# MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016 > `[00:00:00]` We have a fireside chat with Mark Andriessen coming up. Mark I think he\'s right back there. They know who you are. No introductions needed. So thanks for coming back. This is your third Startup School and I think maybe you are the only person who\'s been on stage both as a founder and now as an investor. So I will go through your history. But what I\'d like you to kind of talk us through is how you came to the decision after starting a bunch of tech companies to become an investor. There are a lot of venture funds that exist so why and how different. `[00:00:00]` 我們要和 Mark Andriessen 在壁爐邊聊天。馬克，我想他就在后面。他們知道你是誰。不需要介紹。謝謝你回來。這是你的第三所創業學校，我想也許你是唯一一個以創始人和投資者身份登上舞臺的人。所以我來看看你的歷史。但我想讓你告訴我們的是，你是如何在開始一群科技公司成為投資者之后做出這一決定的。有很多風險基金存在，所以為什么和有多大的不同。 > `[00:00:45]` Yeah the big thing we came up Ben and I came up in the 90s in the industry and at that point venture The good news is venture capital had professionalized and so you had these great venture firms Kleiner Perkins some Americans and others that had gotten really good at what they did. Part of the professionalization was they had tilted very strongly away from founder CEOs and terms professional CEOs. And there were good reasons for that. We can discuss but our view of the industry is that not all but many of the best companies in the industry are run by their founders for a long period of time. ‘職業化的部分原因是，他們已經非常強烈地偏離了創始人 CEO 和專業 CEO 的術語。這是有充分理由的。我們可以討論，但我們對這個行業的看法是，除了許多業內最好的公司之外，并非所有的公司都是由創始人長期經營的。 `[00:01:16]` So IBM run by the Watson to Watson is actually father and son Hewlett Packard run by Hewlett Packard for 50 years. Many other you know many examples Microsoft or Oracle. > `[00:01:16]` 由沃森管理的 IBM 實際上是惠普的父子惠普(HewlettPackard)，經營了 50 年。還有很多你知道的例子-微軟或甲骨文。 `[00:01:27]` Many others the model have just kind of drifted away from that that kind of a default mood became bring in the professional CEO. What do you mean by professional see professional CEO. So the basic thing is because there is what they want is what they would say which is what they said at one point which is oh so what are you guys going to hire a real CEO. So you know this is a general version of that answer the specific thing. When they say professional CEO generally they talk about somebody with a lot of business in a particular sales experience. So somebody who\'s very comfortable with taking something you know taking something that somebody has built Engineers had built in the lab and then taking it out into the world. And so it\'s everything raising money marketing sales finance all organization management all the things involved in building the business and the company around the product. And so we just you know we have this idea that if we want to tilt things back a little bit now we\'re not religious about the founder CEO and there are a lot of founders who don\'t actually want to be the CEO or want to partner with a great CEO. > `[00:01:27]` 許多其他人-這個模式剛剛擺脫了那種默認的情緒-變成了職業 CEO。你所謂的職業 CEO 是什么意思？所以最基本的原因是他們想要什么，他們會說什么，他們曾經說過什么，哦，你們打算雇一個真正的 CEO。所以你知道，這是一個一般的答案，具體的問題。通常，當他們說職業 CEO 時，他們談論的是在某一特定銷售經驗中擁有大量業務的人。所以，有些人非常習慣于拿一些你知道的東西，拿一些已經建成的東西，工程師們在實驗室里建造了一些東西，然后把它帶到世界上去。因此，一切都是籌集資金、市場營銷、銷售資金、所有組織管理、所有與建立業務有關的事情，以及圍繞產品的公司。所以我們有這樣的想法，如果我們現在想讓事情倒退一點，我們對創始人 CEO 就不是虔誠的，很多創始人實際上不想成為首席執行官，也不想和一位偉大的 CEO 合作。 `[00:02:29]` And then there are also founders who can\'t be the CEO and so you know there\'s sort of no I there\'s no concept of CEO tenure right. So it\'s not a guaranteed position. You do have to reform it if you don\'t perform by the way it\'s not the fees that are your problem is that your company collapses and so you know it is important performed but we did believe in the generalized model that founders are really important and the founder CEO is a good model and you can have it and so it just what we observed was there was not at that point a venture capital firm that really had developed an operating model around how to do that. And so we decided to start our firm and then we decided to really on on two things. Has been our big areas of focus for the last seven years so one is all of our general partners have built and run companies before. And so we like to talk about the importance of having people on your board who have been through the struggle. Ben in his book The Hard Thing About Hard Things he talks about the struggle being just all the stuff that goes wrong when you\'re trying to accomplish something big. I call it the ship. He\'s more polite than I am. But it\'s just all the stuff that happens. You know we could talk for hours about. Tapped somebody on board who\'s really been through it it\'s all over all of our GPE by definition fits that criteria. The other thing that we did and this is a huge part of the front for us today is we built a whole operating model around basically we call it giving the founders super powers basically the equivalent capability give a founder who\'s not operated a business before the ability to operate like a professional CEO would be able to if they just walked in the door. And a lot of that has to do with network. And so the network of all the customers that you\'re going to sell to the network to offer all the later on investors are going to raise money from the network of all the big industry companies. You have to work with the network of all the reporters that you want to get your story out the network of all the engineers that you need to recruit the network of all the executives that you need to recruit the network of all the regulators and policymakers that you need to deal with and a lot of these businesses. So we now have 85 full time professionals in the firm build and run these very large networks on behalf of the portfolio and so a founder works with us. Jeff Jeff with 200 new products described it as you plug into the matrix you just kind of instantaneously get this upgrade as a new CEO or even a even experience you just get this big upgrade or all of a sudden you\'re plugged into the world at scale and that\'s working pretty well. > `[00:02:29]` 還有一些創始人不能成為首席執行官，所以你知道，有一種不，我沒有關于 CEO 任期的概念。所以這不是一個有保障的位置。如果你不按你的方式去做，你就必須改革它，問題不是你的公司倒閉了，所以你知道這是很重要的表現，但我們確實相信，創始人是非常重要的，創辦人是一個很好的模型，你可以擁有它，所以我們所觀察到的就是這樣的。在這一點上，風險投資公司確實開發了一種圍繞著如何實現這一目標的運營模式。所以我們決定開始我們的公司，然后我們決定做兩件事。在過去的七年里，我們一直是我們的重點領域，所以其中之一就是我們所有的普通合作伙伴都曾經建立和經營過公司。因此，我們想談談讓那些經歷過這場斗爭的人加入你們董事會的重要性。本在他的書“關于艱難的事情”中，他談到了當你試圖完成一件大事的時候，掙扎只是所有出錯的事情。我叫它船。他比我更有禮貌。但這只是所有發生的事情。你知道我們可以聊上幾個小時。竊聽了船上的某個真正經歷過這件事的人，我們所有的 GPE 都符合這一標準。我們今天所做的另一件事-這對我們來說是一個很大的一部分-我們建立了一個完整的運營模式，基本上我們稱之為它，賦予創始人們同等的能力，讓一個沒有經營過業務的創始人能夠像專業的首席執行官那樣運作，如果他們只是走進大門的話。這與網絡有關。所以你要把所有客戶的網絡賣給這個網絡來提供所有的后來者，投資者將從所有大的行業公司的網絡中籌集資金。你必須與所有記者的網絡合作，你想要把你的故事公諸于眾，所有工程師的網絡，你需要招聘的所有管理人員網絡，你需要招聘的所有監管者和決策者的網絡，你需要處理的，以及很多這樣的企業。因此，我們現在有 85 名全職的專業人士代表投資組合建立和運營這些非常大的網絡，因此一位創始人與我們一起工作。杰夫用 200 種新產品描述了它，當你插入矩陣時，你只是作為一位新的首席執行官，甚至是一次經歷，立即得到了升級，你只是得到了這個大的升級，或者突然間，你被大規模地插到了這個世界上，而且運行得很好。 `[00:04:41]` What did you think about this back in 2006 you done before the firm started to evolve as you as you can build firm. > `[00:04:41]` 你在 2006 年的時候對此有什么看法？在公司開始發展之前，你做了什么，因為你可以建立公司。 `[00:04:49]` Yes so that\'s all evolved and we\'ve we\'ve had a whole bunch of people join the firm that have helped us figure this out and run all these all these all these all these teams and networks for us that really helped us helps us advance our thinking but the core idea was there you know sort of a16 he was a startup and you know having done startups before we went we were big fans of thinking it through and having a differentiated strategy and so we spent about a year and a half planning this out before we started the firm and these ideas were at the core of it. > `[00:04:49]` 是的，所以我們都進化了，我們有很多人加入了這家公司，幫助我們解決了這個問題，并為我們管理了所有這些真正幫助我們推進思維的團隊和網絡，但核心的想法是，你知道，他是一家初創公司，而且你知道，他做過初創公司。在我們開始之前，我們都是思考這個問題并有一個差異化戰略的忠實擁躉，所以我們花了大約一年半的時間來規劃這個問題，然后我們才成立了這家公司，而這些想法正是公司的核心。 `[00:05:15]` So a lot of first time founders and the audience and kind of raising money as we just kind of pitch practice here is a little bit of a black box. What is the very precise way that you know it\'s a process that you use to work with companies. They get a hold of you and what actually happens after the first e-mail. > `[00:05:15]` 所以很多第一次的創辦者和觀眾以及籌集資金的時候，我們只是在做一些投球練習，這是個小黑匣子。你所知道的最精確的方法是什么？這是你與公司合作的一個過程。他們會聯系到你，在第一封電子郵件之后會發生什么。 `[00:05:33]` Yeah. So I would really separate fundraising and this has got a lot more complicated in the last few years in good ways a separate fundraising fundraising from Angel seed investors Accelerator\'s you know sort of accelerate around precede rounds seed rounds seed extension rounds post seed rounds to put all those in one basket and there and that\'s you know that\'s a process that we see wisely plugs into and Demo Day and organize around that. And you know your friends who have had a start up have been through that and so there\'s there\'s there\'s a whole art to that and that\'s that\'s a lot of what gets talked about. Then there comes a time when you engage in a different kind of fundraising. And what I would call it institutional fundraising. And I think that really starts with a formal Series A or anything equivalent to a formal series. It also applies. By the way if you\'re going to go try to raise money from you know a corporate investor whatever it is an institutional process you\'re dealing with somebody who is running a highly professionalized firm you know with real fiduciary responsibility back to their Opie\'s you know their firm lot of venture first men in business for 30 40 50 years. There\'s a way of doing things and things just get more formal. And so I think that that\'s the first really important thing to think about. And you know when we we\'re actually schizophrenic on this because we do a lot of the sea at the sea level and we\'ve tested the sea level it\'s a lot like dealing with any other state investor it\'s you know are you smart you have a really good idea of a great. And let\'s see how it goes. But when it\'s a five or 10 or 15 million dollar a round or B round then things get more serious. > `[00:05:33]` 是的。所以我真的要把籌款分開，這在過去幾年里變得更加復雜了-從天使種子投資者那里單獨籌集資金-你知道，在種子擴展回合之前，種子推廣輪，種子回合之后，把所有的種子都放在一個籃子里，你知道，這是一個我們認為明智地插入和演示日的過程，并圍繞著這個過程組織起來。你知道，你的朋友們都有過這樣的經歷，所以這是一門藝術，這是很多人談論的話題。然后有一段時間，你會進行一種不同的籌資方式。我稱之為機構籌資。我認為這實際上是從一個正式的系列 A 或任何等同于正式系列的東西開始的。它也適用。順便說一句，如果你打算去籌集資金，你就會認識一個公司投資者，不管這是一個機構過程，你要和一個人打交道，他經營著一家高度專業化的公司，你知道他有真正的信托責任，回到他們的奧派那里，你知道他們的公司里有很多風險第一的人，他們在做了 30 到 40 年 50 年的生意。有一種做事的方式，事情就變得更正式了。所以我認為這是第一件真正重要的事情。你知道，當我們在這個問題上精神分裂的時候，因為我們在海平面上做了很多工作，我們測試了海平面，這就像和其他國家投資者打交道一樣，你知道你聰明嗎？你對一個偉大的東西有一個很好的想法。讓我們看看進展如何。但是當一輪或者一輪是五千萬到一千五百萬美元的時候，事情就變得更嚴重了。 `[00:07:05]` And so when you Minteer so let\'s say I\'m raising that 10 million dollar a around a year to give you an e-mail and say hey and then I come in and what happens is is it just a series of meetings and then diligence and then you have a big check like in those game shows that show up at your house when you\'re least expecting it. > `[00:07:05]` 所以，當你減少，假設我每年籌集 1000 萬美元，給你一封電子郵件，然后說嗨，然后我進來，會發生什么，只是一系列的會議，然后勤奮，然后你有一個大的支票，在那些游戲節目，在你的房子里出現，當你最不希望它出現的時候，它會發生什么呢？ `[00:07:25]` So really it really puts the spouses. > `[00:07:25]` 所以它真的把配偶。 `[00:07:30]` So the first thing is how do you actually get get in and so there\'s there\'s this there\'s actually an argument that kind of plays out on this topic in the valley which is the importance of what it called Warm referrals or warm introductions. And so the way that most of the top and venture capital firms work is basically don\'t take you seriously if you come in introduced by somebody they\'ve worked with before and they won\'t take you seriously if you don\'t and there is an argument that plays out in the valley which is that that\'s sort of unfair and unreasonable and you know what about all these you know you guys talk about all these whiners all over the world and like why can\'t they have access the way the people who are already connected can the argument in favor of the warmer first is that it\'s the it\'s the first test and it\'s the first test of the ability to basically network your way to the investor. And basically the way the investor thinks about it is if you can\'t figure out a way to network your way to a vesi firm which is of course in the business of meeting founders then you\'re unlikely to be able to network your way into hiring a great team or network your way into selling your product to customers. So actually I think that the role the former furless is is is misinterpreted. I think you see it as like it\'s the first test. And so I think it\'s a test you just want pass you don\'t want to take any chances on that. The good news is if if you\'re connected to see if you\'re connected into the valley Angel seed ecosystem that\'s a very easy test to pass. If you\'re not connected in NYC then you know the thing to do is to get to the valley right or get into the network and get it. You don\'t get it twice. > `[00:07:30]` 第一件事是，你是怎么進去的因此，大多數高層和風險投資公司的工作方式基本上都是不重視你，如果你是由以前和他們一起工作過的人介紹的，而如果你不這么做，他們就不會認真對待你，而在山谷里有一種爭論，那就是這是不公平和不合理的，你知道這些你了解你自己是怎么回事。男人們談論著世界各地所有的抱怨者，就像為什么他們不能像那些已經聯系過的人一樣-贊成溫暖的人-首先是，這是第一次測試，也是第一次測試你是否有能力和投資者建立網絡聯系。基本上，投資者的想法是，如果你想不出一種方法將你的公司與一家公司建立網絡，這當然是與創始人會面的業務，那么你就不太可能通過網絡建立網絡，雇傭一支優秀的團隊，或者把你的產品銷售給客戶。所以實際上，我認為前者毫無生氣的角色被曲解了。我想你認為這是第一次測試。所以我認為這是一個你只想通過的測試，你不想冒任何風險。好消息是，如果你與天使的種子生態系統連接在一起，那將是一個很容易通過的考驗。如果你在紐約沒有連接，那么你就知道要做的事情是直接到達山谷，或者進入網絡并得到它。你不會得到兩次的。 `[00:08:47]` Good luck if you\'re not into connected NYC. Yeah I see why he has been a huge like why he has really widened the aperture for founders to be able to plug into this process and I think in a very healthy way. So that works really well. So that\'s the first is the warmer for all. Then there\'s two theories. One is go and hide. There\'s going to. > `[00:08:47]` 如果你不喜歡連在一起的紐約，祝你好運。是的，我明白為什么他是一個巨大的人，為什么他真的擴大了創始人的范圍，讓他們能夠加入這個過程，我認為這是非常健康的。所以，這是非常好的。所以這是第一個對所有人來說更溫暖的理論。然后有兩個理論。一個是去隱藏。 `[00:09:05]` And you know one theory is you\'ll hear sometimes is you know only ever talked to senior partners at the firm so don\'t waste any time with the more junior partners the younger people in the firm because they can\'t make the decision pull the trigger. The counter argument is that the senior partners at these firms make very little very few decisions from scratch the senior partners only get to invest in a few companies a year each. And they make very few of those decisions if they\'re going to make a decision on their own without any work done by the junior people in the firm it\'s probably going to be somebody they\'ve already worked with before. So it\'s actually really hard from a sort of standing start to get just a straight yes from a senior partner. So the thing that works better and the thing that I would do if I were you know 20 to 25 again I think there\'s a huge advantage to coming in with a junior people and get networked into the firm and spent a lot of time with the junior people understanding no one just like pre flighting like how is this coming across like how is this going to be received because you know they can read the minds of the senior partners. They can tell you how these things are going to receive and they can help you. And then also frankly the senior partners are different like ours look to the younger people a lot of like OK. What\'s interesting and we count on the younger people to stay very connected especially to the first time founders. So I really encourage people to actually take take the younger people in these firm seriously. So from that usually the process is a first meeting with one one one of those folks which might then lead to a second meeting with a broader group of those folks. Maybe with one or two general partners so you kind of have this kind of wind up kind of period and you\'re kind of working through it. > `[00:09:05]` 你知道，有一個理論是，你有時會聽到的是，你知道你只和公司的高級合伙人交談過，所以不要浪費時間和更年輕的合伙人-公司里的年輕人-在一起，因為他們不能決定扣動扳機。相反的論點是，這些公司的高級合伙人很少從零開始做出決定，高級合伙人每年只能投資幾家公司。他們很少做出這樣的決定，如果他們要自己做出決定，而公司里的初級員工卻不做任何工作，那很可能是他們以前曾與之共事過的人。因此，實際上，從一種站立狀態開始，從高級合伙人那里得到一個肯定的答案是非常困難的。所以，如果你再知道 20 到 25 歲的話，我會做一些更好的事情，我認為和一位初級員工一起進入公司有很大的優勢，并且花了很多時間和年輕人交流，沒有人能像預言家那樣理解任何人，這是怎么回事呢？。因為你知道他們能讀懂高級合伙人的想法。他們可以告訴你這些東西是如何接收的，他們可以幫助你。然后也坦率地說，高級合伙人和我們的不一樣，看著年輕人，很多都喜歡 OK。有趣的是，我們指望年輕人能保持很好的人際關系，特別是第一次創業的人。所以我真的鼓勵人們認真對待這些公司里的年輕人。因此，這個過程通常是與其中一個人的第一次會面，然后可能導致第二次與更廣泛的人群會面。也許有一兩位普通合伙人，所以你會有這樣一段時間的結束，然后你就開始工作了。 `[00:10:29]` And we\'re talking about days weeks months. > `[00:10:29]` 我們說的是幾天、幾個星期、幾個月。 `[00:10:31]` You know it depends in a hot environment. It\'s you know days two weeks because you see you assume that deals go down relatively quickly. And you know for the last several years I think days two weeks has been the expectation. I will tell you in the cold environments you know in 2003 you know we\'re talking six months nine months 12 months right. This is nothing but time because it was so hard for anybody to raise money for anything. You could just let these these these things play out for a long time. These days it\'s days two weeks we try to move in days to a small number of weeks. Then the big event is to then progressed through one or two or three meetings and then the way you really know you\'re making progress is if you get invited to present to the full partnership. > `[00:10:31]` 你知道它取決于炎熱的環境。你知道兩周后的幾天，因為你認為交易的下降速度相對較快。你知道，在過去的幾年里，我認為兩周的時間一直是我們的期望。我會告訴你，在寒冷的環境中，你知道，在 2003 年，你知道，我們說的是 6 個月，9 個月，12 個月。這只不過是時間，因為任何人都很難為任何事情籌集資金。你可以讓這些事情持續很長一段時間。這幾天然后，大事件是通過一兩次會議取得進展，然后你真正知道你正在取得進展的方式是，如果你被邀請參加正式的合作關系。 `[00:11:12]` And that\'s usually at most firms on Monday Monday meeting and that\'s a formal like that\'s a full on formal and that\'s like all the general partners at the firm are there like the whole firm is there. Well like sometimes we\'ll have 40 people in the room for that. > `[00:11:12]` 在周一的會議上，那通常是最多的幾家公司，這是一種正式的形式，這就像公司的所有普通合伙人都在那里，就像整個公司都在那里一樣。好吧，就像有時我們會有 40 人參加。 `[00:11:23]` People come in it\'s like present in the army but like we get everybody and the founder actually just presents company and yeah I did a presentation and then this gets in another debate which is like okay you know you guys like you go on and on about like creativity all this stuff. Why do you want the founder to stand up there like you know like an idiot for 50 minutes reading off a PowerPoint slides. You know like why don\'t we just like why don\'t we have a conversation why don\'t we do things casual why don\'t we. Why didn\'t you do more research upfront. Like why do we do this formal presentation. And again I think again I think that\'s misinterpreted. I think the formal presentation is another test which is as a founder if you\'re not good enough at your job as a CEO to get up and present to an investor for 60 Minutes and sell them on your thing like we\'re easy. This is the thing I thinkMr. about these firms exist to give out money like like work like we love when somebody walks in has a compelling pitch and we can give them a check. Like that\'s a successful day for us. In contrast every other pitch you\'re ever gonna make is going to be to somebody who\'s going to be much worse than us like. So customers are going to be like you know no I\'m not going to give you any money. Like is their default position right. You know engineers you\'re gonna try to recruit engineers and they\'ve got 20 other job offers. Right. > `[00:11:23]` 人們來到這里，就像軍隊里的禮物一樣，但就像我們得到了每個人，而創辦人實際上只是送了一家公司，我做了一次演示，然后進行了另一場辯論，就像好的，你們知道，你們這樣的人，就像創造力一樣，所有這些東西。為什么你想讓創始人站在那里，就像你知道的那樣，像個白癡一樣，花 50 分鐘閱讀一張 PowerPoint 幻燈片。你知道，為什么我們不喜歡，為什么我們不交談，為什么我們不做輕松的事情，為什么我們不。你為什么不提前做更多的研究。比如為什么我們要做這個正式的陳述。我再一次認為這是誤解。我認為，正式的演示是另一個考驗，如果你作為首席執行官的工作做得不夠好，不能站起來向投資者展示 60 分鐘，然后把它們賣給你的東西，就像我們這么簡單一樣。這就是我想的先生。這些公司的存在是為了像我們喜歡的工作那樣提供金錢，當有人進來的時候，我們可以給他們一張支票。這對我們來說是成功的一天。相反，你所做的每一個其他的投球都會變成一個比我們更糟糕的人。所以顧客會像你知道的那樣，不，我不會給你任何錢。就像他們的默認位置是對的。你知道，工程師，你會努力招聘工程師，他們得到了另外 20 份工作機會。右（邊），正確的 `[00:12:29]` And so why is your pitch going to be so much better than the other 20 startups right. And so again I just I view that as like that\'s the second big test which is can you successfully execute a formal pitch. And then if that goes well then generally you go in do you know if its like super super smoking hot you could you could move to Germany very quickly after that. Usually it\'s a week or two of additional work to kind of have some more discussions. Very soon we\'ll follow up. You kind of get into the process of the venture firm really trying to make sure they understand what you do. You start to negotiate the term sheet and then at some point you have a term sheet and how many checks do you write a year. > `[00:12:29]` 那么為什么你的投球會比其他 20 家創業公司好得多呢？再一次，我認為這是第二個大考驗，你能成功地執行一個正式的投球嗎？如果一切順利的話，你就可以進去了，你知道嗎，如果是超級冒煙熱的話，在那之后你可以很快地搬到德國去。通常需要一到兩周的額外工作才能進行更多的討論。很快我們就會跟進。你在某種程度上參與了風險投資公司的過程，試圖確保他們理解你所做的事情。你開始談判學期表，然后在某個時候，你有一個學期表，你每年要寫多少張支票。 `[00:13:04]` So we see 2000 startups a year that are warm referrals and we can say yes for it at the institutional level for A\'s or B\'s we can say yes to about 20. And we\'re a pretty high scale four or eight general partners. And so we\'re and we\'re up and you know large fund size and so we operate at scale there are other Top End firms that will say yes three or four or five times a year. And so by the way like on the one hand that\'s very daunting which is like well you know like that\'s 1 percent right it\'s 1 percent of warmer for us. Basically it so that seems very daunting. > `[00:13:04]` 所以我們看到每年有 2000 家初創公司是熱情的推薦人，我們可以在機構層面對 A 或 B 說是，我們可以對大約 20 家說“是”。我們是四、八個普通合伙人。因此，我們是上升的，你知道，龐大的基金規模，所以我們的規模經營，有其他頂級公司，他們會說是的，每年三、四、五次。順便說一句，一方面，這是非常令人生畏的，就像你知道的，那是百分之一，對我們來說是百分之一的溫暖。基本上，這看起來非常令人望而生畏。 `[00:13:38]` I could just tell you on the other hand it goes back to this concept of the tests like it\'s not that hard to get good at this part like. And so I just I think it\'s worth the time to really understand and get good at how to how to how to get networked and how to make that pitch. Because if you\'re good at that then like I said when it comes time to go sell your product to a customer when it comes time to go hire somebody those same skills reapply in the exact same way. And I think people people should just people should just founders should just get good at that. > `[00:13:38]` 我可以告訴你，另一方面，它可以追溯到考試的概念，就像它不那么難在這個部分取得好的效果。所以，我認為，真正理解和擅長如何建立網絡，以及如何做出這樣的宣傳，是值得的。因為如果你對此很在行，那么就像我說的，當你是時候把你的產品賣給一個客戶時，當你要去雇傭一個人的時候，同樣的技能會以完全相同的方式重新應用。我認為人們應該只是創辦人，應該在這方面做得更好。 `[00:14:05]` So there\'s a pretty big you know gap between kind of an average engineer and a really great engineer and there\'s at least a test of that. How do you know an investor is actually good if you\'re a founder and you\'re raising money for the first time or you haven\'t raised much money. > `[00:14:05]` 所以，你知道，一個普通工程師和一個真正偉大的工程師之間有相當大的差距，至少有一個測試。如果你是一個創始人，或者你第一次籌集資金，或者你沒有籌集到多少錢，你怎么知道一個投資者實際上是好的。 `[00:14:21]` So I think I have five key ways that a founder can know whether an investor is good and they are references references references references and references. > `[00:14:21]` 所以我認為我有五個關鍵的方法可以讓一個創辦人知道一個投資者是否優秀，它們都是推薦人和推薦人。 `[00:14:29]` The third one that references references evidently important. > `[00:14:29]` 第三個引用顯然很重要。 `[00:14:34]` So the good news with the valley is the super network. > `[00:14:34]` 所以山谷的好消息是超級網絡。 `[00:14:37]` As a consequence of that you know people know I\'m the founder and I know I\'m going to seed fund B. What does it mean to do a reference. Well I just find people have invested before. > `[00:14:37]` 由于你知道人們知道我是創始人，我知道我要去種子基金。做一個參考是什么意思。我只是發現人們以前投資過。 `[00:14:49]` Yeah I mean there\'s sort of two different kinds of references there are so-called front door references which as you just you asked me like you know who should I talk to and I\'ll give you a list of people who I hopefully know will say good things about me sometimes I\'m wrong. Then there\'s those the backdoor references Right which which is which is which is usually where the value is which is people who have worked with the investor before other entrepreneurs or people who have been at companies that that investor has funded or by the way for that matter other investors. Right. You can reference like the way a lot of these CEOs get reference chukkas when you know the angels and see angel investors or seed investors. If you\'re in Y C the Y C partners otherwise you founders the Internet Twitter you know these discussions take place all over the place now so. So I think you just you try to. It\'s just like anything else when you\'re evaluating people as you just try to get to other people who\'ve work with them in the past. > `[00:14:49]` 是的，我的意思是，有兩種不同類型的推薦信，也就是所謂的前門推薦信，就像你問我，你知道我該和誰說話一樣，我會給你一張清單，列出我希望認識的人，有時我會說些好的話，我錯了。還有那些后門引用的權利，這通常是價值所在，它指的是在其他企業家之前與投資者一起工作的人，或者是在投資者資助的公司工作過的人，或者是其他投資者。右（邊），正確的當你認識天使，看到天使投資者或種子投資者的時候，你就可以像很多 CEO 一樣去參考 Chukkas。如果你在 YC，YC 合作伙伴，否則你會創建互聯網，Twitter，你知道，這些討論現在到處都在進行。所以我覺得你只是試著。這就像你在評估別人時一樣，因為你只是試圖接觸到過去曾與他們共事過的其他人。 `[00:15:39]` Again I think that\'s a general skill. I think that\'s a good thing to know how to do because if you can reference an investor it also means you can reference a candidate. Right. Which is really critically important. I will just tell you like in the valley like in the valley there is a way to hire great people and it involves preferences references references you just everybody who\'s got chid one list. > `[00:15:39]` 我再一次認為這是一種普通的技能。我認為這是一件很好的事情，知道如何做，因為如果你可以參考一個投資者，這也意味著你可以推薦一個候選人。右（邊），正確的這是非常重要的。我只想告訴你，就像在山谷里一樣，有一種方法可以雇傭偉大的人，它涉及到你的偏好，參考你，只是每個人都有一份清單。 `[00:15:59]` Let\'s have a look first reference check. What should I listen to. That is like the double talk. This is not a good investor. This is not a good. > `[00:15:59]` 讓我們先看看參考證。我應該聽什么。這就像雙重談話。這不是一個好的投資者。這不是一個好的。 `[00:16:06]` Oh yeah. So it\'s all it\'s all a little tells. Right. So it\'s all in the light. If somebody is good they\'re like enthusiastic they\'re going to be part of the team like this this person is great. You should take their money like if you can get them on their board you know you\'re bored or you\'re lucky if you get anything other than that right. That\'s like trouble. Right. And it\'s it\'s like the silence is like you know so what\'s the person like on board meetings. > `[00:16:06]` 哦，是的。所以這一切都說明了一點。右（邊），正確的所以一切都在光明之中。如果一個人是好的，他們就像熱情的一樣，他們會成為團隊的一員，就像這個人是偉大的。你應該接受他們的錢，就像你能讓他們在董事會上一樣，你知道你很無聊，或者如果你得到了別的東西，你就會很幸運。那就像麻煩一樣。右（邊），正確的就像沉默就像你知道的那樣，在會議上那個人是什么樣子的。 `[00:16:26]` And then there\'s like the silence. Then there\'s like the breath like you know it\'s like OK well you know we here we come. > `[00:16:26]` 然后是沉默，然后是呼吸，就像你知道的那樣，好吧，你知道我們來了。 `[00:16:37]` Or you know the other thing is that you know a lot of people don\'t want to say bad things about people even even when nobody else is listening and so they\'ll say these lukewarm. > `[00:16:37]` 或者你知道另一件事，你知道很多人不想說關于別人的壞話，即使沒有人在聽，所以他們會說這些冷酷無情的話。 `[00:16:44]` My favorite is like well they\'re very punctual laughter sharp socks always on time right. Very well dressed. > `[00:16:44]` 我最喜歡的是，它們是非常準時的笑聲，鋒利的襪子總是準時的，穿得很好。 `[00:16:53]` You know I always write donuts. Yeah. > `[00:16:53]` 你知道我總是寫甜甜圈。嗯 `[00:16:55]` So you just you got to look even for the back burner the front of references that\'s what you listen for Buddy. But the macro references even still that\'s what you listen for and even when it\'s people who you know really well they still may not actually tell you the full thing. And so you just you just want to test really carefully. I just think it\'s a it\'s an incredibly useful skill if you learn how to do it. You can basically test this out on investors and then and then when it when it does matter for investors but then what it also really matters is when you\'re hiring especially executives later on. > `[00:16:55]` 所以你只要看看，即使是次要的，參考文獻的前面，這也是你在聽的巴迪。但是宏引用，即使這仍然是你所關注的，即使是你真正了解的人，他們仍然可能沒有告訴你全部的事情。所以你只想仔細地測試。我只是認為，如果你學會了如何去做，那是一項非常有用的技能。你基本上可以在投資者身上驗證這一點，然后當它對投資者來說很重要的時候，但真正重要的是，你在以后招聘的時候，尤其是高管。 `[00:17:22]` So > `[00:17:22]` `[00:17:22]` let\'s step back a little bit. Lots of founders investors look up to you in your ideas. Who do you look up to and how do you make sure your ideas are actually like continue to be good. Yeah. > `[00:17:22]` 讓我們退一步吧。許多創始人投資者在你的想法上都仰慕你。你尊敬誰？你如何確保你的想法確實是好的。是的。 `[00:17:33]` So. So I\'m a big fan of history. So there is a sort of a classic cliché in the valley which is like we don\'t respect history very much and a lot of people who visit the valley for the first time that\'s their impression because they don\'t have people who have had this experience firsthand. Vanity is like I wanna look I want to see something about I want to drive around to see Silicon Valley. It\'s like good luck with that right. Like okay there\'s a freeway. There\'s a strip mall. There\'s there\'s an office park there\'s a security guard who won\'t let me in the office park like there is no physical history here. Right. Really. And then and then in the conversations I mean we\'re all about the future like we\'re building the future and so I think there is this national tendency to assume that the past isn\'t very relevant and I actually think I should criticize a little bit. You know there\'s sort of the Elan school of thought now which is very strong in the valley which is sort of think everything through from first principles which has its huge strengths for sure but it does kind of dismiss the idea that people who came before us had anything to teach us. And my general view is that people who came before us had a harder time doing what they did than we do because the world was in a more immature state like they didn\'t have all the they didn\'t necessarily you know start off started before 50 years ago didn\'t have venture capital right. They didn\'t. There\'s a lot of things that started 20 years ago didn\'t have the internet. Things were harder in the past and so the people who were successful in the past I think were often better than we are because they had to be because it was harder and so like going in that in the past in the tech industry. And I\'ll just recommend a few books so I think that the origin of stories of companies. IBM there\'s a fantastic book about Thomas Watson senior who built IBM by Kevin Maty. And if you think that Steve Jobs is rough was rough on people he had nothing on Thomas Watson senior stuff. The book is The book has transcripts of executive staff meetings at IBM in the 1930s and 1940s. And let\'s just say he was an absolute terror and built an extraordinary company and so he\'s a real role model not terror. > `[00:17:33]` 所以。所以我是歷史的忠實粉絲。所以在山谷里有一種經典的陳詞濫調，那就是我們不太尊重歷史，很多人第一次訪問這個山谷，這是他們的印象，因為他們沒有親身經歷過這種經歷的人。虛榮心就像我想看，我想看一些東西，我想開車到處看看硅谷。這就像祝你好運一樣。好像有條高速公路。有個條形購物中心。有個辦公室公園，有個保安，他不讓我進入辦公室公園，就像這里沒有物理歷史一樣。右（邊），正確的真的在談話中，我的意思是，我們都是關于未來的，就像我們在建設未來一樣，所以我認為有一種全國性的傾向，認為過去與此無關，我實際上認為我應該批評一些。你知道，現在有一種伊蘭學派，它在山谷里非常強大，它從第一性原理開始思考每一件事，這些原則肯定有其巨大的優勢，但它確實否定了先于我們的人有任何東西可以教我們的想法。我的總體觀點是，在我們之前出現的人比我們更難做他們所做的事情，因為世界處于一個更加不成熟的狀態，就像他們沒有擁有他們所沒有的那樣-你不一定知道，50 年前開始的時候，就沒有風險資本了。他們沒有。20 年前開始的許多事情都沒有互聯網。過去的情況更加艱難，所以那些過去成功的人往往比我們更好，因為他們不得不這樣做，因為他們在過去的科技行業里做得更難，就像過去那樣。我只想推薦幾本書，所以我認為公司故事的起源。IBM 有一本很棒的書，講述托馬斯·沃森，他是凱文·馬蒂創建 IBM 的。如果你認為史蒂夫·喬布斯對人很粗暴，那么他對托馬斯·沃森(ThomasWatson)的高級職位一無所知。這本書有上世紀 30 年代和 40 年代 IBM 高管人員會議的成績單。讓我們簡單地說，他是一個絕對的恐怖分子，建立了一家非凡的公司，因此他是一個真正的榜樣，而不是恐怖。 `[00:19:24]` Be careful. This is an interpretive Bill Hewlett Packard. > `[00:19:24]` 小心。這是一部解釋性的比爾·惠普(BillHewlettPackard)。 `[00:19:29]` Michael Malone wrote a great book called Bill and Dave talks about how each got built over the course of 30 or 40 years by Bill and Dave. And then I like going back further. So I like Edison. I like what was called the second industrial revolution a lot we\'re like you got electricity and you got cars so there\'s a great Edison book called The Wizard of Menlo Park. It\'s really good. There\'s a great Ford book called I invented the modern age. And if you go back and read the history of cars a hundred years ago Detroit a hundred years ago was a lot like it was a lot more like Silicon Valley today than I think people people don\'t understand. In fact Henry Henry Ford like Ford Motor Company was not his first company right. So there\'s there\'s there\'s all these very interesting back stories and then I think you can go back even further I like going back and this is not to compare us to this but just as inspiration and role models. Florence you know. The time of the murder. Leonardo da Vinci I just got this great book called Divinity\'s robots and it turns out DaVinci while he was doing everything else that he did in life. He was also designing robots. And in his you know sketch books there are fully fledged designs for like everything mechanical you know all the Boston Dynamics. He was like inventing this stuff 500 years ago didn\'t quite have that you know didn\'t quite have the technology to be able to pull it off couldn\'t quite go to couldn\'t go to a team and get the microcontroller. So he had some issues but you know he\'s an inspiration. There\'s another great book called the Lunar man about something called the Lunar Society which was in England about 250 years ago like James Watt invented the steam engine and all these other guys who were doing this kind of thing back then all worked together. They had kind of a why they think back then. And so it\'s all basically it\'s just you know what it is you\'re trying to look for OK. The world as you know points in time the world is the way it is. 邁克爾馬龍寫了一本偉大的書，名叫比爾和戴夫，講述了每一本書是如何在三四十年里由比爾和戴夫建造的。然后我喜歡回到更遠的地方。所以我喜歡愛迪生。我非常喜歡所謂的第二次工業革命，我們就像你有電，你有汽車，所以有一本偉大的愛迪生書，叫做“門羅公園的巫師”。真的很棒。有一本偉大的福特書叫做“我發明了現代”。如果你回顧一下一百年前的汽車歷史，一百年前的底特律就像今天的硅谷，比我認為人們所不理解的更像。事實上，亨利·福特和福特汽車公司一樣，也不是他的第一家公司。所以，這里有很多有趣的背景故事，然后我認為你可以追溯到更遠的地方，我喜歡回到過去，這并不是要把我們和這個做比較，而是作為靈感和榜樣。弗洛倫斯你知道的。謀殺的時間。萊昂納多·達·芬奇，我剛拿到了一本偉大的書，名為“神性機器人”，結果卻是達芬奇在做他一生中所做的一切。他也在設計機器人。在他的書中，你知道草圖，有成熟的設計，就像所有機械一樣，你知道所有波士頓動力公司。他就像在 500 年前發明了這個東西，你知道，他沒有足夠的技術去完成它，不可能去到一個團隊去得到這個微控制器。所以他有一些問題，但你知道他是個靈感。還有一本偉大的書叫做“月球人”，它講述的是大約 250 年前在英國的一個叫做“月球協會”的書，就像詹姆斯·瓦特發明了蒸汽機，還有其他那些在做這種事情的人，他們當時都是一起工作的。他們有某種原因讓他們回想起那時候。所以這一切基本上都是，只是你知道它是什么，你想找的是什么。世界，正如你所知道的，時間點，世界就是它的樣子。 > `[00:21:13]` Everybody takes it for granted and then there\'s a person or some set up usually a set of people who think no no there\'s a better and you know different and better way to do things and then just all the practical challenges involved in causing that kind of change to happen and trying to build you know whether it\'s a new thing you\'re trying to build a new movement of some kind or a new kind of art. `[00:21:13]` 每個人都認為這是理所當然的，然后就有了一個人或某個人-通常是一群認為沒有更好的人某種運動或一種新的藝術。 > `[00:21:30]` And I think there\'s all kinds of lessons to be drawn from all that and extract ideas from those those people or because there is I think one of the one of the problems of being in the valley is there\'s just such an echo chamber of opinions for every opinion there is a counter opinion it is just as loudly and aggressively drummed. How do you how do you separate what is actually good advice and what is not good advice as a founder. `[00:21:30]` 我認為，從這一切中吸取各種教訓，并從這些人那里汲取思想，或者因為我認為在山谷中的問題之一就是有這樣一個意見的回音室，對于每一種意見，都有一種反對意見，它同樣響亮而有力地鼓噪。作為創始人，你如何區分哪些是好建議，哪些不是好建議。 > `[00:21:55]` Yeah well you just can\'t you go back and guess what Tiger history is like it\'s always hard. And so we just like Henry Ford as an example like there was nothing easy about building a motor company or Thomas Edison there was nothing easy about electricity like electricity and talked about like you would think that that would be a relatively easy thing to get people to want. And it turns out there was actually a lot of effort and work involved in getting people to think that was a good idea. And so it\'s just it\'s it\'s it\'s so it\'s goes back to Ben\'s idea of the struggle. It\'s just there is so much work and effort involved there are so many false starts there are so many things that can go wrong. And I think you draw on all the different lessons and theories from then and now and you kind of view them as a metal tool kit to draw on. But I\'ll just say one of our beliefs. The band also talks about his book as there\'s there\'s no silver bullet like there\'s the temptation when you get kind of in in the show. `[00:21:55]` 是的，你不能回去猜猜老虎的歷史是什么樣子的，這總是很難的。所以我們就像亨利·福特一樣，就像建造一家汽車公司沒有什么容易，托馬斯·愛迪生，電也不容易，你會認為這是一件相對容易讓人們想要的事情。事實上，為了讓人們認為這是個好主意，我們付出了大量的努力和工作。所以，它只是，它回到了本的思想斗爭。只是有這么多的工作和努力，有這么多的錯誤開始，有那么多的事情可能出錯。我認為，從那時到現在，你吸取了所有不同的經驗和理論，你把它們看作是一種可以借鑒的金屬工具包。但我只能說我們的信念之一。樂隊還談到了他的書，因為沒有銀彈，就像你在節目中表現出的誘惑一樣。 > `[00:22:43]` It\'s always like there\'s got to be a way out of this and it\'s got to be one thing if there\'s got to be some idea already a point some piece of advice right or some way to reframe reframe the picture this way or if I could just hire this person or just get this customer or something you know it\'s going to fix everything and we always like to say there are no silver bullets. They\'re only let bullets. And so you just have to kind of do all the work and most of the work is just a grinding it\'s just you know grinding labor and there\'s just no substitute for it. `[00:22:43]` 總是有一條出路，如果必須有一個想法，一個觀點，一個建議，或者某種方式來重新塑造這個形象，或者如果我能雇傭這個人，或者找個客戶或者其他你知道的東西，我們總是會修好的，我們一直都是這樣的。我想說沒有銀彈。他們只會放子彈。所以你只需要做所有的工作，大部分的工作只是磨練，只是你知道研磨的勞動，沒有什么可以代替它。 > `[00:23:10]` And I think that frankly I think that comes out of the history as well so what do you think is you know we\'re we\'re kind of heading in the tail end of 2016 lots in store in the next couple two years two and a half years for the start up ecosystem and are in a lot of talk in a lot of different opinions about both in verticals and verticals handling and just to the larger community and the ecosystem. `[00:23:10]` 我認為坦率地說，我認為這也是歷史上的事情，所以你認為我們在 2016 年的尾聲中會有什么樣的想法呢？在接下來的兩年半時間里，我們都在為啟動生態系統做準備，在很多方面都有不同的看法。垂直和垂直處理，只對更大的社區和生態系統。 > `[00:23:34]` Yeah so I guess you know maybe two to two schools of thought so you\'re all probably well aware. Experts have been declaring an imminent bubble and crash continuously since 2004. So we\'re now in year 13 next year will be year 14 of declarations of an imminent dot com crash redux all over again. They are these the people who predict this are getting increasingly frustrated that it hasn\'t happened and increasingly irate that we\'re all still here. You know maybe they\'re right and we\'ve just completely inflated you know dot com bubble2.0 and we\'re just it\'s just now we\'re just delaying until the inevitable crash. `[00:23:34]` 是的，所以我想你們可能知道兩到兩個學派，所以你們可能都很清楚。自 2004 年以來，專家們一直在宣布即將出現泡沫，并不斷崩盤。因此，我們現在是在第 13 年，明年將是第 14 年，即將到來的網絡崩潰重演。他們是那些預測這件事的人，他們對這件事沒有發生感到越來越沮喪，對我們都還在這里越來越憤怒。你知道，也許他們是對的，我們只是完全夸大了，你知道 docom 泡沫 2.0，我們只是現在，我們只是推遲到不可避免的崩潰。 > `[00:24:13]` It\'s possible. `[00:24:13]` 這是可能的。 > `[00:24:15]` You know mean you seem skeptical and I\'m skeptical of that because the other the other the other theory right. So the other theory is we\'ve we\'ve entered a phase of the industry where you know some things are just working now and in particular right the Internet that it\'s working now which if you were here 20 years ago that was not necessarily a certain thing and like the internet works. Mobile works the smart phone works. You got one with the new Apple headphones will work. You know some stuff is just starting to work. And so you\'ve got these marvelous. You know you\'ve got this giant giant install base. `[00:24:15]` 你知道的意思是你看起來很懷疑，而我對此持懷疑態度，因為另一種理論是正確的。所以另一個理論是，我們已經進入了這個行業的一個階段，你知道有些東西現在起作用了，尤其是互聯網，它現在起作用了。如果你在 20 年前來到這里，那不一定是一件特定的事情，就像互聯網一樣。手機工作智能手機工作。你買了新的蘋果耳機就行了。你知道有些東西才剛開始起作用。所以你有了這些了不起的東西。你知道你有這個巨大的安裝基地。 > `[00:24:48]` Now people all over the world on the Internet. You\'ve got this massive growing consumer acceptance of e-commerce. You\'ve got these giant new social platforms. You\'ve got these you know all these new these new playbooks are how to build these companies. You\'ve got the rise of developer adoption of enterprise technology like a whole thing that\'s working now. And so these things are working at a very big scale. And each of these things the big things at work are all platforms to build on top of opportunities for more things to than get built right on top. And so I just think a lot of those things are working really well. So which isn\'t to say that everything\'s working right and so I think the Valley and startups will always be characterized by you know there will always be what\'s called a power locker. You\'ll always have some big successes and then you\'ll have a long tail of things that don\'t work and you\'ll have a bunch of stuff in the middle and you always get this kind of distribution of success. But you have enough things that are working at scale that are serious. And so you know I think the things that are working are working really really well. `[00:24:48]` 現在全世界的人們都在上網。你得到了越來越多的消費者對電子商務的接受。你有了這些巨大的新社交平臺。你已經得到了這些，你知道，所有這些新的劇本都是如何建立這些公司的。開發人員對企業技術的采用正在興起，就像現在起作用的整個事情一樣。所以這些東西在很大的范圍內起作用。每一件事情-工作中的大事-都是建立在機會之上的平臺，比建立在上面的機會更多。所以我覺得很多事情都很有效。所以，這并不是說一切都正常，所以我認為硅谷和初創企業的特征將永遠是這樣的，你知道，總有一種叫做動力儲物柜的東西。你總是會有一些巨大的成功，然后你會有一長串不起作用的事情，你會有一堆東西在中間，你總是得到這種成功的分配。但你有足夠的東西在規模上工作是嚴肅的。所以你知道，我認為這些事情運作得很好。 > `[00:25:42]` Think in terms of do you believe in this kind of thematic of these three or four markets are these three or four spaces the next couple of years are really going to be most likely the places where some of these outlying returns are going to sit. Or are you more agnostic. `[00:25:42]` 想一想，在這三、四個市場中，你相信這樣的主題嗎？這三、四個市場就是這三、四個市場，未來幾年，最有可能的是，其中一些離經叛道的收益所在的地方。還是你更不可知論。 > `[00:25:56]` Yeah we\'re totally schizophrenic on that point. So anybody in the field can\'t resist talking about this all the time. And by the way there is substance to it right. It\'s like there was there was a point at which you know there was a point that between you know when the iPhone came out to probably 2012 was like there\'s this point where all the mobile killer apps that are going to be on the homescreen of the iPhone we\'re going to get built. And by the way got built. There was a point where you know early earlier there was a point when the piece came out that all theP.C. killer apps are going to be built. So there are these things that happen. These new platforms get established and then there\'s this period of time where things get built on top. There\'s a bunch of candidates for that today that are very exciting so broadly I give a few examplesA.I. machine learning deep learning as one cluster of things very you know tons of activity happening in the intersection of biology healthcare and computer science. Big cluster of things happening there. Transportation right autonomous ground vehicles air vehicles actually now see vehicles different kinds different sizes shapes descriptions uses are really starting to click and you know we could probably name another another half dozen so you know we you know what part of our job is to track track those those field and try to try to figure out the best startups. Do you guys actually track those fields. Oh it\'s just a constant. It\'s just kind of the action of the firm the flow of the firm so it\'s just constantly trying to review it trying to understand trying to map a landscape to understand all the companies trying to meet all the founders. So that\'s the one and I would just say on the other hand on the other hand I would say that I don\'t think any Veazey really does that good a job predicting these things in the sense of first of all. So the big successes are so dependent on the specifics they are contingent on the specifics and so it\'s the right hander with the right idea with the right team with the right breakthrough at the right time and the right market with the right pricing model it\'s all these things have to come together and you just you never my experience is you just never know when that when that company is going to crystallize and that often happens five or ten years after you think it should and then it can often be the case that you get these companies that are breakthrough companies in fields that people thought were dead. So we had just had this company Itanium people written about now which is a security company. And it\'s in a field where I think a lot of you see sort of the opportunity to build big franchises was over and like this company is growing like unbelievably fast very very specific set of people who are really interested in the woman became available at a certain point to go after it. They\'re going after it. You knowV.M. where as another great example virtualization or popular as virtualization virtualization was a 30 year old mainframe technology. It goes back to the 1960s. Diane Greene and mental Rosenblum out of Stanford meadowlarks Stanford and Diane had a son started Vima in 1999 at a time when everybody knew that like of software was on its way out and it turned into one of the big breakthroughs Google hires like Google was like the thirty fifth search engine. `[00:25:56]` 是的，我們在這一點上完全是精神分裂癥。所以這個領域的任何人都禁不住不停地談論這件事。順便說一句，它的實質是正確的。就像在某個時刻，你知道，當 iPhone 發布到 2012 年的時候，你就會知道，在這一點上，所有的移動殺手應用程序都將出現在 iPhone 的主屏幕上，我們將生產這些應用。順便說一句。有一個點，你知道早些時候，有一個點，當這件事出來，所有的 P.C.殺手應用將被建立。所以有些事情是會發生的。這些新的平臺被建立起來，然后在這段時間里，事情就建立在上面。今天有一群候選人非常令人興奮，所以我舉幾個例子，人工智能，機器學習，深度學習，這是一群大家都知道的事情，在生物學、醫療和計算機科學的交匯處發生了大量的活動。大量的事情發生在那里。交通運輸，自動地面車輛，空中車輛，現在可以看到不同的車輛，不同的尺寸，形狀，描述，使用開始點擊，你知道，我們可能還可以說出另外的六個，所以你知道我們的工作的一部分是跟蹤這些領域，并試圖找出最好的初創企業。你們真的追蹤那些領域。哦，這只是一個常數。它只是公司的一種行為，公司的流程，所以它只是不斷地回顧它，試圖理解，試圖繪制一幅地圖來理解所有的公司，試圖會見所有的創始人。這就是我要說的，另一方面，我想說，我不認為任何維西真的做得那么好，首先，我可以預測這些事情。因此，巨大的成功取決于具體情況，所以它是正確的投手，正確的想法，正確的團隊，正確的時間，正確的市場，正確的定價模式，所有這些都必須結合在一起，你只是-我的經驗是，你永遠不知道什么時候才會有這樣的突破。那家公司將會結晶，這通常發生在你認為應該的五到十年之后，然后你會發現，這些公司往往是那些在人們認為已經死了的領域里取得突破的公司。我們剛剛讓 Itanium 公司的人寫了一篇文章，這是一家保安公司。在這個領域，我想你們中的很多人都看到，建立大特許經營的機會已經結束，就像這家公司正在以難以置信的速度增長，非常具體的一組人，對這個女人真正感興趣的人，在某一時刻就有機會去追求它。他們在追殺它。作為另一個很好的例子，虛擬化或虛擬化流行于 30 年前的大型機技術。它可以追溯到 20 世紀 60 年代。黛安·格林(Diane Greene)和精神·羅森布盧姆(Mint Rosenblum)離開了斯坦福草地云雀斯坦福大學(Stanford And Diane)。1999 年，戴安有個兒子創辦了 VIMA，當時大家都知道，就像軟件一樣，它正在走向終結，它變成了谷歌雇傭的重大突破之一，比如谷歌就像第三十五臺搜索引擎。 > `[00:28:43]` Right. `[00:28:43]` 對。 > `[00:28:44]` There\'s like 34 other search engines had come along and like we all knew for a fact that no one search didn\'t work like it would give you crappy results. Number two there was no way to make money on it like those two things we knew for sure. `[00:28:44]` 好像有 34 個搜索引擎出現了，就像我們都知道的那樣，沒有一個搜索不像它會給你帶來糟糕的結果那樣有效。第二，沒有辦法像我們確定的那樣在這兩件事上賺錢。 > `[00:28:55]` But you know as a founder that you are not to Erlick as you know we talked to a lot of founders and how do you know that your thirty fifth rather than maybe first or second date your timing is right. `[00:28:55]` 但是你知道，作為一個創辦人，你不是埃利克，因為你知道，我們和很多創始人談過，你怎么知道你的第三十五次約會，而不是第一次或第二次約會，你的時機是對的。 > `[00:29:06]` So my experience is the great founders almost always feel like you almost always feel like you\'re too late and you\'re almost always too early and you almost always feel like you\'re too late. The reason is because for you it\'s become obvious like all of you I\'m listening to this like you\'ve got some idea in your head and like as far as you\'re concerned the world should already work this way which is why you\'re pursuing it. And so to you it\'s a little bit inexplicable as to why it hasn\'t happened yet and there must be 80 other people going after the same idea. And it must be just about to happen. And I must be too late. Which is just how I felt with this tape. `[00:29:06]` 所以我的經驗是，偉大的創始人幾乎總是覺得你太遲了，你幾乎總是太早，你幾乎總是覺得你太遲了。因為對你來說，它變得很明顯，就像你們所有人一樣，我聽著，就像你們腦子里有一些想法一樣，就像你們所關心的那樣，世界應該已經這樣運作了，這就是你們追求它的原因。所以對你來說，這是一個有點令人費解的原因，為什么它還沒有發生，肯定有 80 其他人追求同樣的想法。這肯定就要發生了。我一定太遲了。這就是我對這盤帶子的感受。 > `[00:29:35]` I was too late. In retrospect we weren\'t. `[00:29:35]` 我來得太晚了。回想起來我們不是。 > `[00:29:40]` The reality is you\'re almost always too early. We almost never see a qualified founder fail because they\'re too late to market. It\'s almost always closer to a relative market. And I think by the way and I don\'t say that critically I think we make when we screw up investments I think that\'s often the reason as well. I think we\'re in the exact same boat as the founder and in that degree which is we believe it\'s going to happen therefore we invest in it just it just turns out the way the history gets written as the world just wasn\'t ready yet. So I always like to point out like the iPod is like this breakthrough product in 2009 and you know Stapel my God I I these things well. `[00:29:40]` 事實是，你幾乎總是太早了。我們幾乎從來沒有見過合格的創始人失敗，因為他們太晚才能上市。它幾乎總是更接近一個相對的市場。順便說一句，我不這么說，我認為，當我們搞砸投資的時候，我認為這也常常是原因。我認為我們和創立者處于同一條船上，在某種程度上，我們相信它會發生，因此我們投資于它，就像世界還沒有準備好一樣，歷史就是這樣寫的。所以我總是喜歡指出，iPod 就像 2009 年這個突破性的產品，你知道，斯塔佩爾，我的上帝，我把這些事情做得很好。 > `[00:30:10]` There was this thing called the Newton 20 years earlier in 1989 if you haven\'t heard of it. Look it up on Wikipedia. It was the iPad 20 years earlier and it was like virtually the same thing in the world just wasn\'t ready yet. The technologies were in place you didn\'t have mobile broadband you didn\'t have the high resolution screens you didn\'t have the battery technology and you just brought the thing in a market crash and burn and it convinced people for 20 years that tablet computing would never work. And then they did it again in the iPod and it worked. And so I think that in a lot of ways that\'s the biggest risk that the biggest conceptual risk we\'ll deal with is just that I think that\'s the permanent curse of the entrepreneur. `[00:30:10]` 如果你還沒聽說過的話，20 年前的 1989 年，有一種叫做牛頓的東西。在維基百科上查一下。那是 20 年前的 ipad，世界上幾乎一樣的東西還沒有準備好。技術已經到位，你沒有移動寬帶，沒有高分辨率屏幕，沒有電池技術，你剛剛在市場崩潰和燃燒中帶來了這個東西，這讓人們相信，20 年來，平板電腦是行不通的。然后他們又在 iPod 里做了一次，它起了作用。因此，我認為，在很多方面，這是最大的風險，我們將處理的最大的概念風險，只是我認為這是企業家的永久詛咒。 > `[00:30:45]` Yeah I remember you. You\'re going to talk I see one time and you said you know if you the one way to figure out if your not too late is if what you\'re working on was being hotly covered three four years ago you\'re probably right on time because now the infrastructure and consumer behavior is not caught up to what was exciting in 2012 13. Last question you know do whatever fato whatever you lose everything and at the end of the day today are 22 years old again. What do you start with the company you would start. `[00:30:45]` 是的，我記得你。你要跟我談一次，你說過，如果你知道，如果你不太晚的話，那就是四年前你所做的工作是否受到了熱烈的關注，你很可能按時完成了，因為現在基礎設施和消費者的行為還沒有趕上 2012 年令人興奮的事情。最后一個問題，你知道，做任何事情，無論你失去了什么，在今天結束今天又是 22 歲。你從你要創辦的公司開始做什么？ > `[00:31:15]` So if I\'m 22 again I think what I do is I go try to find the best the the hottest company the company in the valley that\'s growing the fastest and that has a really good culture and a really good foundation for training. And so an example of that would be an urban bee. But you know there are many others by the way still Facebook. `[00:31:15]` 所以如果我再次 22 歲，我想我所做的就是去尋找最好的公司-硅谷發展最快的公司，有著非常好的文化和良好的培訓基礎的公司。因此，這方面的一個例子就是城市蜜蜂。但順便說一句，還有很多人仍然是 Facebook。 > `[00:31:36]` I would go try to get a plant myself at a company where I can really learn fast forward while you\'re 25 you\'ve got you\'ve got three years that everybody is that now. `[00:31:36]` 我會親自去一家公司買一棵植物，在你 25 歲的時候，我真的可以學到更快的東西-你現在每個人都有三年的時間了。 > `[00:31:48]` Well so I spend that time someone as I worked my butt off to establish a good reputation so that when people reference struck me read a reference like well but the other is I spend that time thinking and I really critically I spend that time building my network and the people who I know that I want to work with you know down the road. And then and then either. Yeah. Either come up with an idea or I don\'t but I would focus so much. I think it\'s very hard and I\'m deliberately avoiding your question because I think it\'s very hard to answer in the abstract. Let me answer in a different way if I were 18 and I were going to college. I would do I would really I would do computer science again in a heartbeat. And then I would either focus on cryptocurrency distributed systems and broad domain of cryptocurrency number one number two a machine learning deep learning or number three intersection of bio biology and CSIRO genomics and synthetic biology. I would personally I would do those one of those three areas. And the hard part for me would be picking between them because I think they\'re all they\'re all to me it\'s just like all three of us are going to have transformative work happen in the next 20 years is going to change a lot of how the world works. `[00:31:48]` 好吧，我把時間花在了某人身上，因為我努力工作是為了建立一個良好的聲譽，所以當別人提到的時候，我會讀得很好，但另一個是，我會花時間思考，我真的會花時間去建立我的關系網，以及我認識的那些我想和你一起工作的人。不管是什么。嗯要么想出一個主意，要么我不想，但我會非常專注。我認為這很難，我故意回避你的問題，因為我認為這很難用抽象的方式回答。如果我 18 歲就要上大學的話，讓我用另一種方式回答。我會然后，我要么關注密碼貨幣分布式系統和廣泛的密碼學領域，第一，第二，機器學習，深入學習，要么是生物學與 CSIRO 基因組學和合成生物學的第三交叉。就我個人而言，我會做這三個領域中的一個。對我來說，最難的是在他們之間選擇，因為我認為他們對我來說都是，就像我們三個人在接下來的 20 年里都會發生變革一樣，這將改變世界的許多運作方式。 > `[00:32:49]` Awesome. Thank you for your time. Thanks. `[00:32:49]` 太棒了。謝謝您抽時間見我謝謝 > `[00:32:52]` Bradley. `[00:32:52]` 布拉德利。