# Ian Hogarth > `[00:00:03]` Now we\'re going to move on to the next speaker which is Ian Hogarth of Songkick. `[00:00:03]` 現在，我們要轉到下一位演講者，即 Songkick 的 Ian Hogarth。 > He\'s the co-founder and CEO Y Combinator funded Songkick in 2007 and a fun fact it\'s actually through Ian that I found out about Y Combinator all that time ago. 他是聯合創始人兼首席執行官 Y Combinator 在 2007 年資助了宋健，一個有趣的事實是，我在很久以前就發現了 Y Combinator，實際上是通過 Ian 發現的。 > So if you don\'t know Songkick is the simplest way to find out when your favorite artists are coming to town. 因此，如果你不知道，宋踢是最簡單的方式，以了解什么時候你最喜歡的藝術家來鎮上。 > And now the second most trafficked concert service in the world with over 10 million unique fans visiting every month. 現在是世界上第二大被販賣的音樂會服務，每個月都有超過 1000 萬的獨特歌迷來訪。 > So welcome in. 歡迎加入。 > `[00:00:47]` Co. `[00:00:47]` 公司 > So yeah I mean Hogarth. 所以我是說霍加思。 > And I\'m one of the two three cofounders of Songkick. 我是松克三位聯合創始人之一。 > So this is a Michelle and I\'m usually the one out talking there. 所以這是一個米歇爾，我通常是那個在外面說話的人。 > There they\'re even more responsible than I am for any of the stuff I\'m about to explain to you that we\'ve learned along the way. 在那里，他們比我對我要向你們解釋的任何事情都更負責任，我們在路上學到了這些東西。 > So we started in 2007 and we were in the summer 2007 y c batch. 所以我們從 2007 年開始，我們是在 2007 年夏天開始的。 > Yeah. 嗯 > The easiest way to find shows. 找到節目最簡單的方法。 > If you\'ve ever experienced the sort of frustration of finding out about a show you\'d like to have gone to the day after it happens. 如果你曾經經歷過這樣的挫折，因為你發現了一個節目，你會希望在它發生的第二天就去。 > That\'s the sort of the problem that Songkick is trying to solve. 這就是松克想要解決的問題。 > The average user who starts using Songkick goes to twice many concerns afterwards so it\'s all about making it easier to go to shows were backed by some great facies index and Secoya and I guess we sort of see there being three main music apps on your phone. 普通用戶開始使用松果舞之后會引起兩倍的關注，所以這一切都是為了讓你更容易去看節目，它得到了一些不錯的相索引和 Secoya 的支持，我想我們在你的手機上看到了三個主要的音樂應用程序。 > There\'ll be a on demand streaming app like Spotify a radio app like Pandora and a conscious app like Songkick. 將會有一個隨需應變的流媒體應用，比如 Spotify，一個像 Pandora 的廣播應用程序，還有一個有意識的應用程序，比如宋楚克。 > `[00:01:43]` And the average artist makes about 70 per cent of their income from touring so we hope we can be relevant to artists as well as fans. `[00:01:43]` 平均每個藝術家 70%的收入來自于巡回演出，所以我們希望我們能和藝術家以及歌迷們保持聯系。 > `[00:01:51]` So one thing that happens when you build the same company for seven years is you get to watch waves of startups succeed and fail around you and it kind of rewires your intuition about startups. `[00:01:51]` 當你創建同一家公司七年的時候，有一件事發生在你周圍，你可以看到一波又一波的創業成功和失敗，它在某種程度上重新連接了你對初創企業的直覺。 > And I guess I did like it too watching the first season of 24 after watching all eight seasons in a row. 我想我也很喜歡看 24 賽季的第一季，連續看了八個賽季。 > I remember being really terrified by this compact the song that launched when we we\'re just getting started and they grew to millions of users in a pretty short space of time and was being so scared like how that how are we ever going to do anything about that. 我記得當我們剛開始的時候，這首歌真的被這首歌嚇了一跳，他們在很短的時間內就增加到了數百萬的用戶，并且被嚇到了-我們該怎么做呢？ > And what happened though is over time the distribution platform that they built their product on kind of like moved underneath them and they disappeared. 然而，隨著時間的推移，他們建立起他們的產品的分銷平臺就像是在他們的下面移動，然后他們就消失了。 > And that really resets your sense of what to be scared by. 這真的會讓你重新意識到害怕什么。 > Similarly though you\'ll see startups that are kind of just seemed to have it all figured out and they become the talk of the town and you know that will really surprise you. 同樣地，你也會看到一些初創公司，它們似乎都已經解決了，它們成了全鎮的熱門話題，你知道這會讓你大吃一驚。 > You\'ll be like great. 你會很棒的。 > They\'re an awesome company and they get out you suddenly read about them having 100 million dollar valuation. 他們是一家很棒的公司，你突然讀到他們有 1 億美元的估值。 > What will surprise you is exponential value creation. 令你驚訝的是指數價值創造。 > So you know that starts up that was suddenly valued at a hundred dollars. 所以，你知道，在一開始的時候，它突然被估價為一百美元。 > The next year you read on tech crunch they\'re valued at a billion dollars and you\'re like whoa OK. 第二年，你讀到關于科技危機的文章時，他們的估值為 10 億美元，你會覺得哇哦，好吧。 > Well we\'ve got a really good year coming we\'re going really hard. 嗯，我們有一個非常好的一年即將到來，我們將非常努力。 > It\'s going to get better. 會好起來的。 > And then the next year they go from a billion dollars to ten billion dollars. 第二年，他們從 10 億美元增加到 100 億美元。 > And that just completely resets your sense of what is possible. 這就完全讓你重新意識到什么是可能的。 > I think some of the people have spoken today are perfect examples of that crazy exponential curve you can get into. 我認為今天有些人的發言是你可以進入的瘋狂指數曲線的完美例子。 > So to put this all in perspective if I go back to the summer of 2007 there were 22 companies in our way see batch a lot lot less than it is now. 因此，從整體上看，如果我回到 2007 年夏天，就會有 22 家公司擋著我們的路，看到的批數比現在要少得多。 > And I believe most most of the others ended up getting shot down or acquired for relatively small amounts of money. 我相信其他大多數人最終都會被擊落，或者用相對較少的錢買到。 > And when you see that play out it really makes you internalize how hard it is. 當你看到這場比賽的時候，它真的讓你內化了它有多難。 > And. 和 > You know I remember getting to Boston that summer and just being really intimidated by everybody I mean people were technically more brilliant than us. 你知道，我記得那年夏天我去了波士頓，被每個人嚇到了，我的意思是人們在技術上比我們更聰明。 > There were people who were way more charismatic and better at present their products and asks people with stronger product vision and pretty much everybody was more experienced at building Internet companies than we were. 有些人現在的產品更有魅力，更好，他們要求產品眼光更強的人，而且幾乎每個人在建立互聯網公司方面都比我們更有經驗。 > Michelle and I. 米歇爾和我。 > One of the startups in our batched I remember being intimidated by was discuss that. 我記得在我們分批的一家初創公司中，有一家被嚇到了，那就是討論這個問題。 > They\'re like an awesome pair of founders and it is plausible that Sonka can discuss may end up being 10 to 100 x more valuable. 他們就像一對了不起的創始人，桑卡可以討論的可能最終是價值的 10 到 100 倍。 > Than startups from our batch that were shut down or had an early exit which on the face of it seems like we know we must have figured some things out. 我們的批次中的初創企業被關閉或提前退出，表面上看，我們似乎知道我們一定已經解決了一些問題。 > There must be something to be learned from our path the marketetc. 我們必須從市場營銷的道路上學到一些東西。 > But the other company that really endured small batch is. 但另一家真正忍受小批量生產的公司是。 > Dropbox. Dropbox > Which is likely worth 100 x more than both of us at this point. 這很可能比我們兩個人都高出 100 倍。 > I\'m not all emotional about valuations of money it\'s impact and I do think the valuation is often a pretty good pretty good indicator of that. 我對貨幣的估值并不完全感情用事，它的影響，我確實認為估值通常是一個很好的指標。 > What\'s more remarkable still is that Drew and Arash are two of the most humble down to earth founders I know. 更值得注意的是，Drew 和 Arash 是我所認識的兩位最卑微的創始人。 > So kind of amazing. 真是太棒了。 > I think what\'s maybe more inspiring still is although Dropbox is an incredible company. 我認為，盡管 Dropbox 是一家令人難以置信的公司，但更鼓舞人心的仍然是。 > It\'s quite possible that one person in this room creates something that\'s 10x more valuable than Dropbox which is kind of nuts when you think about it. 很有可能，這個房間里的一個人創造的東西比 Dropbox 高出 10 倍，當你想到這件事時，你會覺得有點瘋狂。 > So I guess hopefully you take this all as a disclaimer for the advice that follows. 因此，我想，希望您把這一切作為對以下建議的免責聲明。 > If you really want to know the mysteries of the startup universe go talk to during a rush. 如果你真的想知道創業世界的奧秘，那就趕緊去談談吧。 > Also I\'m most interested in consumer stuff so most this advice applies to that so having a caveat that I probably have about 100 x less insights than most people who have spoken Startup School in the past. 另外，我對消費者的東西最感興趣，所以大部分的建議都適用于這一點，所以我有一個警告，我的洞察力可能比大多數過去說過創業學校的人少 100 倍。 > I thought about what I would like someone to explain to me in retrospect. 回想起來，我想找個人向我解釋一下。 > So first of all doing a music startup is a pretty good way to get beat down. 因此，首先，做一個音樂初創企業是一個很好的方式被擊敗。 > Secondly understand as much of the game as possible before you start to play it. 第二，在你開始玩游戲之前，盡可能多地了解它。 > And finally you know nurture your resilience so you don\'t give up. 最后，你知道要培養你的韌性，這樣你才不會放棄。 > So on online music. 在線音樂就是這樣。 > Being an excellent way to get beat up. 是個被揍的好方法。 > Here are some exceptional founders who have all to a greater and lesser extent taken a beating from following their passion into music starts up Dalton Caldwell who\'s spoken here before Sean Parker Jeff Ralston Dave Goldberg who\'s now the CEO of Survey Monkey David Pachmann is an amazing founder. 以下是一些杰出的創始人，他們在不同程度上都從追隨自己的激情進入音樂事業中受到了打擊，創立了道爾頓·考德威爾(Dalton Calwell)，他在肖恩·帕克(Sean Parker)、杰夫·拉斯頓(Jeff Ralston)、戴夫·戈德伯格(Dave Goldberg)之前在這里發言，他現在是“調查猴子” > Ali Partovi it some it seems to be a relatively well trodden path. 阿里帕托維，它有些，它似乎是一條相對較好的被踐踏的道路。 > And I was thinking about it on the cycle over here that the founders of the most successful business to come out of out of you know start a business come to Europe. 我在想，在這里的循環中，最成功的企業的創始人-你知道，創業-來到歐洲。 > Skype actually did two different music startups in Khazar and an audio. Skype 實際上在 Khazar 創建了兩家不同的音樂初創公司和一家音頻公司。 > So I then realized that Dalton had basically given that talk. 于是我意識到道爾頓基本上是說了這番話。 > So I\'m not going to rehash rehashes if I say you can find it on YouTube. 所以，如果我說你可以在 YouTube 上找到它，我就不會再重提它了。 > It\'s hilarious hilarious. 這太搞笑了。 > Listen what I will give you is a slightly more reductive take on building startups in entertainment related industries. 聽著，我要給你的是一個關于建立娛樂相關行業的初創公司的更簡單的做法。 > `[00:07:14]` Film TV arts music. `[00:07:14]` 電影電視藝術音樂。 > `[00:07:17]` So if you\'re going to build a startup in one of those domains. `[00:07:17]` 如果你要在其中一個域中創建一個啟動程序。 > Here is what I. 這里是我。 > Here\'s the advice I would give you and I have some advice for how this translates into other markets so first of all everybody thinks they\'re more into music film than they actually are. 這是我給你的建議，我有一些關于如何將它轉化到其他市場的建議，所以首先，每個人都認為他們對音樂電影的投入比實際情況要多。 > So there was a pretty fascinating study that Zillow puts out around the subprime crisis. 因此，在次貸危機期間，齊洛進行了一項非常引人入勝的研究。 > Where are they. 他們在哪。 > They surveyed homeowners and they asked them what was going to happen to the value of homes over the next six months. 他們調查了房主，并問他們在接下來的六個月里房屋價值會發生什么變化。 > And the majority of people said value of homes is going to go way down. 大多數人說，房屋的價值會大幅下降。 > And then they ask those same people. 然后他們問同樣的人。 > What do you think is going to happen the value of your home and everyone\'s like oh my home\'s going to stay the same or go up. 你認為你的家的價值會發生什么，每個人都會覺得，噢，我的家會保持原樣或者上升。 > And it\'s kind of the same I think with entertainment and I think it\'s part of the sort of like sort of blind spot the founder sometimes have with the space. 這和我對娛樂的看法是一樣的，我認為這也是創始人有時對空間的盲點的一部分。 > Actually most people aren\'t a much narrower set of kind of creative works than they realize. 實際上，大多數人并不比他們意識到的范圍更窄。 > And so a small number of creators drive most activity and revenue for these industries. 因此，少數創作者為這些行業提供了大部分活動和收入。 > Now the next interesting thing about these industries is ninety nine point nine 9 9 9 9 9 9 percent of creators end up struggling for a very long time without success. 現在，關于這些行業的下一個有趣的事情是，99 9 9 9%的創作者最終掙扎了很長一段時間，但沒有成功。 > And so when they do break out they\'re very happy to transfer rights for their work to somebody who is going to give them some financial stability whether it\'s a label or a concert promoter or a studio. 因此，當他們真的爆發的時候，他們非常樂意把他們的作品的權利轉讓給那些會給他們一些經濟穩定的人，不管他們是一家唱片公司，還是一家音樂會的發起人，還是一家錄音室。 > You know it might be tempting to sort of label that as selling out or something like that but having had friends who you know spent the last ten years sleeping on couches to try and make their their their career as an artist\'s work. 你知道，這可能是一種誘人的標簽，比如賣出去之類的東西，但你認識的朋友過去十年都睡在沙發上，嘗試著成為一名藝術家的作品。 > It\'s just about getting stable and paying off your debts. 這只是為了穩定和還清你的債務。 > And unlike tech where you can be a sick engineer builder starts up totally fails. 和技術不同的是，你可以成為一個生病的工程師，建筑商的啟動完全失敗。 > Go get a great job at Google. 去谷歌找份好工作吧。 > You know if you\'re a musician and your career doesn\'t succeed you can\'t just go and join Radiohead. 你知道，如果你是一名音樂家，而你的事業不能成功，你不能只是去加入電臺。 > So have to have that sympathy. 所以必須得到這種同情。 > So this transference of rights from the creators to these middlemen leads to a pretty small number of companies owning all the rights for these these these verticals. 因此，這種權利從創作者轉移到這些中間商，導致少數公司擁有這些垂直產品的所有權利。 > `[00:09:23]` So ironically as the entertainment industry lurches from one model to the next actually gets even more consolidated. `[00:09:23]` 具有諷刺意味的是，隨著娛樂業從一種模式走向另一種模式，它實際上得到了更大的整合。 > So for example you know music moving fromC.D to Empey 3s to streaming. 例如，你知道音樂從 C.D 到 Empey3s 到流媒體。 > Because the companies who represent the rights are like. 因為代表這些權利的公司就像。 > We\'re going to get killed if we don\'t consolidate further under the apartments of justiceetc. 如果我們不進一步合并到法院的公寓里，我們就會被殺。 > say okay you can merge. 說好你可以合并。 > So for example during the last ten years the world\'s largest record label was allowed to get even bigger by acquiring EMI. 例如，在過去的十年里，世界上最大的唱片公司被允許通過收購百代而變得更大。 > So Universal Music Group now represents 40 percent of the rights in the recorded music markets in value. 所以環球音樂集團現在唱片市場上占到了 40%的權利。 > Similarly you know and to a greater extent the world\'s largest concert promoter Live Nation was allowed to work merge with the world\'s largest ticket vendor. 同樣，你也知道，在更大程度上，世界上最大的演唱會發起人 LiveNation 被允許與世界上最大的門票供應商合并。 > So know it actually consolidation to me seems to be an increasing trend rather than a decreasing one. 所以我知道，事實上，鞏固對我來說似乎是一個越來越大的趨勢，而不是一個減少的趨勢。 > And you know don\'t don\'t sort of delude yourself that you know other creative verticals don\'t have rights. 你知道，不要自欺欺人，你知道其他創造性的垂直產品沒有權利。 > Typically there is some kind of rate structure whether it\'s similar to copyright whether it\'s in ticketing or merchandise or visual art or film. 通常存在某種費率結構，無論是與版權相似，還是在票務、商品、視覺藝術或電影中。 > So that level of rights consolidation means it\'s basically really really hard for a startup to transform the entertainment industry without you know buy in and support from those rights holders which basically means waiting till they\'re ready to embrace you and there\'s lots of different tactics for waiting things out but that in my opinion is one of the main reasons for the success of Spotify now versus the nightmare that Daughton went through. 因此，這種程度的權利整合意味著，初創企業要想在沒有你知道的情況下改變娛樂業是非常困難的，收購和支持這些權利持有者基本上意味著要等到他們準備好擁抱你時，才會有很多不同的策略來等待，但在我看來，這是 Spotify 現在成功的主要原因之一，而不是 Daughton 所經歷的噩夢。 > There is a caveat which is much larger technology companies can just do it a scale of leverage they have forced things force things to happen faster. 有一個警告，這是大得多的技術公司可以這樣做，一個規模的杠桿，他們強迫事情發生得更快。 > So Google saved YouTube like label annihilation and eight years later owns the largest free streaming music service on the planet or the way Apple created digital download markets and that\'s it. 因此，谷歌拯救了 YouTube，就像標簽毀滅一樣。八年后，谷歌擁有了全球最大的免費流媒體音樂服務，或者蘋果創造數字下載市場的方式，僅此而已。 > That\'s one caveat. 這是一個警告。 > So the biggest question you need to ask yourself. 所以你需要問自己的最大問題。 > You want to build a company in that same industry is why will the industry be willing to embrace you. 你想要在同一個行業建立一家公司，這就是為什么這個行業愿意擁抱你。 > How are you solving a problem for them. 你是如何為他們解決問題的。 > You need to understand their problems as well as you understand the consumer\'s problems so I guess if if PGE said kill Hollywood I would say help Hollywood grow Hollywood or fail. 你需要理解他們的問題，也要理解消費者的問題，所以我想如果 PGE 說殺了好萊塢，我會說是幫助好萊塢成長，還是失敗。 > So the broader point here which is hopefully useful if you\'re not thinking about doing an entertainment startup is that the level of consolidation in your industry massively changes how you build your startup. 因此，如果你不考慮做一家娛樂初創公司，那么更廣泛的觀點是，如果你不考慮做一家娛樂初創公司，那么你希望這是有用的，那就是你所在行業的整合程度會極大地改變你創建初創企業的方式。 > If it\'s highly consolidated you pretty much have to find a way of partnering with incumbency. 如果它是高度鞏固的，你幾乎必須找到一種與現任者合作的方式。 > If it\'s much more fragmented say vacation rentals or private hire there cause you know you\'re probably best off just going for stock and competing with the existing incumbents. 如果它更加零碎，比如度假租賃或私人租賃，因為你知道你最好還是去買股票，和現有的現任員工競爭。 > So I thought I thought you know one of the things that most I most admire about Patrick\'s done with stripe is the way that they worked with the banks rather than being like you know kill Bank of America or something. 所以我認為你知道我最欣賞帕特里克用條紋做的事情之一就是他們與銀行的合作方式，而不是像你所知道的殺死美國銀行之類的。 > So the second thing I want to share with you guys today is the importance of understanding the startup game before you try and play it. 所以，我今天想和大家分享的第二件事是，在你嘗試玩創業游戲之前，了解它的重要性。 > So this is another TV show The Wire a great a great moment when the game of chess is being explained. 這是另一檔電視節目“電線”，這是一個很棒的時刻，下棋的游戲正在被解釋。 > I don\'t think startups are particularly rational game to play. 我不認為初創公司是特別理性的游戲。 > If your if your goal is financial success particularly in consumer startups there is a level of randomness. 如果你的目標是財務上的成功，特別是在消費初創企業，那就有一定程度的隨機性。 > And so if you\'re someone who\'s good at building things you\'re probably going to make more money by going and joining one of the hit companies of our era. 因此，如果你是一個擅長制造東西的人，你很可能會通過加入我們這個時代最受歡迎的公司而賺更多的錢。 > Or you know for example I remember reading that the first hundred or multiple hundred employees at Facebook made more money from Facebook than the average success founder of a successful startup. 或者你知道，舉個例子，我記得我讀到，Facebook 的前 100 名或數百名員工從 Facebook 賺的錢比一家成功創業公司的創始人的平均收入還要多。 > Or finding a way to kind of be involved in multiple startups. 或者找到一種參與多家初創公司的方法。 > You know this is one way of doing that but there may be new structures emerge. 你知道，這是一種方法，但可能會出現新的結構。 > And you know just a cursory overview of portfolio theory will teach you that you know if the market has a high degree of randomness probably not a good thing to put all your eggs in one basket. 你知道，僅僅粗略地概述投資組合理論就會告訴你，如果市場具有高度的隨機性，那么把所有的雞蛋放在一個籃子里可能不是件好事。 > There\'s this brilliant sequel Matt Cohler who I think is sort of the perfect Bayesian agent here. 有一個精彩的續集馬特科勒，我認為他是一個完美的貝葉斯代理人在這里。 > He he joined linked in very early on moved to Facebook very early on and then became a top Asyut benchmark. 他很早就加入了社交網站，很早就搬到了 Facebook，然后成為了 Asyut 的頂級基準。 > So I think the main reason to try and build a startup is actually a pretty irrational one. 所以我認為嘗試創業的主要原因其實是一個相當不合理的原因。 > You\'re just really motivated to solve a problem a very specific problem and the satisfaction of building something to solve that problem it kind of justifies five to 10 years of of of stress and a good likelihood of failure. 你真的很有動力去解決一個問題，一個非常具體的問題，以及為解決這個問題而建立一些東西的滿足感-它有理由承受 5 到 10 年的壓力，并且很有可能失敗。 > A bunch of which will be kind of random and out of your control. 其中一堆會是隨機的，你無法控制。 > So if I haven\'t deterred you through that positive little positive message then here are the rules of the startup game as I see them. 因此，如果我沒有通過積極的、積極的信息來阻止你，那么下面就是我所看到的創業游戲的規則。 > So there are three engines that I think determine a startup success. 因此，我認為有三個引擎決定了創業的成功。 > This insight came to us about three years into Songkick life from this incredibly brilliant guy called Sean Ellis who is surprisingly not well known but I would track down his blog he\'s just incredibly insightful about what it takes to make something work. 這個洞察力來自于宋踢生活的三年左右，他來自一個名叫肖恩·埃利斯(SeanEllis)的非常聰明的家伙，他出奇地不為人所知，但我會追蹤他的博客，他對如何使某些事情奏效非常有洞察力。 > So if I define a a new variable unicorn that\'s. 所以如果我定義一個新的變量獨角獸\‘s。 > Your level of unicorn this will be roughly your gratification engine the power of your growth engine to the power of your economic engine and you become like a full unicorn Allah BMB Dropbox Google if you get all three right and every engine that fails will reduce your unicorn ness by an order of magnitude. 您的獨角獸水平，這將大致是您的滿足引擎，您的增長引擎的力量，你的經濟引擎的力量，你會變成一個完整的獨角獸真主 BMB Dropbox 谷歌，如果你得到所有三個正確和每一個引擎失敗將減少您的獨角獸一個數量級。 > So. 所以 > If we take the gratification engine that\'s been expressed a much less nerdy terms by Y Combinator as make something people want. 如果我們以滿足感引擎為例，YCombinator 用它來表達一個不那么書呆子的術語，作為人們想要的東西。 > In our case that was a pretty brutal experience. 在我們的例子中，這是一次相當殘酷的經歷。 > We launched Songkick by combining some scrapers for ticket sites with downloadable plugin for your for your Mac that would once you downloaded it scanned the excel file that contained information about what music you listen to and at the end of all of that you get a list of concerts in your area based on the music you listen to. 我們通過將一些票務站點的刮刀器和 Mac 的可下載插件結合起來，啟動了松踢，一旦你下載了它，就會掃描 Excel 文件，其中包含了你所聽的音樂的信息，在所有這些信息的最后，你會根據你所聽的音樂在你所在的地區獲得一張音樂會列表。 > And it was a pretty crappy first time use is a screenshot of early on the return on the kind of 5 minutes of your life that it took you to sign up and install the plugin. 這是一個相當糟糕的第一次使用是一個屏幕截圖，在你的生命的 5 分鐘的回報，它花了你注冊和安裝插件。 > Was this person has this stuff shows and some people were willing to do that and they liked it. 這個人有這樣的表演，有些人愿意這樣做，他們很喜歡。 > But the amount of friction involved was way too high for most regular people. 但對大多數普通人來說，摩擦的數量太高了。 > So for a long time you know you\'re kind of going around why isn\'t it working why more people using it. 所以很長一段時間，你都知道你在四處奔波，為什么它不起作用，為什么會有更多的人使用它。 > And we felt like the main reason people weren\'t kind of adopting our products in larger numbers was that it didn\'t do enough. 我們覺得人們不愿意大量使用我們的產品的主要原因是他們做得不夠。 > And we added a pretty massive array of additional features that resulted in very little additional usage. 我們還添加了大量的附加功能，結果很少有額外的使用。 > The turning point came when my co-founder Michelle inspired by Shawn that I started running these surveys. 當我的共同創始人米歇爾在肖恩的啟發下開始進行這些調查時，轉折點就來了。 > They really dug deep into why the users that loved our product loved it and why the ones who were kind of like Matt didn\'t find it. 他們深入研究了為什么喜歡我們的產品的用戶喜歡我們的產品，以及為什么那些像 Matt 一樣的人沒有找到它。 > Didn\'t find it very compelling and the bottom line was that our simple idea of personalized concert alerts and never missing a show was actually a very gratifying experience. 沒有發現它很有說服力，底線是，我們簡單的想法，個性化的音樂會提醒，從來沒有錯過一個節目，實際上是一個非常令人欣慰的經歷。 > Like people found shows they would never have gone to and they. 就像人們發現的那樣，他們永遠也不會去，他們。 > Had life changing experiences and we get we would get these e-mails that said oh my god I just went to four shows and there were some of the best nights I\'ve had this year. 如果我們經歷了改變生活的經歷，我們就會收到這樣的電子郵件：哦，天哪，我剛去看了四場演出，還有一些我今年過得最好的夜晚。 > Thank you. 謝謝。 > But too few users were getting to it and we just need to radically improve the you know how easy it was to get that gratified experience. 但是用戶太少了，我們只需要從根本上改進，你知道，獲得這種滿意的體驗是多么的容易。 > And that became easier when new streaming services emerged and API has emerged for mobile devices so you could get your taste faster. 隨著新的流媒體服務的出現和移動設備 API 的出現，這變得更容易了，這樣你就可以更快地嘗到你的口味了。 > And we also needed to have better underlying Consett data. 我們還需要有更好的基礎 Consett 數據。 > And that was a really big lesson for me. 這對我來說是很重要的一課。 > I think engineers startup people they cherish the idea of 80 20 or MVP but once you find something that works. 我認為工程師們在創業時很珍惜 80，20 或 MVP 的想法，但一旦你找到了有用的東西。 > The key is to do the 2080 where you do this grindingly incremental work that gets the last 20 percent of value but takes 80 percent of your time. 關鍵是完成 2080 年，在 2080 年中，您要做的是進行這一非常出色的增量工作，這將獲得最后 20%的價值，但需要您 80%的時間。 > And for us that I think that really ended up being around data getting more and more high quality timely comprehensive trusted Consett data which is you know relatively hard problem to solve so that we will become the trusted authority for a fan. 而對我們來說，我認為這真的是圍繞著數據，得到越來越多的高質量、及時、全面的可信 Consett 數據，這是你知道的比較難解決的問題，這樣我們才能成為一個粉絲的可信權威。 > And you know when you talk to users you\'d really feel it you know they\'d be they\'d they\'d suddenly realize your data hadn\'t you had like every small show in their city and the trust level would go up and they become more evangelical about the service or you know you wouldn\'t have those problems where someone said you know I was waiting for you to tell me this show was happening you didn\'t you fail me I\'m not using products ever again. 你知道，當你和用戶交談時，你會真的感覺到，他們會突然意識到你的數據沒有像他們城市里的每一個小節目那樣，信任程度會提高，他們會對服務更有信心，或者你知道如果有人說你在等你告訴我這個節目，你就不會有問題了。發生了你沒讓我失望我再也不使用產品了。 > So data. 所以數據。 > We were always told us commodity you don\'t bother with it. 我們總是被告知商品你不用費心。 > It turned out to actually be really the linchpin around around kind of solving this gratification engine. 它實際上是解決這個滿足感引擎的關鍵。 > So you know your gratification and you\'ll have many many levels of refinement that kind of compound on each other whether it\'s the messaging when someone\'s arrives at the site. 所以，你知道你的滿足感，你會有很多層次的精致，這種復合在對方身上，不管是當某人到達網站時的信息。 > The core experience the onboarding flows various different conversion rates and you should probably never stop trying to increase its. 核心經驗，入職流動，各種不同的轉換率，你可能永遠不應該停止嘗試增加它。 > The next engine is your growth engine how new users discover your products. 下一個引擎是你的增長引擎，新用戶如何發現你的產品。 > I guess the first big point here is that your growth engine has no chance of really starting unless you have a great gratifying experience. 我想這里的第一個要點是，除非你有一個令人欣慰的經歷，否則你的成長引擎就沒有機會真正開始了。 > And I\'ll talk about that more in a minute but I think there\'s sort of four main ways of driving substantial growth with consumer products. 我稍后會更多地討論這個問題，但我認為有四種主要的方式來推動消費品的大幅增長。 > Word of mouth or viral growth for example WhatsApp or Snapchat or. 口碑或病毒的增長，例如 WhatsApp 或 Snapchat 或。 > Kickstarter. 基克斯特。 > And typically you know one of the most compelling ways to do that is through building a communications app. 通常情況下，你知道最引人注目的方法之一是通過構建一個通信應用程序。 > Paid acquisition. 付費收購。 > So for example Groupon ambient being Zingo when you have a compelling economic model you don\'t should spend money to buy users or subsidize something about the experience that would normally pay for. 例如，Groupon 環境是 Zingo，當你有一個引人注目的經濟模式時，你就不應該花錢購買用戶，也不應該為那些通常需要付費的體驗提供補貼。 > A CEO. 首席執行官。 > So Yelp or Wikipedia or rap genius and then kind of API widget distribution. 所以 Yelp 或者 Wikipedia 或者 RAP 天才然后是 API 小部件發行版。 > So YouTube soundcloud Twitter. YouTube SoundCloud 推特。 > And these aren\'t mutually exclusive. 這些并不是互相排斥的。 > So for example Yelp has a killer mobile app and they get tons of word of mouth growth in addition to our. 舉個例子，Yelp 有一款極具殺傷力的移動應用程序，除了我們的應用程序外，他們還獲得了大量的口碑增長。 > Or you know you probably didn\'t think of it of ABM as a company that it grew through spending money because they\'ve done many other aspects of growth right. 或者你知道，你可能不認為 ABM 是一家通過花錢成長起來的公司，因為他們做了很多其他方面的增長。 > They\'ve got a killer killer product with word of mouth. 他們有一種口耳相傳的殺手產品。 > Word of mouth. 口碑。 > That allowed them to spend money on optimizing a referral program similar to what Dropbox did. 這使得他們可以花錢優化一個類似 Dropbox 的推薦程序。 > They did an amazing job of PR very early on and throughout most companies life. 在大多數公司生命的早期和整個過程中，他們都做了出色的公關工作。 > And they also did really creative stuff like. 他們也做了一些很有創意的事情。 > Like the Craigslist stuff that sort of become famous. 就像 Craigslist 之類的東西會出名。 > So it\'s not mutually exclusive for Songkick. 因此，這并不是互相排斥的宋踢。 > There were a bunch of different drivers of growth. 有許多不同的增長驅動因素。 > So the first big insight that really like I clicked was that there was no canonical page on the Internet for concert or for a tour similar to how there was a count on a whole page of restaurants and Yelp or Kanako page for a movie or director in MTV and you know when you build enough kind of value and in a compelling differentiated data to be the kind of Michael Page you get all these other beneficial effects kicking in. 所以，真正像我所點擊的第一個大洞察力是，在互聯網上沒有用于音樂會或巡演的規范頁面，就像在一整頁餐館和 Yelp 或 Kanako 頁面上為 MTV 中的電影或導演所做的統計一樣，你知道什么時候你建立了足夠的價值，在一個引人注目的差異化數據中，你知道就像邁克爾·佩奇，你會得到所有其他有益的效果。 > Whether it\'s Social referrals or ASIO or the industry linking to you or you know the ability to do distribution API partnerships and that core insights when we got it humming led to a lot of growth success. 無論是社交推薦，還是 ASIO，還是與你聯系的行業，或者你都知道做分發 API 伙伴關系的能力，以及當我們得到它時的核心洞察力，它帶來了巨大的增長成功。 > So you know we would do these partnerships. 所以你知道我們會合作的。 > But like Spotify and Soundcloud and Youtube we started to optimize our site so that Google could discover the content we had better. 但就像 Spotify、SoundCloud 和 YouTube 一樣，我們開始優化我們的網站，以便谷歌能夠發現我們更好的內容。 > We started to build products for artists so they could link to Songkick more easily. 我們開始為藝術家們制作產品，這樣他們就可以更容易地鏈接到松踢。 > The second big kind of growth factor came from mobile and word of mouth and you know in my opinion know the mobile app stores are reward a gratifying user experience more than any other distribution platform in history. 第二大增長因素來自手機和口碑，在我看來，手機應用商店比歷史上任何其他分銷平臺都更能獎勵用戶的滿意體驗。 > And so in that case really I think most the greatest came from making the product more useful easier to get into more more compelling. 因此，在這種情況下，我認為最偉大的是讓產品更有用，更容易進入更引人注目的領域。 > So we\'ve benefited from three of these channels not paid because we\'ve not had an economic model that would allow us to to spend money to acquire users. 因此，我們從三個沒有付費的渠道中受益，因為我們沒有一個經濟模式，可以讓我們花錢來獲取用戶。 > So finally the economic engine so that\'s how you make money from your users. 最后是經濟引擎，這就是你從用戶那里賺錢的方式。 > You may not become a sustainable company. 你可能不會成為一家可持續發展的公司。 > I can\'t say as much about that for us because it\'s still a work in progress and it\'s the reason one of the reasons we\'re not in the pantheon of unicorns yet. 我不能對我們說那么多，因為它還在進行中，這也是為什么我們還沒有進入獨角獸的萬神殿的原因之一。 > Initially we bootstrapped revenue by setting up these affiliate deals with ticketing companies so that when we found someone to show we\'d link to the ticketing company and they give us a small cut for the transaction we generated so kind of similar to kayak or TripAdvisor and that\'s taken us to a revenue run rate of millions of dollars but it won\'t take us to a revenue run rate of hundreds of millions of dollars. 最初，我們通過與票務公司建立附屬公司的交易來提升收入，這樣當我們找到人來展示我們與票務公司的鏈接時，他們會給我們一個與皮艇或 TripAdvisor 類似的交易的小部分，這會讓我們獲得數百萬美元的收入運營率，但這不會給我們帶來數億美元的收入運營率。 > And I think it\'s always been a you know it\'s always been clear what the kind of the optimal revenue model for us would be which is just you know you discover the show and you buy the ticket at the same time from us. 我認為它一直是一個，你知道的，它一直是清楚的，什么樣的最佳收入模式，對我們來說，就是你知道你發現了節目，你同時從我們購買門票。 > But that requires on us being at a scalable to access inventory which going back to what I was saying earlier about supply side consolidation and need to partner with the industry that requires finding economic alignment with the people who currently hold the rights. 但這要求我們有一個可伸縮的庫存，這可以追溯到我早些時候所說的供應側整合，并需要與行業合作，這需要找到與目前擁有這些權利的人在經濟上的一致。 > So it\'s a work in progress but it\'s quite exciting in London and we actually have 25 percent of all the contests in London you can now buy tickets to in a few taps through your Songkick. 這是一項正在進行中的工作，但在倫敦是相當令人興奮的，我們實際上有 25%的比賽在倫敦，你現在可以買到門票，在幾個水龍頭，通過你的歌踢。 > So we\'re you know it\'s quite exciting watching that develop for us. 所以，你知道，對我們來說，觀看這些節目是非常令人興奮的。 > Finally there\'s the team that you build and retain to solve all these problems. 最后，你需要建立和保留一個團隊來解決所有這些問題。 > This is our team pushing a bus up a hill when it broke down on the way to a festival which is probably a reasonable method metaphor for a kind of startup life. 這是我們的團隊推著一輛公共汽車上山，當它在去節日的路上拋錨了，這可能是一種合理的方法來比喻一種創業生活。 > So each of these things I just talked about gratification growth revenue and team they are all dependent on each other. 所以，我剛才提到的每一件事，包括滿足、增長、收入和團隊，都是相互依賴的。 > So if I just pressed it mathematically I\'ve got this unicorn this is gratification the power of growth the power revenue. 所以，如果我按一下數學，我就得到了這只獨角獸，這就是滿足，增長的力量，力量的收入。 > Gratification is dependent on your team your economic engine and your growth because you need an amazing team to build a world class product and you need you need revenue to sustainably pay for those people salaries. 滿足感取決于你的團隊，你的經濟引擎和你的增長，因為你需要一個驚人的團隊來建立一個世界級的產品，你需要收入來持續支付這些人的工資。 > And in many case having an economic model actually allows you to provide more value to your users. 在很多情況下，擁有一個經濟模型實際上可以讓你為你的用戶提供更多的價值。 > And finally you know some products get better with more people using them so you may actually need growth to better offer a compelling experience. 最后，你知道一些產品會隨著更多的人使用而變得更好，所以你可能實際上需要增長才能提供更好的體驗。 > So social networks marketplacesetc. 所以社交網絡、市場等等。 > So the gratification end depends on your team. 所以滿足感取決于你的團隊。 > The other two engines you know the next thing growth that is actually also dependent on other stuff. 另外兩個引擎，你知道，接下來的事情，增長，實際上也依賴于其他東西。 > So your ability to recruit a growth team obviously is a big factor. 因此，你招募一支成長團隊的能力顯然是一個重要因素。 > If you have a revenue engine and economic engine you are able to access from the most powerful source of growth which is going to pay for users and a key point to make here is it\'s a lot easier to grow by spending money than not spending money. 如果你有一個收入引擎和經濟引擎，你就可以從最強大的增長來源獲取，這將為用戶支付費用。這里要做的一個關鍵點是，花錢比不花錢增長容易得多。 > And if you want a simple example of that just think about the number of world class highly effective SBO people out there in the world compared the number of people who can set up an Adwords account or buy ads on Facebook. 如果你想要一個簡單的例子，那就想想世界上最有效率的 SBO 用戶數量，比較一下可以在 Facebook 上建立 Adword 賬戶或購買廣告的人數。 > Most importantly if you don\'t have a great product you won\'t get the most powerful and fundamental driver word of mouth and you won\'t build all the positive stuff that happens when that\'s working. 最重要的是，如果你沒有一個偉大的產品，你將不會得到最強大和最基本的口碑，你也不會建立起所有積極的東西，當它起作用時。 > So I mean just as an example of how these things are interconnected we have this with this partnership with YouTube that was very meaningful to us early on and we were on every single video page on YouTube within a few years of Songkick life and that didn\'t come about because of some like epic biz dev Interac and from bases or hustling our way there it came about because a product manager at YouTube was using Songkick and thought it was awesome and emailed support you know support email to say you know can we do a partnership can we do something here. 所以我的意思是，就像這些東西是如何相互關聯的一個例子，我們和 YouTube 的這種合作關系很早就對我們很有意義，我們在宋詩生命的幾年內出現在 youtube 上的每一個視頻頁面上，而這并不是因為一些史詩般的 biz dev Interac，從基地或者從我們的基地來的。因為 Youtube 的一位產品經理正在使用松踢，認為這很棒，并通過電子郵件提供支持，你知道，支持電子郵件，說你知道我們能不能合作，我們可以在這里做點什么。 > So they\'re very interconnected and you know you have to get all the right all the bits to work to get one of the bits to work. 所以它們是非常相互關聯的，你知道，你必須得到所有正確的，所有的位元，讓其中的一個位元工作。 > And you finally you know the caliber of the team that you can recruit and retain is hugely dependent on how big a problem you\'re solving and how much your team kind of feel like they\'re building something awesome. 你終于知道，你能招募和留住的團隊的能力在很大程度上取決于你解決的問題有多大，以及你的團隊有多大感覺他們在建設一些很棒的東西。 > And there are some kind of funny paradoxes in the startup world. 在創業世界里也有一些有趣的悖論。 > For example you know the most sophisticated best species who are most in demand are actually sometimes the best people to go to if you want to fund a really crazy hard hard hard idea. 例如，你知道最復雜的、最受歡迎的物種，如果你想為一個瘋狂的、艱難的想法提供資金的話，有時也是最好的人。 > And that\'s because they may have more confidence from all the success they\'ve had to be more contrarian rather just following the herd of what whatever one all seems to be jumping on. 這是因為他們可能從所有的成功中獲得了更多的信心，他們不得不更加逆向，而只是跟隨一群似乎都在跳躍的東西。 > And similarly it seems to be the case that if you\'re you\'re more likely to get really amazing people to want to work on something that\'s a hard problem. 類似地，如果你更有可能得到真正令人驚嘆的人，那么你就會想要解決一些棘手的問題。 > That\'s not a trivial thing to solve. 這不是一件小事。 > But great people also want career growth. 但偉人也想要職業發展。 > And if you don\'t grow fast enough it will be tough to continue to give them enough career opportunities. 如果你成長不夠快，就很難繼續給他們足夠的職業機會。 > And then finally you know at some point you know if you want to sustainably grow your team you need a great economic engine to do that. 最后，你知道，在某個時候，你知道，如果你想要持續發展你的團隊，你需要一個強大的經濟引擎來做到這一點。 > So the team again depends on you know these other three things make a similar bunch of arguments about why the economic engine is dependent on the others. 所以團隊再一次依賴于你知道的其他三件事，對于為什么經濟引擎依賴于其他因素，會產生類似的爭論。 > But hopefully you get my point. 但希望你明白我的意思。 > So Unicorn\'s is gratification the power growth the power of economic gratifications depends on everything growth everything. 所以，獨角獸就是滿足，動力增長，經濟滿足的力量，一切都取決于增長。 > Teams do everything economics and everythinga.k.a. 團隊做一切經濟和一切事情。 > everything is connected and you\'re watching the first season of True Detective. 一切都是有關聯的，你在看“真探”的第一季。 > I\'ve labeled this point and hopefully not bored you to tears because to me it seems like one of the most important things to understand about the game. 我已經給這一點貼上了標簽，希望你不會無聊到流淚，因為對我來說，這似乎是理解這場比賽最重要的事情之一。 > Of startups is it\'s all connected and you get all these key pieces working in concert to build an exceptional business. 對于初創企業來說，這一切都是相互關聯的，而這些關鍵部分都是為了建立一個特殊的企業而協同工作的。 > And the earlier you figure out the whole system the earlier you get on the path to building the next Dropbox. 你越早計算出整個系統，你就越早走上構建下一個 Dropbox 的道路。 > I was just browsing adorers linked in what I was I was waiting to talk. 我只是在瀏覽那些連接在我等著說的東西上的裝飾品。 > And you know she has a computer science degree and experience making products that people like. 你知道她有計算機科學學位和制作人們喜歡的產品的經驗。 > She also worked. 她也工作過。 > She works at slide on all that growth stuff and she seems like she did some sort of master\'s in economics so you know all three engines there\'s there\'s an element of insight there that allows you to jump faster to something that really works holistically. 她在幻燈片上學習那些增長的東西，她好像學過經濟學碩士，所以你知道，這三個引擎都有一種洞察力，可以讓你更快地跳到真正有效的東西上。 > So again the earlier you figure out all three of these things the faster you get on the path of being the next Dropbox or BMB or Google. 因此，你越早弄清楚這三個問題，你就越快走上下一個 Dropbox、BMB 或 Google 的道路。 > So. 所以 > The last thing I want to talk about is that all of this takes time and is very hard and you can\'t give up. 我最不想談的是，所有這些都需要時間，而且非常困難，你不能放棄。 > And that\'s you know that\'s that\'s that\'s I think fairly commonly given advice in startup land. 這是你知道的\我認為在初創公司的土地上通常會給出建議。 > So I wanted to give you a few things to take away about how to develop your resilience and how to keep going. 所以我想給你們一些關于如何發展你的韌性和如何繼續前進的東西。 > The first thing is it usually does get better if you keep going. 第一件事是，如果你繼續走下去，它通常會變得更好。 > I remember the bleakest point in Songkick life was around December 2010 and nothing felt like it was working. 我記得，2010 年 12 月左右，松踢生活中最慘淡的一點是，沒有什么能讓人感覺到它在起作用。 > We went into Christmas with this brutal board meeting we agreed to try a bunch of new things new year. 在這個殘酷的董事會會議上，我們進入了圣誕節，我們同意在新年里嘗試一些新的東西。 > And I remember just being like so miserable that whole Christmas and that was what it was. 我記得就像整個圣誕節那樣悲慘，這就是我的感受。 > You know that\'s that\'s what graph looked like at that point in time. 你知道在那個時候圖是什么樣子的。 > You know we had some growth but we built these new features. 你知道，我們有了一些發展，但我們建立了這些新功能。 > Nothing happened. 什么都沒發生。 > No one really cared about them it didn\'t really improve things and it was just really bleak outcome and how much cash we had but it wasn\'t a ton. 沒有人真正關心他們，這并沒有真正改善事情，只是結果很糟糕，我們有多少現金，但這并不是一噸。 > And then when things get hard I try to go back and look at our growth graph and I remember that that was the point that it felt that Bahjat just before a lot of things started to work. 當事情變得艱難的時候，我試著回去看看我們的成長圖，我記得這就是在很多事情開始起作用之前，巴哈伊的感覺。 > And now you know we have 10 million people using us and the graph looks a lot better. 現在你知道，我們有 1000 萬人在使用我們，這個圖表看起來好多了。 > So it usually does get better if you keep moving and a founder of a startup of a great company told me once you know survival is a growth strategy. 所以，如果你繼續前進的話，它通常會變得更好。一家偉大公司的創始人告訴我，一旦你知道生存是一種增長策略，它就會變得更好。 > And his was like a platform that essentially grown when everybody else gave up he just kept getting all of their users and gradually got to this crazy crazy crazy size. 他的平臺就像一個平臺，當其他人放棄的時候，這個平臺基本上在成長，他只是不斷地吸引他們所有的用戶，并逐漸達到這個瘋狂的規模。 > But I think the best thing about surviving is you get to see new platform shifts and changes in the market more broadly. 但我認為，生存的最好之處在于，你可以看到新的平臺發生變化，市場也發生了更廣泛的變化。 > So for example we\'ve experienced the shift from desktop to mobile and that\'s been a really really positive for song thing for Songkick for lots of reasons and everyone likes to talk about how new startups get built when new platforms emerge. 例如，我們經歷了從桌面到移動的轉變，這對歌曲來說是非常積極的，原因很多，每個人都喜歡談論新的創業公司是如何在新平臺出現的時候建立起來的。 > So for example Uber getting built on the back of Mobile. 比如，優步就建立在手機的背上。 > But things that are already working can also suddenly work a lot better. 但是那些已經在起作用的東西也會突然變得更好。 > So Shazam and Pandora were companies that were 8 and 7 years old at the time that the iPhone launched and at that point in time I think they\'ve kind of been great but not spectacular breakouts. 所以 Shazam 和 Pandora 公司在 iPhone 發布的時候已經有 8 到 7 年的歷史了，在那個時候，我認為這兩家公司取得了不錯的突破，但并不是驚人的突破。 > And the iPhone changed out. 然后 iPhone 就變了。 > I mean I remember hearing from the Pandora guys that the iPhone doubled their growth overnight. 我是說，我記得從潘多拉一家那里聽說，iPhone 在一夜之間增長了一倍。 > So platforms shift sort of expand the sets of startup visions that can finally be fully realized. 因此，平臺的轉變擴大了一些最終可以完全實現的創業愿景。 > So just let that be another reason to sort of push through the hard times that the environment may get better. 因此，讓這成為另一個理由來推動環境改善的艱難時期。 > Another thing I would recommend doing is trying to articulate why you believe you are doing important work and I think a good way to do that is to sort of do a five wise analysis on your motivations until you get to the root cause. 我建議你做的另一件事是試圖闡明為什么你認為自己在做重要的工作，我認為一個好的方法就是對你的動機進行五種明智的分析，直到找到根本原因。 > Michelle Pete and I did that a few years back and wrote them down and they got to refer to when when things get hard. 米歇爾·皮特和我在幾年前就這樣做了，并把他們寫下來，當事情變得艱難時，他們不得不提到。 > So the whys for us were we believe that live music can change your life. 所以我們的理由是我們相信現場音樂可以改變你的生活。 > And we believe that at its best live music is this pure intimate experience between you and an artist and we believe that\'s what that\'s what music is all about. 我們相信，在它最好的現場音樂是你和一個藝術家之間這種純粹的親密體驗，我們相信這就是音樂的意義所在。 > And we want everyone to have that experience and at present seeing live music is to nation experience because it\'s inaccessible because it takes so much effort. 我們希望每個人都有這樣的體驗，而目前，看現場音樂對國家來說是一種體驗，因為它是無法獲得的，因為它需要付出很大的努力。 > And we believe that fails artists and fans and it\'s happened because the industry has lost sight of what\'s most important which is that intimacy and connection between the two of them. 我們認為，藝術家和歌迷都失敗了，這是因為這個行業已經忽略了最重要的是他們之間的親密和聯系。 > So we don\'t accept that we\'ll create a better future for live music where the online experience will be true to that feeling of being there. 因此，我們不能接受，我們將為現場音樂創造一個更美好的未來，在那里，在線體驗將是真實存在的感覺。 > So when you when you\'re low if you write that down when you\'re feeling good you\'ll have something to refer back to that will kind of remind you of like the fact that this isn\'t about you know whether you\'re kind of the next cool company on tech crunch or whatever else. 所以當你情緒低落的時候，如果你在感覺良好的時候把它寫下來，你會想起一些東西，這會讓你想起這樣一個事實：這不是關于你的，你知道你是下一個科技危機中的酷公司還是其他什么。 > It\'s it\'s about the fact that you really earnestly want to solve a problem. 它是關于一個事實，你真的很想解決一個問題。 > When you\'re really low. 當你真的很低的時候。 > Spend some time with your users the happy ones will remind you of why you\'re doing it. 花點時間和你的用戶在一起-快樂的用戶會提醒你為什么要這么做。 > And the unhappy disengaged ones will sort of transform this sense of abstract impending doom into this more practical feeling of there\'s something to fix. 而那些不快樂、不投入的人會把這種抽象的、即將到來的厄運轉變成一種更實際的感覺，即有一些事情需要解決。 > And our product team actually ended up knocking a wall in one of our in our in our meeting room and creating a makeshift User user research lab that helps to set a regular tempo for getting users in and having your whole team watch the experience they have with your product. 我們的產品團隊最終在我們的會議室里敲了一堵墻，創建了一個臨時的用戶研究實驗室，這個實驗室可以幫助你設定一個固定的用戶進入速度，讓你的整個團隊來觀察他們對你的產品的體驗。 > As individuals not in kind of an aggregate Google Analytics Ziwei. 作為個人，而不是在某種程度上，谷歌分析，紫薇。 > Finally start your company with people you can count on when shit\'s going sideways. 最后，和你可以指望的人一起開始你的公司。 > I think it\'s really hard to know that about someone without a real foundation of friendship. 我覺得很難知道一個沒有真正友誼基礎的人。 > So I thoroughly endorse. 所以我完全贊同。 > Why is this thing about building on top of a longstanding and trusted relationship. 為什么這是建立在長期和信任的關系之上的事情。 > I\'ve been incredibly lucky to have two amazing cofounders Michelle and Pete and an amazing team of people many of whom have been here right from the start and I think you know I can\'t really imagine how you would get through some of the hard times without those relationships. 我非常幸運有兩位出色的聯合創始人米歇爾和皮特，以及一組非常棒的團隊，他們中的許多人從一開始就在這里，我想你知道我無法想象沒有這些關系你會如何度過一些艱難的時期。 > So in summary if you\'re going to do a startup in the entertainment industry or any highly consolidated industry you\'ll probably need to work with the industry more than you realize. 總之，如果你想在娛樂業或任何高度整合的行業中創業，你可能需要更多地與這個行業合作，而不是你所意識到的那樣。 > So get started early on. 所以早點開始吧。 > Understand as much of the game and what drives success. 了解游戲的大部分內容，以及是什么推動了成功。 > Before you start building. 在你開始建房子之前。 > And find ways to nurture your resilience because keeping going is usually the right answer. 想辦法培養你的韌性，因為堅持下去通常是正確的答案。 > Thanks. 謝謝 > Applause. 掌聲。