# Zach Sims at Startup School NY 2014
> `[00:00:00]` I have a distinct privilege right now to introduce another one of those New York Y Combinator companies.
`[00:00:00]` 我現在有一個獨特的特權來介紹另一家紐約 Y 組合公司。
> CEO is co-founder and CEO Zach Sims who started Code Academy.
首席執行官是聯合創始人兼首席執行官扎克·西姆斯,他創辦了代碼學院。
> Yes hopefully I\'ll know about Code Academy If programming is the fluency of this generation.
是的,希望我能了解代碼學院,如果編程是這一代的流利之處的話。
> They are the place they are the global place to learn it since they launched about three years ago.
自三年前推出以來,它們是全球學習的地方。
> They have now served I think over 24 million students all over the world in every single country.
我認為,他們現在為世界各地每一個國家的 2400 萬學生服務。
> Is that true as well as Antarctica.
南極洲也是這樣嗎。
> Presumably we\'re going to hear more about that.
我們大概會聽到更多關于這一點的消息。
> One of the things that\'s really exciting about this is not only was he a drop out from Columbia but yes was that for dropouts or for Columbia.
其中一件令人興奮的事情是,他不僅從哥倫比亞退學,而且對輟學或哥倫比亞大學來說也是如此。
> I\'m not sure but we\'ll say both.
我不確定,但我們可以說兩者兼而有之。
> But like so many startup stories you know from the outside it seems really simple really clear I figure something out makes something people want to grow grow grow them before you know you\'re on The Colbert Report which is was there was a great episode but in fact every startup has its own cluster and I hope Zach shares with you the story of the few weeks running up to demo day because Code Academy was anything but a sure thing.
但是,就像你從外面知道的很多創業故事一樣,看起來真的很簡單,真的很清楚,我想出了一些東西,在你知道你在“科爾伯特報告”(Colbert Report)上有一個很棒的插曲之前,我就想做一些人想要做的事情,但事實上,每一家初創公司都有自己的集群,我希望扎克和你分享幾個星期以來的故事。演示一天因為代碼學院絕對不是一件確定的事情。
> So please give it up for Zach Sims.
所以請為扎克·西姆斯放棄吧。
> `[00:01:19]` Awesome thank you Alexis.
`[00:01:19]` 太好了,謝謝你,亞歷克西斯。
> I didn\'t realize I\'d have to compete with the soccer game today.
我沒有意識到我今天必須和足球比賽。
> Should have interwove and like the score in my presentation.
應該是交織在一起的,喜歡我演講中的分數。
> But anyway my name\'s Zach Sims.
但不管怎樣我叫扎克·西姆斯。
> And as Alexis just mentioned I started a company called Code Academy with my co-founder Ryan and we teach people the skills they need to find jobs in the 21st century online.
正如 Alexis 剛才提到的,我和我的聯合創始人 Ryan 創建了一家名為 CodeAcademy 的公司,我們教人們在 21 世紀在線尋找工作所需的技能。
> But as Alexis mentioned it wasn\'t always that way.
但正如亞歷克西斯所提到的,情況并不總是這樣。
> So when I go to a talk like this and I sit in the audience I always ask why is that person on stage.
所以當我去做這樣的演講時,我總是坐在觀眾中,我總是問為什么那個人在舞臺上。
> What experiences have they been through that let them stand up and preach to people and what can I learn from that.
他們經歷了什么樣的經歷,讓他們站起來向人們宣講,我從中學到了什么。
> And so today I looked at the slate of speakers that\'s here today and saw a lot of pretty awesome names.
所以今天我看了今天在這里的演講人名單,看到了很多非常棒的名字。
> You have world class investors you have people who are changing the world with nonprofits and people with super fast growing companies and then I think they needed someone to fill the cliche spot they needed to drop out.
你有世界級的投資者,有人用非營利組織改變世界,有的人擁有超高速發展的公司,然后我認為他們需要有人來填補他們需要退出的陳詞濫調。
> So my story is somewhat similar to what you\'d see on the Social Network the movie that hopefully a lot of you are familiar with but with a lot less Trent Reznor music and a lot less cocaine.
所以,我的故事有點類似于你在社交網絡上看到的電影,希望你們中的很多人都熟悉這部電影,但有更少的特倫特·雷茲諾音樂和更少的可卡因。
> So.
所以
> What I hope you guys leave with at the end of today is kind of our story and hopefully a few key lessons you can learn that will tell you some things you can do to eventually one day prepare yourself to start your own company and then a lot of things that we did that you probably shouldn\'t do if you do start your own company and hopefully a couple of fun stories in between.
我希望你們在今天結束時留下的是我們的故事,希望你們能學到一些關鍵的經驗教訓,告訴你們一些你可以做的事情,最終有一天你可以為自己的公司做好準備,然后我們做了很多你可能不應該做的事情,如果你真的成立了你自己的公司,希望在中間有幾個有趣的故事。
> Because as Alexis said You hear all the time about people who kind of just hit it and it just works.
因為就像亞歷克西斯說的,你經常聽到有人打它,它只是起作用。
> And I think the story that\'s been told about Code Academy a lot is that we built the actual product a few weeks before Demo Day and launch and had a lot of success but it wasn\'t really that easy.
我認為關于代碼學院的故事是,我們在演示日前幾周制作了實際的產品,并取得了很大的成功,但這并不是那么容易。
> So I want to go back to 2003 when I really started becoming interested in the Internet and that was the year that the iTunes music store got really big.
所以我想回到 2003 年,那時我開始對互聯網產生興趣,那是 iTunes 音樂商店變得非常大的一年。
> They ran the first advertisements for the iTunes music store and somewhat ironically they were headlined byDr.
他們為 iTunes 音樂商店刊登了第一批廣告,但頗具諷刺意味的是,這些廣告的標題是 dr。
> Dre and so now that\'s all kind of come full circle.
德雷,等等,現在這一切都成了一個完整的循環。
> A few years later I got my first iPod in 2003 and I brought it with me everywhere for the first time you could carry a thousand songs in your pocket.
幾年后,我在 2003 年買到了我的第一臺 iPod,我第一次隨身攜帶了它,這是你第一次在口袋里放一千首歌。
> And so I brought it to the gym I brought it on runs and it skipped throughout the runs.
所以我把它帶到了健身房,我帶它跑步,它在整個跑步過程中跳過。
> But what I didn\'t have was a way to protect it.
但我所沒有的是一種保護它的方法。
> When I dropped it on the ground which happened all the time and as all you know with hard drives dropping them on the ground isn\'t so great.
當我把它扔在地上的時候,它一直在發生,正如你所知道的,硬盤把它們扔在地上并不是很好。
> So I looked online and I tried to find a case that I could use for my iPod and instead of doing what the normal person dies and buying the first one that I saw I realized should just make one myself.
所以我在網上查了一下,我試著找一個可以用來裝 iPod 的箱子,而不是做正常人死了的事,買第一個我意識到應該自己做的盒子。
> So at the age of 13 in 2003 I emailed a bunch of different iPod case manufacturers across the country and told them that I had the greatest idea ever to build a waterproof iPod case.
因此,在 2003 年,我 13 歲的時候,我給全國各地的一群不同的 iPod 機箱制造商發了郵件,告訴他們我有一個有史以來最棒的想法來制造一個防水的 iPod 外殼。
> I didn\'t tell them that I was 13 and had no idea what I was talking about.
我沒有告訴他們我 13 歲,也不知道我在說什么。
> So after around six months of emailing with someone who worked at a big case manufacturer across theU.S.
因此,在與一位在美國一家大型箱包制造商工作的人進行了大約六個月的電子郵件之后。
> finally I had something in my hands that had gone from having an idea when I first got the iPod to having something that now protected it everywhere.
最后,我手里拿著一些東西,從我第一次買 iPod 時的想法變成了現在到處保護它的東西。
> And then a couple of weeks later the guy on the other end who worked at the case manufacturer asked to get on the phone with me so we could talk about how we were going to launch and market what we had built.
幾周后,在箱子制造商工作的另一端的那個家伙要求和我打電話,這樣我們就可以談談我們將如何推出和銷售我們建造的產品。
> And so what I thought was really cool was that no one on the Internet knew that I was 13 and in my parents basement.
所以我覺得很酷的是,互聯網上沒有人知道我 13 歲,在我父母的地下室里。
> It\'s really the great equalizer.
這真是個偉大的均衡器。
> The great equalizer that is until you get on the phone with someone and your voice cracks 10 seconds into the phone call.
最偉大的均衡器是,直到你和某人通了電話,你的聲音在電話中發出了 10 秒的裂痕。
> So.
所以
> That relationship was really fruitful until he realized that I was 13.
在他意識到我 13 歲之前,這段關系真的很有成效。
> But what was really empowering about that was that I realized that being young or being somewhere not in New York or in San Francisco didn\'t matter on the internet didn\'t matter that I never built hardware before it didn\'t matter that I didn\'t know what marketing was.
但真正讓我感到鼓舞的是,我意識到,年輕或者不在紐約或舊金山并不重要,在互聯網上我從來沒有制造過硬件并不重要,因為我不知道什么是營銷。
> But the Internet allowed me to learn all these things very quickly and to build something that came out of that.
但互聯網讓我能夠非常快地了解所有這些東西,并從中產生一些東西。
> So it was one of the first lessons I learned early on is don\'t know until you try.
因此,這是我在早期學到的第一課之一,直到你試著才知道。
> And so I started trying pretty early.
所以我很早就開始嘗試了。
> So after that first experience kind of kept going back to the question of how do I learn more about the Internet and what I can do with it.
因此,在第一次體驗之后,我又回到了一個問題上,那就是如何更多地了解互聯網,以及我能用它做些什么。
> It already seen what an amazing impact it can have on me and people around me.
它已經看到了它對我和我周圍的人有多么驚人的影響。
> And so I went to the library and I picked up a book on THP and Miis.
于是我去圖書館拿了一本關于 THP 和 Miis 的書。
> Q L for Dummies.
Dummies 的 Q L。
> I went to a shelf and I saw a list full of yellow and black books picked up a few of them that had acronyms I didn\'t quite understand and I figured you know a book for the rest of us we can really sympathize with that.
我走到一個書架上,看到一張滿是黃色和黑色書籍的清單,里面有幾本我不太懂的縮略語,我想你知道一本書,對我們其他人來說,我們真的很同情。
> And I went home and I read a bunch of four Demis books but it never really clicked and I never really built anything with the knowledge that I\'d picked up by reading these books because they didn\'t actually have me working on real projects.
回到家,我讀了四本德米斯的書,但是它從來沒有被點擊過,我從來沒有建立任何我通過閱讀這些書學到的知識,因為它們實際上沒有讓我從事真正的項目。
> So when I turned 18 I went to Columbia in New York as Alexis mentioned and instead of studying computer science for some reason I decided to study political science.
所以當我滿 18 歲的時候,我去了紐約的哥倫比亞大學,就像亞歷克西斯提到的那樣,我沒有因為某種原因學習計算機科學,而是決定學習政治學。
> And I usually try not to mention that but I\'ll tell you guys that secret.
我通常盡量不提這個,但我會告訴你們這個秘密。
> So I went to college and my first semester I tried to find people that were like me that were interested in technology that were interested in startups.
所以我上了大學,我的第一個學期我試著找到像我一樣對科技感興趣的人,他們對創業感興趣。
> But there was no one.
但沒有人。
> I asked everyone around me and what are you guys interested in doing with with your future and your careers and half of them told me were definitely not thinking about that we\'re just interested in partying.
我問了我周圍的每個人,你們對自己的未來和事業有興趣做什么,他們中的一半告訴我,他們肯定沒有想過我們只是對派對感興趣。
> And the other half looked at me similarly weirdly and said you know we\'re working in banking consulting.
另一半人也奇怪地看著我說:“你知道,我們在銀行咨詢部門工作。”
> Obviously like everyone else in New York.
顯然和紐約的其他人一樣。
> So I was a little discouraged but second semester of my freshman year saw a poster that there was gonna be a talk from someone who I thought was kind of famous in the New York startup scene.
所以我有點泄氣,但是我大一的第二學期看到了一張海報,上面寫著一個我認為在紐約創業時很有名的人的演講。
> And name is Sam less in and he started a company called Drop Yo.
名字叫山姆,他創辦了一家名為 DROYO 的公司。
> It was a file sharing company and he was coming and I showed up two hours early for his talk.
那是一家文件共享公司,他要來了,我提前兩個小時來聽他的談話。
> I was thinking there\'s gonna be like a packed house.
我在想,那里會像一個擠滿了人的房子。
> You know I got there and it was in a really small room but it was in that really nice building.
你知道我到了那里,它在一間很小的房間里,但它在那棟非常漂亮的建筑里。
> So I figured like very important person a lot of people are gonna be here.
所以我想像個很重要的人很多人都會在這里。
> Sam showed up on time and no one else showed up.
山姆準時出現,其他人都沒來。
> So that was New York in 2008.
那就是 2008 年的紐約。
> It was a world where no one was interested in startups and you got ridiculed and there was no one to talk to you about about working in technology.
在這個世界里,沒有人對創業感興趣,你被嘲笑,也沒有人和你談論科技工作。
> And so Sam was the only thing I had.
所以山姆是我唯一擁有的東西。
> So I pestered him for the next six months until he finally let me work for him for a summer for free.
所以在接下來的六個月里,我一直纏著他,直到他終于讓我免費為他工作了一個夏天。
> And I tutored the essay at night back in Connecticut where I\'m from.
晚上,我在康涅狄格州輔導這篇文章,我來自康涅狄格州。
> And I sat on the couch and I learned everything I could from what Sam was doing.
我坐在沙發上,從山姆所做的一切中學到了一切。
> I went back to college and I said What can I do next that will help me learn more how we become better than the experience I had at dropping them.
我回到了大學,我說接下來我能做些什么,這將幫助我更多地了解我們是如何變得更好的,而不是我放棄他們的經歷。
> I definitely wasn\'t taking another class on political theory which at that point was interesting but not quite relevant to what I wanted to do after I graduated.
我絕對不想再上一門政治理論課,這門課當時很有趣,但與我畢業后想要做的事情不太相關。
> So I got to know a lot of other people in New York who were working in startups and I went to tech crunch disrupt that year and I saw two friends of mine demos something called group me that at the time allowed you to text one phone number.
所以我認識了紐約很多在初創公司工作的人,那年我去了科技危機公司,我看到了我的兩個朋友,一個叫“我組”的人,當時我可以發短信給你一個電話號碼。
> They created a group chatting application you could send one one text to one number go to like five or six people and they could all text back to that number.
他們創建了一個群聊天應用程序,你可以把一條短信發送給一個號碼,然后發送給五到六個人,然后他們都可以發回那個號碼。
> And I thought it was super cool.
我覺得很酷。
> The two founders who were friends of mine had been at a music festival the week beforehand and experienced this themselves when they were trying to text and there was no data.
這兩位創始人是我的朋友,他們在一周前參加過一個音樂節,當他們試圖發短信時,他們自己也經歷過這種情況,而且沒有任何數據。
> And that for their e-mails to get through and they could text each other and they got lost and then a week later they built something that solve their problem.
為了讓他們的電子郵件通過,他們可以互相發短信,然后迷路了,一周后,他們建立了解決問題的方法。
> That was crazy to me.
對我來說太瘋狂了。
> And so Grooby went on to be super popular at tech crunch disrupt and I eventually joined them to work on group me when it was just the two of them and me in an apartment with a couple other people and I realized that solving their problem was the key to their early success.
所以 Grooby 在科技危機中非常受歡迎,我最終加入了我的團隊,當時只有他們倆和我和其他幾個人住在一間公寓里,我意識到解決他們的問題是他們早期成功的關鍵。
> They\'d build something that they needed to use and they figured you know there\'s a lot of people to go to music festivals and there\'s a lot of people that need to communicate and so they build something for themselves.
他們會建造一些他們需要使用的東西,他們認為你知道有很多人可以去參加音樂節,還有很多人需要交流,所以他們為自己建立了一些東西。
> And so what I had a group me was something that finally my friends believed in and went from you know my friends looking at me as if I had the worst ideas ever to adding them all to a group chat.
所以,我有了一個團體,我的朋友們終于相信了,我的朋友們看著我,好像我有了最糟糕的想法,把他們都加入到了集體聊天中。
> And for the first time they thought that something I was involved in was pretty cool.
他們第一次覺得我參與的事情很酷。
> And then a lot of other people thought it was pretty cool too.
然后很多其他人認為這也很酷。
> And so we went from nothing in think it was July of 2010 descending hundreds of thousands of messages a day really really quickly.
因此,我們從無到有地認為,那是 2010 年 7 月,每天減少數十萬條信息的速度非常快。
> We hired a team and we came up with it with a sign that pound sign in retrospect a little embarrassing.
我們雇了一個團隊,我們想出了一個標志-回想起來,那個英鎊標志有點尷尬。
> `[00:10:33]` To Alvin\'s fast slide quickly and I realize that you know the most important thing I could do is get a front row seat on the rocket ship you know and watch as group me grew from 2 people to 15 people to 20 people and then less than a year after with stardate it sold to Skype.
‘
> `[00:10:52]` So after that I went back to laughter.
`[00:10:52]` 那之后,我又笑了起來。
> `[00:10:59]` I went back to college and you know I had such a good experience.
`[00:10:59]` 我回到了大學,你知道我有這么好的經歷。
> I kind of figured what most people would do is double down and go back and work in startups.
我想,大多數人會做的是加倍下來,回到創業公司工作。
> But I fell prey to the peer pressure and I interviewed at banks and consulting firms like everyone else and I realized sitting across the table from all these managing director is there was absolutely nothing I wanted to learn from these people.
但我和其他人一樣,在銀行和咨詢公司接受了同行的壓力采訪,我意識到坐在這些董事總經理的對面,我絕對不想從這些人身上學到任何東西。
> Desolately nothing.
一無所有。
> I sat there and I regurgitated a discounted cash flow function.
我坐在那里,然后恢復了一個貼現現金流函數。
> I learned the night beforehand and even doing it in an interview was just massively painful and figured if that was going to be my life for 18 hours a day for two years I should choose something else to do.
我在前一天晚上就知道了,甚至在一次面試中做這件事也是非常痛苦的,我想,如果這是我每天 18 小時的生活,持續兩年,我應該選擇其他的事情去做。
> `[00:11:39]` But what I also saw was that the skills that I had learned over the past two and a half years while I was a Columbia weren\'t relevant to what mattered in the job market.
`[00:11:39]` 但我也看到,在過去兩年半的時間里,我在哥倫比亞學到的技能與就業市場的重要性無關。
> And I saw that all my friends struggled to find jobs.
我發現我所有的朋友都很難找到工作。
> Two and a friend of mine Ryan at the time was a senior.
當時我的兩個朋友萊恩是個大四學生。
> And all of his friends were trying to find jobs.
他所有的朋友都想找工作。
> And even though they were they were seniors graduating from Columbia a lot of them still struggle because the skills that they were learning weren\'t immediately practical.
盡管他們是從哥倫比亞大學畢業的高年級學生,但他們中的許多人仍然在掙扎,因為他們正在學習的技能并不是立即實用的。
> So I talked to Ryan who at the time probably thought I was crazy and said we should fix this.
所以我和瑞恩談了談,他當時可能覺得我瘋了,說我們應該解決這個問題。
> You know this gap between education and employment and it shouldn\'t be too hard to solve.
你知道教育和就業之間的差距,應該不難解決。
> I sent him an email on the first e-mail that I think kind of really started the company with this headline.
我在第一封電子郵件上給他發了一封電子郵件,我認為這是公司的第一封郵件。
> One other thing that one other thing turned out to be your company.
另一件事,原來是你的公司。
> But we started talking about ways to connect people with skills that would eventually help them find jobs.
但我們開始討論如何將人們的技能聯系起來,從而最終幫助他們找到工作。
> And we realized we should just get started.
我們意識到我們應該開始了。
> We had a lot of free time and nights and weekends.
我們有很多空閑的時間,晚上和周末。
> And so we started building a bunch of different ideas.
所以我們開始建立一系列不同的想法。
> The first one we\'ve always been really great at namings.
第一個我們一直都很擅長命名。
> The first one is called Come recruit us I believe.
第一個叫來招募我們我相信。
> `[00:12:51]` I think we had the dotU.S.
`[00:12:51]` 我想我們有了美國。
> domain name.
域名。
> So we\'re very inventive.
所以我們很有創造力。
> And at the time we figured the best way to connect students with jobs was to have them log in with their Facebook account and just say where they wanted to work.
當時,我們認為最好的辦法是讓學生登錄他們的 Facebook 賬號,然后說出他們想在哪里工作。
> It seemed pretty simple.
看起來很簡單。
> So we built the first version of this in 2011 and we talked to a lot of friends and mentors people who worked at startups before.
因此,我們在 2011 年建立了第一個版本,我們與許多朋友和導師交談,這些人曾在初創公司工作過。
> And all the people that worked at startups looked at us and said This is the dumbest thing I\'ve ever heard.
所有在初創公司工作的人都看著我們說,這是我聽過的最愚蠢的事情。
> We\'re like it\'s OK.
我們就像沒事一樣。
> You\'re not the market for this.
你不是這個的市場。
> So we spoke to our friends a Colombian.
所以我們跟我們的朋友說了一個哥倫比亞人。
> We\'re going to help you get jobs and they all looked at us.
我們會幫你找到工作,他們都看著我們。
> This is the dumbest thing I\'ve ever heard.
這是我聽過的最愚蠢的事。
> It says very very encouraging.
上面寫著很鼓舞人心。
> `[00:13:33]` Horizon and I took that feedback and we said you know well we\'ll roll with this and we\'ll apply to Y Combinator because if no one else thinks our idea is good maybe someone will think it\'s crazy.
`[00:13:33]` Horizon 和我接受了反饋,我們說你知道,我們會接受這一點,我們將申請 Y 組合,因為如果沒有人認為我們的想法是好的,也許有人會認為這是瘋狂的。
> `[00:13:44]` So we filled out a y our Y Combinator application and we asked for some feedback and got some of the best advice I\'ve gotten since we started the company which is we had too many words and not enough information.
`[00:13:44]` 所以我們填寫了一個 Y 組合器應用程序,我們詢問了一些反饋意見,并得到了一些我自創建公司以來得到的最好的建議,那就是我們有太多的單詞而沒有足夠的信息。
> And that was probably because we didn\'t really know what we were building ourself and so we just kind of put a lot of words around around a thing in it.
這可能是因為我們不知道自己在做什么,所以我們就在里面放了很多的話。
> And you know we we applied twice and figured we\'d never ever get in.
你知道我們申請了兩次還以為我們永遠也進不來了。
> Turned out we got an email a couple of weeks later and we were invited to interview.
結果,幾周后我們收到了一封電子郵件,我們被邀請去面試。
> So we flew out to California and we met with all the partners.
所以我們飛到了加利福尼亞,我們會見了所有的合作伙伴。
> And before doing that we landed went to a coffee shop.
在此之前,我們去了一家咖啡店。
> We figured it and put the finishing touches on on the thing that we had built that helped people find jobs through Facebook.
我們意識到了這一點,并對我們建造的幫助人們通過 Facebook 找到工作的東西做了最后的修改。
> `[00:14:27]` And we realized on the plane this amount had an epiphany that this is just a horrible idea.
`[00:14:27]` 我們在飛機上意識到,這是一個可怕的想法。
> Everyone had been talking to us was absolutely right it was just the worst idea ever you know.
每個人都在和我們交談是完全正確的,這是你所知道的最糟糕的想法。
> So at the time we figured well we can hold programmers find jobs that\'s a better niche because we were you know I was learning to program myself.
因此,當時我們認為,我們可以讓程序員找到一個更好的職位,因為我們是,你知道,我正在學習自己編程。
> My co-founder was a programmer.
我的聯合創始人是個程序員。
> We were doing programming challenges.
我們在做編程上的挑戰。
> So we spent the next 48 hours in a café in San Francisco building a way for people to take programming challenges and then find jobs from there and were so focused on building the first prototype of that product that we didn\'t realize we had locked the keys to or Veon be inside or beN.V.
接下來的 48 個小時,我們在舊金山的一家咖啡館里建立了一種方式,讓人們能夠接受編程挑戰,然后在那里找到工作,我們如此專注于制造第一個原型產品,以至于我們沒有意識到我們已經鎖定了通往或 Veon Inside 或 BeN.V 的鑰匙。
> So we went back that night and didn\'t have a place to stay.
所以那天晚上我們回去了,沒有地方住了。
> So next morning we showed up at Y Combinator looking a little raggedy and just a total mess and we figured we walked in.
所以第二天早上,我們出現在 Y Combinator,看起來有點雜亂無章,一團糟,我們想我們走了進去。
> We spoke to the partners for ten minutes and we got question after question but the weird thing was they were answering each other\'s questions so we didn\'t know whether that meant we had a really good idea or a not so good idea and we didn\'t have a chance to demo what we had spent 48 hours building and so on the way out one of the partners tapped us on the shoulders kind of looked at us and said Can you guys even actually program.
我們和合伙人談了十分鐘,我們得到了一個接一個的問題,但奇怪的是,他們正在回答對方的問題,所以我們不知道這是否意味著我們有一個好主意,或者不是一個好主意,我們沒有機會演示我們花了 48 個小時建造的東西,在離開其中一個拍檔的路上,等等。我們在肩膀上看著我們說,你們真的可以編程嗎?
> Kind of like sheepishly nodded and they they didn\'t ask how well the answer was yes.
有點像害羞地點點頭,他們沒有問答案有多好。
> So we left and we said well we blew it and we flew out here we had this big shot.
所以我們離開了,我們說,我們搞砸了,我們飛到這里,我們有這么大的機會。
> We got a lot of questions and we don\'t even get to answer any of them.
我們有很多問題,甚至沒有回答任何一個問題。
> And they don\'t even think we know we\'re doing so which wasn\'t far from the truth at the time.
他們甚至不認為我們知道我們在這么做,這與當時的事實相去甚遠。
> And so we we went from being on a superhigh before interview to super low walking around Palo Alto.
所以我們從面試前的超級興奮變成了在帕洛阿爾托漫步的超低水平。
> And then a few hours later Paul Graham called us and said We\'d like to have you for Y Combinator this year.
幾個小時后,保羅·格雷厄姆打電話給我們,說我們希望今年有你為 Y 組合公司服務。
> I think my answer to him on the phone was like This is the wrong number.
我想我在電話里給他的回答是:這個號碼打錯了。
> How do you do.
你好
> Are you serious.
你是認真的。
> And then I did something smart and I said Can I get back to you which I have no idea what I did when we needed to think about but apparently we did.
然后我做了一件聰明的事,我說,我能回你那里嗎?我不知道當我們需要思考的時候,我做了什么,但很明顯,我們做了。
> So a couple of weeks later we got our first check from my combinator.
幾周后,我們從我的組合器那里得到了第一張支票。
> So the first feeling of like wow we actually made it.
所以第一次感覺就像哇,我們真的做到了。
> Know everyone gets into like nominator instantly successful it\'s like pixie dust.
大家都知道,每個人都像個提名人,很快就成功了,就像精靈塵埃一樣。
> So that\'s what we figured and we moved out to Silicon Valley and we said you know awesome everything set from here on out going to live and work in a sweet office.
這就是我們的想法,我們搬到了硅谷,我們說,從現在開始,一切都很棒,我們要在一間溫馨的辦公室里生活和工作。
> You know you see all these pictures of brick in San Francisco and then we get out there and we crash on the floor of a friend\'s apartment who worked a Palantir.
你知道,你在舊金山看到了所有這些磚頭的照片,然后我們跑到外面,在一位在帕蘭提爾工作的朋友的公寓里撞車。
> And so this was our office and.
所以這是我們的辦公室。
> And where we slept for the first couple of weeks until we realized it\'s not productive when your desk is the box for a coffee machine laughter.
我們在那里睡了幾個星期,直到我們意識到當你的桌子是咖啡機笑的盒子時,它是沒有效率的。
> `[00:17:14]` So we moved into our own office.
`[00:17:14]` 所以我們搬到了自己的辦公室。
> I felt really warm and cozy.
我感到非常溫暖和舒適。
> `[00:17:18]` This `[00:17:18]` is our apartment too.
`[00:17:18]` 這也是我們的公寓。
> You\'ll notice we were really good at namings so the company\'s name is right Zach is my co-founder his name is Ryan and my name is Zach and we figured like very very inventive.
你會注意到我們非常擅長命名,所以公司的名字是對的,扎克是我的聯合創始人,他的名字是 Ryan,我的名字是 Zach,我們覺得很有創意。
> `[00:17:30]` You\'ll see this is a recurring theme we\'ll get back to this.
`[00:17:30]` 你會看到這是一個反復出現的主題,我們將回到這個主題。
> So this was our first office.
這是我們的第一個辦公室。
> And finally we were excited like we\'re doing something right.
最后,我們很興奮,好像我們做了正確的事情。
> We have an office we have an apartment.
我們有辦公室我們有公寓。
> Let\'s prove what we\'re doing shouldn\'t be so hard you know.
讓我們來證明我們所做的不應該那么困難。
> So we spoke to a bunch of a bunch of startups and we said you know we have a way for you to hire more programmers and they said that is awesome.
所以我們采訪了一群初創公司,我們說我們有辦法讓你雇傭更多的程序員,他們說這太棒了。
> The hardest thing we do is hire.
我們做的最困難的事就是雇傭。
> And we can\'t find a way to find people we can\'t find a way to evaluate them.
我們找不到方法去找人,我們也找不到評估他們的方法。
> And so we knew we were on the right track there.
所以我們知道我們在正確的軌道上。
> Now we talked to the programmers and we said we have this really awesome thing.
現在我們和程序員談了談,我們說我們有一件很棒的事情。
> We will help you get jobs and you know just to do it.
我們會幫助你找到工作,你知道只是為了做這件事。
> You just have to do these fun challenges.
你只需要做這些有趣的挑戰。
> And they had absolutely no interest in what we were building.
他們對我們的建筑毫無興趣。
> Went to a Y Combinator dinner and they were all like you know we just started a company and I see and I still get 50 linked and e-mail requests everyday like why am I going to mess around on your on your garbage platform.
參加了一次 Y 組合晚宴,他們都覺得我們剛剛成立了一家公司,我看到了,我每天都會收到 50 個鏈接和電子郵件請求,為什么我要在你的垃圾平臺上亂搞呢?
> So we went back to the drawing board.
所以我們又回到了畫板上。
> And you\'ll notice this is not the first time we went back to the drawing board.
你會注意到這不是我們第一次回到畫板上。
> But this time it wasn\'t just metaphorical and we didn\'t go back to the original concept that we had of helping people learn skills to find jobs.
但這一次,這不僅僅是比喻,我們沒有回到最初的概念,我們有幫助人們學習技能,以找到工作。
> Instead we basically became random startup idea generators.
相反,我們基本上變成了隨機的啟動想法生成器。
> So here\'s a few of our ideas you\'ll notice some of them are really good like building a CRM for club promoters luridly if you spun like a jackpot wheel you would not get anything as crazy as what we were coming up with.
因此,我們的一些想法,你會注意到,其中一些是非常好的,比如為俱樂部的發起者建立一個客戶關系管理系統(CRM),如果你像一個頭獎的輪子一樣旋轉,你就不會得到任何我們想出來的瘋狂的東西。
> So we kind of sat there and were like Well unclear what we\'re doing but we\'re in Y Combinator and we have a hundred seventy thousand dollars so that\'s cool.
所以我們坐在那里,好像不清楚我們在做什么,但是我們在 Y 組合望遠鏡里,我們有 17 萬美元,所以這很酷。
> And there\'s two of us and we figure we can move in with friends.
我們兩個人可以搬去和朋友住。
> We could eat ramen and we would have five years of burn just work on your hands for club promoters all day.
我們可以吃拉面,我們會有五年的燒傷,只是在你的手上為俱樂部的發起人整天工作。
> So we were determined.
所以我們下定決心。
> Not to fail.
不要失敗。
> And I remember going to office hours with Sam Altman and Sam and called us.
我記得和山姆·奧爾特曼和山姆一起去上班的時候打電話給我們。
> You know the worst the worst ratio of intelligence to ideas.
你知道智力和思想之間最糟糕的比例。
> So smart but such stupid ideas.
如此聰明但如此愚蠢的想法。
> `[00:19:36]` So every night we\'d go home and I\'d sit there and run.
`[00:19:36]` 所以每天晚上我們回家,我就坐在那里跑步。
> I would write code for one of these ideas and we\'d get super super frustrated both with what we were building.
我會為其中一個想法編寫代碼,我們會對我們正在構建的內容感到非常沮喪。
> But for me without a formal programming background I had takenC.S.
但對我來說,沒有正式的編程背景,我就上了 C.S。
> one on one when I was a Columbia.
我還是哥倫比亞大學的時候一對一。
> I had read a couple of those for Dummies books.
我讀了幾本關于啞劇的書。
> And Ryan had actually started an organization on campus in Columbia to teach people how to program.
瑞安在哥倫比亞大學成立了一個組織,教人們如何編程。
> And so in the process I was learning the skills I needed to do my job basically.
所以在這個過程中,我學到了做我的工作所需要的技能。
> And so we started kind of came back to where we started which is can we teach people the most important skill they need to find a job in the 21st century which was programming and we had sort of patient zero which is me if I could learn how to program well then probably a couple older people could use it too.
于是我們又回到了起點,我們可以教人們在 21 世紀找到一份工作所需要的最重要的技能,那就是編程,我們的病人是零,如果我能學會編程,那么也許有幾個年紀大的人也會用到它。
> And this was around 3 to 4 weeks before Demo Day.
這大約是演示日前的 3 到 4 周。
> At this point.
在這一點上。
> And so we started building the first version of Code Academy and we spoke to a couple of the partners NYC and some investors and again you\'ll notice this is a common refrain.
于是我們開始建造第一個版本的代碼學院,我們和紐約的幾個合作伙伴以及一些投資者進行了交談,你會再次注意到這是一個常見的重復。
> They told us it was really stupid.
他們告訴我們這真的很蠢。
> And a lot of them told us that there were only 100000 employed programmers in the US.
他們中的很多人告訴我們,在美國只有 100000 名受雇的程序員。
> Like there\'s just no market for something that teaches people to program.
就像沒有什么市場可以教人們編程。
> People are not interested in programming and never will be.
人們對編程不感興趣,而且永遠也不會感興趣。
> That was something we heard a couple times.
我們聽過幾次了。
> `[00:21:01]` But this time you knew something was different.
`[00:21:01]` 但這一次你知道有什么不一樣的。
> Ryan and I were super interested in what we were doing mostly because we were building for me and based on Ryan\'s experience.
萊恩和我對我們正在做的事情非常感興趣,主要是因為我們是為我而建的,而且是基于瑞安的經驗。
> And so we\'d go home every night worked all the time.
所以我們每天晚上都回家工作。
> We did some research for some of the fundamental pieces of code Kadam Ryan still tries to convince me that playing Farmville counted as research for how he eventually built the gamification Antica Academy.
我們對一些基本代碼進行了一些研究,KadamRyan 仍然試圖說服我,扮演 Farmville 是他如何最終建立游戲化 Antica 學院的研究。
> `[00:21:26]` I think he was addicted.
`[00:21:26]` 我想他上癮了。
> `[00:21:29]` And then we showed the first version of code academy to a lot of investors and everyone at Y Combinator and the line that people generally use is you should be embarrassed when you launch for the first time.
`[00:21:29]` 然后我們向許多投資者和 Y Combinator 的每個人展示了代碼學院的第一版,人們通常使用的是當你第一次啟動時應該感到尷尬。
> But what people told us was you should be embarrassed when you launch for the first time.
但人們告訴我們的是,當你第一次發射的時候,你應該感到尷尬。
> Not this embarrassed it\'s like you know who Facebook get out was what we were told.
這并不是讓我們尷尬的\就像你知道 Facebook 會把誰弄出來,這是我們被告知的。
> So you know we went back and I played with it a couple times.
所以你知道我們回去玩了幾次。
> `[00:21:55]` This is made for me and it works for me and I know javascript now.
`[00:21:55]` 這是為我做的,它為我工作,我現在知道 javascript 了。
> So we\'re doing something right and I really like the experience.
所以我們做的很對,我真的很喜歡這樣的經歷。
> And this is another thing we learned again as as I learned in the group me instance it\'s much easier when you\'re building for yourself.
這是我們再次學到的另一件事,就像我在小組中學到的那樣,當你為自己而建的時候,這件事會容易得多。
> All these people we were showing Code Academy.
所有這些人都是我們展示給代碼學院的。
> You didn\'t get it because they knew how to program.
你不明白是因為他們知道怎么編程。
> But I didn\'t.
但我沒有。
> So this was the one of the first early versions of Code Academy.
這是代碼學院最早的版本之一。
> You know you learn in line learning by doing.
你知道你是通過做來學習的。
> And there\'s no video and no boring books you have to read it\'s all instantaneous feedback.
沒有視頻,也沒有無聊的書,你必須閱讀它,所有這些都是即時反饋。
> And so we launched Code Academy and we left we left the apartment.
于是我們開辦了密碼學院然后離開了公寓。
> Right and I bet that there wouldn\'t be more than 50 people on the site at the same time that day and we installed HRP and we left to get bagels.
沒錯,我敢打賭,當天同一時間,網站上不會有超過 50 人,我們安裝了 HRP,然后我們離開去買百吉餅。
> We got to the bagel store and my phone started going off because there were 1000 people on the site at the same time with something that we had built basically for like me and my mom to use.
我們到了百吉餅店,我的手機開始響了,因為網站上同時有 1000 人,我們為我和我的媽媽做了一些基本的東西。
> `[00:22:52]` And we noticed stuff like this on Reddit where people just had no idea how to how to program before how to learn this skill and all of a sudden we made it easy for them.
`[00:22:52]` 我們在 Reddit 上注意到了這樣的事情,人們在學習這種技能之前根本不知道如何編程,突然之間,我們讓他們變得很容易。
> `[00:23:01]` And that was super super empowering.
`[00:23:01]` 那是超級授權。
> Turns out that wasn\'t an isolated case.
事實證明那不是一個孤立的案子。
> This is Ryan with our Torpey dashboard that day you\'ll notice we actually broke the chart it\'s manometer because so many people were on the site at the same time.
這是瑞安和我們的 Torpey 儀表板,那天你會注意到,我們實際上打破了圖表,它的壓力表,因為這么多的人在同一時間在網站上。
> And so immediately we basically went from being the least popular company in Y Combinator that summer where you know three weeks beforehand we actually suggested to us that we just not demo Demo Day because you know you don\'t have an idea.
因此,我們很快就從 Y Combinator 的最不受歡迎的公司發展到了那個夏天,在那里,你知道三個星期前,我們實際上建議我們不要演示日,因為你知道你沒有什么想法。
> You haven\'t built anything.
你什么都沒做。
> It\'s not possible to make anything in three weeks.
三周內做什么都不可能。
> Not plausible.
不可信。
> So we built something anyway and we were the fastest growing Y Combinator company at that time.
所以我們建立了一些東西,我們當時是發展最快的 Y 組合公司。
> And this was sort of the bullet point was you know we we taught people to program.
這就是我們教人們編程的重點。
> And finally we had the data that millions of people do want to learn programming and we were the answer and this was the slide the two of us used to talk about ourselves.
最后,我們得到了數以百萬計的人想要學習編程的數據,我們就是答案,這是我們倆過去常談論自己的幻燈片。
> `[00:23:53]` Look a little young and we went from having no one to pay attention to us and no one returning our cold e-mails to investors texting me and saying they actually had a dream about Code Academy.
`[00:23:53]` 看上去有點年輕,我們從沒有人關注我們,也沒有人回復我們冰冷的電子郵件給投資者發短信給我,說他們真的做了一個關于代碼學院的夢。
> It turns out I thought it like this whole thing was a dream is like we\'re still eating Rahmon and like nothing you know is not possible to a few weeks later we closed our series with the gentleman who just was on stage with Fred and in Union Square Ventures and we moved back to New York and we actually went to an AGM to verify it was like this cannot be real.
原來我以為整件事都是個夢,就像我們還在吃拉赫蒙一樣,就像什么都不可能,直到幾周后,我們結束了與弗雷德和聯合廣場風投剛剛上臺的這位先生的系列賽,我們搬回了紐約,我們去了一家 AGM 公司,證實這一切都是不可能的。
> Well how is this money in her bank account.
她銀行賬戶里的錢是怎么回事。
> So armed with two and a half million dollars in on cloud nine after raising our series we set about building a company.
所以在云 9 上裝備了 250 萬美元,在我們的系列節目中,我們開始建立一家公司。
> But we realized it pays to be a cockroach.
但我們意識到做蟑螂是值得的。
> And by that I mean it pays just to not stop and just to not die like we thought everything along the way it tried to kill us.
我的意思是,不停止,不像我們所想的那樣死亡,這是值得的,因為它一直想要殺死我們。
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> Like all of our friends were like startups are dumb.
就像我們所有的朋友一樣,創業公司是愚蠢的。
> Your dumb your ideas are dumb.
你的愚蠢,你的想法是愚蠢的。
> And we kind of just looked at all of them and said whatever and build Code Academy it pays not to quit.
我們只是看了看所有的人,說了什么就建代碼學院,不放棄是值得的。
> `[00:25:07]` So after moving back to New York we thought like we\'re on cloud 9 we have all this money all these people on our Web site.
`[00:25:07]` 所以搬回紐約后,我們以為我們就像在云端一樣,我們有這么多錢,所有這些人都在我們的網站上。
> Turns out that last part was not true because all those people were on our Web site because we were on tech crunch.
最后一部分并不是真的,因為所有的人都在我們的網站上,因為我們處于技術危機中。
> And so hopefully some of you are familiar with the Tech Crunch of initiation.
所以希望你們中的一些人熟悉印心的技術。
> Riegert super popular and then you at the drop of sorrow where everything\'s miserable.
里格特超級受歡迎,然后你在悲傷的點滴里,一切都很悲慘。
> And we had that and we went back and we tried to hot fire find more people to join the team.
我們有這樣的想法,我們回去了,我們努力尋找更多的人加入我們的隊伍。
> We interviewed 100 people before hiring our first person.
在雇用第一個人之前,我們采訪了 100 人。
> That is an exercise in frustration.
這是一種挫折感。
> So we realized startups really are a roller coaster.
所以我們意識到初創公司真的是過山車。
> You know we went from getting into Y Combinator and thinking success was a sure thing too.
你知道,我們從進入 Y 組合,并認為成功也是肯定的事情。
> Two weeks later realizing we didn\'t have an idea to eventually going back to the original idea that we had and finding the right implementation of it.
兩周后,我們意識到我們沒有辦法最終回到原來的想法,并找到正確的實現。
> And the thing is that startups are much easier to deal with when you actually care about what you\'re doing.
問題是,當你真正關心自己在做什么的時候,創業公司更容易處理。
> So now every morning we wake up read the newspaper and you see that a year after they graduate more than 50 percent ofU.S.
所以,每天早上,我們醒來,讀報紙,你會發現,在他們畢業一年后,美國有超過 50%的人畢業。
> college students are unemployed or underemployed that by 2020 there\'s going to be more than a million open programming jobs.
大學生失業或就業不足,到 2020 年,將有 100 多萬個開放式編程工作。
> If education keeps going at the same speed and this is really motivating for us because this is a massive problem because the world companies won\'t grow as fast as they can.
如果教育繼續以同樣的速度發展,而這對我們來說確實是激勵因素,因為這是一個巨大的問題,因為世界企業不會像他們所能的那樣快速增長。
> People won\'t have jobs if we don\'t exist.
如果我們不存在,人們就不會有工作。
> And to this day in a more than 24 million people have used code academy is something that we started building in our dorm room at Columbia and then built in California and now proudly build in New York.
直到今天,超過 2400 萬人使用了代碼學院,這是我們在哥倫比亞大學的宿舍里開始建造的,然后在加利福尼亞建造,現在紐約自豪地建造。
> More than 24 million people have used something that we built.
超過 2400 萬人使用了我們建造的東西。
> But what matters most is the stories of the people that use it.
但最重要的是使用它的人的故事。
> People like Ryan who a year and a half ago had absolutely no idea how to program learned on code academy built an app called circuit that was featured as one of Time\'s best Web sites of 2013.
像瑞安這樣的人,一年半前完全不知道如何在代碼學院上編程學習,他們創建了一個名為電路的應用程序,它被列為 2013 年時代最好的網站之一。
> And then two weeks ago Ryan sold his company.
兩周前 Ryan 賣掉了他的公司。
> So he went from knowing absolutely nothing to a year and a half later building a company and a startup in a product and selling it there there\'s people like Amy who at 13 started learning to program on code academy.
因此,他從完全一無所知到一年半后,在一家公司和一家初創公司中建立了一家產品,并在那里銷售,就像艾米這樣的人,他們在 13 歲時就開始學習在代碼學院編程。
> And by the time she was 14 the EU and called her the European Digital girl of the year because she spoke all over Europe telling everyone how important programming was for the future.
當她 14 歲的時候,歐盟稱她為年度歐洲數字女孩,因為她在歐洲各地發表演講,告訴每個人編程對未來是多么重要。
> So hopefully a couple of things you guys will take away from today\'s talk.
所以希望你們能從今天的談話中拿走一些東西。
> First you shouldn\'t make excuses to get started.
首先,你不應該找借口開始工作。
> It\'s really simple.
真的很簡單。
> You have the internet which is the biggest distribution engine ever and the tools is all you need is a web browser and a text editor should optimize everything you do for learning.
你有一個互聯網,它是有史以來最大的發行引擎,你所需要的工具就是一個網絡瀏覽器,文本編輯器應該優化你為學習所做的一切。
> You get a front row seat on a rocket ship so you know what it\'s like to build a company and we\'re hiring if you want us to be that rocket ship.
你在火箭飛船上有一個前排座位,所以你知道建立一家公司的感覺,如果你想讓我們成為火箭飛船的話,我們會雇用你的。
> You should realize that startups are a roller coaster and you should never ever give up.
你應該意識到創業是一種過山車,你永遠不應該放棄。
> And lastly you should be passionate about what you\'re working on because that will make all the difference.
最后,你應該對你正在做的事情充滿激情,因為這會讓一切都變得不同。
> Maybe the most important thing I\'ve learned after doing this for a few years and speaking a few times and speaking with a couple other people that speak is that everyone here has no idea what they\'re doing.
也許在做了幾年之后,我學到的最重要的一件事就是,每個人都不知道自己在做什么。
> And so even as you get further along and you build a startup you realize that startups are hard and there are new challenges at every step along the way.
因此,即使你走得更遠,創建了一家創業公司,你也會意識到創業很艱難,而且在創業過程中的每一步都會遇到新的挑戰。
> So despite the fact that none of us quite know what we\'re doing yet you don\'t know until you try.
所以,盡管我們中沒有一個人很清楚自己在做什么,但在你嘗試之前,你還不知道自己在做什么。
> So thank you.
所以謝謝你。
- Zero to One 從0到1 | Tony翻譯版
- Ch1: The Challenge of the Future
- Ch2: Party like it’s 1999
- Ch3: All happy companies are different
- Ch4: The ideology of competition
- Ch6: You are not a lottery ticket
- Ch7: Follow the money
- Ch8: Secrets
- Ch9: Foundations
- Ch10: The Mechanics of Mafia
- Ch11: 如果你把產品做好,顧客們會來嗎?
- Ch12: 人與機器
- Ch13: 展望綠色科技
- Ch14: 創始人的潘多拉魔盒
- YC 創業課 2012 中文筆記
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2012
- Travis Kalanick at Startup School 2012
- Tom Preston Werner at Startup School 2012
- Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2012
- Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012
- Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012
- Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012
- David Rusenko at Startup School 2012
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School 2012
- 斯坦福 CS183b YC 創業課文字版
- 關于 Y Combinator
- 【創業百道節選】如何正確的閱讀創業雞湯
- YC 創業第一課:你真的愿意創業嗎
- YC 創業第二課:團隊與執行
- YC 創業第三課:與直覺對抗
- YC 創業第四課:如何積累初期用戶
- YC 創業第五課:失敗者才談競爭
- YC 創業第六課:沒有留存率不要談推廣
- YC 創業第七課:與你的用戶談戀愛
- YC 創業第八課:創業要學會吃力不討好
- YC 創業第九課:投資是極端的游戲
- YC 創業第十課:企業文化決定命運
- YC 創業第11課:企業文化需培育
- YC 創業第12課:來開發企業級產品吧
- YC 創業第13課,創業者的條件
- YC 創業第14課:像個編輯一樣去管理
- YC 創業第15課:換位思考
- YC 創業第16課:如何做用戶調研
- YC 創業第17課:Jawbone 不是硬件公司
- YC 創業第18課:劃清個人與公司的界限
- YC 創業第19課(上):銷售如漏斗
- YC 創業第19課(下):與投資人的兩分鐘
- YC 創業第20課:不再打磨產品
- YC 創業課 2013 中文筆記
- Balaji Srinivasan at Startup School 2013
- Chase Adam at Startup School 2013
- Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013
- Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013
- Diane Greene at Startup School 2013
- Jack Dorsey at Startup School 2013
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2013
- Nate Blecharczyk at Startup School 2013
- Office Hours at Startup School 2013 with Paul Graham and Sam Altman
- Phil Libin at Startup School 2013
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2013
- 斯坦福 CS183c 閃電式擴張中文筆記
- 1: 家庭階段
- 2: Sam Altman
- 3: Michael Dearing
- 4: The hunt of ThunderLizards 尋找閃電蜥蜴
- 5: Tribe
- 6: Code for America
- 7: Minted
- 8: Google
- 9: Village
- 10: SurveyMonkey
- 11: Stripe
- 12: Nextdoor
- 13: YouTube
- 14: Theranos
- 15: VMware
- 16: Netflix
- 17: Yahoo
- 18: Airbnb
- 19: LinkedIn
- YC 創業課 SV 2014 中文筆記
- Andrew Mason at Startup School SV 2014
- Ron Conway at Startup School SV 2014
- Danae Ringelmann at Startup School SV 2014
- Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014
- Eric Migicovsky at Startup School SV 2014
- Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014
- Jessica Livingston Introduces Startup School SV 2014
- Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014
- Kevin Systrom at Startup School SV 2014
- Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar at Startup School SV 2014
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014
- YC 創業課 NY 2014 中文筆記
- Apoorva Mehta at Startup School NY 2014
- Chase Adam at Startup School NY 2014
- Closing Remarks at Startup School NY 2014
- David Lee at Startup School NY 2014
- Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014
- Introduction at Startup School NY 2014
- Kathryn Minshew at Startup School NY 2014
- Office Hours at Startup School NY 2014
- Shana Fisher at Startup School NY 2014
- Zach Sims at Startup School NY 2014
- YC 創業課 EU 2014 中文筆記
- Adora Cheung
- Alfred Lin with Justin Kan
- Hiroki Takeuchi
- Ian Hogarth
- Introduction by Kirsty Nathoo
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar
- Patrick Collison
- Paul Buchheit
- Urska Srsen
- Y Combinator Partners Q&A
- YC 創業課 2016 中文筆記
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School SV 2016
- Chad Rigetti at Startup School SV 2016
- MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016
- Office Hours with Kevin Hale and Qasar Younis at Startup School SV 2016
- Ooshma Garg at Startup School SV 2016
- Pitch Practice with Paul Buchheit and Sam Altman at Startup School SV 2016
- Q&A with YC Partners at Startup School SV 2016
- Reham Fagiri and Kalam Dennis at Startup School SV 2016
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016
- 斯坦福 CS183f YC 創業課 2017 中文筆記
- How and Why to Start A Startup
- Startup Mechanics
- How to Get Ideas and How to Measure
- How to Build a Product I
- How to Build a Product II
- How to Build a Product III
- How to Build a Product IV
- How to Invent the Future I
- How to Invent the Future II
- How to Find Product Market Fit
- How to Think About PR
- Diversity & Inclusion at Early Stage Startups
- How to Build and Manage Teams
- How to Raise Money, and How to Succeed Long-Term
- YC 創業課 2018 中文筆記
- Sam Altman - 如何成功創業
- Carolynn Levy、Jon Levy 和 Jason Kwon - 初創企業法律機制
- 與 Paul Graham 的對話 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Michael Seibel - 構建產品
- David Rusenko - 如何找到適合產品市場的產品
- Suhail Doshi - 如何測量產品
- Gustaf Alstromer - 如何獲得用戶和發展
- Garry Tan - 初創企業設計第 2 部分
- Kat Manalac 和 Craig Cannon - 用于增長的公關+內容
- Tyler Bosmeny - 如何銷售
- Ammon Bartram 和 Harj Taggar - 組建工程團隊
- Dalton Caldwell - 如何在 Y Combinator 上申請和成功
- Patrick Collison - 運營你的創業公司
- Geoff Ralston - 籌款基礎
- Kirsty Nathoo - 了解保險箱和定價股票輪
- Aaron Harris - 如何與投資者會面并籌集資金
- Paul Buchheit 的 1000 億美元之路
- PMF 后:人員、客戶、銷售
- 與 Oshma Garg 的對話 - 由 Adora Cheung 主持
- 與 Aileen Lee 的對話 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Garry Tan - 初創企業設計第 1 部分
- 與 Elizabeth Iorns 的對話 - 生物技術創始人的建議
- 與 Eric Migicovsky 的硬技術對話
- 與 Elad Gil 的對話
- 與 Werner Vogels 的對話
- YC 創業課 2019 中文筆記
- Kevin Hale - 如何評估創業思路:第一部分
- Eric Migicovsky - 如何與用戶交談
- Ali Rowghani - 如何領導
- Kevin Hale 和 Adora Cheung - 數字初創學校 2019
- Geoff Ralston - 拆分建議
- Michael Seibel - 如何計劃 MVP
- Adora Cheung - 如何設定關鍵績效指標和目標
- Ilya Volodarsky - 初創企業分析
- Anu Hariharan - 九種商業模式和投資者想要的指標
- Anu Hariharan 和 Adora Cheung - 投資者如何衡量創業公司 Q&A
- Kat Manalac - 如何啟動(續集)
- Gustaf Alstromer - 新興企業的成長
- Kirsty Nathoo - 創業財務陷阱以及如何避免它們
- Kevin Hale - 如何一起工作
- Tim Brady - 構建文化
- Dalton Caldwell - 關于樞軸的一切
- Kevin Hale - 如何提高轉化率
- Kevin Hale - 創業定價 101
- Adora Cheung - 如何安排時間
- Kevin Hale - 如何評估創業思路 2
- Carolynn Levy - 現代創業融資
- Jared Friedman - 硬技術和生物技術創始人的建議