# Alfred Lin with Justin Kan > `[00:00:02]` Next up I\'m pleased to introduce Alfred Lynn who\'s a partner at Sequoia Capital One of the top investors in Silicon Valley and the world. `[00:00:02]` 下一節我很高興地介紹阿爾弗雷德·林恩，他是紅杉資本的合伙人，是硅谷和世界頂級投資者之一。 > He serves as a director on a bunch of awesome Silicon Valley companies like Airbnb Inbee and house. 他是一群令人敬畏的硅谷公司的董事，比如 Airbnb、In 蜜蜂和 House。 > And before that he was the CFO of Zappos. 在此之前，他是 Zappos 的首席財務官。 > Worked in startups for a long time. 在初創公司工作了很長時間。 > So we\'ll have a chat. 那我們就聊聊吧。 > Over here. 在這邊。 > `[00:00:37]` Thanks Justin. `[00:00:37]` 謝謝賈斯汀。 > Thanks for having me. 謝謝你邀請我。 > All right cool. 好酷。 > Thanks for being here. 謝謝你能來這里。 > So. 所以 > Let\'s just start off in the early days and tell us like how you got started with your first startup at an exchange. 讓我們從早期開始，告訴我們你是如何在交易所第一家創業的。 > `[00:00:51]` So I knew Tony and Sandra in college. `[00:00:51]` 所以我在大學認識托尼和桑德拉。 > And originally Tony. 原來是托尼。 > So I came out to the Bay Area one year before Tony. 所以我比托尼早一年來到灣區。 > He had originally wanted to scope out a place on campus at Stanford to open up a Subway\'s franchise because he was always into food. 他原本想在斯坦福大學的校園里找個地方開一家地鐵專賣店，因為他總是喜歡吃東西。 > Before that he and I had met through his pizza business and I told him I\'m sorry there\'s already one on University Avenue happened to be a half mile away from the university but the union and at the time the university would not allow commercial entities to be on campus. 在那之前，他和我是通過他的披薩生意認識的，我告訴他，我很抱歉，在大學大道上已經有一個了，正好離大學只有半英里遠，但是工會和當時的大學不允許商業實體在校園里。 > I said you know what. 我說了你知道嗎。 > When you come out you\'re going to have to do something else. 當你出來的時候，你將不得不做些別的事情。 > So he and Sanjay came out to the Bay Area. 于是他和桑杰來到海灣地區。 > They were working for Oracle and they were extremely bored so they started a company on their side. 他們為甲骨文工作，非常無聊，所以他們在自己的公司里創立了一家公司。 > `[00:01:43]` Building Web sites and they had built these Web sites. `[00:01:43]` 建立網站，他們建立了這些網站。 > They had put their hearts and souls into making them beautiful at the time. 他們用他們的心靈和靈魂使他們在當時美麗。 > This is 1996 97 so now a lot of people knew how to code an HMO. 這是 1996 年的 97 年，現在很多人都知道如何編碼 HMO 了。 > And they were solving a problem that a lot of people wanted a website because the Web was coming up to speed and they built these great websites. 他們解決了一個很多人都想要一個網站的問題，因為網絡正在加速發展，他們建立了這些偉大的網站。 > But there was no traffic. 但是沒有交通。 > So they like GS spent all this time on this. 所以他們喜歡 GS 花了這么長時間在這上面。 > And so how do we get these Web sites to get traffic. 那么，我們如何才能讓這些網站獲得流量。 > And one of if you had Bhoja you can go. 如果你有 Bhoja 你就可以走了。 > Buy advertising on Yahoo or AOL Amazon at that time. 在那個時候購買雅虎或 AOL 亞馬遜的廣告。 > But if you\'re a small Web site how do you get traffic and that\'s the problem that they. 但是，如果你是一個小網站，你如何獲得流量，這就是他們的問題。 > Experience and the problem that they went out solving and so they left these websites together. 經驗和他們出去解決的問題，所以他們離開這些網站在一起。 > And so. 而且如此。 > That became like an interesting thing and they link them so that if you showed a banner on your site you\'d get to show a banner somewhere else on the network and as the network grew the network became more and more powerful because of network effects. 這就像一件有趣的事情，他們把它們連接起來，如果你在你的網站上展示了一個橫幅，你就可以在網絡上的其他地方展示一個橫幅，隨著網絡的發展，網絡變得越來越強大，因為網絡效應。 > And we had some pretty interesting companies that were part of that network. 我們有一些非常有趣的公司也是這個網絡的一部分。 > And when we sold the company to Microsoft it arguably had the largest audience on the web at the time. 當我們把公司賣給微軟時，它可以說是當時網絡上最大的受眾。 > `[00:02:55]` How did we get you to join an exchange that was the conversation. `[00:02:55]` 我們是如何讓你參加一次交流的，那是我們的談話。 > What were you doing. 你當時在做什么。 > Well I was. 我曾經是。 > `[00:03:02]` I was in a PHC program and statistics. `[00:03:02]` 我在 PHC 程序和統計中。 > And as Tony would like to say that\'s like watching paint dry on the wall in the dark. 正如托尼想說的那樣，這就像在黑暗中看著墻上的油漆干了一樣。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > `[00:03:14]` And look I love numbers and I and I really enjoyed what I was studying. `[00:03:14]` 看，我喜歡數字，我真的很喜歡我正在學習的東西。 > But I did have a passion for business. 但我對生意很有熱情。 > And my parents being very traditional Asian parents had this hierarchy of jobs that you can get one the highest. 我的父母是一個非常傳統的亞洲父母，他們的工作等級是最高的。 > Type of job you can do is to be a scholar and contribute to society. 你所能做的工作就是成為一名學者，為社會做出貢獻。 > `[00:03:33]` Then if you can\'t do that then be a doctor and then if you can\'t do that be a lawyer if you can\'t do that be an engineer and all the way down on the list is to be in business. `[00:03:33]` 如果你不能那么做，那你就當醫生，如果你不能做律師，如果你做不到，那就做一名工程師。 > It was a hard conversation with my parents for me to leave myPh.D. 我要離開博士學位對我來說和父母的談話很難。 > program but I know Antonians Aunger for a long time and there were people that I bonded with in college and so they needed someone who could work on the finance side. 但是我認識安東尼·安格爾很長一段時間，我在大學里和一些人建立了聯系，所以他們需要一個能在金融方面工作的人。 > And I told them I had no experience in finance but I\'m happy to learn. 我告訴他們我沒有金融方面的經驗，但我很高興學習。 > `[00:04:02]` I\'m good with numbers and I became finance and Link Exchange. `[00:04:02]` 我對數字很在行，我成了金融和鏈接交換。 > `[00:04:08]` And how did you guys in the early days give your initial customers like what was that when you decide to do an exchange. `[00:04:08]` 在最初的日子里，你們是怎么給你們最初的顧客的，就像你們決定交換的時候是什么樣子的。 > What was the process like to actually build it into big company. 把它建設成大公司的過程是什么樣子的。 > `[00:04:16]` Well so they had a net. `[00:04:16]` 那么他們就有了網。 > They had an initial Web sites that they had already built. 他們已經建立了一個最初的網站。 > That was part of the sort of thing that basically pivoted their way. 這是那種基本上按自己的方式旋轉的東西的一部分。 > It was a nice little side business by being able to charge per hour to create these Web sites whereas not very scalable and then decided you know what we\'re get for all this money we can forego all of that and we\'re going to just try to get people to join that network and back. 這是一項不錯的小生意，它可以每小時收費來創建這些網站，但并不能很好地擴展，然后你決定你知道我們從所有這些錢中得到了什么，我們可以放棄所有這些，我們只想讓人們加入這個網絡，然后再回來。 > And there is this directory called Yahoo. 還有一個叫做 Yahoo 的目錄。 > So they went down to some of these Web sites that were very popular and reached the popular ranks in Yahoo. 因此，他們進入了一些非常受歡迎的網站，并進入了雅虎的受歡迎行列。 > And they just contacted them and asked them Would you like more promotion. 他們只是聯系了他們，問他們你想要更多的晉升。 > And of course everybody would say yes. 當然每個人都會答應。 > And they joined the network up more and more powerful and it got easier and easier to sell the next company to join because of network effects your arguably better off joining leik exchange. 他們加入了網絡，越來越強大，出售下一家公司加入變得越來越容易，因為網絡效應，你可以說加入萊克交易所更好。 > You know after that the last person joined. 你知道在那之后最后一個人加入了。 > And so one of the more interesting things is. 所以更有趣的是。 > The one of the very early. 很早的那個。 > People who joined was a company called Auction Web. 加入的人是一家叫做“拍賣網”的公司。 > Nobody probably ever heard of AuctionWatch but if you go to Wikipedia and look up eBay you\'ll see in the very early days their original name was AuctionWatch. 也許沒人聽說過 AuctionWatch，但是如果你去維基百科查閱 eBay，你會發現在早期你會看到他們最初的名字是 AuctionWatch。 > So even companies like eBay need a promotion. 所以即使像 eBay 這樣的公司也需要升職。 > Back then of course they\'re worth 65 billion dollars and we were only able to sell the company for 265 no and so. 當然，當時他們的身價為 650 億美元，我們只能以 265 英鎊的價格出售該公司，諸如此類。 > They had a much better business. 他們的生意好多了。 > `[00:05:49]` How did how did you guys end up having that conversation about selling the company wants you. `[00:05:49]` 你們怎么會有關于出售公司想要的你的談話呢？ > You have this business that was generating revenue and. 你有一項能創造收入的生意。 > How do you decide what you wanted to do with it. 你怎么決定你想用它做什么。 > `[00:05:59]` Thank you is our first company we had. `[00:05:59]` 謝謝你是我們的第一家公司。 > Tony has been very public about this in his book. 托尼在他的書中對這件事非常公開。 > We had hired people that were. 我們雇了以前的人。 > In it to basically let\'s call it murse mercenaries. 基本上讓我們稱其為雇傭兵。 > They wanted to sort of. 他們想說的是。 > Join the company because it was a rocket ship. 加入公司是因為它是一艘火箭飛船。 > The metrics looked exponential from the growth perspective and they were trying to build enough business so they can monetize. 從增長的角度來看，這些指標看上去是指數級的，他們正試圖建立足夠的業務，以便能夠實現貨幣化。 > The. 這，這個，那，那個 > Company. 連在一起。 > And. 和 > Day by day went by and the place became less and less fun. 日復一日，這個地方變得越來越不好玩了。 > To work at. 去工作。 > And we had decided that you know what this is our first company and it was a good offer and we decide to sell the company. 我們已經決定，你知道這是我們的第一家公司，這是一個很好的報價，我們決定出售該公司。 > And arguably we sold the company to too early and. 可以說我們把公司賣得太早了。 > `[00:06:49]` It was a difficult decision but I think everybody was pretty happy after the fact because we all got to do what we wanted to do. `[00:06:49]` 這是一個艱難的決定，但我認為每個人都很高興，因為我們都要做我們想做的事。 > Tony and I started at the very early days of the startup was a lot of fun. 我和托尼在創業初期就開始了，非常有趣。 > So we after we sold the company to Microsoft. 所以我們把公司賣給微軟之后。 > We left and started a small Angel Fund called Venture Frogs in 1999. 1999 年，我們離開并成立了一個名為“風險青蛙”的小天使基金。 > Probably the worst time ever to start a fund. 可能是啟動基金的最糟糕的時候了。 > Right before the dot com crash. 就在網絡崩潰之前。 > `[00:07:14]` But you know we got I wouldn\'t say that we were smart we just got lucky because we invest in some pretty amazing companies like Astley\'s and Open Table and a few others that got sold pretty quickly in 1999 2000 and then we made 27 investments. `[00:07:14]` 但是你知道，我不會說我們很聰明，我們只是運氣好，因為我們投資了一些非常棒的公司，比如 Astley‘s 和 Open Table，還有幾家在 1999 到 2000 年很快賣出的公司，然后我們進行了 27 次投資。 > We went through a fund we were supposed to invest that fund over a two or three years. 我們經歷了一只我們應該在兩三年內投資的基金。 > We invested then and I think in nine months another not such great idea. 我們當時進行了投資，我認為在九個月內，另一個不太好的主意。 > `[00:07:45]` But we were left in 2000 2001 with basically a portfolio of 20 companies seven of them. `[00:07:45]` 但我們在 2000 年留下的基本上是 20 家公司，其中 7 家。 > We thought we were going to war sold or we\'re going to do fine without us. 我們以為我們要去打仗，被賣了，或者沒有我們，我們會過得很好的。 > And then we looked at the 20 and we ourselves or most of these are going to do well or not to world despite our help. 然后我們看了這 20 個，盡管我們幫助了世界，但我們自己或者說其中的大多數都會做得很好，或者不會做得很好。 > We\'re going to focus on two companies. 我們將專注于兩家公司。 > One was tell me what works and the other was Zappos. 一種是告訴我什么有效，另一種是 Zappos。 > They. 他（她，它）們 > Spent some time at tell me now works at the time the company was losing. 花了一些時間告訴我，在公司虧損的時候，我現在正在工作。 > When I joined asV.P. 當我加入副總統的時候。 > of finance they were losing. 他們失去的資金。 > Gosh I think about 60 million dollars a year. 天哪，我想一年大約 6000 萬美元。 > They had just come off 1999 where they had been able to raise two hundred and sixty five million. 他們剛剛從 1999 年開始，在那里他們籌集了兩億六千五百萬美元。 > It was the first time I thought well most most companies learn how to pivot and deal with things when they have so little money. 這是我第一次很好地思考，大多數公司在錢這么少的時候學會了如何轉變和處理問題。 > And this is the first time when I saw a company that actually raise so much money that it was a bad thing. 這是我第一次看到一家公司籌集了這么多資金，這是一件壞事。 > And I didn\'t know that that could be a bad thing until I saw how much money you can blow because everything was just not worth your time anymore because you had so much money in the company and it\'s not the discipline of this that. 我不知道這可能是件壞事，直到我看到你能花多少錢，因為一切都不值得你花時間了，因為你在公司里有那么多錢，而這不是這方面的紀律。 > Necessarily the CEO of the management team it\'s it becomes ingrained in the company is like well we have this amount of money in the bank should we just. 必須是管理團隊的首席執行官-它在公司中根深蒂固-就像我們在銀行里有這么多錢，如果我們只是這樣的話。 > Use that money to experiment versus being thoughtful about where you want to spend and invest your comfort your company\'s money. 用這筆錢來做實驗，而不是仔細考慮你想花在哪里的錢，并把你的錢投入到公司的錢中去。 > So what habitant tell me how did you. 是什么居民告訴我你是怎么。 > `[00:09:16]` Turn this ship around. `[00:09:16]` 讓這艘船掉頭。 > We became very very focused. 我們變得非常專注。 > The company had been focused on a consumer business suite pivoted city enterprise selling it and tell me for those who you don\'t know what was originally started as a voice portal as a voice recognition portal so you would call 1 800 5 4 5 tell and you can ask at any question. 該公司一直專注于一家以城市企業為中心的消費商業套件，并告訴我那些你不知道最初作為語音識別門戶開始的人，所以你可以撥打 1800 5 4 5 Tell，你可以在任何問題上提問。 > We pivoted to the enterprise and we started to automate using voice recognition 1 800 numbers and it was arguably one of the first SAS company\'s cloud companies in the world. 我們轉向企業，并開始使用語音識別，1800 個數字，它可以說是世界上最早的 SAS 公司的云公司之一。 > We had to build our own recognition servers and put in the cloud. 我們必須建立自己的識別服務器，并將其放入云中。 > And so we got very focused on the Enterprise very very focused on a few select customers not trying to. 因此，我們非常關注企業部，非常專注于少數選擇的客戶，而不是試圖。 > Get any customer that we could sign up. 找任何我們能注冊的客戶。 > `[00:10:06]` We were very very targeted on 12 to 24 customers and making sure that those were large contracts and very very multi-year successful engagements. `[00:10:06]` 我們的目標是 12 到 24 名客戶，并確保這些都是大合同和多年成功的合同。 > And then one when when I left the company to join Zappos we basically went from zero revenues to about 150 million dollars and recurring revenue and pretty stable cash generating business and was. 然后當我離開公司加入 Zappos 的時候，我們基本上從零收入上升到了 1.5 億美元，經常性收入和相當穩定的現金產生業務。 > Later sold to Microsoft for eight hundred million dollars or so. 后來以 8 億美元左右的價格賣給了微軟。 > So pretty successful. 非常成功。 > Seem to work out. 似乎成功了。 > `[00:10:42]` Fine. `[00:10:42]` 好的。 > How did you so at the same time you guys threw Venture Frogs had funded Zappos. 你們是怎么做到的，同時你們還扔了風投青蛙，資助了 Zappos。 > So how did you. 那你是怎么。 > `[00:10:51]` Why did you fund that fund them. `[00:10:51]` 你為什么資助他們。 > Well Zappos found us and it was next winner who is the founder left a voicemail which we almost deleted. 好吧，Zappos 找到了我們，下一個獲獎者是創始人，他留下了一封語音郵件，我們幾乎把它刪除了。 > I think Tony had his hand on his finger on the delete button of the voicemail because he started saying I have this crazy idea. 我想托尼把手放在語音信箱的刪除按鈕上，因為他開始說我有個瘋狂的想法。 > I want to sell shoes on the internet. 我想在網上賣鞋子。 > I know nobody would want to buy it on the Internet because people have to try on shoes. 我知道沒有人會想在網上買，因為人們不得不試穿鞋子。 > But. 但 > Then. 然后 > `[00:11:16]` If you had deleted it you wouldn\'t have heard that but. `[00:11:16]` 如果你刪除了它，你不會聽到的，但是。 > But the shoe business is a 40 billion dollar business and five percent of it or 2 billion was already being done on militar. 但鞋業是一項價值 400 億美元的業務，其中 5%(20 億美元)已經用于軍事領域。 > Now. 現在 > That. 那，那個 > The investment thesis that the Internet was going to be bigger than mail order carried the company it was consistent all the way through the company. 關于互聯網將比郵購更大的投資論斷，它貫穿公司的始終是一致的。 > I\'m not saying the company didn\'t have to pivot or had lots of struggles they had tons of that but we got that right. 我并不是說公司不需要轉向，也沒有經歷過很多困難，他們有很多這樣的想法，但我們做得對。 > And. 和 > `[00:11:45]` Nick got that right. 尼克說得對。 > Which was the. 那就是。 > Which was key and allow the company to focus on. 這是關鍵，讓公司專注于。 > Building a business that people thought couldn\'t. 做一件人們認為不能做的生意。 > Be done. 完成吧。 > And I think that\'s actually great that you see founders build businesses that logically should exist but people don\'t think that it can because. 我認為\真的很好，你看到創始人建立了邏輯上應該存在的企業，但人們不認為它可以存在，因為。 > You know if logically it should exist and you solve a real need that people want that service or that product and if people think it can\'t be made it can\'t be done or can\'t be made or can\'t for whatever reason exist. 你知道，從邏輯上講，它是否應該存在，你解決了一個真正的需求：人們想要那種服務或那種產品，如果人們認為它不能被制造出來，那么它就不能被完成，不能制造，或者因為任何原因而不能。 > Then you have a situation where you don\'t have a lot of competition in the very early days where you do need to pivot where you do need to learn and where you need to figure out you\'re standing in the marketplace. 然后你會遇到這樣一種情況：在最初的日子里，你沒有太多的競爭，你確實需要轉向你需要學習的地方，你需要弄清楚你在市場上的地位。 > And that was a very powerful proposition for Zappos and another powerful thing for Zappos. 對于 Zappos 來說，這是一個非常強大的提議，對 Zappos 來說，這也是一個強大的東西。 > It was a bit of a. 有點像。 > Blessing mostly a blessing but also a curse was that Zappos could never raise a lot of money. 祝福主要是一種祝福，但也是一種詛咒，那就是 Zappos 永遠不會籌集到很多錢。 > And at Zappos had to figure out how to generate revenue and be proper and do it profitably relatively early. 而在 Zappos 公司，必須想出如何創造收入和適當的方法，并在相對較早的時候盈利。 > Soon after you guys investors there was really hard to raise money. 很快，你們這些投資者就很難籌到錢。 > `[00:13:00]` Yeah. `[00:13:00]` 是的。 > You know originally we thought you know we\'ll put 500000 dollars and then we\'ll just. 你知道，最初我們以為我們會投 500000 美元，然后我們就。 > `[00:13:07]` Hit the next milestone we\'ll put another 500000 dollars and eventually we\'re 2 million dollars into the company. `[00:13:07]` 到達下一個里程碑，我們將再投入 500000 美元，最終我們將為公司注入 200 萬美元。 > Nobody really wanted to fund it in 2000 2001. 在 2000 年的 2001 年，沒有人真正想為它提供資金。 > So we had to keep going and as Tony has written in his book he sold his apartment a few of his apartments that he had acquired after. 因此，我們不得不繼續前進，正如托尼在他的書中所寫的，他賣掉了他后來買下的幾套公寓。 > Link Exchange was sold to sort of put more money in the company. LinkExchange 出售是為了在該公司投入更多的資金。 > And so it was a long road of doing things person making personal sacrifices employees taking less salary than they would like. 因此，做事情是一條漫長的道路-一個人做出個人犧牲-員工拿的薪水比他們想要的要少。 > But it all eventually worked out. 但最終都成功了。 > But it was a. 但那是個。 > Painful process through all of that. 所有這一切都是痛苦的過程。 > Were there. 當時就在那里。 > Were times when you were. 當你在的時候。 > `[00:13:51]` Ready to throw in the towel and say look this is not going to happen. `[00:13:51]` 準備認輸，說這不會發生。 > `[00:13:55]` I don\'t think we wanted to throw in the towel. `[00:13:55]` 我不認為我們想認輸。 > I just we just didn\'t understand why people didn\'t see the world the way we saw the world. 我只是不明白為什么人們不像我們看待世界那樣看待世界。 > And we kind of thought well. 我們覺得不錯。 > `[00:14:06]` It\'s a pretty big market out there just in the United States. `[00:14:06]` 在美國，這是一個相當大的市場。 > Why when people backed us and you know there are reasons why people in Baccus backed them right there. 為什么當人們支持我們，你知道，為什么在巴庫斯的人們支持他們的原因就在那里。 > There are lots of e-commerce companies in 1999 2000 2001 that raise a ton of money and then blew it all in customer acquisition. 在 1999，2000，2001 年間，有許多電子商務公司籌集了大量資金，然后在客戶收購上一敗涂地。 > And these were smart people. 這些人都很聰明。 > And I think some of the Struth thinking was good and some of the thinking was not so good. 我認為一些“真理”的想法是好的，而有些則不是很好。 > But you know the thing that people did was they sort of calculate the lifetime value on a small base of customers and figured out how much they can spend on marketing and they spend you know basically lifetime value minus a penny a dollar or whatever it is and there is no margin for error. 但是你知道，人們所做的事情是，他們在一小部分客戶的基礎上計算出他們一生的價值，并計算出他們可以在營銷上花費多少錢，他們基本上知道一生的價值-減去一美元或任何東西-這是沒有任何可能出錯的。 > `[00:14:50]` And if you model things it doesn\'t always work out like the model says. `[00:14:50]` 如果你做模型的話，它并不總是像模型所說的那樣工作。 > And secondly your early adopters are probably that long term value of your earlier doctors are probably higher than the later adopters and people who had not taken that into account. 其次，你的早期采用者可能是你早期醫生的長期價值可能高于那些沒有考慮到這一點的后來者和人。 > And so companies that raise 25 50 100 million dollars and in some cases billions of dollars came and gone in the e-commerce space. 因此，那些籌集了 25500 億美元，在某些情況下數十億美元的公司，在電子商務領域出現并消失了。 > So what we did was we tried to be profitable in the first order which was which was not heard of. 因此，我們所做的是，我們試圖在第一次訂單盈利，這是聞所未聞的。 > `[00:15:22]` Back then it\'s hadn\'t heard of now. `[00:15:22]` 那時候它還沒聽說過呢。 > `[00:15:27]` How did you mean were the things that you like learned and you should be informed what you were doing. `[00:15:27]` 你是什么意思？你喜歡學的東西是什么？你應該被告知你在做什么。 > `[00:15:33]` I think that the thing that we learned at Link Exchange was that we wanted to build a company that was very very much focused on having a great culture. `[00:15:33]` 我認為我們在 LinkExchange 學到的是，我們想要建立一家非常專注于擁有一種偉大文化的公司。 > And so at Zappos we decided they were going to focus on making sure that the culture is part of the everyday sort of operating principles. 因此，在 Zappos，我們決定他們將專注于確保文化成為日常運作原則的一部分。 > And I think a lot of companies start out with great cultures and eventually they end up not having great cultures because you don\'t focus on it. 我認為很多公司都是從偉大的文化開始的，最終他們并沒有擁有偉大的文化，因為你沒有把注意力集中在它上。 > You focus on your day to day things that you\'re supposed to do and. 你每天都把注意力集中在你應該做的事情上。 > You forget that the culture is only good if you invest in it. 你忘記了，文化只有在你投資的時候才是好的。 > And I just point out to people when they come to when they were taking tours as opposed to the time you know how does this place remain. 我只是向人們指出，當他們去旅游的時候，你知道這個地方是如何保留下來的。 > `[00:16:18]` Focused on culture day in and day out when it gets to be big and it\'s just it\'s like a daily habit. `[00:16:18]` 日復一日地關注文化，當它變得很大的時候，它只是它就像一種日常的習慣。 > I think the thing that customer culture and customer service and fitness and staying healthy all have in common is. 我認為，客戶文化與客戶服務、健身和保持健康的共同之處在于。 > `[00:16:33]` You can try to do it in upswings and downswings but if you don\'t make it a daily habit and focus on it on a daily basis it\'s not going to really be your your core competency. `[00:16:33]` 你可以在漲跌時試著做這件事，但如果你不養成每天的習慣，每天關注它，那就不是你的核心能力了。 > `[00:16:42]` And if you want customer service or or anything or your culture or anything else to be a core competency you have to focus on on a daily basis. `[00:16:42]` 如果你想要客戶服務，或者你的文化或者任何其他東西成為你的核心能力，你必須每天都集中精力。 > `[00:16:51]` So you went from being investments up to joining as an operator how to how to be. `[00:16:51]` 所以你從投資到加入運營商。 > How did that conversation you how do you decide. 那次談話你是怎么決定的。 > That. 那，那個 > You need to do that. 你得這么做。 > `[00:17:03]` Well I think there was. `[00:17:03]` 嗯，我想有。 > `[00:17:04]` Tony had joined early on as an adviser. `[00:17:04]` 托尼很早就加入為顧問。 > And then eventually full time and then eventually big. 最后是全職，最后是大的。 > NEC decided Tony should be CEO and I had finished finish up my tour at Tell Me and. NEC 決定托尼應該是首席執行官，我已經結束了在告訴我和。 > There was one company we thought we could make. 有一家我們認為我們可以成立的公司。 > Great and you know we had basically Venture Frogs was was. 很好，你也知道我們的冒險青蛙是。 > `[00:17:32]` Money front friends a family of ours and we wanted to make sure that even those in 1999 fund and lot of angel funds or venture funds decided that they could take a big write off for that year. `[00:17:32]` 金錢的朋友是我們的一個家庭，我們希望確保即使是 1999 年的基金和許多天使基金或風險基金的人也決定，他們可以在那一年大減記。 > We decided that was not going to be the case. 我們決定不是這樣的。 > We at least had to make sure that we provided. 我們至少要確保我們提供。 > Capital back if not a good return. 如果不是一個好的回報，資本就會回來。 > We wanted to make sure that we provide a good return and wanted to. 我們想確保我們提供一個良好的回報，并希望如此。 > So basically it was something that. 基本上是這樣的。 > `[00:17:57]` I felt personally responsible and compelled to to make sure was successful. `[00:17:57]` 我覺得自己有責任，必須確保成功。 > `[00:18:03]` You know. `[00:18:03]` 你知道的。 > Tell me tell me was a very interesting experience where they had too much money. 告訴我，這是一個非常有趣的經歷，他們有太多的錢。 > It was overcapitalized. 它被過度資本化了。 > And I would say Zappos was another story where they were undercapitalised for a long period time. 我認為 Zappos 是另一個長期資本不足的故事。 > There are very few e-commerce companies that have been built with less than Tamilians a primary equity invested in it. 很少有電子商務公司是在泰米爾人的基礎上投資建立的。 > Zappos had only about 10 million hours of primary equity invested and then. Zappos 當時只有大約 1000 萬小時的初級股權投資。 > HadU.S. 哈德美 > debt and a revolving line of credit to build its business borrowed from their merchants sister continued to build its business and it was. 債務和建立從商人那里借來的業務的循環信貸，姐姐繼續建立它的業務，而且它是這樣做的。 > `[00:18:39]` Very scary sometimes because leverage is great on the upside it also can kill you on the downside. `[00:18:39]` 有時候非常可怕，因為杠桿在正面是很好的，它也會在不利的情況下殺死你。 > `[00:18:47]` What was the scariest moment. `[00:18:47]` 最可怕的時刻是什么？ > `[00:18:50]` There are a lot of scary moments I think enduring Link Exchange we almost missed payroll a few times. `[00:18:50]` 有很多可怕的時刻，我認為持久的鏈接交換，我們幾乎錯過了幾次工資。 > That sort of hardens you once you have to go through that once or twice or three times. 一旦你不得不經歷一兩次或三次，你就會變得堅強起來。 > My time was the tenth time you just kind of said alright we\'ll figure it out. 我的時間是你第十次說，好吧，我們會想出辦法的。 > And so Zappos had many of those challenges too before I joined. 所以在我加入 Zappos 之前，Zappos 也遇到了很多這樣的挑戰。 > When I you know I had. 當我你知道我有。 > Just gotten married and had. 剛結婚就有了。 > `[00:19:17]` Just basically SIRF convinced my wife that we\'re gonna go move from San Francisco to Las Vegas where they where Zappos had moved to. `[00:19:17]` 基本上，SIRF 說服了我的妻子，我們將從舊金山搬到拉斯維加斯，在那里，Zappos 已經搬到了那里。 > And then Tony tells me that we had this revolving line of credit. 然后托尼告訴我們有一個循環信貸額度。 > It had temporarily been increased from three or 40 million. 這一數字暫時從三千萬到四千萬增加。 > We had we had to use all. 我們不得不用盡一切。 > 40 million of it at the time but because of a glitch in an algorithm of a markdown mark up process we had. 當時有 4000 萬，但因為一個標記過程的算法出現了故障。 > Sort of. 說大也大吧 > Over ordered. 點過頭了。 > `[00:19:49]` A bunch of stuff and we had to sort of mark that down. `[00:19:49]` 一堆東西，我們得把它記下來。 > And so therefore we\'re going to take a loss this quarter which would. 因此，本季度我們將遭受損失。 > I\'m like listening to all this might come on what\'s what\'s the big deal which was going to cause us to break one of our bank covenants. 我就像聽著這一切可能會發生在什么大事件上，這會使我們違反銀行的一條契約。 > And I\'m like thinking. 我就像在想。 > `[00:20:07]` What did I just do I just quit my last job. `[00:20:07]` 我剛剛做了什么-我剛剛辭掉了我的上一份工作。 > I had convinced my wife to win in Vegas. 我說服我妻子在拉斯維加斯贏了。 > We\'re just sold our house. 我們剛剛賣掉了房子。 > And. 和 > Then we\'re going to pack up. 那我們就收拾行李。 > So I heard that as soon as I heard that it got on the phone we just figured we\'d just try to figure out how to. 所以我一聽到電話里就知道了，我們就想辦法弄清楚該怎么做。 > So we had to find 10 million dollars because the line was going from. 所以我們不得不找出 1000 萬美元，因為這條線已經被切斷了。 > 40 to 30 million dollars in about a month and we had to find ten dollars to reduce our debt by ten dollars and make all the payments. 四千萬到三千萬美元，大約一個月，我們不得不找到十美元，以減少我們的債務 10 美元，并支付所有的。 > And not missed payroll and things like that was pretty. 而且沒有錯過工資之類的東西很漂亮。 > `[00:20:45]` Heron\'s you know. `[00:20:45]` 蒼鷺你知道嗎？ > But we got through it. 但我們挺過去了。 > I think you know once you get through it once or twice you know that you can get through it again. 我想你知道，一旦你度過了一次或兩次，你就知道你能再次渡過難關。 > You know 19. 你知道 19 歲。 > 1999 2000 was a very interesting time there was a lot of ups and then 2000 2001 was a lot of downs. 1999 年-2000 年是一個非常有趣的時期，有很多起起落落，而 2000 年 2001 年則有很多起伏。 > `[00:21:04]` I think 2005 and 2006 were starting to get out of those downs for a lot of e-commerce companies and then 2008 2009 there was a lot of downs. `[00:21:04]` 我認為 2005 年和 2006 年對于許多電子商務公司來說已經開始走出這些低谷，而 2008 年到 2009 年出現了很多下滑。 > `[00:21:15]` I think this you just have to as Hiroki said you have to be an emotional story of rock and be able to absorb these shocks the system. `[00:21:15]` 我認為你只需要像裕基所說的那樣，你必須成為一個關于搖滾的情感故事，并且能夠吸收這些沖擊，整個系統。 > And if you can do that you can persisting continue to go on was Zappos growing the whole time with these times and ups and downs as opposed is crying throughout this time. 如果你能做到這一點，你可以堅持下去，繼續前進，Zappos 一直在增長，伴隨著這些時間的起伏，而相對的是，這段時間一直在哭泣。 > But it was growing in it in an inconsistent rate. 但它是以不一致的速度增長的。 > And I think the hardest part about. 我覺得最難的是。 > Startups is the plan for what\'s going to happen. 創業是對將要發生的事情的計劃。 > You think if you\'re building a product the great thing about software today is if you\'re building a software product it\'s in a cloud you can provision perfectly and anything that requires hardware that requires inventory it requires servers provisioning spaceetc. 你認為，如果你正在構建一個產品，現在軟件最重要的一點是，如果你在云中構建一個軟件產品，你可以完美地提供任何需要庫存的硬件，它需要服務器、供應、空間等等。 > If you\'re off you can be you can be significantly off because. 如果你離開了，你可以很明顯地離開，因為。 > Compounding works in mysterious ways and you can be off a lot and if you bought too much and you\'re off. 復合以神秘的方式工作，你可能會失去很多，如果你買了太多，你就走了。 > Then you\'re. 那你就是。 > You have too much inventory you bought too little and you\'re off. 你的存貨太多了，你買的太少了，所以你就走了。 > You may miss out a bunch of sales missing on a bunch of sales is not as bad as being laden with a bunch of inventory. 你可能會錯過一堆的銷售，在一堆銷售是沒有那么糟糕的是滿載一堆庫存。 > It\'s not good either. 這也不太好。 > `[00:22:32]` Either. `[00:22:32]` 也是。 > So what are some of the most innovative things that you think you did at Zappos that really kind of made the company what it was. 那么，你認為自己在 Zappos 所做的一些最具創新性的事情，確實讓公司變得像現在這樣。 > Talking about the culture we\'re talking about things in ways that you were. 說到我們談論的文化，我們談論的事情就像你所說的那樣。 > `[00:22:46]` I think the culture is very important. `[00:22:46]` 我認為文化是非常重要的。 > I think you\'re building a company that was focused on customer service that was very important. 我認為你正在建立一家專注于客戶服務的公司，這是非常重要的。 > So focus on customer service one back then nobody really focused on customer service. 所以把重點放在客戶服務上，那么就沒有人真正關注客戶服務了。 > If you said to me today I\'m building the Zappos of another category it\'s probably not as interesting but if you come up if you solve a hard problem and make that your core competency I think that\'s a very very important lesson because. 如果你今天對我說，我正在建造另一類的 Zappos，它可能沒那么有趣，但如果你想解決一個難題，并把它作為你的核心競爭力，我認為這是一個非常重要的教訓，因為。 > First of all hopefully that problem you\'ve lived and you\'re personally passionate about and you\'re solving it. 首先，希望你曾經經歷過的問題，你個人對它充滿激情，并且你正在解決這個問題。 > That\'s probably because. 那可能是因為。 > There are other people who face that problem and make that a priority in their lives and find value in that. 還有一些人面對這一問題，并將此作為他們生活中的優先事項，并從中找到價值。 > So we found lots of people missed the fact that stories provided actually good customer service and online online provided not so great customer service and we\'re going to bring that back. 所以我們發現很多人忽略了這樣一個事實：故事提供了良好的客戶服務，而在線則提供了不太好的客戶服務，我們將把它帶回過來。 > So that was another innovation. 這是另一項創新。 > I think the fact that we were running our distribution center and our call center 24/7 was seemingly. 我認為，我們管理著我們的配送中心和呼叫中心，這似乎是一件很有意義的事情。 > You know today may not seem like. 你知道今天可能不像。 > An innovation but back then it was we had figured out ways of picking. 這是一項創新，但當時我們已經想出了選擇的方法。 > `[00:23:52]` When you place an order we would pick pack and ship within four hours whereas other people were batching them the next day and sending it out. `[00:23:52]` 當你下訂單時，我們會在四個小時內挑選包裹并裝運，而其他人則在第二天把它們分批送出去。 > Little things add up. 小事情加起來。 > And so. 而且如此。 > We figured out how to get products to people after the order of between five to seven days when we started. 我們在五到七天的訂單開始后，我們想出了如何把產品送到人們手中。 > And then eventually we cut that time little by little by little to overnight before we sold the company to Amazon. 最后，在我們把公司賣給亞馬遜之前，我們一點地縮短了這段時間。 > So I think those things were all very innovative. 所以我認為這些東西都很有創意。 > Obviously we had some other technology advantages such as we had a full warehouse that was. 顯然，我們還有其他一些技術優勢，比如我們有一個完整的倉庫。 > `[00:24:29]` That every single item we had and license plate unique license plate number assigned to it. `[00:24:29]` 我們所擁有的每一件物品，以及分配給它的唯一車牌號碼。 > So we knew exactly where it was in inventory so we had close to 100 percent accuracy in inventory management which had not been heard of before and direct to consumer fulfillment. 因此，我們確切地知道它在庫存中的位置，所以我們在庫存管理方面有接近 100%的準確性，這在以前從未聽說過，并且直接影響到消費者的實現。 > And so those are some. 所以這些都是一些。 > `[00:24:48]` Examples. `[00:24:48]` 例子。 > So you talked about selling the company how did after surviving all these different ups and downs for years and years how did that conversation come about how you\'d make that decision. 所以你談到了出售公司，在經歷了這么多年的不同起起落落之后，你是如何做出這個決定的呢？ > Well Amazon had those actually disclose both Tony\'s book and the recent book about Amazon Amazon had been following the company and. 亞馬遜確實披露了托尼的書和最近出版的關于亞馬遜的書。 > `[00:25:10]` Wanted to buy the company for a long period of time. `[00:25:10]` 想要長期收購這家公司。 > They had started to compete with us and. 他們已經開始和我們競爭了。 > They made an offer that was much more compelling. 他們提出了一個更有說服力的提議。 > `[00:25:19]` Most most of the time acquisitions what happened you\'d get absorbed by the parent company. `[00:25:19]` 大多數情況下，發生的事情你都會被母公司所吸收。 > Here is a situation where Still\'s appears today as a separate brand a separate business has a separate culture and a separate location. 在這種情況下，時至今日仍是一個獨立的品牌，一個獨立的企業擁有一個獨立的文化和一個獨立的位置。 > And left to the. 然后離開了。 > The current. 電流。 > Team there to run as a wholly owned subsidiary but a separate business and that was much more compelling than being absorbed into a mothership. 在那里的團隊以全資子公司的身份運作，但卻是一家獨立的公司，這比被母艦吸收要引人注目得多。 > `[00:25:46]` What do some of the lessons that you learned about Zappos. `[00:25:46]` 你學到的一些關于 Zappos 的課程是什么？ > Do you know today that you wish you knew. 你今天知道你希望你知道。 > In the beginning about supporting startups. 一開始支持初創公司。 > `[00:25:56]` I think you know a lot of the things we\'ve just talked about. `[00:25:56]` 我想你知道很多我們剛剛談過的事情。 > Yeah. 嗯 > You want to continue to price progress and not give up on the. 你要繼續為進步定價，而不是放棄。 > On the. 在.。 > On your big dream. 在你的大夢想上。 > You need to sort of maybe make calls and pivot and write off certain thingsetc. 你需要打幾個電話，轉一下，然后注銷某些東西。 > But the courses as people have pointed out here non-linear and pivoting is okay but you don\'t want to give up. 但是，正如人們所指出的，非線性的和旋轉的課程是可以的，但是你不想放棄。 > The second thing is. 第二件事是。 > `[00:26:21]` You know I think companies that get started by personal passion and solving a personal pain seems to do a lot better than those do not. `[00:26:21]` 你知道，我認為那些以個人激情和解決個人痛苦為出發點的公司，似乎比那些沒有的公司做得更好。 > Third is those charts that are. 第三是那些圖表。 > `[00:26:33]` Sort of exponential growth. `[00:26:33]` 某種指數增長。 > If you do you know in all these talks if you sort of narrow it down to the very early beginnings it looks very very flat. 如果你知道，在所有這些談話中，如果你把它縮小到很開始的時候，它看起來很平淡。 > It takes a long time to get the flywheel going and so don\'t be discouraged if the flywheel hasn\'t gone. 飛輪的運轉需要很長時間，所以如果飛輪沒有消失，不要氣餒。 > As smoothly as you expected it to go. 就像你預料的那樣順利。 > But just keep at it keep at it get stronger and stronger every single day. 但只要堅持下去，一天比一天強。 > What do you think the core the core problem that you\'re solving for. 你認為你要解決的核心問題是什么。 > And when you sort of pivot and you think about what the next thing that you\'re trying to do solve a real heart problem that nobody else is solving. 當你有點支點的時候，你會想一想接下來你要做的事情是什么，去解決一個沒有人能解決的真正的心臟問題。 > And. 和 > Find a core competency that you can own and you can talk about all the companies you\'ve heard on stage today whether it\'s stri for Homejoy or. 找到一個你可以擁有的核心競爭力，你就可以談論你今天在舞臺上聽到的所有公司，不管是 Homejoy 的戰略，還是。 > `[00:27:22]` Go paperless all these companies are trying to solve problems that they had personal pain with and they had to sort of get the flywheel going over a number of trials. `[00:27:22]` 無紙化-所有這些公司都在試圖解決他們個人痛苦的問題，他們不得不讓飛輪通過一些試驗。 > `[00:27:33]` So now you\'ve move back to the Bay Area to become professional investors again and working at Sequoia. `[00:27:33]` 現在你又搬回灣區去做專業投資者，在紅杉工作。 > What. 什么 > Would you think. 你覺得。 > How do you think companies should ideally try to work with their investors. 你認為公司應該如何在理想的情況下與投資者合作。 > What do you think. 你怎么認為 > Good Vs Veazey does. 好的比維西更好。 > `[00:27:49]` It\'s funny that you ask that question. `[00:27:49]` 你問這個問題很有趣。 > Look he\'s been so I\'ve been on both sides and I think it\'s a privilege they\'ve been on both sides. 聽著，他一直是這樣的，我一直在兩邊，我認為這是一種特權，他們一直在雙方。 > And I think the reason the reason I joined Sequoia is that you know personally I think it\'s a very special place because most of the partners there have. 我認為我加入紅杉的原因是，你知道，我個人認為這是一個非常特別的地方，因為那里的大多數合伙人都有。 > Worked at companies start a company has been met been part of the Managed chain of companies that have done pretty extraordinary things. 在公司工作，開始一家公司已經遇到了被管理的公司鏈的一部分，這些公司都做了非常不尋常的事情。 > And we don\'t see ourselves as as investors. 我們不認為自己是投資者。 > We\'re not looking to buy low sell high. 我們不想買低賣高。 > I think that\'s what you should look for. 我想這就是你應該找的。 > In someone who is an investor you want a partner you don\'t want an investor. 對于一個投資者來說，你想要的是一個合伙人，而不是一個投資者。 > And. 和 > That\'s that\'s probably something that I would coach all of you to sort of think about. 這可能是我教你們大家要考慮的事情。 > The other thing is. 另一件事是。 > Often pitches are very short. 投球往往很短。 > We\'re trying to assess you. 我們在試著評估你。 > You\'re trying to assess us. 你在試著評估我們。 > I would just point out a statistic that you should think about which is you know people date for many years and they get married where they decide to have a partnership whether it\'s it\'s marriage or or. 我只想指出一項統計數字，你應該考慮的是，你認識的人約會了很多年，他們結婚后決定結婚，不管是結婚還是結婚。 > `[00:28:59]` Or a business partnership. `[00:28:59]` 或商業合伙。 > And 50 percent of those relationships still end up. 而這些關系中的 50%最終還是會結束。 > Breaking up or in divorce a break. 分手或離婚。 > So I would spend more time getting to know your investors before you let them and us in your company because if things go well it\'s a 5 10 15 year journey. 因此，我會花更多的時間來了解你的投資者，然后再讓他們和我們進入你的公司，因為如果一切順利的話，那將是一段 5、10、15 年的旅程。 > So. 所以 > My advice. 我的建議。 > `[00:29:23]` To you guys have invested in a very high percentage of some of the top seed companies. `[00:29:23]` 對你們來說，一些頂尖種子公司的投資比例很高。 > How do. 你好啊。 > `[00:29:30]` You How do you how do you pick the companies that you work with. `[00:29:30]` 你是如何挑選與你合作的公司的？ > `[00:29:34]` Well look I mean we\'ve been very very fortunate to be in business with Y see for many many years since the very beginning. `[00:29:34]` 嗯，我的意思是，從一開始，我們就很幸運能和 Y See 做生意很多年了。 > And. 和 > I think we try we try to be. 我想我們試著成為。 > `[00:29:47]` Try to understand who the founders are. `[00:29:47]` 試著了解創建者是誰。 > `[00:29:49]` Again back to what I said before we\'re looking for people we want to work with for the next 5 10 15 years. `[00:29:49]` 再次回到我說過的話，在我們尋找我們想要在未來的 5，10，15 年中與之共事的人之前。 > We\'re looking for founders that will not will our unstoppable will not stop and they will figure out ways to get to the next level next level that we\'re looking for. 我們正在尋找那些不會停止的創始人，我們無法阻擋的創始人不會停止，他們會想辦法達到我們想要的下一個水平。 > People who have deep insight into an industry and have asked why and why again. 那些對一個行業有深刻洞察力的人，他們又一次問了為什么和為什么。 > `[00:30:13]` And challenge all the assumptions on the whole industry that they\'re trying to disrupt and decide that these are the five things they\'re going to try to do. `[00:30:00]` 并挑戰所有他們試圖破壞的整個行業的假設，并決定這是他們將要做的五件事。 > Not a hundred things. 不是一百件事。 > These are the five things they\'re going to do to disrupt the industry. 這是他們要做的五件事來擾亂這個行業。 > And have a clear sense of what that wedge into that industry would be. 并清楚地意識到這一行業的楔子會是什么。 > `[00:30:32]` So we hear the early days of trying to restart stripe or Air B and B or Dropbox. `[00:30:32]` 所以我們聽到了早期嘗試重新啟動條紋、B 和 B 或 Dropbox 的聲音。 > All of them had very clear reasons why they\'re going to be a destructive destructive force. 他們都有非常清楚的理由說明為什么他們會成為一股毀滅性的力量。 > In. 在……里面 > `[00:30:45]` Their particular domain or in their particular industry. `[00:30:45]` 他們的特定領域或特定行業。 > Go. 去 > `[00:30:50]` Figure running out of time. `[00:30:50]` 時間不多了。 > So thanks a lot for joining us. 所以非常感謝你加入我們。 > All right. 好的 > Thank you. 謝謝。