# Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014 > `[00:00:00]` Hi everyone. `[00:00:00]` 大家好。 > Good afternoon. 下午好 > My name\'s Aaron Harris. 我叫亞倫？哈里斯。 > I\'m a partner at Y Combinator and before I was a partner at Y C I founded a company called tutor\'s spree that went through Y Combinator in the winter of 2011 and today it\'s my honor to introduce someone who doesn\'t really need very much of an introduction but I\'ll do it anyway. 我是 Y Combinator 的合伙人，在我成為 YC 的合伙人之前，我創建了一家名為“家庭教師狂潮”的公司，在 2011 年冬天經歷了 YCombinator。今天，我很榮幸地介紹一位不太需要介紹的人，但我還是會這么做的。 > Fred Wilson has been investing in technology for close to 30 years and in that time he\'s founded two separate DC firms the first one flat iron partners was founded in 2000 in 1996 and the second Union Square Ventures was founded in 2004. 弗雷德·威爾遜(FredWilson)近 30 年來一直投資于技術領域，在此期間，他成立了兩家獨立的直流電公司，第一家平板鋼鐵合作伙伴成立于 2000 年，第二家聯合廣場創業公司(Second Union Square Ventures)成立于 2004 年。 > Without a doubt Fred is one of the best known investors on the East Coast and he\'s one of the premier consumer technology investors in the world. 毫無疑問，弗雷德是東海岸最知名的投資者之一，也是世界上主要的消費技術投資者之一。 > He\'s also created through his blog AVC a lively community which is home to wide ranging discussions about finance technology government and his taste in music. 他還通過自己的博客 AVC 創建了一個活躍的社區，圍繞金融、科技、政府以及他對音樂的品味展開了廣泛的討論。 > You all join me in welcoming Fred Wilson. 你們跟我一起歡迎弗雷德·威爾遜。 > `[00:01:09]` So that was obviously eye right. `[00:01:09]` 那顯然是右眼。 > I think so. 我也這么想。 > So that was a great talk by Shannah. 這是 Shannah 的一次很棒的演講。 > You know what I love about Shana. 你知道我喜歡 Shana 的什么嗎。 > She has opinions and she\'s not afraid to share them. 她有自己的觀點，她不怕與人分享。 > And that\'s what makes great investors. 這就是偉大投資者的原因。 > I think investors need conviction and she\'s got conviction. 我認為投資者需要信心，她也有信心。 > `[00:01:26]` What would seem like if you were waffling on each of your investment decisions you\'d never really reach anything. `[00:01:26]` 如果你在每一個投資決策上喋喋不休，你就什么都不會真正達成。 > `[00:01:31]` There\'s a lot of people in the venture business who hedge and follow and you know try to figure out what the hot thing is and don\'t have like a like a you know kind of their own opinions. `[00:01:31]` 許多從事風險投資的人都在對沖和跟蹤，你知道，試著找出什么是最熱門的東西，而不是像你知道的那樣，他們有自己的觀點。 > I don\'t buy I don\'t agree with I probably don\'t agree with half of what Shannah said. 我不買，我不同意，我可能不同意尚納所說的一半。 > But like we argue about these things but I appreciate that. 但就像我們為這些事情爭吵但我很感激。 > Like she\'s probably write a bunch of places where I\'m wrong. 好像她寫了一大堆我錯的地方。 > I might be right in a few places where she\'s wrong but that\'s okay. 我可能是對的，在一些地方，她錯了，但沒關系。 > That\'s why I think investors need to have that. 這就是為什么我認為投資者需要這樣做。 > And entrepreneurs sometimes get annoyed because they walk into a meeting and they\'re meeting with you and they\'re like chicest just not buying this at all you know. 企業家有時會生氣，因為他們走進一個會議，和你見面，他們就像最聰明的人，只是你知道，他們根本不買這個。 > But you know better than I think pitching to someone who is just like you know next to nothing and they are pretty awful. 但是你比我想象的更清楚，向一個你幾乎一無所知的人投球，他們是相當糟糕的。 > `[00:02:17]` You know it\'s interesting I guess if all the investors agreed with each other prices would rise infinitely and no deals would actually get done. `[00:02:17]` 你知道這很有趣，我想如果所有的投資者都同意對方的價格會無止境地上漲，而沒有真正的交易完成。 > At the end of the day know sitting in the room with an investor with someone who comes to you with a patch you know what\'s going to make you decide that you believe in what they\'re doing versus saying you know it this isn\'t really going to work. 一天結束時，你要知道，和一個投資者坐在房間里，和一個帶著補丁來找你的人在一起，你知道這會讓你決定你相信他們在做什么，而不是說你知道，這不太管用。 > What are you looking for. 你找什么呢? > `[00:02:36]` Well we have opinions. `[00:02:36]` 我們有意見。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > So it sort of goes back to what you\'re saying much it we have certain opinions about what\'s interesting to us so we come into the meeting with a preconceived notion about what we\'re looking for. 所以它可以追溯到你說的很多，我們對我們感興趣的東西有一定的看法，所以我們進入會議時，對我們要尋找的東西有一個先入為主的概念。 > What\'s exciting to us what\'s not exciting to us. 什么對我們來說是令人興奮的，什么對我們來說是不令人興奮的。 > So part of it is is just that that entrepreneur is connecting to some preconceived notion that we already have. 因此，部分原因在于企業家正與我們已有的一些先入為主的觀念聯系在一起。 > I mean I remember back when Brad and I were raising the first USV funded 2003. 我是說，我還記得我和布拉德在 2003 年籌集第一個 USV 的時候。 > He said to me why isn\'t there a Google for jobs instead of having to go to Hot Jobs or Craigslist or monster like why can\'t you just go to someplace and search and just have every job posting on the entire internet like filtered for you. 他對我說，為什么沒有谷歌來招聘工作，而不是去“熱門喬布斯”、“Craigslist”或者其他怪物-為什么你不能去某個地方搜索-就像過濾掉你在整個互聯網上發布的每一份工作一樣。 > `[00:03:21]` And I was like a good idea. `[00:03:21]` 我是個好主意。 > `[00:03:23]` And then and then one day I was with my friend John motel\'s blog and he he mentioned this company had launched called indeed and I was like Brad that\'s the thing you\'ve been looking for. `[00:03:23]` 然后有一天，我和我的朋友約翰·莫特的博客在一起，他提到這家公司發起了真正的呼叫，而我就像布拉德，那就是你一直在尋找的東西。 > And we called them up we\'re like let us invest. 我們打電話給他們，我們就像讓我們投資一樣。 > Though no one talked to these CEOs to call on them keep calling them and eventually you know at five times the valuation that we originally thought we were going to pay we did get to invest. 雖然沒有人和這些首席執行官談過，請他們繼續打電話給他們，但最終你知道，我們原本以為我們要支付的估值是原來的 5 倍，但我們確實得到了投資。 > `[00:03:47]` So that\'s interesting. `[00:03:47]` 那很有趣。 > I mean that\'s that\'s an example of a specific idea you had in mind a specific company that you want to see for. 我的意思是，這是一個你想要看到的特定公司的一個具體想法的例子。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Is that typical of how you make investments or is it more thematic. 這是典型的投資方式還是更有主題性。 > `[00:03:57]` No that\'s rare. `[00:03:57]` 不，那很少見。 > Like we\'re entrepreneurs the ones who generally come up with the great ideas and we react to them. 就像我們是企業家，通常會想出偉大的想法，并對他們做出反應。 > So it\'s generally more sort of thematic. 所以它一般都是主題性的。 > That we just have certain ideas about what\'s coming and given that that\'s coming. 我們只是對將要發生的事情有明確的想法，并且考慮到這一點即將到來。 > This should happen and boy so we should look for that thing. 這是應該發生的，孩子，所以我們應該尋找那東西。 > And sometimes these ideas are sort of half baked and not fully formed and then an entrepreneur comes in and you\'re like yeah yeah that\'s what it was thinking about but they\'ve kind of crystallized it way more because they obviously thought way more about like when you\'re when you\'re building a company you\'re doing one thing like you become obsessed about that one thing and you get really deep into it and you generally understand that opportunity better than an investor will. 有時候，這些想法是半生不熟的，沒有完全形成，然后一個企業家出現了，你就像它在想的那樣，但它們更多地結晶了它，因為很明顯，當你創建一家公司的時候，你會做一件事，你會對這件事很著迷，而你會變得很深。這樣你就能更好地理解這個機會，而不是投資者的意愿。 > `[00:04:50]` So this is actually something pretty interesting that you\'re touching on which is something we talk about a lot. `[00:04:50]` 事實上，這是一件非常有趣的事情，你正在談論它，這是我們經常談論的事情。 > When we look at applications which is the ability of the founder to communicate his ideas or her ideas clearly and well it\'s so critical because there are a lot of people who probably have thought about these things very deeply. 當我們研究應用程序時，即創始人能夠清晰、良好地交流他或她的想法，這是非常關鍵的，因為很多人可能已經非常深刻地思考過這些事情。 > What do you think it is that that drives certain people to be able to communicate that. 你認為是什么驅使某些人能夠溝通。 > Or what do you react to in terms of that communication and that clarity that that stands out. 或者，你對這種溝通和清晰性的反應是什么？ > Well you know this is. 你知道這是。 > `[00:05:18]` I think this is true of a lot of investors. `[00:05:18]` 我認為很多投資者都是這樣的。 > I like it when somebody can explain something very crisply and very simply and so in they and they get you to the sort of nugget of what they\'re doing right away. 我喜歡有人能非常簡潔地解釋一些事情，所以他們會讓你了解他們現在正在做的事情。 > I mean not not by rushing into it by but by just kind of simplifying it and making it easy to understand. 我的意思是，不是倉促地去做，而是把它簡化一下，讓它更容易理解。 > And I think that some people are born with that gift. 我認為有些人天生就有這種天賦。 > `[00:05:51]` Other people I think can develop it. `[00:05:51]` 我認為其他人可以發展它。 > I have worked on that myself over the years and I\'ve found that I\'ve gotten better and better and better at that and I do that a lot of times for our portfolio companies when it\'s the next round or maybe the decided they want to sell and so we get involved in helping them do that. 這些年來，我一直在做這方面的工作，我發現我在這方面做得越來越好了，我經常為我們的投資組合公司做這件事，而這是下一輪的時候，或者是他們決定出售的時候，所以我們參與了幫助他們做到這一點。 > And I have found that I\'ve gotten good at. 我發現我很擅長。 > `[00:06:13]` Positioning the opportunity quickly in a way that\'s very hopefully attractive to the person on the other end of the phone or whatever. `[00:06:13]` 快速定位機會的方式非常有希望對電話另一端的人有吸引力。 > But that\'s that\'s really really important skill is to be able to explain what you\'re doing. 但真正重要的技能是能夠解釋你在做什么。 > And I think without buzz words. 我認為沒有空話。 > Because it\'s so easy to fall back on buzz words or three letter acronyms CRM or something like that and people\'s eyes tend to glaze over. 因為它很容易回到熱門詞或三個字母縮寫，客戶關系管理或類似的東西，人們的眼睛往往呆滯。 > I think it\'s it\'s another temptation. 我認為這是另一種誘惑。 > People have sometimes is to say I\'m the x for x you know I\'m you know ETSI for electronics or I\'m uber for helicopters or whatever. 人們有時會說，我是 x 的 x，你知道我是電子設備的 ETSI，或者直升機的 ETSI。 > And and you know that\'s a really good in some ways a really great technique. 從某些方面來說，這是一種非常好的技術，一種非常棒的技術。 > But it also sometimes trivializes what you\'re doing. 但有時它也會使你所做的事情變得瑣碎。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > So but but I think being able to communicate crisply and clearly is really important. 所以，我認為能夠清晰、清晰地交流是非常重要的。 > `[00:07:09]` It\'s interesting that you mention the vest for that thing. `[00:07:09]` 你提到那件事的背心很有趣。 > When we when we applied to Y Combinator was judiciary we pitched ourselves as the Air B and B for tutor\'s. 當我們申請 YCombinator 是司法機構時，我們把自己定位為 B 級和 B 級導師。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And part of the reason we did that was it allowed us to pack a lot of information into a very short sentence. 我們這么做的部分原因是它允許我們把很多信息打包成一個很短的句子。 > Turns out we were totally wrong. 結果我們完全錯了。 > We were not the urban bee for tutor\'s it was it was not the right way to look at the business. 我們不是家庭教師的城市蜜蜂，這不是看待企業的正確方式。 > `[00:07:28]` When you say when you came in and said we\'re air B and B for tutor\'s. `[00:07:28]` 當你說當你進來的時候，你說我們是導師的 B 和 B 空氣。 > `[00:07:31]` Great. `[00:07:31]` 太好了。 > That\'s interesting. 這很有趣。 > Yeah. 嗯 > No he he was into that is like who Airblue and I mean this is this is so he responds well to that he did it he did in that case. 不，他喜歡這個，我的意思是，這是他的反應很好，他做了，在那種情況下。 > `[00:07:41]` It was interesting I think that he was looking at us as a founding team and then thinking about what could happen next in the company and air being Betis four years ago was certainly growing quickly. `[00:07:41]` 有趣的是，我認為他把我們看作是一個創始團隊，然后想一想公司接下來會發生什么，而四年前的貝蒂斯公司肯定在迅速發展。 > Had already turned them down. 已經拒絕了他們。 > `[00:07:53]` Thank you for that. `[00:07:53]` 謝謝你。 > But they were certainly Helfgot an open wound right here. 但他們肯定是赫爾夫格特身上的傷口。 > You want to pour some money on it. 你想花點錢在上面。 > I mean you\'ve got to bring it. 我是說你得帶上它。 > I\'m not here to stay out of it. 我不是來這里不插手的。 > But you know it\'s funny. 但你知道這很有趣。 > I think what you just said about. 我想你剛才說的。 > You said. 你說過。 > Something about. 是關于。 > `[00:08:09]` The the team was good and the potential of what they could do with the idea. `[00:08:09]` 球隊很好，他們可以用這個想法做些什么。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > I think that\'s what seed investors are good at. 我認為這正是種子投資者所擅長的。 > Yes seed investors are really good at connecting to the potential of the team and the potential of the big idea and not getting caught up in much more than that. 是的，種子投資者非常善于將團隊的潛力和大創意的潛力聯系起來，而且不會被更多的東西所吸引。 > We we sometimes invest in seed rounds but usually those are seed rounds for companies that have already shipped a product. 我們有時對種子輪進行投資，但通常是那些已經交付產品的公司的種子輪。 > I think we this is a criticism or maybe just an observation of USV. 我認為我們這是對 USV 的批評，或者僅僅是對 USV 的觀察。 > We\'re actually not very good at the thing you just said that seat investors do. 事實上，我們并不擅長你剛才所說的坐位投資者所做的事情。 > I think we\'re very good at. 我覺得我們很擅長。 > Evaluating a team once they\'ve created a product. 一旦一個團隊創建了一個產品，他們就會對其進行評估。 > So I see Zach Sims just walked in back there and when Zack and Ryan chip code academy you know we were able to say oh fuck that\'s a maze like we need to invest in this right. 所以我看到扎克·西姆斯剛剛走到后面，當扎克和瑞安芯片代碼學院，你知道，我們可以說，哦，操，這是一個迷宮，我們需要投資在這個權利。 > We also knew Zack and Ryan we knew how great they were because we were hanging around Columbia University trying to find interesting teams coming out of there. 我們也認識扎克和瑞安，我們知道他們是多么偉大，因為我們在哥倫比亞大學附近徘徊，試圖尋找出有趣的球隊。 > But so it was the potential of the team on top of something that they already shipped into the market right. 但是，這是團隊的潛力，在他們已經進入市場的東西之上，是正確的。 > And I think that\'s what we\'re good at. 我認為這是我們擅長的。 > And I think that great seed investors don\'t need to see. 我認為偉大的種子投資者不需要看到。 > The product they they somehow can recognize the potential in the people that they are going to create that product. 產品，他們可以在某種程度上認識到人們的潛力，他們要創造的產品。 > `[00:09:33]` And I think we would find that hard to do now Codecademy is a pretty interesting example of that because when they launched it old and working on it for a few weeks it launched. `[00:09:33]` 我想我們會發現現在很難做到這一點，科德羅米是一個非常有趣的例子，因為當他們推出舊的，工作了幾個星期，它啟動了。 > I mean it\'s an unduly nailed it. 我的意思是，這是一個不適當的釘死它。 > They know the traction is huge immediately right. 他們知道牽引力很大，對不對。 > So when you compare that against other you know Chenowith saying you know do something different. 所以，當你拿它和其他人比較的時候，你知道，切諾，說你知道，做一些不同的事情。 > `[00:09:51]` I think they were the first people to do in browser you know like writing code in browser as a way to teach coding. `[00:09:51]` 我認為他們是第一個在瀏覽器中做的人，你知道的，就像在瀏覽器中寫代碼，作為教編碼的一種方式。 > I think so. 我也這么想。 > Is that right. 對不對。 > We the first yes. 我們是第一個是的。 > He claims that they were. 他聲稱他們是。 > So I don\'t know who to believe everything he says. 所以我不知道誰能相信他說的一切。 > But that was a unique tweak on the idea of how do you teach someone to code. 但這是一個獨特的想法，你如何教別人編碼。 > And so that. 就這樣。 > That I think was was part of why they kind of just took off because it was inviting to people. 我認為這也是他們之所以起飛的原因之一，因為它吸引了很多人。 > Oh I can do this. 哦我能做到的。 > So when you\'re looking at that sort of take off moment. 所以當你看到這樣的起飛時刻。 > `[00:10:28]` What metrics are you looking at is there a specific set of things you\'re analyzing or is it just a general momentum somewhere. `[00:10:28]` 你在看什么指標，你正在分析的是一組特定的東西，還是某個地方的總動量。 > `[00:10:33]` We don\'t have like a number of people always say to be how many how many monthly active users do I need before you\'re going to invest in my company. `[00:10:33]` 我們沒有像很多人常說的那樣，在你投資我的公司之前，我需要多少個每月活躍的用戶。 > Was like I have no idea. 就好像我不知道。 > It\'s more sort of it\'s it\'s more sort of. 更多的，更多的。 > Based on. 基于。 > The market. 市場。 > The product. 產品。 > What you would expect for a product like that. 你對這種產品的期望。 > Certain things that are you know super viral you\'d want to see much larger numbers things that are more utilities smaller numbers but you know the right kinds of engagement might might be more important niche services that have sort of high value niches maybe it\'s even smaller numbers but just so it\'s a we don\'t have a formula. 有些東西，你知道，超級病毒，你想看到更大的數字，更多的公用事業，更小的數字，但你知道正確的類型可能是更重要的利基服務，具有高價值的利基，也許它是更小的數字，但就這樣，它是一個我們沒有公式。 > We don\'t like an algorithm or anything like that. 我們不喜歡算法之類的東西。 > We\'ve toyed around with my partner Albert is enamored of this idea. 我們和我的搭檔艾伯特玩過，對這個想法很著迷。 > Moneyball for EVC. 給 EVC 的錢球。 > Could we create an algorithm and just set centrally like crawl the Internet and run algorithms and then I\'ll just tell us what companies to invest in. 我們能不能創建一個算法，集中設置，比如爬行互聯網，運行算法，然后我就告訴我們該投資哪些公司。 > I don\'t think it\'s that simple. 我覺得沒那么簡單。 > I think it\'s a little bit more art than science. 我認為這比科學更像是藝術。 > `[00:11:48]` What\'s most likely to trick you on that decision. `[00:11:48]` 那個決定最有可能欺騙你的是什么？ > `[00:11:58]` Well a good example is turntable. `[00:11:58]` 轉盤就是一個很好的例子。 > It\'s a turntable was a monster right at the gate. 那是個轉盤，就在門口是個怪物。 > It ended up not working. 結果不起作用了。 > And so their problem was that they did churn problem. 所以他們的問題是他們確實制造了問題。 > But their. 但是他們的。 > Acquisition was so high in the early days that you couldn\'t really see the churn unless you really knew how to look for it. 收購在早期是如此之高，除非你真的知道如何去尋找它，否則你無法真正看到它。 > But over time the churn revealed itself and. 但隨著時間的推移，攪動者暴露了自己。 > Then it just could never get beyond that. 那它就是無法超越它。 > And I think that the churn was related to the fact that the that a lot of people listen to music in a very passive sort of way like they take a software engineer or they go into work they put on their music they put on their headphones and grinding when they don\'t actually want to be like in a room engaging with people around the music right. 我認為這與很多人以一種非常被動的方式聽音樂有關，就像他們帶著一個軟件工程師，或者他們開始工作，他們戴上他們的音樂，戴上耳機，當他們真的不想和周圍的人在一起的時候，他們會磨蹭。 > So it was too intense. 所以太緊張了。 > And people just had they like I got to get off of this I got to go back to Pinda or whatever else I\'m listening to. 人們就像我一樣，離開這一切，我要回到平達或者其他我正在聽的東西。 > So that was what I think cause. 所以這就是我認為的原因。 > But so we got Hedvig on that one. 但我們得到了海德維格的支持。 > `[00:12:58]` Would you make the same kind of bet again. `[00:12:58]` 你會再下一次同樣的賭注嗎？ > There is a huge amount of momentum behind that. 這背后有巨大的動力。 > `[00:13:02]` I think the real well you know but also the soaped. `[00:13:02]` 我認為真正的好，你知道，但也肥皂。 > Let\'s unpack that a little bit more. 讓我們再把它打開一點。 > I\'d known Billy for six years and I know Seth for close to. 我認識比利六年了，我也認識賽斯近了。 > Well 15 to 20 years. 15 到 20 年。 > So was a team meeting really well and they had this super hot property. 所以球隊的會議真的很好，他們擁有這個超級火爆的場地。 > And so it was kind of a combination. 所以這是一種組合。 > I\'ve been looking to invest in one of these projects for a long time because I always had recognized his talent. 很長一段時間以來，我一直想投資其中一個項目，因為我一直認同他的才能。 > So it was kind of it was like the perfect storm of. 所以它就像是一場完美的風暴。 > I liked the people. 我喜歡那些人。 > There\'s a. 有一個。 > There\'s a product centric entrepeneur here who I\'ve always respect and wanted to work with. 這里有一個以產品為中心的企業家，我一直很尊敬他，也想和他一起工作。 > And now if they Dave Neil what they\'ve hit it. 現在，如果他們，戴夫尼爾，他們擊中了它。 > So maybe the fact that the people side of the equation was. 所以也許這個方程的人的一面是。 > Was so strong for me meant that I was willing to kind of maybe not. 對我來說是如此的強大意味著我可能不愿意。 > Be as. 像你一樣。 > Diligent in the analysis of the phenomena. 勤于分析現象。 > `[00:14:00]` When you\'ve made that decision right when you\'ve made the decision to invest in a company is really calling me a B round. `[00:14:00]` 當你決定投資一家公司的時候，當你做出這個決定的時候，你真的叫我 B 回合。 > What are you expecting people to go and do once they have your money in their bank. 一旦他們把你的錢存入銀行，你期望人們去做什么？ > `[00:14:12]` Well at its core I think doing a startup is building business. `[00:14:12]` 我認為創業的核心是做生意。 > So I think that what I would want them to do is get on with the building of a business and wrote a blog post today about the metaphore of going up a flight of stairs and step one is building the product and getting the product market fit step in. 所以我想他們要做的是繼續做生意，今天寫了一篇博客文章，關于上樓的比喻，第一步是建立產品，讓產品市場適應市場。 > That\'s. 那.。 > Generally what I think of seed money for. 一般來說，我認為種子錢是為了什么。 > And then. 然后 > Getting you know getting a series a done so that you can go beyond the founding team which might be two or three or four people and go out and build sort of a 10 or 12 or 14 person team to really. 讓你知道一個系列的完成，這樣你就可以超越創始團隊，可能是兩三個或四個人，出去建立一個 10 人或 12 人或 14 人的團隊。 > You know get you know all of the aspects of the business going really create sustainable growth and really continue invest in product and then once you\'ve proven you can do that series B would be around building full blown business scaling the team taking the market becoming the dominant product in the market and then Series C get to profitability. 你知道，讓你知道業務的各個方面，真正創造可持續增長，并真正繼續投資于產品。然后，一旦你證明了你的能力，B 系列就是建立全面的業務，擴大團隊，讓市場成為市場上的主導產品，然后 C 系列獲得盈利能力。 > And then after that take the company public sell it to a secondary. 在那之后，公司上市，把它賣給二級市場。 > So each of those steps along the way is ultimately in furtherance of building a company building a real business. 因此，這些步驟中的每一步最終都是為了推動建立一家公司，建立一家真正的企業。 > And so I see it sort of as a as a just a march through those those parts and I want to see people commit to making the investments in the business that are required to make all those things happen. 因此，我認為這只是一次跨越這些部分的游行，我希望看到人們致力于在企業中進行投資，這是實現所有這些事情所必需的。 > So it\'s it\'s usually about you know continue to invest in product and build out a team get to a business model execute their business model get revenues get customers. 所以，通常情況下，你要知道，繼續投資于產品，建立一個團隊，建立一個商業模式，執行他們的商業模式，獲得收入，得到客戶。 > Continue to build the team and. 繼續建立團隊。 > If the entrepreneur either gets unfocused and. 如果企業家要么注意力不集中。 > Like. 喜歡 > Starts. 開始吧。 > Lighting up a whole bunch of side projects or is reluctant to build a team or there\'s some. 點亮大量的附帶項目，或者不愿意建立一個團隊，或者有一些。 > Kind of classic red flag you get some times when you start to see that there for whatever reason not really kind of committed to. 這是一種典型的紅旗，有時你會發現，不管出于什么原因，你都沒有真正的承諾。 > That. 那，那個 > Sort of grinding away on the business that I think has got to do. 在我看來必須要做的事情上磨磨抹角。 > `[00:16:28]` You\'ve been watching companies raise money and spend money for 30 years. `[00:16:28]` 30 年來，你一直在看公司籌集資金和花錢。 > `[00:16:33]` There\'s been a lot of talk about how starting a startup is easier than ever Alexa\'s mentioned all you all you need to do now is open your laptop to be less cost or have gone down remarkably. ‘ > But see brands are getting larger and larger. 但看到的是，品牌正變得越來越大。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > So many things going on there. 那里發生了很多事情。 > `[00:16:50]` I think it\'s just a function that there\'s a lot of demand from investors. `[00:16:50]` 我認為這只是投資者大量需求的一個函數。 > You know everything from angel investor seed investors sees in lots of other types to put money into startups. 你知道從天使投資者，種子投資者看到了很多其他類型的投資創業。 > And so I think entrepreneurs are in a. 所以我認為企業家們。 > You know in a in a market in a sellers market where they can raise a lot of capital and. 你知道，在賣方市場上，他們可以籌集大量資金。 > A lot of entrepreneurs are choosing to do that because they equate capital with runway and run away with increasing the probability of success. 許多企業家之所以選擇這樣做，是因為他們把資本等同于跑道，跑掉了，增加了成功的可能性。 > But I think that\'s a little bit of a trap because I think that with a limited amount of money to too little money will kill you and too much money will kill you with a limited amount of money. 但我認為這是個小陷阱，因為我認為用有限的錢到太少的錢會殺死你，而太多的錢會用有限的錢殺死你。 > If it\'s sufficient it focuses you and constrains all of the possible things you might do and makes you and your cofounders. 如果它足夠的話，它會集中你的注意力，約束你可能做的所有可能的事情，讓你和你的共同創始人。 > Make the hard decisions about do we do this or do we do this we can\'t do both. 做出艱難的決定，我們是這樣做，還是我們這樣做，我們不能兩者兼而有之。 > We have to pick one let\'s do this. 我們得選一個讓我們這么做。 > It forces you into this kind of process about optimizing the most important things and doing the things that are going to get you to where you want to go. 它迫使你進入這樣的過程，優化最重要的事情，做那些能把你帶到你想去的地方的事情。 > And I really really like that. 我真的很喜歡。 > So I I I think that. 所以我覺得。 > The market is. 市場是。 > At a stage right now where you wish you could go out and do it two and a half million dollars seed. 就在現在這個階段，你希望你能出去，做個 250 萬美元的種子。 > I\'m generally I would generally advise founders not to do that given the low interest rate environment. 一般來說，考慮到低利率環境，我建議創始人不要這么做。 > `[00:18:21]` The fact that doesn\'t seem to be ending any time soon where rent growth and inflation are you can reasonably assume that that kind of capital interaction is going to go on for quite some time. `[00:18:21]` 在租金增長和通貨膨脹的情況下，這一事實似乎不會很快結束，你可以合理地假設這種資本互動將持續相當一段時間。 > So as an investor looking a little bit later. 因此，作為一名投資者，看上去有點晚了。 > Are you at all worried that the traditional size of the rounds and the prices that you pay for rounds are just going to get to a place where it doesn\'t make sense for you anymore. 你擔心的是，傳統的輪大小和價格只會到達一個對你來說不再有意義的地方嗎？。 > Well I mean. 我是說。 > If you look at that know we\'ve beenU.S. 如果你看看這個，你就會知道我們是美國的。 > vs 10 years old this year and if you look at the prices we were paying for seeds and series A\'s in 2004 2005 2006. 與今年 10 歲的孩子相比，如果你看一下我們在 2004 年、2005 年、2006 年為種子和 A 系列支付的價格。 > That was here and then in 2007 8 2000. 那是在這里，然后在 2007 年，2000 年。 > `[00:18:59]` 2007 2008 2009 that was here and then in 2010 2011 2012 it was here and now it\'s like here right. `[00:18:59]` 2007，2008，2009，在這里，然后在 2010 年，2011 年，2012 年，它在這里，現在它就像在這里。 > So it just keeps going up and. 所以它一直在上升。 > You know we have reacted to that by. 你知道我們已經對此做出了反應。 > I think making some changes. 我想做些改變。 > We become more willing to invest in places like Iowa and Pittsburgh and Philadelphia and Berlin and. 我們更愿意在愛荷華州、匹茲堡、費城和柏林等地投資。 > `[00:19:31]` Other parts of Europe. `[00:19:31]` 歐洲其他地區。 > `[00:19:33]` And so that\'s going to where the supply demand equation is not quite as in favor of entrepreneurs as as it is in Silicon Valley in New York. `[00:19:33]` 這樣的話，供給需求方程就不會像紐約硅谷那樣更有利于企業家了。 > And increasingly other parts the United States so. 而且越來越多的美國其他地區也是如此。 > `[00:19:48]` That\'s one thing we\'ve done. `[00:19:48]` 那是我們做過的一件事。 > We\'ve got a little bit more picky. 我們有點挑剔。 > OK. 好的 > `[00:19:52]` If we\'re going to pay those prices then damn well be you know you know risk reward equation that were we\'re happy with so maybe we want to see a little bit more traction or want a really up super high quality team. `[00:19:52]` 如果我們要支付這些價格，那么你應該知道風險回報方程，我們對此很滿意，所以也許我們希望看到更多的吸引力，或者想要一支非常優秀的團隊。 > `[00:20:07]` So that\'s how we\'ve managed it. `[00:20:07]` 所以我們就是這樣管理它的。 > I guess it could get to the point where we think we\'re not going to make money but we don\'t see any hints maybe maybe even series have been mispriced for 25 years. 我想它可能會達到這樣的程度，我們認為我們不會賺錢，但我們看不到任何跡象，也許即使是系列劇已經被錯誤定價了 25 年。 > And maybe the market\'s finally starting to price them correctly. 也許市場終于開始正確定價了。 > `[00:20:21]` When you think about the seed investment is basically a very long long option. `[00:20:21]` 當你想到種子投資基本上是一個很長的選擇。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Where it\'s EDAR worth a hundred a thousand acts or it\'s worth nothing. 在那里，EDAR 值十萬件，或者什么都不值錢。 > You could argue it\'s worth a lot more than people paid for it in the past and maybe that is what we see. 你可以說它的價值遠遠超過過去人們為此付出的代價，也許這就是我們所看到的。 > `[00:20:37]` Yeah. `[00:20:37]` 是的。 > That might be because the success rates of startups is going up and therefore I mean when an investor is pricing an investment. 這可能是因為初創企業的成功率正在上升，因此我的意思是，當投資者在定價一項投資時。 > `[00:20:50]` Unfortunately the entrepreneur is paying for the fact that a number of the investors investments are not going to work out right. `[00:20:50]` 不幸的是，這位企業家正在為這樣一個事實買單，那就是，許多投資者的投資不會得到正確的結果。 > So I mean what we want. 所以我說的是我們想要的。 > We understand that a third of the things we invest in are not going to work at all a third of the things we invest in are going to kind of work but not not particularly well and and it\'s the final third that actually produce all the returns. 我們知道，我們所投資的東西中有三分之一根本不起作用-我們投資的三分之一會有某種效果，但效果并不特別好-最后三分之一的投資才能產生全部回報。 > And so the entrepreneur who is taking money from us who\'s in that group that\'s producing all the returns is actually paying a little bit for the failure rates right because we\'re thinking about it you know what\'s the blended return on our portfolio. 因此，從我們這個群體中獲得全部回報的企業家，實際上為我們的失敗率付出了一點代價，因為我們正在考慮這個問題，你知道，我們投資組合的混合回報率是多少？。 > Well if failure rates go down because of things like why see that increase the probability of success. 好吧，如果失敗率下降是因為為什么要看到這會增加成功的概率。 > And I I absolutely believe that while he does that. 我絕對相信當他這么做的時候。 > `[00:21:36]` Then maybe that\'s part of why pricing has gone up given that the world is so connected now. `[00:21:36]` 那么，考慮到當今世界是如此的緊密相連，這也許是定價上升的原因之一。 > `[00:21:44]` We have the internet. `[00:21:44]` 我們有互聯網。 > Thank you internet and people out on the Internet or watching us now. 謝謝大家現在上網或收看我們的節目。 > `[00:21:50]` Investors are finding deals all over the place. `[00:21:50]` 投資者到處都在尋找交易。 > You\'re funny you mention Philadelphia Berlin all over the place. 你很有趣，你到處都提到了費城，柏林。 > Given that seem that there would be parity in prices where ever you are it shouldn\'t matter that your location is Silicon Valley or New York or Berlin it\'s not yet. 考慮到無論你身在何處，價格似乎都是平價的，所以你的地理位置在硅谷、紐約或柏林并不重要。 > `[00:22:05]` Not yet. `[00:22:05]` 還沒有。 > Angel List maybe has the potential to change that. 天使名單也許有可能改變這種狀況。 > I mean if we really end up with a a. 我是說如果我們真的得到了一個。 > Nasdaq like market for for seed and series A and Series B investments then then that would would happen. 納斯達克喜歡種子市場和 A、B 系列投資，然后就會發生這種情況。 > But still a lot of investing particularly seed investing is local and people want to be able to meet the entrepreneur and hear the pitch in. 但是，很多投資，特別是種子投資，都是本地的，人們希望能夠與企業家見面，傾聽他們的心聲。 > And possibly join a board or at least be on an advisory board or spend some time on a regular basis with the entrepreneur. 也有可能加入董事會，或者至少加入咨詢委員會，或者定期與企業家在一起度過一段時間。 > And so that means that entrepreneurs who are in places where there is a lot of capital like Silicon Valley and New York to a slightly lesser extent but there\'s a lot of capital here. 因此，這意味著，那些身處資金充裕的地方的企業家，比如硅谷和紐約，其規模略小一些，但這里有大量的資本。 > You are in a better situation than than entrepeneurs were parts of the world where there isn\'t much of that money. 你現在的處境比那些沒有多少錢的世界上的企業家要好。 > So. 所以 > So I think also investors may have a higher comfort factor with startups that are in. 因此，我認為，投資者在初創公司上市時也可能會有更高的舒適度。 > Regions that have a lot of startup density. 有大量啟動密度的區域。 > I\'m not entirely sure why that would be the case but I think that probably. 我不完全確定為什么會這樣，但我認為可能是這樣。 > `[00:23:12]` Is new. `[00:23:12]` 是新的。 > I think there\'s something of an environmental aspect to that when you\'re around other people who are doing startups and are talking about technology I think it\'s beneficial. 我認為，當你和那些正在創業、談論科技的人在一起的時候，這是一個環境方面的問題，我認為這是有益的。 > I know that when I left finance to work in startups at which point by the way I applied for the USV Analyst Program and was summarily rejected without even an interview. 我知道，當我離開金融公司在初創企業工作時，順便說一句，我申請了 USV 分析師計劃，甚至在沒有面試的情況下被草率地拒絕了。 > No interview. 沒有面試。 > Wow. 哇 > Yeah. 嗯 > So thank you. 所以謝謝你。 > I guess it\'s worked out pretty well. 我想這件事做得很好。 > You know but but this is part of why why he thinks that. 但這也是他為什么這么想的原因之一。 > We\'ll find great startups wherever they are. 無論他們在哪里，我們都能找到偉大的創業公司。 > We want that to come to Silicon Valley. 我們希望硅谷也能實現這一目標。 > So we\'ll see how things are done there and then go back. 所以我們會看看事情是怎么做的，然后再回去。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > We went out to New York. 我們去了紐約。 > All right. 好的 > Whatever is best for your business right. 不管對你的生意有什么好處。 > That\'s kind of where you should be. 那是你該去的地方。 > `[00:23:53]` I think that\'s right or whatever is best for you. `[00:23:53]` 我認為那是對的，或者任何對你最好的。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > I know some entrepreneurs want to build their companies in a place where they want to raise their families or whatever. 我知道一些企業家想要在一個他們想要撫養他們的家庭或其他什么的地方建立他們的公司。 > You know that could be Silicon Valley that could be New York. 你知道，那可能是硅谷，可能是紐約。 > That could be Boston it could be Boulder a beatnik you know. 那可能是波士頓，可能是博爾德，你知道的。 > `[00:24:09]` So I do agree that you should do a startup in the place that\'s best for you. `[00:24:09]` 所以我同意你應該在對你最有利的地方開辦一家公司。 > But I also think maybe you should do it in. 但我也覺得也許你應該這么做。 > There\'s. 有\。 > Probably at least. 可能至少。 > A dozen geographies around the world that have enough startup density and investor density that. 世界各地有十幾個地區擁有足夠的創業密度和投資者密度。 > Would be a decent place to build a company. 是建立公司的好地方。 > I would say you pick pick one of those. 我會說你選了其中一個。 > You don\'t go to a. 你不能去。 > You know. 你知道 > Some. 一些。 > Out of the way place that it will be hard to recruit management right even if there\'s cheap housing. 即使有廉價的住房，也很難招聘到合適的管理人員。 > Yeah I mean you know it\'s really really hard to recruit people to know. 是的，我的意思是，你知道，招募人才是非常困難的。 > If you were doing a startup in Bozeman Montana you\'d think you\'d you. 如果你在蒙大拿州博茲曼做一家創業公司，你會認為你有。 > I mean I don\'t mean to pick on Boesman. 我的意思是我不是故意去找博斯曼的。 > It\'s a wonderful place. 那是個很棒的地方。 > `[00:24:58]` But you know I just think you\'d have a hard time recruiting the really high quality talent there. `[00:24:58]` 但是你知道，我只是覺得你很難在那里招聘到真正的高質量人才。 > Either you\'re gonna find it locally or you\'re kind of stuck. 要么你會在當地找到它要么你會被困住。 > I was just in Israel a couple of weeks ago in Tel Aviv and. 幾周前我在以色列特拉維夫。 > `[00:25:12]` Dega and I was I was struck by how vibrant the scene was there. `[00:25:12]` 德加和我被那里的景象是多么的生機勃勃而震驚。 > I knew that there was great technology that I knew there were great investors. 我知道有偉大的技術，我知道有偉大的投資者。 > But it seems like some of what\'s going on in San Francisco and in New York is starting to seep out there. 但在舊金山和紐約發生的一些事情似乎已經開始蔓延開來。 > `[00:25:25]` Oh I think it\'s well I mean you know Israel has been a startup hub for a long time. `[00:25:25]` 哦，我認為這很好，我是說，你知道以色列已經成為一個很長時間的創業中心了。 > They had a little bit of a a period where they would be a little bit of what happened in Boston although I think that. 他們有一段時間，他們會對在波士頓發生的事情有一點了解，盡管我認為是這樣的。 > Israel has bounced back stronger in some ways than Boston. 以色列在某些方面比波士頓的反彈更強勁。 > But what happened was there was a transition from sort of more infrastructure and enterprise stuff to more consumer stuff. 但是發生的事情是，從更多的基礎設施和企業產品過渡到更多的消費者產品。 > Really around the time we started USV was when it kind of really started to happen and. 就在我們開始使用 USV 的時候，它真的開始出現了。 > Entrepreneurs and Deasy\'s in both Israel and Boston I think struggled to make that transition as quickly as entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley and New York. 我認為，以色列和波士頓的企業家和迪西(Deasy)們，要想像硅谷和紐約的企業家那樣，盡快實現這一轉變，實在是舉步維艱。 > It was easy for you. 對你來說很容易。 > New York was easy to make that transition because it always had a bent that way to begin with. 紐約很容易實現這一轉變，因為它一開始就有這樣的傾向。 > But Silicon Valley I was always impressed by how quickly they made that transition. 但硅谷總是給我留下深刻印象的是，他們這么快就完成了這一轉變。 > And I think that Israel went through a little bit of a period where they struggled but they got they got their mojo back. 我認為以色列經歷了一段時間的掙扎，但他們找回了自己的魔力。 > And because you know they\'ve been doing startups in Israel particularly in Tel Aviv for 20 or 30 years now. 因為你知道，他們已經在以色列，特別是特拉維夫開辦了二三十年的初創公司。 > At least. 至少 > They have a lot of repeat entrepreneurs and a lot of talent and a lot of knowledge about how to do these kinds of things. 他們有很多重復創業的人，有很多人才，也有很多關于如何做這些事情的知識。 > So you take you take a team to Silicon Valley to kind of see how things are done there what the people in Israel know how to do a startup. 所以你帶著一個團隊去硅谷看看那里是怎么做的，以色列人知道如何創業。 > So they had the culture there. 所以他們有那里的文化。 > And it\'s it\'s it\'s a great place. 那是個很棒的地方。 > `[00:26:54]` And unfortunately don\'t have much more I\'m left. `[00:26:54]` 不幸的是，我已經沒有更多的了。 > I do want to turn back to New York one last time because it\'s where we are and it\'s where we want to be finding more companies. 我確實想最后一次回到紐約，因為這是我們現在所在的地方，也是我們想要找到更多公司的地方。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > You know I\'m curious over the next over the next few years. 你知道我對未來幾年很好奇。 > Looking back the last few years what\'s happened. 回顧過去幾年所發生的事情。 > What do you see coming in New York that particularly interests you. 你認為在紐約你特別感興趣的是什么？ > `[00:27:12]` Well the big observation is that enterprise SAS type business models seem to be thriving in New York right now. `[00:27:12]` 最大的觀察是，企業 SAS 類型的商業模式現在似乎在紐約蓬勃發展。 > We have a few in our portfolio but they\'re there they\'re everywhere I look I\'m seeing really good SAS enterprise companies getting built here and that was definitely not what the vibe was in New York in 2009 2010. 我們的投資組合中有一些，但它們在那里，我看到的到處都是它們，我看到企業公司在這里建設得非常好，而這絕對不是 2009 年到 2010 年在紐約出現的那種氛圍。 > Now I think it\'s a balance. 現在我認為這是一種平衡。 > We\'ve still got lots of good consumer stuff going on but now I think we\'ve got an equally strong B2B SAS type of. 我們仍然有許多好的消費者的東西正在進行，但現在我認為我們有一個同樣強大的 B2B SAS 類型。 > Startup environment here and that\'s really good for New York because you know it. 這里的啟動環境對紐約來說真的很好，因為你知道的。 > You know you need to have both kinds of companies I think they\'re. 你知道你需要兩種公司，我認為他們都是。 > You know terrible for these CEOs to have both kinds of companies in their portfolio. 你知道，對于這些 CEO 來說，在他們的投資組合中有兩種類型的公司是很糟糕的。 > And I think that you know the talent pool here in New York can work in both. 我想你知道紐約的人才庫在這兩種情況下都可以發揮作用。 > `[00:28:11]` So that probably the big biggest change and then also just so much more capital here. `[00:28:11]` 所以，這可能是最大的變化，也就是更多的資本。 > Yeah which is great for New York. 是的，這對紐約來說很好。 > Yes. 是 > Well Fred thank you so much for joining us today at. 那么，弗雷德，非常感謝你今天來到我們這里。