `[00:25:42]` 我的意思是，他們如此專注于他們正在做的事情，而我們總是如此專注于我們的使命，所以我們一起做這件事是合情合理的-你們之間的對話就像你們思考的那樣-我想你們知道很多人談論的焦點往往是槍支和數字。 > But you know we were never focused on the numbers we were more focused on how can we make it work so successful how can we make it work so that we continue to grow. 但你知道，我們從來沒有把注意力放在數字上，我們更關注的是，如何才能使它如此成功，如何才能使它發揮作用，從而使我們繼續成長。 > `[00:26:12]` And you know me and Brian are still obviously around and we\'ll be around them. `[00:26:12]` 你知道我和布萊恩顯然還在附近，我們會在他們身邊的。 > We continue to lead what\'s and we\'re in Montagues so we\'re a little bit separate from that memo Park office because it will allow us to focus on completing a mission which we still don\'t think is. 我們繼續領導我們的工作，我們在蒙塔格，所以我們與備忘錄公園辦公室有點不同，因為這將使我們能夠專注于完成一個我們仍然不認為是的任務。 > I mean we really do want to connect everybody and everybody was a smartphone when it was started out people would ask us What\'s your goal in the early days in 2009 2010. 我的意思是，我們真的想把每個人聯系起來，當智能手機問世時，每個人都是智能手機，人們會在 2009 到 2010 年初問我們你的目標是什么。 > And I would say while I want what\'s up to be on every single smartphone. 我會說，當我想在每一部智能手機上做些什么的時候。 > `[00:26:39]` Backdowns was like on a 200 million smartphones so it was easy. `[00:26:39]` 倒退就像在 2 億部智能手機上，所以很容易。 > But today if you think about it like we we\'re not on every single smartphone by far. 但是今天，如果你像我們這樣想的話，到目前為止，我們并不是每一部智能手機都在使用。 > In fact I think we should be doing a much better job. 事實上，我認為我們應該做得更好。 > I\'m sure a lot of you here probably don\'t use WhatsApp and you know that\'s partially our fault and we should make sure that no matter how much success we had that will stay focused on keep keep our eye on making sure that every single person has WhatsApp on their phone. 我相信在座的很多人可能不使用 WhatsApp，你們知道這部分是我們的錯，我們應該確保，無論我們取得了多大的成功，我們都要專注于確保每個人的手機上都有 WhatsApp。 > `[00:27:03]` It\'s just interject them I think. `[00:27:03]` 我想只是插話而已。 > Yun was never focused on the money at a human dimension. 云從來沒有從人的角度來關注金錢。 > `[00:27:10]` The first stop he had here in Mountain View was that the food stamps line the welfare office and social services. `[00:27:10]` 他在山景城的第一站是福利辦公室和社會服務部門的食品券。 > And if you think about being an immigrant and starting in the bottom 1 percent and having this ambition to connect to your family and friends and Yan didn\'t mention this but you lost his mom and his grandmother while I was at Yahoo. 如果你想成為一名移民，從最低的 1%開始，并有與你的家人和朋友建立聯系的野心-顏沒有提到這一點，但我在雅虎的時候，你失去了他的媽媽和祖母。 > And I think that formed a big part of who he was and as important as monetary gain can be to the people in the audience I think ganj passion really started with connecting the world and creating it in an economically attractive way that would allow people to interact with one another across country boundaries. 我認為，這是他的重要組成部分，對觀眾來說，金錢收益同樣重要。我認為，甘吉的熱情是從連接世界開始的，并以一種經濟上有吸引力的方式創造它，這樣人們就可以跨越國界相互交流。 > And I think getting out of the Facebook team and Zach a lot of credit I think they understood how important that was on and I think that\'s reflected in the board seat. 我認為，離開 Facebook 團隊和扎克，我認為他們明白這是多么重要，我認為這反映在董事會的席位上。 > And two years of wonderful conversations were over time I think they came together on the business and I think that\'s what allowed the two companies to come together. 經過兩年的精彩交談，我認為他們在生意上走到了一起，我認為這就是讓這兩家公司走到一起的原因。 > `[00:28:08]` We\'ve definitely seen it. `[00:28:08]` 我們肯定看到了。 > I see the people that make the most money from start ups are the ones where that is not even the you know number two number three goal. 我看到，那些從初創企業中賺得最多的人，就是那些你知道的第二、第三目標的人。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > You kind of have to not be shooting at it for it to really work out it\'s this crazy thing. 你不一定要向它開槍才能真正解決這件瘋狂的事情。 > So to wrap up to whatever you can talk about it what\'s what\'s sort of in the future for WhatsApp and what are you most excited to besides getting an phone. 所以，總結一下你可以談論的任何事情，WhatsApp 未來的發展趨勢，以及除了手機之外，你最興奮的是什么。 > `[00:28:29]` Oh yeah. `[00:28:29]` 哦，是的。 > `[00:28:32]` Our job is very sexy. 我們的工作很性感。 > We come into work and we just try to fix crashes and to make our protocol faster and more efficient on the wire and we just focus on little details like how can we make our applications start up faster. 我們開始工作，我們只是試圖修復崩潰，使我們的協議更快和更有效的線路，我們只關注一些小細節，例如，我們如何使我們的應用程序更快地啟動。 > How can we make our application more reliable. 如何使我們的應用更加可靠。 > How can we make sure that our cloud backup works or that we do the right thing when you switch phones or when you switch SIM cards there is a lot of kind of edge cases that we need to think about. 我們如何確保我們的云備份工作，或者我們做正確的事情，當您切換電話或當您切換 SIM 卡，有很多種邊緣情況，我們需要考慮。 > And we\'re we\'re we\'re far from getting it right. 我們還遠沒有把它做好。 > `[00:29:00]` And you know for us for us to get it right is a lot of hard work and that\'s what everybody is focused on. `[00:29:00]` 你知道，對我們來說，做好這件事是一件很辛苦的工作，這也是每個人都關注的問題。 > We still have a lot of work to do. 我們還有很多工作要做。 > All right. 好的 > Thank you so much for calling you. 非常感謝你打電話給你。 > Thank you. 謝謝。