# Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar
> `[00:00:05]` Hi everyone.
`[00:00:05]` 嗨,大家好。
> My name\'s Kevin Hower partner at Y Combinator.
我是 Y Combinator 的凱文·豪爾合伙人。
> I went through see myself back in 2006.
我在 2006 年經歷過自我。
> Cofounded a company called Wufu online form builder Rennick company for about five years and was acquired by Survey Monkey back in 2011.
合建了一家名為“五福在線表單建筑商 Rennick”的公司約五年,2011 年被“調查猴”收購。
> My background is in product development User Experience Design and customer support.
我的背景是產品開發,用戶體驗設計和客戶支持。
> `[00:00:29]` My name is Casser I\'m also a partner in NYC quick history is I went through icee in winter 11 and we had a company called Hawkman and Tuckman lets consumers send messages to businesses and vice versa.
`[00:00:29]` 我的名字叫卡賽爾,我也是紐約快速歷史上的合伙人,我在 11 月份經歷過冰,我們有一家叫 Hawkman 的公司,Tuckman 允許消費者向企業發送信息,反之亦然。
> We were acquired by Google coincidentally on the exact same day as Wufu.
我們被谷歌收購恰巧就在和吳福同一天。
> So that\'s an interesting fact for me and Kevin and and I\'ve been a partner here.
這對我來說是個有趣的事實,凱文和我一直是這里的合伙人。
> My perspective and partner a couple times.
我的觀點和搭檔幾次。
> My experience is actually similar to Kevin\'s.
我的經歷和凱文很相似。
> I was a product design is kind of what I\'m what I\'m good at.
我是一個產品設計,這是我所擅長的。
> All right so time to do some office hours so office hours are a big part of why he is.
好吧,所以是時候做一些辦公時間了,所以辦公時間是他的主要原因之一。
> And there are kind of four different types of office hours.
有四種不同類型的辦公時間。
> There are group office hours in the sense that when you\'re a startup you actually are broken into many groups that we see and Kevin and I have group office hours with small groups every Tuesday and this is the case with all the partners the group OFSAA serve as a way to see what you as a startup are doingvs.
這里有小組辦公時間,也就是說,當你是一家初創公司的時候,你實際上被分成了很多小組,我們看到凱文和我每周二都有小組辦公時間,所有的合伙人都是這樣的。SAA 的團隊可以用來觀察你作為一家初創公司所做的事情。
> the other startups and in terms of the tempo as you\'re going through I see what you should be working on what problems you\'re facing and you really realize I think as a founder in group office hours that your problems are actually not just unique to you.
其他的創業公司,就你所經歷的節奏而言,我看到了你應該做些什么來解決你所面臨的問題,而且你真的意識到,作為團隊辦公時間的創始人,你的問題并不僅僅是你自己的問題。
> They\'re actually very similar to other companies.
它們實際上與其他公司非常相似。
> Then there\'s individual office hours.
然后是個人辦公時間。
> That\'s what we\'re going to try to emulate here.
這就是我們在這里要模仿的。
> It\'s individual partners sitting down with companies we do a lot of individual office hours every week hundreds of them.
這是個人合伙人與公司坐下來,我們每周做很多個人辦公時間,其中數百人。
> That is really the heart of kind of office hours and when people are offered office hours that\'s usually what they\'re talking about.
這實際上是辦公時間的核心,當人們被提供辦公時間時,這通常是他們所談論的。
> There\'s two other types of office hours worth mentioning.
還有另外兩種類型的辦公時間值得一提。
> One is investor office hours so Elford and I actually did office hours and we\'re going to talk.
一個是投資者的辦公時間,所以埃爾福德和我實際上做了辦公時間,我們要談談。
> So investors come to see we pair them up and literally go through you know what the company is in short short meetings.
所以投資者會來看我們把他們配對,然后從字面上看,你知道公司在簡短的會議上是怎么做的。
> And then there are what we call like a company office hours so Amazon or Apple come in very tactical things like how do you know problems with the app store or to yes or whatever it might be Rackspace Roku et cetera.
還有我們稱之為公司辦公時間的東西,所以亞馬遜或蘋果都有一些戰術上的問題,比如你怎么知道應用程序商店的問題,或者是的,或者任何可能是 Rackspace,Roku 等等的問題。
> So today we\'re going to do individual OFSAA give you guys a little bit of a peek of what happens at Lycee.
所以今天我們要做個別的 OFSAA,讓大家看看在 Lycee 發生的事情。
> `[00:02:27]` So these are obviously going be a little bit different than actual office hours.
`[00:02:27]` 這些顯然與實際的辦公時間有點不同。
> The ones that we do see they tend to be a lot longer we only have 10 minutes for these startups and we usually have a ton of context because we\'ve been working with these startups over time so people might think that office hours like the way you\'ve probably seen before are like pitches but that is not actually the way we run them.
我們看到的那些公司往往要長得多,我們只有 10 分鐘的時間來開辦這些初創公司,而且我們通常有大量的背景信息,因為隨著時間的推移,我們一直在與這些初創企業合作,所以人們可能會認為,像你以前可能看到的那樣的辦公時間就像球場一樣,但實際上我們并不是這樣運作它們的。
> We already have a lot of understanding of what the startups are working on.
我們已經對創業公司的工作有了很多了解。
> And so usually our officers are very tactical very focused on very solving very specific problems with them.
因此,我們的軍官通常都是非常戰術性的,非常專注于解決與他們有關的非常具體的問題。
> And so we might not get into that today but you know that\'s how things are gonna be a little bit different.
所以,我們今天可能不會討論這個問題,但你知道,事情會有一些不同。
> You know I would have 800 people watching right.
你知道我會讓 800 人看對的。
> That changes the dynamic a little bit.
這稍微改變了動態。
> The other thing is I want to talk a little bit about sort of like if you get a chance to do office hours are there with your partners or other sort of notable investors.
另一件事是,我想談一談,比如,如果你有機會做辦公時間,你的合伙人或其他知名投資者也在那里。
> There are some things that I would highly recommend to you.
有些事情我會強烈推薦給你。
> So both for the sharks that we\'re about to meet with but also for you guys out there if you go talk to us later today or with other investors down in the future because officers tend to not be like pitches right which is where I would recommend you focus on being concise and clear in regular office hours where you\'re having a relationship with an investor.
所以,對于我們將要遇到的鯊魚來說,如果你們今天晚些時候去和我們交談,或者將來和其他投資者交談的話,你們也會遇到這樣的情況,因為官員們往往不像投手那樣,這也是我建議你們在正常的辦公時間里保持簡潔和清晰的地方,在這里,你們和投資者有著良好的關系。
> What we want to know is very quickly to get to the heart.
我們想知道的是很快就能到達心臟。
> So the first thing is like know your numbers.
所以第一件事就是知道你的號碼。
> It\'s very frustrating to us that we\'re talking with a startup and they have we ask questions about sort of like about retention their users and all this stuff and they just don\'t know where they stand and it makes it very difficult for us to sort of diagnose their problems.
讓我們非常沮喪的是,我們正在和一家初創公司交談,他們會問一些問題,比如如何留住他們的用戶和所有這些東西,他們只是不知道自己的立場,這讓我們很難診斷出他們的問題。
> The other thing is I come to do office hours with a specific problem in mind.
另一件事是,我來上班時考慮到了一個具體的問題。
> Investors don\'t really like sitting around and sort of shooting the shit or at least not the good ones right.
投資者不太喜歡坐著打炮,或者至少不喜歡好的。
> So we like to be able to say that like you have something specific some problem that you want identified or solved and then we\'ll brainstorm with you during that or we might have a connection that might be able to help solve that problem for you.
所以我們喜歡這樣說,就像你有一些你想要找出來或解決的具體問題,然后我們會在這個過程中和你頭腦風暴,或者我們可能有一種聯系,可以幫助你解決這個問題。
> And the last thing is like if you\'re having an office hours with someone and it feels like deja vu from the last time you talked to them or you\'re repeating the same numbers over again still working on the exact same problems.
最后一件事是,如果你和某人有辦公時間,感覺就像上次和他們交談時的似曾相識,或者你又在重復同樣的數字,仍然在處理同樣的問題。
> No that that is a problem to us.
不,這對我們來說是個問題。
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> So try to focus on when you have office hours like you\'ve done a lot of things based on the feedback from beforehand or you have reasons why those things don\'t work and going to us with new sets of problems rather than hashing over the same things over and over again.
所以,試著把注意力集中在你有辦公時間的時候,比如你已經根據事先的反饋做了很多事情,或者你有理由讓這些事情不起作用,然后帶著新的問題去找我們,而不是一遍又一遍地重復同樣的事情。
> All right.
好的
> With that let\'s do the deal first company is Zeila fi.
就這樣,讓我們完成交易,第一家公司是澤拉·菲(ZeilaFI)。
> `[00:04:50]` And I think we have Lauren let\'s give me a round of applause applause applause.
`[00:04:50]` 我想我們有勞倫,讓我們為我鼓掌吧。
> `[00:04:57]` This is really this is really turning into a variety show.
`[00:04:57]` 這真的是-這是一個真正的綜藝節目。
> `[00:05:00]` He has gone off to do some tricks afterwards.
`[00:05:00]` 他后來去做一些把戲了。
> All right.
好的
> So tell us what you do.
告訴我們你是做什么的。
> `[00:05:06]` So we either fight we profile high growth exciting small and medium sized companies to leverage their company culture and employer brands as a competitive advantage.
`[00:05:06]` 因此,我們要么把高增長、令人興奮的中小企業作為競爭優勢,利用他們的公司文化和雇主品牌進行競爭。
> So we build online profiles using our feet to the office.
所以我們用雙腳到辦公室建立網上檔案。
> It is the employees and understanding what it\'s like to work there and to what end to help them attract great talent so talent can self select as well.
這是員工和理解什么是喜歡在那里工作,目的是幫助他們吸引偉大的人才,這樣人才也可以自己選擇。
> So yeah exactly.
所以沒錯。
> `[00:05:30]` And why do those picks start ups.
`[00:05:30]` 以及為什么這些挑選會啟動。
> I mean they tend to be companies that don\'t have a lot of money to recruit.
我的意思是,他們往往是那些沒有足夠資金招聘的公司。
> `[00:05:36]` Sure.
`[00:05:36]` 當然。
> So part of the problem was at university obviously you know we focus on the junior level market and the large corporates have such a big employer brand and stock in so many talented graduates.
所以,問題的一部分是在大學,很明顯,我們關注初級市場,而大公司擁有如此大的雇主、品牌以及如此多優秀畢業生的股票。
> But all of these small companies that meet great people just don\'t have that employee to live.
但是,所有這些小公司,遇到了偉大的人,只是沒有員工可以生活。
> So whilst they most they don\'t have a huge budget they do have a great great company culture and they are an attractive place to work.
因此,盡管他們大多數人沒有龐大的預算,但他們確實有很好的公司文化,而且他們是一個很有吸引力的工作場所。
> But for the average joe you could come out of university they don\'t know these companies exist.
但對于普通的喬來說,你可以從大學畢業,他們不知道這些公司的存在。
> `[00:06:03]` So I mean you know we did start up one of the first things you would see when you see a job board is do you actually.
`[00:06:03]` 我的意思是,你知道,當你看到求職板的時候,你會看到的第一件事就是你真的開始了。
> Are there other companies on there that are relevant.
有沒有其他相關的公司。
> How do you get kind of these early adopters to actually sign up because the first thing I\'m looking as I don\'t wanna waste my time posting across 15 different sites or what\'s the incentive for that early stage company to actually.
你是如何讓這些早期用戶真正注冊的呢?因為我看上去第一件事就是我不想浪費時間在 15 個不同的網站上發表文章,或者這個早期公司的動機是什么。
> `[00:06:21]` Sure.
`[00:06:21]` 當然。
> So company culture is quite a popular topic at the moment with companies like Buffa showing how important it is to leverage their company culture.
因此,公司文化目前是一個很受歡迎的話題,像 Buffa 這樣的公司展示了利用他們的公司文化是多么的重要。
> So as an example they profile their company culture quite widely themselves and on average get 400 applicants per job.
因此,舉個例子,他們自己相當廣泛地描述了自己的公司文化,平均每份工作有 400 名申請者。
> So the impacts of showing your company culture is really valuable.
因此,展示你的公司文化的影響是非常有價值的。
> So actually when we go to chat\'s companies that\'s something they understand quite well.
因此,實際上,當我們去聊天的公司,這是他們非常了解的事情。
> So from our perspective it\'s just a great way for them to share that.
所以從我們的角度來看,這只是他們分享的一個很好的方式。
> So this is.
所以這就是。
> `[00:06:51]` The way I sort of see it as a straight up sort of market place sort of play.
`[00:06:51]` 我把它看作是一個直截了當的市場場所。
> And whenever we\'re dealing with groups that are creating marketplaces that they have like onesided in the marketplace like sort of solved right with some kind of deep insight or they have something they figured out right so they can focus all their time on the other side of the market.
每當我們與那些正在創造市場的群體打交道時,他們就像市場上的一邊倒,就像某種深度的洞察力解決了問題,或者他們有一些他們想得對的東西,這樣他們就可以把所有的時間都集中在市場的另一邊。
> So where are you guys at right now.
你們現在哪。
> `[00:07:09]` Sure.
`[00:07:09]` 當然。
> So I think we\'re definitely more focused on the company side.
所以我認為我們肯定會更加關注公司方面。
> I think on the supply side and on the supply side you\'re correct on the on the candidate side you know our strategies are just kind of with or without networks leveraging the student student societies on campuses but which one do you feel like you have solved that you focus on the other.
我認為,在供應方面和供應方面,你是正確的,在候選人方面,你知道我們的策略只是有或沒有網絡,利用校園里的學生社團,但是你覺得你解決了另一個問題。
> `[00:07:28]` I think it\'s the companies so actually onboarding companies there\'s been a lot more simple candidates than misconceptions of start ups and seminars with junior level talent is quite large in terms of what they think it would be like what career progression is there so actually solving that side is quite difficult.
`[00:07:28]` 我認為是那些公司,所以實際上,入職公司有很多簡單的應聘者,而不是對創業和有初級人才的研討會的誤解,因為他們認為職業發展會是怎樣的,所以解決這方面的問題是相當困難的。
> But the companies really understand why they want to show off what they want what it\'s therefore and how they can attract talent.
但這些公司真的明白,他們為什么要炫耀自己想要的東西,因此,他們想要的是什么,以及他們如何吸引人才。
> `[00:07:51]` The thing is like for these types of businesses like signing up companies are usually not that difficult because the companies don\'t pay you what for the first or second or third posting but if there isn\'t traction I think that we say all companies do pay upfront.
`[00:07:51]` 對于這類企業,比如注冊公司,通常不會那么困難,因為公司不給你第一、第二或第三次職位的報酬,但如果沒有牽引力,我認為所有公司都會提前付款。
> Okay.
好的。
> `[00:08:03]` Because you convince them that they can we will help highlight your culture quickly and as a student why would I use this job more than any other one.
`[00:08:03]` 因為你說服他們,我們會幫助他們迅速突出你的文化,作為一個學生,為什么我會比其他任何一份工作更多地使用這份工作。
> It seems somewhat more limiting than again the same thing right.
這似乎比同樣的事情更有限制,是對的。
> You don\'t want to post across multiple parties.
你不想在多方之間發帖子。
> Sure.
好的
> `[00:08:17]` So obviously you know if your if your if you\'re a university graduate looking at jobs usually just get a standard job and that doesn\'t tell you anything about what the company is like.
`[00:08:17]` 很明顯,你知道如果你是一名大學畢業生,在找工作的時候,通常只會得到一份標準的工作,而這并不能告訴你公司是什么樣的。
> So you can get to very similar job but votes.
這樣你就可以得到非常相似的工作但投票。
> But actually the companies behind it can be very very different.
但實際上,背后的公司可能會有很大的不同。
> So what we do is we as Lawrence said we would go with photos the office of video interviews of the current employees in fresh about the company compromise that you have on the site.
所以,我們所做的就是,我們會像勞倫斯所說的那樣,帶著照片、辦公室的視頻,采訪現職的員工,以全新的方式了解你在網站上遇到的公司妥協。
> 12 at the moment.
12 分鐘。
> Okay.
好的。
> And how many students have you guys actively placed.
你們安排了多少學生。
> Currently currently does none.
目前沒有。
> We\'re still the early stage.
我們還在早期階段。
> We\'ve had we\'ve had can do is go through an interview.
我們能做的就是通過一次面試。
> How long have you guys been working on this.
你們做這件事多久了。
> `[00:08:52]` About six months.
`[00:08:52]` 大約六個月。
> So we went live about a month ago with our company.
所以大約一個月前我們和我們的公司一起去了現場。
> So we\'ve just been driving can what do you think going to be the biggest challenge in the next three months in terms of.
所以我們一直在開車,你認為在接下來的三個月里,最大的挑戰是什么?
> `[00:09:03]` I guess I guess I\'m a bit skeptical that students are just going to rush in to sign up for a job site.
`[00:09:03]` 我想我有點懷疑學生們是否會匆忙加入求職網站。
> `[00:09:09]` Yeah exactly and actually we found quite high engagement.
`[00:09:09]` 是的,事實上我們發現了相當高的參與度。
> So we had to go through each interview and haven\'t had the results yet but they look through all the different jobs in those two companies that they had about their own user experience.
因此,我們必須每次面試,還沒有結果,但他們查看了所有不同的工作,在這兩家公司,他們有自己的用戶體驗。
> They were quite interested in that area.
他們對那個地區很感興趣。
> They compared both and came to us and said I didn\'t think I fit in this company but I\'m pretty sure I definitely fit in this one.
他們比較了這兩家公司,并來找我們說,我認為我不適合這家公司,但我很確定我絕對適合這家公司。
> So for us it\'s a great way to understand how they\'re looking at it the depth of information and actually to give some context.
所以對我們來說,這是一個很好的方法來理解他們是如何看待它的,信息的深度,以及給出一些背景。
> `[00:09:36]` You said you have 12 company profiles you sort of made it feel like right now like your own job is not on board anymore companies like your place.
`[00:09:36]` 你說你有 12 份公司簡介,你讓人覺得你自己的工作現在已經不在了,像你所在的公司一樣。
> Some employers obviously the big thing is like what did the student say and like how many students have you program your students have actually gone in and filled out applications at the moment.
有些雇主,很明顯,最重要的是,學生說了些什么,就像你給多少學生編程一樣,你的學生現在實際上已經填寫了申請。
> `[00:09:53]` You know there are a lot of vanity Metock I\'d be like how many people are coming to come to the site but as you said I kind of focus is just to get those like a very few small handful of very high quality up gimps and get them through.
`[00:09:53]` 你知道有很多虛榮心,梅托克,我會像有多少人來這個網站,但正如你說的,我的重點是讓那些像極少數幾個非常高質量的小矮人,并讓他們通過。
> `[00:10:05]` I think what you need to be that\'s like you know I think right now you\'re just trying to figure out what sticks.
`[00:10:05]` 我認為你需要的是
> Sure.
好的
> So like how are you finding even your student how even knowing about you guys.
就像你怎么找到你的學生,怎么知道你們倆。
> I feel like you want as many students to be aware of you.
我覺得你想讓更多的學生意識到你。
> `[00:10:20]` So yeah I mean currently that party like just targeting your personal networks.
`[00:10:20]` 所以是的,我是說,目前那個派對就像只針對你的個人關系網。
> So people are coming to us saying no we need a job what kind of companies have you got.
所以人們來找我們說不,我們需要一份工作,你有什么樣的公司。
> `[00:10:29]` And then we can show them the profiles and sort of careers with the end within our season the advantage as well is how did you get the first 12 companies.
`[00:10:29]` 然后我們可以向他們展示他們的個人資料和職業生涯,在我們的賽季結束時,優勢也是你是如何得到前 12 家公司的。
> So just to pass.
所以就這么過去了。
> Okay.
好的。
> How do you how do you want to get the next hundred say.
你想怎樣才能得到下一個一百的發言權。
> Well the most recent ti we\'ve got through client recommendations they\'ve said you thought their value is in marketing companies is also raising their awareness so getting that brand out there and that\'s what\'s made them recommenders on.
好吧,我們最近通過客戶推薦得到的信息,他們說你認為他們在營銷公司的價值也在提高他們的意識,所以把這個品牌推廣出去,這就是他們推薦人所要做的。
> So that\'s part of what we\'re looking at as well.
這也是我們所看到的一部分。
> And then building in options to share the company and show that sort of viral.
然后選擇分享公司并展示這種病毒。
> `[00:11:00]` So beyond the original you know.
`[00:11:00]` 原來你知道的。
> So let\'s let\'s go back to the actual applicants beyond your friends and people at your uni.
因此,讓我們回到你的朋友和其他人的實際申請人在你的大學。
> How are you going to kind of communicate this value proposition because I think saying like oh there\'s great culture in these companies.
你打算如何傳達這個價值主張,因為我想說,哦,在這些公司里有著偉大的文化。
> `[00:11:16]` Yes and that\'s more of our pitch towards companies.
`[00:11:16]` 是的,這是我們對公司的更多宣傳。
> `[00:11:20]` For a lot of graduate students that are to say like looking at the profiles and going like this it\'s like a culture.
`[00:11:20]` 對于很多研究生來說,就像看簡介,像這樣,就像一種文化。
> Yeah yeah.
對,對。
> What\'s ingredients to culture and how do you differentiate if you have 12 companies that are all that have good culture.
文化的要素是什么?如果你有 12 家擁有良好文化的公司,你該如何區分。
> `[00:11:32]` So it varies I guess you get users looking for what makes people want to stay.
`[00:11:32]` 所以它是不同的-我猜你會讓用戶尋找人們想要留下的東西。
> What are the people like you sitting next to.
像你這樣坐在旁邊的人是什么。
> So rather than just sort of company culture which is the overarching term we use I guess a lot of what we\'re looking at is do you want to sit next that has an everyday context.
所以,我們使用的不僅僅是公司文化,我猜,我們所看到的很多東西是,你想坐在旁邊,有著日常生活的背景嗎?。
> `[00:11:47]` You know what I\'m worried about right now is like you\'ve done a really good job building like a company branding Yelp like service.
`[00:11:47]` 你知道我現在擔心的是你做得很好,就像一家公司給 Yelp 打了個像服務一樣的品牌。
> Right.
對啊。
> But like that job marketplace.
但就像那個就業市場。
> Yes that\'s right.
是的,那是正確的。
> And I think right now you\'ve got to talk to more students about like are the pages actually effect like they\'re effective at making the companies feel good about themselves because they feel like well we look pretty lame before these guys can make us look at these sort of landing pages.
我認為現在你需要和更多的學生談談,比如頁面的效果,就像它們能有效地讓公司感覺良好,因為他們覺得我們看上去很差勁,然后這些家伙才能讓我們看這些登陸頁面。
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> `[00:12:09]` But like the punchline I mean you don\'t want these companies to be enthusiastic for you just because you came and shot their offices and you did individual sales and founders do sales.
`[00:12:09]` 但就像那句笑話一樣,我的意思是,你不希望這些公司僅僅因為你來了他們的辦公室,你做個人銷售,創始人做銷售就對你充滿熱情。
> They\'re very effective.
它們非常有效。
> But as you go to the next 100 or 200 companies there is at least to me and this is a shortcut and this is strange because usually we\'d have talk for hours.
但是當你去接下來的 100 或 200 家公司的時候,至少對我來說是這樣的,這是一條捷徑,這很奇怪,因為我們通常會聊上幾個小時。
> It just it\'s it\'s strange too it\'s hard for me to identify a very clear differentiator.
這也很奇怪,我很難找出一個非常清晰的區別。
> And I think what Kevin is saying is talking to students because I think if a lot of Suyanto companies will show up.
我認為凱文的意思是和學生交談,因為我認為如果蘇揚托的很多公司會出現的話。
> So so what.
那又怎樣。
> You know what is the kind of what\'s going to drive students.
你知道什么樣的東西會驅使學生。
> `[00:12:43]` The other thing I\'m worried about is like culture.
`[00:12:43]` 我擔心的另一件事是文化。
> It\'s one of those things that people once they sort of experience the company first hand.
這是人們在親身體驗公司時所做的事情之一。
> It\'s going to be authentic or not.
不管是真的還是假的。
> It doesn\'t matter what you sort of see on the Web site.
你在網站上看到什么并不重要。
> Once they go in there for the job interview resumes are going to know whether that company is Lamira.
一旦他們去那里參加面試,簡歷就會知道那家公司是否是拉米拉。
> It\'s like saying I\'m pretty cool.
就像說我很酷一樣。
> Yeah that\'s cool.
是的,那很酷。
> What we know.
我們所知道的。
> So you\'re not lying on this.
所以你不能在這件事上撒謊。
> It\'s one of those things like maybe the focus is like these companies are too lame to make this marketplace sort of take off and the maybe the first companies that you really need sort of help.
這是其中之一,比如,也許重點是這些公司太差勁了,無法讓這個市場起飛,也許是你真正需要幫助的第一家公司。
> Build out this other side of the marketplaces you\'ve got to figure out how do I get these really cool as companies out there whether it\'s offering them services for free right to highlight their stuff and tell their story as early on as possible.
建立市場的另一面-你必須弄清楚,作為公司,我如何才能讓這些東西變得很酷?-它是否在免費為他們提供服務,以突出他們的東西,并盡早講述他們的故事。
> It\'s like the really good companies figure out how to do that for themselves.
這就像真正的好公司想出了如何為自己做這件事一樣。
> The company that have a hard time talking about like how we\'re cool like there were already like going uphill.
這家公司很難談論我們是多么的酷,就像我們已經開始上山一樣。
> `[00:13:30]` You know in a normal office hours I would say let\'s talk next week after you talk to X number of students and we just validate that or even in those conversation was amazing and forgot.
`[00:13:30]` 你知道,在正常的辦公時間里,我會說,下周,在你和 X 個學生交談之后,讓我們來談談吧,我們只是證實了這一點,甚至在那些談話中,我們都很驚訝,甚至忘記了。
> Look what is actually relevant to students in this audience and we assume that culture is like a super critical thing but maybe to students that just isn\'t and isn\'t a hypothesis that we have that isn\'t really validated by the market.
看看與這些觀眾中的學生相關的東西,我們假設文化就像一個超級批判性的東西,但也許對學生來說,它不是,也不是我們所擁有的一個假設,這個假設并沒有被市場所證實。
> I think I think it\'s a good example of an idea.
我認為這是一個很好的例子。
> I think it sounds great.
我覺得這聽起來很棒。
> I mean first time you look at your local dissection makes a lot of sense but it\'s a very intellectually seductive and that\'s not a great thing because you actually don\'t know there isn\'t somebody who woke up today and said you know what I\'d really love a job site which highlights you know a company culture so I can choose a company to work at.
我的意思是,當你第一次看到你的本地解剖是很有意義的,但這在智力上很有誘惑力,這不是一件好事,因為你其實不知道今天沒有人醒來,說你知道我真正喜歡什么工作網站,它強調你了解公司文化,這樣我就可以選擇一家公司工作。
> And that\'s.
那是.。
> You know that\'s a big fear that you actually build something that people actually don\'t want even though it sounds like something that people would want.
你知道,這是一個很大的恐懼,因為你實際上建造了人們實際上不想要的東西,盡管這聽起來像是人們想要的東西。
> So changing gears just a little bit.
所以換一下齒輪。
> Have you considered it like you actually building this for just regular job seekers in general.
你是否認為這實際上是為普通求職者而建的呢?
> `[00:14:28]` I mean a focus was the junior job market purely because obviously that\'s the kind of market that we knew and that\'s how we experienced it firsthand in my understanding of junior job market would be like why do hourly employees like the taco bells of the world.
`[00:14:28]` 我的意思是,一個焦點是初級就業市場,純粹是因為很明顯,那是我們所知道的那種市場,在我對初級就業市場的理解中,這也是我們親身經歷的,就像為什么每小時的員工喜歡世界上的玉米鐘一樣。
> `[00:14:41]` They need a lot of help.
`[00:14:41]` 他們需要很多幫助。
> Is there a reason that you specifically chose kind of start ups other than maybe your own interest.
你是否有理由特別選擇一些創業公司,而不是你自己的興趣。
> `[00:14:48]` Well not even so much just startups I mean it\'s very much the kind of high growth high performing Samis purely for the fact that no graduates come out to university and they just have no idea what else is out there apart from the large professional services firms and they just don\'t seem to want to explore that.
(00:14:48)我的意思是,這在很大程度上是一種高增長、高績效的 Samis,純粹是因為沒有任何畢業生上大學,他們只是不知道除了大型專業服務公司之外還有什么其他的東西,他們只是不想去探索。
> `[00:15:04]` So yeah I think a lot of it is down to sort of pressure from parents that feel like you\'re just guessing right now.
`[00:15:04]` 是的,我認為這很大程度上是因為來自父母的壓力,他們覺得你現在只是在猜測。
> So we\'ve done we\'ve done research on that side.
所以我們在這方面做了研究。
> `[00:15:15]` So we had like if they\'re not actively searching out there then the triggers for like getting them to come to your site are going to be difficult.
`[00:15:00]` 所以,如果他們不積極搜索,那么讓他們進入你的網站的觸發因素就會很困難。
> You have to figure out like how do I change the natural behavior of India like ideal scenario.
你必須弄清楚,我該如何改變印度的自然行為,就像理想的情景。
> `[00:15:25]` Like you already know there\'s there\'s this latent demand and you\'re you\'re just going to put the hose on it and extract that value.
`[00:15:25]` 就像你已經知道的那樣,有潛在的需求,你只需要把水管放在上面,然后提取出這個值。
> And so I think what Kevin means is Yeah like maybe actually students only want to go to professional firms or do something else that maybe actually they don\'t want to work for start ups and they don\'t want to work for high growth and B.
所以我認為凱文的意思是,就像事實上,學生只想去專業公司工作,或者做一些實際上他們不想為初創公司工作的事情,他們不想為高增長和 B 工作。
> `[00:15:44]` We hope we have evidence that\'s not true.
`[00:15:44]` 我們希望我們有證據證明這不是真的。
> For example when we did like an office crawl where we had a load of companies we took a group of students around to look inside and we had a number of students who said I was only applying to the structured graduate scheme.
例如,當我們在辦公室爬行的時候,我們有很多公司,我們帶著一群學生四處看看里面,我們有一些學生說我只是在申請結構化的研究生計劃。
> I always only want to look in these small companies.
我總是只想看看這些小公司。
> Yeah I didn\'t I don\'t even know these existed in my own.
是的,我不知道這些存在于我自己的身體里。
> `[00:16:03]` So you\'re saying the biggest Promus education right now.
`[00:16:03]` 那么你說的是現在最大的普羅姆斯教育。
> Yeah exactly.
沒錯。
> Are you guys educating students.
你們是在教育學生嗎。
> Yeah.
嗯
> Which are you doing that.
你要這么做。
> `[00:16:08]` So we\'ve got sort of nonfinancial partnerships with a lot of society say the entrepreneur Saatchi\'s things like that that can be there to give an understanding of what it\'s like to work in these companies.
`[00:16:08]` 所以我們和很多社會都建立了某種非金融合作關系,企業家薩奇說,這樣的事情可以幫助我們了解在這些公司工作的感覺。
> Running office cross-sell.
辦公室交叉銷售。
> We are going to try as far as how many students I talked to through those.
我們要試一試,有多少學生,我通過這些交談。
> `[00:16:27]` I mean it\'s kind of been in the hundreds rather than thousands at the moment obviously just ask the two of us.
`[00:16:27]` 我的意思是,現在已經有幾百人了,而不是幾千人,很明顯,只要問問我們兩個人就行了。
> We\'re trying to be as high as possible.
我們要盡可能高。
> I mean scaling that is probably going to be one of our biggest challenges.
我的意思是,擴大規模可能是我們最大的挑戰之一。
> `[00:16:39]` I mean you know and then you say you talk to someone so I take that as to be true.
`[00:16:39]` 我的意思是,你知道,然后你說你和某人交談,所以我認為這是真的。
> That means if students really do want these types of jobs then it becomes really important for you obviously to communicate on the landing page which is kind of there.
這意味著,如果學生真的想要這些類型的工作,那么很明顯,在登陸頁面上進行交流就變得非常重要了。
> We looked at the language before here.
我們在這里之前看過語言。
> We would do a separate office on copy and you act on that.
我們會做一個單獨的辦公室復印,而你采取行動。
> But the the kind of other thing is how do you make sure the companies that get in are not leme because of the companies are getting lame students who are who actually bought that call that action whether they hear from another society maybe they\'re in some professions you actually might have ruined them for.
但另一件事是,你如何確保進入的公司不是萊姆,因為這些公司的學生都是跛腳的,這些學生實際上是買下了這種行動,不管他們是從另一個社會那里聽說的,也許他們從事的是某些職業,你可能真的毀了他們。
> Yeah but they\'re like well this isn\'t exactly like you know what I envisioned.
是的,但是他們是這樣的,這并不完全像你知道我所設想的那樣。
> `[00:17:17]` Yeah that\'s very true.
`[00:17:17]` 是的,那是真的。
> That\'s why you know we are trying to almost have a kind of filtering process of the companies that we work with.
這就是為什么你知道,我們正試圖對我們合作的公司進行一種過濾程序。
> What are the kind of rough so like 15 to 250 employees high growth high performing and kind of people centric.
什么樣的粗糙,比如 15 到 250 名員工,高增長,高績效和以人為中心。
> You know they they do turn away companies.
你知道他們確實拒絕了公司。
> Yeah.
嗯
> `[00:17:35]` Yeah.
`[00:17:35]` 是的。
> I mean it\'s exactly you say well our site is nothing without having quality and we feel very conscious of making sure that especially with the company\'s site.
我的意思是,你說得對,我們的網站沒有質量就什么都沒有了,我們非常清楚地確保這一點,特別是在公司的網站上。
> `[00:17:46]` And it doesn\'t like if that\'s online and if they\'re making up this company culture that doesn\'t exist then it doesn\'t work for let\'s say if I have a lame startup what I really want to be on your site could not fake this stuff like say I\'m really high growth say I\'m really cool have a cool icon and get on your site and then actually be late again.
`[00:17:46]` 如果這是在線的,如果他們在打造一種不存在的公司文化,那就不管用了,如果我有一家蹩腳的初創公司,我真正想在你的網站上做什么,就不能假裝我真的很酷,比如我真的很酷,有一個很酷的圖標,上了你的網站,然后實際上又遲到了。
> How do you actually test that the companies are not lame.
你怎么才能真正檢驗這些公司是不是跛腳的。
> `[00:18:10]` Yeah I think at the moment it\'s very sort of time intensive on my side so I do a lot of the client side sales and it\'s just understanding how they talk what they discuss looking at their social media accounts looking at their how their previous employee discussed there.
`[00:18:10]` 是的,我認為目前我這方面的時間很緊張,所以我做了很多客戶端的銷售,這只是理解他們是如何談論的,看他們的社交媒體賬戶,看看他們以前的員工是如何在那里討論的。
> Yeah.
嗯
> `[00:18:25]` I mean I think it\'s the right thing to do at this stage.
`[00:18:25]` 我的意思是,我認為在這個階段做這件事是正確的。
> Again another kind of we could do OFSAA again next week.
下個星期我們還可以再做一次。
> The other thing I would say is that the other thing I would say is yeah like it would be good to identify at this stage just a two or three different metrics that you do want to.
另一件事,我要說的是,另外一件事,我要說的是,是的,就像它將是好的,在這個階段,只確定兩個或三個不同的度量,你確實想要。
> Ultimately you want to get to a state where you can say this company and we talk to him in 10 minutes are going to says they should be on here or not.
最終,你想要進入一個你可以說是這家公司的州,我們在 10 分鐘后和他交談,我們會說他們應該在這里,或者不在這里。
> And the reason.
還有原因。
> And how to communicate to other companies that are not on their own why they\'re not on there so they don\'t say when students ask them why are you not on the job board to say like well because we\'re lame and they told us.
以及如何與其他不是自己的公司溝通-為什么他們不在那里-所以當學生問他們為什么你不在求職板上說的時候,他們不會說,因為我們很差勁,他們告訴我們。
> `[00:18:57]` Exactly.
`[00:18:57]` 正是。
> `[00:18:58]` So we\'re out of time.
`[00:18:58]` 所以我們沒時間了。
> Thank you very much.
非常感謝
> Just like.
就像。
> `[00:19:10]` It is strange doing officers because you on stage because when you\'re when you\'re doing individual officers don\'t bring up the next company Buza as you know when we\'re doing individual office hours.
`[00:19:10]` 做軍官很奇怪,因為你在舞臺上表演,因為當你在舞臺上表演時,不要提起下一個公司布扎,就像你知道的那樣,當我們做個人辦公時間的時候。
> Aside from the thing that Kevin said it did a lot of context.
除了凱文說的那件事外,還有很多背景。
> You can just I think really get into the nitty gritty like we you know in this case I was kind of dying to actually pull up the site to really talk about if a lot of these value props that they\'re that they\'re they\'re talking about actually show up on the center easily communicated because obviously the founders and Ogleby pitching to startups and companies it\'s that site that has to make that clear.
你可以-就像我們知道的那樣-我真的很想打開這個網站,來討論他們談論的很多價值道具是否真的出現在這個中心,因為很明顯,創始人和奧格勒比向初創企業和公司推介這一點-必須明確的是,正是這個網站必須清楚地表明這一點。
> `[00:19:44]` Onto the next tushy name and a little bit better start to share.
`[00:19:44]` 進入下一個名字,開始分享吧。
> `[00:19:49]` I\'m Adara Mazic and I am the founder and CEO of a startup called views fusee is as its a platform trying to make the physical world an easier place to understand.
`[00:19:49]` 我是 Adara Mazic 和我是一家名為 ViewsFusee 的初創公司的創始人和首席執行官,它是一個平臺,試圖讓物質世界變得更容易理解。
> `[00:19:58]` And we do this specific what does that mean literally like said a and.
`[00:19:58]` 我們這樣做,具體的意思是什么,就像前面說的 A 和。
> All right.
好的
> We are a retailer.
我們是零售商。
> What does that mean to me.
這對我意味著什么。
> `[00:20:09]` You\'re a retailer.
`[00:20:09]` 你是個零售商。
> We put sensors in your stores.
我們在你的商店里放了傳感器。
> We detect customers as they move around and we show you what type of sensors we put in Wi-Fi sensors that pick up smartphone signals.
我們在顧客四處走動時探測到他們,并向你們展示我們在 WIFI 傳感器中安裝了哪種感應器來接收智能手機信號。
> One said multiple sensors multiple sensors in actually and then that it just Wi-Fi which basically.
一個說多個感應器在實際上,然后它只是 Wi-Fi,基本上。
> So they are reconfigured Wi-Fi access points which can then detect the Wi-Fi icicles or smartphones.
因此,他們被重新配置的 Wi-Fi 接入點,然后可以檢測 Wi-Fi 冰柱或智能手機。
> `[00:20:32]` We try to rate people as they move across the water while people who just walk by the Wi-Fi as the Tories problems are right so whatever they walk by the right and actually go in.
`[00:20:32]` 我們試著給那些通過 Wi-Fi 的人打分,因為保守黨的問題是對的,所以不管他們從右邊走到哪里,都是正確的。
> `[00:20:42]` That\'s the biggest problem in our space product wise.
`[00:20:42]` 這是我們太空產品中最大的問題。
> So most of the companies in our space trying to take people using an access point which as you\'ve highlighted you are not able to actually figure out whether a person is inside or outside.
因此,在我們的空間中,大多數公司都試圖讓人們使用一個接入點,正如你所強調的那樣,你無法真正弄清楚一個人是在里面還是在外面。
> So what we\'ve built is a system that actually is able to tell whether a person is really outside or inside.
因此,我們所建立的系統實際上能夠分辨出一個人到底是在外面還是里面。
> This is like.
這就像。
> This is out in the real world.
這是現實世界里的事。
> This is life right now.
這就是現在的生活。
> How many customers do you have.
你有多少客戶。
> We have four customers for customers at four locations or four companies for companies for many locations.
我們有四個客戶為客戶在四個地點或四個公司為許多地點。
> `[00:21:11]` They\'re in pilot stage about one or two locations each pilot stage that means they\'re paying you or it\'s not yet they\'re all paid.
`[00:21:11]` 他們處于試點階段,每個試點階段大約有一兩個地點,這意味著他們支付給你,或者他們還沒有全部拿到工資。
> OK.
好的。
> So you end there just Wi-Fi access points to as the wife explains everything else.
所以當妻子解釋其他事情的時候,你就在那里結束了 Wi-Fi 的接入點。
> Is there any other type of sensor quote unquote.
是否有其他類型的傳感器報價未報價。
> `[00:21:24]` So we also use for counters 3-D cameras that can pick up and move across the shop.
`[00:21:24]` 所以我們也用在柜臺上的 3D 相機,可以在商店里撿到和移動。
> `[00:21:29]` I\'ve read all the cool stuff that burying the lead on the course.
`[00:21:29]` 我已經讀了所有那些把鉛埋在球場上的很酷的東西。
> Yeah the first thing you see is like we install custom customized Wi-Fi access points out 3-D cameras all this stuff and we track data for retail outlets that has a contract beforehand and we call them and also not to do it yet.
是的,你看到的第一件事是,我們安裝定制的 Wi-Fi 接入,指出所有這些東西的 3D 攝像頭,我們跟蹤數據的零售店,事先有合同,我們打電話給他們,也不這樣做。
> So you don\'t have anyone wants to join your company and pitch is pitching it back to you.
所以你沒有人想加入你的公司,而投球是向你推銷的。
> `[00:21:52]` Okay.
`[00:21:52]` 好的。
> So I think we understand what you do.
所以我想我們知道你在做什么。
> So I mean I think it\'s pretty out of the let\'s let\'s.
所以我的意思是,我認為這是非常不公平的。
> Why do retailers want this.
為什么零售商想要這個。
> `[00:21:59]` So they don\'t currently do.
`[00:21:59]` 所以他們現在不這么做。
> Okay so today about let\'s say 43 percent of UK retailers actually track people who move into the stores using their full four counters either a physical one or an actual physical counter of a doorway at the other people tracking.
好的,今天,假設 43%的英國零售商使用他們的整整四個柜臺來跟蹤那些搬進商店的人-一個是實體的,或者是另一個人門口的實際柜臺。
> So those who aren\'t tracking either don\'t see the business benefit yet.
因此,那些沒有跟蹤的人還沒有看到商業利益。
> It could be a supermarket where they get maybe 90 something percent of people who walk in converts in any way or could be businesses too small and focused on survival rather than politics.
它可能是一家超市,那里有 90%的人以任何方式進入皈依者,或者生意太小,專注于生存而不是政治。
> So your product these four pallets are large locations mid to large size businesses rather than locations even businesses with small locations and lots of them are still valid customers.
所以,你的產品,這四個托盤是大地點,中到大規模的企業,而不是地點,甚至是小地點的企業,其中許多仍然是有效的客戶。
> `[00:22:37]` Okay so just large companies that are sophisticated enough to actually digest some of the analytics.
`[00:22:37]` 好吧,只要是大公司,它們就足夠成熟,能夠真正消化一些分析。
> Exactly.
一點兒沒錯
> So let\'s talk about the analytics that you give.
那么讓我們談談你給出的分析。
> What is the what\'s the thing that the retailers want the most.
零售商最想要的東西是什么?
> `[00:22:46]` The two pieces of information they want the most.
`[00:22:46]` 他們最想要的兩條信息。
> One of those is the percentage of visitors who were outside who are now inside.
其中之一是現在里面的外來游客所占的百分比。
> And that ties back to theU.S.
這與美國有關。
> we talked about earlier on the second of those is how much time people spend in site.
我們早些時候討論了其中的第二個問題,那就是人們在網站上花了多少時間。
> So the dwell time and the stock PA as we call them and then what can they do with those three pieces of data.
所以駐留時間和股票 PA,我們稱之為,然后,他們能做什么,對這三個數據。
> So with the dwell time we see a relationship between the amount of money people spend and the amount of time they spend so much time being money for every 1 percent increase in dwell time you have a one point three percent increase in the actual spend per customer.
因此,隨著停留時間的延長,我們可以看到,人們花費的時間和花費的時間之間存在著一種關系-每增加 1%的駐留時間,你的實際消費就會增加 1.3%。
> That\'s one that\'s great.
那是一個很棒的。
> The second is Stockham PA.
第二位是斯托克姆·帕斯卡。
> So if you see if you\'re running a retail store and you get in let\'s say 10000 visitors in on a day you don\'t know if that was 1 percent of passing traffic or 5 percent of Passan traffic.
所以,如果你看到你經營的是一家零售店,如果你每天有 10000 游客進入,你就不知道那是 1%的路過流量還是 5%的帕桑流量。
> You\'re not able to optimize and actually increase that.
您無法優化并實際增加這個值。
> How do you find these first four.
你是怎么找到前四名的。
> So we actually went we did we did an accelerator when we first started the acceleration truces as he introduced us to a few different customer groups and we really threw a few things at the wall to see what stuck.
當他介紹給我們幾個不同的客戶小組時,我們做了一個加速器,當我們第一次開始加速測試時,我們向墻上扔了一些東西,看看是什么東西卡住了。
> We started out togged and smaller retailers go in for a shorter key inside their smaller retailers.
我們一開始很吃力,規模較小的零售商在他們較小的零售商里爭取一個更短的鑰匙。
> They just don\'t have time to try to survive.
他們只是沒有時間去嘗試生存。
> Their interest and optimize and just want to be around DIMAR.
他們的興趣和優化,只是想周圍的 DIMAR。
> So we went through this and we discovered that retailers are largest market and they have a need.
所以我們研究了一下,我們發現零售商是最大的市場,他們有需求。
> The challenge that we found is that they have quite a long sell cycle.
我們發現的挑戰是,他們的賣出周期很長。
> The larger they get.
他們越大。
> But that\'s where the real need as well.
但那也是真正需要的地方。
> So we\'re just working through a cell cycle right now.
所以我們現在只是在研究細胞周期。
> `[00:24:11]` So you guys you run in the pilots.
`[00:24:11]` 你們在飛行員里跑。
> When is the next step for those pilots.
這些飛行員的下一步是什么時候。
> But they become like customers.
但他們變成了顧客。
> `[00:24:17]` So the steps are typically six months 36 months to a pilot and then you\'ve got a time after that when they\'re evaluating the product and then they do a rollout.
`[00:24:17]` 所以步驟通常是六個月到一個飛行員 36 個月,然后你有一段時間,當他們評估產品,然后他們做了一個推廣。
> `[00:24:26]` It\'s just like I guess you have or your past experience knows this.
`[00:24:26]` 就像我猜你有或者你過去的經驗都知道這一點。
> `[00:24:29]` This is base.
`[00:24:29]` 這里是基地。
> I mean this is coming in from other companies who\'ve been in space before so during comments that we\'re in place and so it\'s a mix of what we\'ve learned and what they\'ve done as well.
我的意思是,這是來自其他公司,他們之前曾在太空工作過,所以在評論我們已經就位的時候,這是我們學到的東西和他們所做的事情的混合體。
> `[00:24:37]` What I assume you talk to more than four to get these four pilots the ones that said no what was there like most significant objection.
`[00:24:37]` 我假設你和四名以上的飛行員交談,讓這四名飛行員-那些說不的飛行員-有什么最重要的反對意見。
> `[00:24:44]` So those that have said no.
`[00:24:44]` 所以那些拒絕的人。
> Some of it\'s because they literally have so much analytics in place already and they just don\'t need anymore.
有些是因為他們已經有了這么多的分析工具,而且他們不再需要了。
> Some of them one level.
其中一些是一級的。
> `[00:24:56]` I mean that\'s going to be worrying right because she\'s visited retailers that means they\'re probably employing a lot of this technology already so that when one definite.
`[00:24:56]` 我的意思是,她會很擔心,因為她去過零售商,這意味著他們可能已經使用了很多這樣的技術,所以當一個人確定的時候。
> `[00:25:04]` The thing is like they just don\'t have the kind of brainpower to digest and sort of like analyze it like they just don\'t have time to like bring on data science people to work on that stuff.
`[00:25:04]` 事情就像他們沒有足夠的腦力去消化和分析它,就好像他們沒有時間讓數據科學的人去做那樣的事情一樣。
> So that\'s usually a problem that has come out.
因此,這通常是一個已經出現的問題。
> `[00:25:15]` One suggestion would be is to develop just that viruses to say hey listen we actually make this digest we\'ll make this actionable through these different ways because even the current kind of products that they\'re using are probably not actually giving them great information.
`[00:25:15]` 一個建議是,開發病毒,說嘿,聽著,我們實際上是通過這些不同的方式使這個摘要變得可行,因為即使是他們使用的現有產品也可能沒有給他們提供很好的信息。
> `[00:25:30]` And so many people visited Dan in your sales pitch you already give like a little detail of that she\'s like this factor is highly correlated to this.
`[00:25:30]` 在你的銷售推銷中,有那么多人訪問過丹,你已經給出了一些細節,她的這個因素與此高度相關。
> Then you have to take it the next step.
那你就得采取下一步行動。
> You say you can\'t stop there for this product to be compelling and for them to have it actionable.
你說你不能為了這個產品的吸引力和他們的行動而停下來。
> Then you have to say like all right here are your options not at play and ideally you would have the kind of product that says like we\'ll take you there like we can help you finish things.
然后你必須說,就像這樣,這是你的選擇,而不是發揮作用,理想情況下,你會有這樣的產品,就像我們會帶你去那里,就像我們可以幫你完成任務一樣。
> `[00:25:51]` Is there any insights that you have in terms of or any anyway they\'re using data to compare retailers against each other or against a location.
`[00:25:51]` 你是否有任何洞察力,或者不管怎么說,他們用數據來比較零售商之間或某個地點。
> `[00:25:58]` Yeah.
`[00:25:58]` 是的。
> So we\'re building.
所以我們在建造。
> This is something that would come with enough of a spread of solutions but we\'d like to build an industry wide benchmark customer behavior something that works because I think I mean what\'s tough about I think the business right now is what you\'re talking about is the commodity hardware that anything is you people or any network you don\'t have any network effects right now quite frankly like with benchmarking.
這會帶來足夠多的解決方案,但我們希望建立一個行業范圍內的基準客戶行為-這是因為我認為我想我的意思是,我認為現在的業務就是你所說的商品硬件,任何東西都是你的人,或者你現在沒有任何網絡效應的任何網絡,坦白地說,就像基準測試一樣。
> `[00:26:21]` In my experience like Ivano like forms and service stuff a lot of people look at benchmarking numbers and they will immediately say like if it\'s again sort of what they want to hear they\'ll say like well make my companies different.
`[00:26:21]` 根據我的經驗,就像伊萬諾一樣,表格和服務之類的東西,很多人都會看基準數據,他們會馬上說,如果這又是他們想聽到的,他們會說,就像讓我的公司與眾不同一樣。
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> That doesn\'t apply to me.
這不適用于我。
> Sure.
好的
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> And then they\'ll continue doing what they want because they think like.
然后他們會繼續做他們想做的事,因為他們喜歡。
> That\'s someone else either in my company you definitely would have yeah.
那是我公司里的另一個人,你肯定會有,是的。
> `[00:26:39]` So like the reason it worries me so the picture I\'ll paint is you\'re talking about long sales cycles six months a year in a best case you don\'t get a year plus before you get money in the bank.
`[00:26:39]` 所以,就像它讓我擔心的原因一樣,我要畫的畫面是,你說的是一年六個月的銷售周期,最好的情況是,你在銀行存款之前沒有一年以上的時間。
> You\'re you.
你就是你。
> There\'s not a very clear way to go from one real teller or the other and they just outbound sales so it\'s not like a consumer product in which there is some quote unquote virology or some way that you can you can move you so you could run out of money before you actually proved it would not have been a top selling right challenge.
從一個真正的出納員到另一個出納員并沒有一個非常明確的方法,他們只是對外銷售,所以它不像一個消費產品,其中有一些報價,不報價病毒學,或某種方式,你可以移動你,這樣你就可以用完錢,在你真正證明它不會是一個最暢銷的正確的挑戰。
> `[00:27:05]` What do you spend most your time on right now.
`[00:27:05]` 你現在花的時間最多的是什么?
> Product or sales numbers of a time of sales which makes sense.
一個銷售時期的產品或銷售數字,這是有意義的。
> Yes.
是
> And then I think I\'d want to challenge that assumption that you said like we have to wait this long period of time because like sort of close Hipple like I\'d want you to like make people feel uncomfortable all the stuff but also like your whole thing is like we\'re providing value and you want to get started right now and if you get like on the ground floor with us with this like you\'re gonna get many benefits out of it.
然后我想挑戰你的假設,你說我們必須等這么長時間,因為就像我希望你喜歡讓人們感到不舒服,所有的東西,但也像你的整件事,就像我們提供價值,你想現在開始,如果你喜歡在底層,如果你喜歡讓人感到不舒服,所有的東西,就像我們提供價值,你想現在就開始,如果你喜歡在一樓。像你這樣的我們會從中得到很多好處的。
> `[00:27:31]` Yeah.
`[00:27:31]` 是的。
> Pilots have are definitely valuable in certain cases.
飛行員在某些情況下絕對是有價值的。
> But the one downside and you could potentially experience that they actually don\'t really want it.
但唯一的缺點是,你可能會體驗到他們其實并不想要它。
> And as long as you\'re willing to do some free legwork for them they\'re like cool.
只要你愿意為他們做一些免費的法律工作,他們就像酷一樣。
> Maybe we\'ll get some insights maybe not.
也許我們會得到一些洞察力,也許不會。
> Who cares.
誰在乎呢。
> `[00:27:43]` So all the pilots are actually paid for today.
`[00:27:43]` 所以今天所有的飛行員都得到了報酬。
> We\'ve generated about six figures of revenue just in the pilots alone.
僅在飛行員身上,我們就創造了大約六位數的收入。
> And all customers go through private social pricing.
所有的顧客都要通過私人的社會定價。
> What\'s your pricing model.
你的定價模式是什么?
> It\'s a personal model.
這是個私人模型。
> So rather it\'s as per square metre model.
因此,它是按每平方米的模式。
> So a larger location single location pay a lot small locations lots of them pay a smaller amount.
因此,一個較大的地點,單個地點,支付很多小地點,很多地方,他們支付較少的數額。
> Wideout rather than like recurring like it is a recurring role or a curse.
與其像重復一樣,它是一個反復出現的角色,或者是一個詛咒。
> `[00:28:07]` So where are these pilots right now.
`[00:28:07]` 這些飛行員現在哪里?
> Are there like three months in performance in the first of.
是否有三個月的表現在第一個。
> `[00:28:14]` Is a month or so and right now Honkala is very recent you know very very recent long cell cycle to get there.
`[00:28:14]` 是一個月左右的時間,現在洪卡拉是最近才到的,你知道最近有很長的細胞周期。
> Yeah.
嗯
> `[00:28:22]` And then what do you have at the end of it that\'s going to tip them over like have you identified and set up a roadmap that sounds like okay if we achieved this.
`[00:28:22]` 最后你有什么能讓他們翻過來的東西,就像你已經確定并建立了一個路線圖,如果我們做到了這一點,聽起來還不錯。
> Like you start seeing these sort of numbers and improvements then we sign up because like when I worried that like you\'re just collecting data and you\'re showing it to them and if they feel like Oh well I can\'t do any actionable with these things right now they\'re not going to see that there\'s any value yet the end of the six months or a year you realize Man is the answer.
就像你開始看到這樣的數字和改進,然后我們注冊,因為當我擔心像你這樣的人只是在收集數據,你向他們展示數據時,如果他們覺得,哦,好吧,我現在不能對這些事情采取任何行動,他們不會發現在六個月或一年的時間里,你還沒有看到任何價值,你會意識到男人才是答案。
> I would do everything you can to say like OK.
我會盡你所能像好的那樣說。
> You now see where you are.
你現在知道你在哪了。
> While working with us.
在和我們一起工作的時候。
> We\'re going to help you drive those downwards or upwards depending on where they need to go.
我們將幫助你把它們往下或往上開,這取決于它們要去哪里。
> `[00:28:53]` So that\'s exactly it.
`[00:28:53]` 就是這樣。
> So the first the first conversations we had we figured out that leaving them to run the pilot in the room just wasn\'t going to work and they needed actually a fair bit of account management and handhold.
所以,我們第一次談話時,我們發現讓他們在房間里駕駛飛行員是行不通的,他們實際上需要一些賬戶管理和控制。
> `[00:29:04]` Yeah that\'s and that\'s what makes sense with the data right because that means you\'re really I mean you don\'t what you don\'t want to become becomes you don\'t the company become a consultancy essentially a consultancy.
`[00:29:04]` 是的,這就是數據正確的原因,因為這意味著你真的-我的意思是-你不是你不想成為的,而是你-你不是一家咨詢公司,本質上是一家咨詢公司。
> `[00:29:12]` So if you own a product business you basically have to be able to knock out a pilot and then start thinking about those sort of features that helps them get to the touchdown sort of moment not just the ones where there\'s sort of like identifying assessing nodes definitely about what we think we use actually is make sure that they focus on Arwin as we use our y as the key metric to determine at all.
`[00:29:12]` 所以,如果你擁有一項產品業務,你基本上必須能夠淘汰一名飛行員,然后開始考慮那些能幫助他們進入觸地狀態的特性,而不僅僅是那些我們認為我們實際使用的是確保它們專注于 Arwin 的節點。y 是要確定的關鍵指標。
> `[00:29:34]` I mean these there\'s other ways that you can like the 60 some pertly you know 50 60 percent that said do not use any sort of internal analytics.
`[00:29:34]` 我的意思是,還有其他的方法,你可以喜歡這 60 種-你知道 50%-60%的人說不要使用任何內部分析。
> And the ones that had nodes you there\'s going to be a rationalization for not to do this so that the Auro II has to be so clear that the industry assumes it\'s the standard but that\'s a very very very high benchmark for a young company to hit in the first year or two before money runs out.
而那些有節點的公司,如果不這么做,那將是一個合理的理由,因此 Auro II 必須如此明確,以至于業界認為這是標準,但對于一家年輕的公司來說,這是一個非常高的基準,在資金用完前的頭一兩年就能實現。
> And that\'s scary.
那太可怕了。
> `[00:30:00]` We\'re at a time fortunately but that no great pleasure talking to here.
`[00:30:00]` 我們一次很幸運,但不太高興在這里交談。
> Thanks Aaron.
謝謝亞倫。
> `[00:30:18]` What Kevin is telling him is our e-mail addresses so we can stay in touch.
凱文告訴他的是我們的電子郵件地址,這樣我們就可以保持聯系了。
> I mean these guys are brave to in order to talk about their company in front of a front of a large group of people.
我的意思是,為了在一大群人面前談論他們的公司,這些人是勇敢的。
> `[00:30:27]` All right next one is third and last I\'m going to do something slightly different here.
`[00:30:27]` 好的,下一個是第三個,也是最后一個,我要在這里做一些稍微不同的事情。
> Yes.
是
> `[00:30:33]` Screen pushed at me give me a round of applause applause.
`[00:30:33]` 屏幕按在我面前,給我一輪掌聲。
> Yeah yeah you got it.
是的,你明白了。
> `[00:30:44]` Being founders you have to empathize with other founders.
`[00:30:44]` 作為創建者,你必須與其他創建者產生共鳴。
> This is not an easy easy job.
這不是一項容易的工作。
> `[00:30:49]` So first off Russian name and Tosspot screen push.
`[00:30:49]` 所以,首先是俄國人的名字和 Tospoint 屏幕推送。
> `[00:30:55]` So my name is Woolite and screen push is essentially a screenshot collaboration tool.
`[00:30:55]` 所以我的名字是伍利特,屏幕推送本質上是一個截圖協作工具。
> So what we\'re doing is we\'re trying to target the the design digital design vertical.
因此,我們所做的是,我們試圖將數字設計作為垂直設計的目標。
> And so we\'re really interested in kind of if youre redesigning lets say I can use web site you my you know maybe go to an agency which Kevin is literally doing you might go to an agency lets say instead of doing it yourself and what you don\'t want is that agency you give them the brief let\'s say you don\'t want that agency to go away 2 weeks later and say hey here it is full full final product.
所以我們真的很感興趣,如果你在重新設計,讓我們說我可以用你的網站,我的,你知道,也許去一個機構,凱文真的在做,你可以去一個機構,我們說,而不是自己做,你不想要的是,你給他們一個簡短的,讓我們說,你不希望該機構離開 2 周。稍后說嗨,這是完整的最終產品。
> `[00:31:34]` Okay.
`[00:31:34]` 好的。
> So.
所以
> So it makes it easier for designers to collaborate or a person in the company to collaborate with somebody outside their company by sharing their screen.
因此,這使得設計師更容易合作,公司中的一個人也更容易與公司之外的人分享屏幕。
> `[00:31:41]` So yeah like kind of two fold in the sense that it gives us like tool that allows the designers.
`[00:31:41]` 是的,就像兩倍,它給了我們類似的工具,可以讓設計師。
> `[00:31:46]` Here\'s the thing I\'m worried about like we\'re gone several sentences into this and I don\'t know exactly what the thing is.
`[00:31:46]` 這是我擔心的事情,好像我們已經做了幾句話,我不知道到底是怎么回事。
> OK.
好的
> You just told me about like this is the kind of solution.
你剛剛跟我說過這就是解決辦法。
> And there\'s you talk a little bit about the problem.
關于這個問題你還談了一點。
> Yes.
是
> `[00:31:57]` So I think a desktop application does start with that desktop application that the designers download themselves and then keyboard shortcut to actually send the current version that they\'re designing to the other designer.
`[00:31:57]` 所以我認為桌面應用程序是從設計人員自己下載的桌面應用程序開始的,然后鍵盤快捷方式將他們正在設計的當前版本發送給其他設計人員。
> While each and every screenshot is kind of saved and organized in a timeline so that the client can then go onto a Web site not have to download any kind of desktop application.
雖然每個屏幕截圖都是在一個時間線中保存和組織的,這樣客戶端就可以訪問 Web 站點,而不必下載任何類型的桌面應用程序。
> `[00:32:19]` That\'s a good place to start.
`[00:32:19]` 那是個很好的開始。
> In terms of you talk about copy for your actual landing page is that you actually want to describe.
就你所說的副本而言,你的實際登陸頁面是你真正想要描述的。
> You can start off with a very verbose what you literally do and then pare it down as a good so don\'t pick on you.
你可以從你真正做的事情開始,然后把它壓縮為一個好的,所以不要挑剔你。
> `[00:32:30]` But this is actually a typical problem that we see all the time especially as investors a lot of founders the reason that they start their company is around the Y.
`[00:32:30]` 但這實際上是一個典型的問題,我們一直都看到,特別是作為投資者,很多創始人,他們創辦公司的原因是 Y。
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> The problem whatever the inspiration for them getting into the space is like it\'s the passion that sort of fuels them but for people who like see tons of pitches over and over again.
不管他們進入太空的靈感是什么,問題就好像是激情給他們帶來了動力,但是對于那些喜歡一遍又一遍地看投球的人來說。
> The problem that we have from our perspective is just like remembering what you do.
從我們的角度來看,我們面臨的問題就像記住你所做的一樣。
> So we really need that first right make sure we understand that and then if we\'re interested we\'re going to prompt you and pull out of you all the whys the passion and all that stuff.
所以我們確實需要第一個正確的方法,確保我們理解它,然后如果我們感興趣,我們將提示你,從你身上抽出所有的激情和所有的東西。
> Okay.
好的。
> However we\'re going to stop here and agilely a lot of the kind of office hours that CASA and I do at C is actually you X reviews and we go through people sign up for flows and stuff.
然而,我們將在這里停下來,非常靈活地,CASA 和我在 C 所做的很多辦公時間實際上是你的 X 審查,我們會通過人們注冊流程和其他東西。
> `[00:33:13]` And so we want to do something different here.
`[00:33:13]` 所以我們想在這里做些不同的事情。
> And they were literally going to go through the center of the product and give us our thoughts and hear why you made decisions that you made.
他們真的要穿過產品的中心,告訴我們的想法,聽聽你為什么做出決定。
> Sure.
好的
> Okay.
好的。
> So once you turn around so you can see.
所以一旦你轉過身,你就可以看到。
> And then the way we did this because we do want to take a chance of trying to do like a lot them or what have you.
然后我們這樣做,是因為我們確實想嘗試像他們一樣做很多事情,或者你想做什么。
> I just went through the product through design flow and it took like a billion screenshots going through that experience.
我剛剛經歷了產品的設計流程,經歷了 10 億張截圖。
> I\'m just going to sort of narrate and go through it here.
我只想在這里講述一下。
> So here\'s the front page screen push and this is the top third of it so is a shot collaboration made easy.
這是首頁的屏幕推送,這是它的前三分之一,所以這是一個很容易的鏡頭協作。
> And then the next sentence is collaboration.
下一句是合作。
> It\'s what we do.
我們就是這么做的。
> And literally I think Karzai and I both thought exactly like what you do.
從字面上講,我認為卡爾扎伊和我都很像你所做的事情。
> `[00:33:56]` But really we\'re doing something together I wonder what it is.
`[00:33:56]` 但是我們真的在一起做一些事情,我想知道這是什么。
> `[00:34:04]` So if we scroll down the page further and he talks a little bit about his features here.
`[00:34:04]` 如果我們再往下滾動,他會在這里稍微講一下他的特征。
> So in descriptions of each team member is assigned a specific shortcut notifications are subtle gentle and understanding.
因此,在對每個團隊成員的描述中,指定了一個特定的快捷通知,即微妙、溫和理解。
> `[00:34:16]` The punchline here is really no one would read this.
`[00:34:16]` 這里的笑話是沒有人會看的。
> We\'d probably already be at the bottom of the page.
我們可能已經在頁面的底部了。
> `[00:34:19]` Right `[00:34:19]` okay.
`[00:34:19]` 權利\`[00:34:19]` 好的。
> So cross paths compatible and I\'m starting to get the first hint by looking at one screenshot and it says Mac Windows.
所以交叉路徑兼容,我開始從一個屏幕截圖中得到第一個提示,上面寫著 MacWindows。
> Check check that.
檢查一下。
> Oh this is a desktop app right.
哦,這是一個桌面應用程序對。
> Then the last part says looks familiar.
最后那部分看起來很眼熟。
> Thought so.
我是這么想的。
> Say goodbye to the screenshot graveyard forever.
永遠告別截圖墓地。
> So now it is the first time I hear about like this is some kind of problem that is sort of solving but I don\'t know exactly what it is.
所以,這是我第一次聽說這是某種解決問題的方法,但我不知道它到底是什么。
> `[00:34:41]` There should be an image to be fair on the left that demonstrates what is the screenshot graveyard.
`[00:34:41]` 左邊應該有一張公平的圖片,展示什么是截圖墓地。
> But that may have not came up OK.
但這可能沒什么好的。
> `[00:34:51]` It happens it\'s understandable so I think that just a bit before we go into the actual sign of flow.
`[00:34:51]` 這是可以理解的,所以在我們進入實際的流動跡象之前,我認為這是可以理解的。
> `[00:34:58]` The punch line here is if you sat down you know there\'s hundreds of people here.
`[00:34:58]` 這里的要點是,如果你坐下來,你知道這里有成百上千的人。
> Yeah with your site and said hey listen I\'m an intern or I got hired by this company called Tigrean push.
是的,在你的網站上說,嘿,聽著,我是個實習生,否則我就被這家叫 Tigrean Push 的公司雇用了。
> What do you think this page is after looking at it for not like we\'ve already talked for five minutes within you know 500 milliseconds or two seconds or three seconds four seconds.
你認為這個頁面在你知道 500 毫秒或兩秒或三秒、四秒之內已經談了五分鐘之后是什么樣子呢?
> I don\'t think any of them would get what you think your company is.
我不認為他們中的任何人會得到你認為的公司。
> Yeah that is a big deal because that\'s how most people go to discover your product.
是的,這是一件大事,因為大多數人都是這樣發現你的產品的。
> That\'s kind of a meta piece of advice as you have all these things that you know what you mean by the word collaboration.
這是一種元建議,因為你有所有這些東西,你知道你所謂的協作是什么意思。
> Yeah but not clever means lots of things lots exact.
是的,但不聰明意味著很多事情都很精確。
> `[00:35:31]` I think it\'s become like this big buzz word and we got drawn into that.
`[00:35:31]` 我認為它變成了一個大熱門詞,我們被卷入其中。
> So it\'s like yeah we\'re collaborators using his wife\'s right here.
所以我們是利用他妻子的合作者。
> Exactly.
一點兒沒錯
> And we got drawn into that kind of the same with like big Dana everybody uses these words and everybody has completely different interpretations and we definitely.
我們被吸引到同樣的情況,就像大人物一樣,每個人都用這些詞,每個人都有完全不同的解釋,我們肯定。
> `[00:35:47]` So one thing I would say positive before we\'re going to move on to it is though it is a beautiful sight.
`[00:35:47]` 所以,在我們繼續前進之前,我想說一件積極的事情,那就是,盡管這是一幅美麗的景象。
> It\'s wild.
它很狂野。
> I mean it\'s it\'s visually well-designed.
我是說它設計得很好。
> `[00:35:53]` Are you copyrighted.
`[00:35:53]` 你有版權嗎?
> Did you read the copy.
你看過那本。
> Did I tell you.
我告訴過你。
> So like how do you recommend you guys like go through the site you to sign it float because there\'s some really nice copy in terms of the sign up in terms of the e-mail that he sends.
所以,就像你推薦你這樣的人去瀏覽你的網站,你可以在這個網站上簽名,因為在他發送的電子郵件中,有一些關于注冊的非常好的副本。
> All right.
好的
> And then real office I we wouldn\'t compliment you we just go on to the next.
然后是真正的辦公室,我-我們不會恭維你-我們只是繼續下一個。
> OK.
好的
> So I went through and you click on the button and you go through a sign of procedure that goes on.
所以,我通過了,你點擊按鈕,你就通過了一個程序的標志,繼續進行。
> So what\'s your e-mail.
你的電子郵件是什么?
> The password yeah.
密碼是的。
> Can you tell me your name.
你能告訴我你的名字嗎。
> And then what do you do.
然后你會做什么。
> And this will place.
這個地方。
> Hazarajat stuff.
哈扎拉賈特的東西。
> Yeah.
嗯
> I mean it\'s so beautiful it\'s in line I think that\'s great.
我是說它太漂亮了,我覺得它很棒。
> It\'s it\'s a unique sign a process.
這是一個獨特的標志,一個過程。
> But literally what you do.
但實際上你所做的。
> I didn\'t know what to put there.
我不知道該放什么。
> I think the example you have the front end dev.
我認為你有前端開發的例子。
> Yeah.
嗯
> `[00:36:29]` Product manager should invest I.
`[00:36:29]` 產品經理應該投資我。
> I don\'t know what to do.
我不知道該怎么辦。
> And then if you go back one slide two slides I\'m sorry you don\'t know his full name or password there\'s no indication of this is alphanumeric how long and so what ends up happening is when I got I got an error state at the end of the sign flow.
然后,如果你返回一張幻燈片,兩張幻燈片,很抱歉,你不知道他的全名或密碼,沒有跡象表明這是字母數字,結果是當我在符號流的末尾得到一個錯誤狀態時。
> Okay which is very frustrating because that already gone through a bunch of questions and then I had to figure out.
好吧,這是非常令人沮喪的,因為這已經經歷了很多問題,然后我必須弄清楚。
> That\'s when it closed the browser sharing.
這就是它關閉瀏覽器共享的時候。
> `[00:36:53]` All right.
`[00:36:53]` 好的。
> So you go through it and then it does this nice pause and it says like you\'ve got mail which was a really nice touch just like some a little different.
所以你瀏覽它,然后它做了一個很好的停頓,它說,就像你收到了郵件,這是一個非常好的觸摸,就像一些不同的東西。
> And so I go and check my e-mail and I get into the app and then the first thing it shows me is this screen right here it says my team.
所以我去查看我的電子郵件,我進入應用程序,然后它給我展示的第一件事就是這個屏幕,上面寫著我的團隊。
> You did it.
你干得不錯
> Let\'s get started.
我們開始吧。
> Oh you don\'t seem to have created any teams yet.
哦,你似乎還沒有建立任何團隊。
> Let\'s get started.
我們開始吧。
> We got repetition there start a lot and then team name and team and then team invites.
我們在那里重復了很多,開始很多,然后是團隊名稱,然后是團隊邀請。
> And so the first thing I\'m thinking is also like I don\'t know what this is the first thing I do not want to do is send it to my friends.
所以我想的第一件事也是我不知道這是我第一件不想做的事就是把它寄給我的朋友。
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> Yeah.
嗯
> So like this would not be the ideal setting.
所以,就像這樣,這并不是理想的環境。
> And as desktop software a lot of times the hardest part is like getting them then source software.
而作為桌面軟件,很多時候,最難的部分就是獲得它們,然后是源代碼軟件。
> So yeah that didn\'t start off with that yet which is why I went to because I was like Let me see what it is before I send it to any friends cool.
所以,是的,這還沒有開始,這就是為什么我去了,因為我就像讓我看看是什么,然后我發送給任何朋友酷。
> So go and download it.
所以去下載吧。
> So it goes here.
所以它就在這里。
> No convenient shortcut linked to the applications folder.
沒有方便的快捷方式鏈接到應用程序文件夾。
> So people are falling all left and right where you have one soul left.
所以,在你還剩下一個靈魂的地方,人們都在向左、向右墜落。
> So here the connect through it and then what happens when you like open is absolutely nothing like clears away.
因此,在這里,連接通過它,然后發生什么,當你喜歡打開,絕對沒有什么像清除。
> And I was like I\'m going to start what\'s going on.
我就像我要開始做這件事。
> And you\'d have to notice and this is the S with the hexagon that that icon appeared and the top dog like you did know that the only indication right that it started and you\'re into it.
你必須注意到,這是有六邊形的 S,圖標出現了,像你這樣的頂級狗知道,唯一正確的跡象是,它開始了,你進入了它。
> So I click on here and I see user name and I\'m like I don\'t remember adding new user to my fellow mottling.
所以我點擊這里,我看到了用戶名,我不記得給我的同事添加了新的用戶。
> It was important to me.
對我來說很重要。
> I don\'t know what\'s going on.
我不知道發生了什么事。
> And I go back through and I actually go back to the account and I said like oh let me just log into the app and when I come back here there\'s no link to log in.
然后我回到這個賬戶,我說,哦,讓我登錄這個應用程序,當我回到這里的時候,沒有鏈接可以登錄。
> So I\'m like OK well let me refresh because I remember this thing showed up dynamically and then I\'m like I don\'t sealing the log in.
所以我想,好吧,讓我刷新一下,因為我記得這個東西是動態出現的,然后我就像我沒有密封日志一樣。
> And it took me a while to realize the order ready registered the way I get to log in subtle.
我花了一段時間才意識到訂單準備就緒,注冊了我登錄微妙的方式。
> I finally get there.
我終于到了那里。
> I actually had to go through a password reset theme at some point.
實際上,在某個時候,我不得不經歷一個密碼重置主題。
> Good copy.
很好的副本。
> Make a really great copy in the places that you sort of catch me.
在你抓到我的地方做一個很棒的復制品。
> I think that\'s like sort of like what got me through it.
我覺得這有點像讓我經歷了這一切。
> So we get to reset password.
所以我們重新設置密碼。
> I do this and this actually this page just refreshes backward.
我這樣做,實際上這個頁面只是向后刷新。
> But there has no confirmation on it except there\'s an e-mail you do send me and that\'s only way I know that the password to read that so I probably hit that with a typo 10 10000 times.
但是上面沒有任何確認信息,除非你給我發了一封電子郵件,這是我唯一知道的密碼,所以我可能打了 10,10000 次。
> Right.
右(邊),正確的
> And so when I finally like because I did it like five times and I don\'t know which password I actually got accepted.
所以,當我終于喜歡,因為我做了五次,我不知道我實際上被接受了哪個密碼。
> So I eventually get logged in and I sit here and I\'m finally here and I\'m like I don\'t know what this is to do.
所以,我最終登錄,我坐在這里,我終于來到這里,我覺得我不知道這是做什么。
> The thing I think is like oh I put the biggest button on here.
我想,哦,我把最大的按鈕放在這里了。
> Yeah.
嗯
> So the button click is what do you think.
所以按鈕點擊是你怎么想的。
> Yeah.
嗯
> Because it\'s the most has the greatest sort of afford it.
因為它是最有能力買得起的。
> And of course it\'s like a feedback e-mail form.
當然,這就像一份反饋電子郵件。
> So OK that\'s nice.
好吧,那很好。
> I think you hit the hexagon push thing and it takes a screen shot and then that is all it does.
我認為你擊中了六邊形的推物,它需要一個屏幕截圖,然后這就是它所做的一切。
> It\'s like a crop cone at Y Combinator and a check and an axe.
它就像 Y 組合器上的一個農作物錐,一個支票和一把斧頭。
> I\'m like What am I checking.
我想我在查什么。
> What am I crossing off.
我在劃什么。
> I don\'t know what\'s happening.
我不知道發生了什么。
> And eventually I check it off and go back to the eye to see any clues about it and there really isn\'t anything there yet.
最后,我把它取下來,然后回到眼睛里去,看看它的任何線索,現在真的什么都沒有了。
> So anyway so that is very harsh.
所以不管怎么說,這是非常嚴厲的。
> `[00:40:16]` You know in regular office hours in regular office hours we would really be going step by step and really figure out like what would be better copy here what did the individual think literally Chicago called for time what would we actually change and every single one of those scripts and very tactical and it\'s mundane boring but like that\'s what building makes somebody like all that up front making progress but seeing it that way you can see like every place that I had a problem and just the fact that that slide deck had like 25 Sligh.
`[00:40:16]` 你知道,在正常的辦公時間里,我們真的會一步地走,并真正想出什么更好的辦法前面正在取得進展,但從這個角度看,你可以看到我遇到問題的每一個地方,就像滑梯甲板上有 25 Sligh 一樣。
> `[00:40:43]` Yeah.
`[00:40:43]` 是的。
> `[00:40:44]` Before I got to the part where I\'m logged in the point I would take way for you guys who are all building products right now.
`[00:40:44]` 在我進入我登錄的那部分之前,我會給你們這些現在都是建筑產品的家伙讓路。
> You should do what Kevin and I basically did here which is have people who don\'t know your product use it all the time.
你應該做凱文和我在這里做的事情,就是讓那些不知道你的產品一直在使用它的人。
> I\'m talking about every single day meeting people who don\'t know what your company does and letting them actually go to the kind of flow their first interactions because that means you you\'re just so caught in your own company.
我說的是每一天都會遇到那些不知道你的公司在做什么的人,讓他們開始第一次互動,因為這意味著你被自己的公司困住了。
> Yeah that you know you don\'t realize like the most basic things like it\'s a desktop app is not obvious yet and therefore you know it becomes a real fundamental product.
是的,你知道你沒有意識到像它這樣的最基本的東西是一個桌面應用程序還不明顯,因此你知道它成為一個真正的基本產品。
> Awesome.
太棒了。
> All right.
好的
> So those are not normal hours.
所以這不是正常的時間。
> We\'ll do regular conversation with them offstage.
我們將在后臺與他們定期交談。
> Yeah.
嗯
> `[00:41:23]` So we\'re at 4 o\'clock now.
`[00:41:23]` 所以我們現在四點了。
> I think we\'re having a break until 4:00 30.
我想我們要休息到 4:30。
> We will see you then.
到時候見。
> Thanks guys.
謝謝各位。
> Thank you.
謝謝。
- Zero to One 從0到1 | Tony翻譯版
- Ch1: The Challenge of the Future
- Ch2: Party like it’s 1999
- Ch3: All happy companies are different
- Ch4: The ideology of competition
- Ch6: You are not a lottery ticket
- Ch7: Follow the money
- Ch8: Secrets
- Ch9: Foundations
- Ch10: The Mechanics of Mafia
- Ch11: 如果你把產品做好,顧客們會來嗎?
- Ch12: 人與機器
- Ch13: 展望綠色科技
- Ch14: 創始人的潘多拉魔盒
- YC 創業課 2012 中文筆記
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2012
- Travis Kalanick at Startup School 2012
- Tom Preston Werner at Startup School 2012
- Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2012
- Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012
- Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012
- Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012
- David Rusenko at Startup School 2012
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School 2012
- 斯坦福 CS183b YC 創業課文字版
- 關于 Y Combinator
- 【創業百道節選】如何正確的閱讀創業雞湯
- YC 創業第一課:你真的愿意創業嗎
- YC 創業第二課:團隊與執行
- YC 創業第三課:與直覺對抗
- YC 創業第四課:如何積累初期用戶
- YC 創業第五課:失敗者才談競爭
- YC 創業第六課:沒有留存率不要談推廣
- YC 創業第七課:與你的用戶談戀愛
- YC 創業第八課:創業要學會吃力不討好
- YC 創業第九課:投資是極端的游戲
- YC 創業第十課:企業文化決定命運
- YC 創業第11課:企業文化需培育
- YC 創業第12課:來開發企業級產品吧
- YC 創業第13課,創業者的條件
- YC 創業第14課:像個編輯一樣去管理
- YC 創業第15課:換位思考
- YC 創業第16課:如何做用戶調研
- YC 創業第17課:Jawbone 不是硬件公司
- YC 創業第18課:劃清個人與公司的界限
- YC 創業第19課(上):銷售如漏斗
- YC 創業第19課(下):與投資人的兩分鐘
- YC 創業第20課:不再打磨產品
- YC 創業課 2013 中文筆記
- Balaji Srinivasan at Startup School 2013
- Chase Adam at Startup School 2013
- Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013
- Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013
- Diane Greene at Startup School 2013
- Jack Dorsey at Startup School 2013
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2013
- Nate Blecharczyk at Startup School 2013
- Office Hours at Startup School 2013 with Paul Graham and Sam Altman
- Phil Libin at Startup School 2013
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2013
- 斯坦福 CS183c 閃電式擴張中文筆記
- 1: 家庭階段
- 2: Sam Altman
- 3: Michael Dearing
- 4: The hunt of ThunderLizards 尋找閃電蜥蜴
- 5: Tribe
- 6: Code for America
- 7: Minted
- 8: Google
- 9: Village
- 10: SurveyMonkey
- 11: Stripe
- 12: Nextdoor
- 13: YouTube
- 14: Theranos
- 15: VMware
- 16: Netflix
- 17: Yahoo
- 18: Airbnb
- 19: LinkedIn
- YC 創業課 SV 2014 中文筆記
- Andrew Mason at Startup School SV 2014
- Ron Conway at Startup School SV 2014
- Danae Ringelmann at Startup School SV 2014
- Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014
- Eric Migicovsky at Startup School SV 2014
- Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014
- Jessica Livingston Introduces Startup School SV 2014
- Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014
- Kevin Systrom at Startup School SV 2014
- Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar at Startup School SV 2014
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014
- YC 創業課 NY 2014 中文筆記
- Apoorva Mehta at Startup School NY 2014
- Chase Adam at Startup School NY 2014
- Closing Remarks at Startup School NY 2014
- David Lee at Startup School NY 2014
- Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014
- Introduction at Startup School NY 2014
- Kathryn Minshew at Startup School NY 2014
- Office Hours at Startup School NY 2014
- Shana Fisher at Startup School NY 2014
- Zach Sims at Startup School NY 2014
- YC 創業課 EU 2014 中文筆記
- Adora Cheung
- Alfred Lin with Justin Kan
- Hiroki Takeuchi
- Ian Hogarth
- Introduction by Kirsty Nathoo
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar
- Patrick Collison
- Paul Buchheit
- Urska Srsen
- Y Combinator Partners Q&A
- YC 創業課 2016 中文筆記
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School SV 2016
- Chad Rigetti at Startup School SV 2016
- MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016
- Office Hours with Kevin Hale and Qasar Younis at Startup School SV 2016
- Ooshma Garg at Startup School SV 2016
- Pitch Practice with Paul Buchheit and Sam Altman at Startup School SV 2016
- Q&A with YC Partners at Startup School SV 2016
- Reham Fagiri and Kalam Dennis at Startup School SV 2016
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016
- 斯坦福 CS183f YC 創業課 2017 中文筆記
- How and Why to Start A Startup
- Startup Mechanics
- How to Get Ideas and How to Measure
- How to Build a Product I
- How to Build a Product II
- How to Build a Product III
- How to Build a Product IV
- How to Invent the Future I
- How to Invent the Future II
- How to Find Product Market Fit
- How to Think About PR
- Diversity & Inclusion at Early Stage Startups
- How to Build and Manage Teams
- How to Raise Money, and How to Succeed Long-Term
- YC 創業課 2018 中文筆記
- Sam Altman - 如何成功創業
- Carolynn Levy、Jon Levy 和 Jason Kwon - 初創企業法律機制
- 與 Paul Graham 的對話 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Michael Seibel - 構建產品
- David Rusenko - 如何找到適合產品市場的產品
- Suhail Doshi - 如何測量產品
- Gustaf Alstromer - 如何獲得用戶和發展
- Garry Tan - 初創企業設計第 2 部分
- Kat Manalac 和 Craig Cannon - 用于增長的公關+內容
- Tyler Bosmeny - 如何銷售
- Ammon Bartram 和 Harj Taggar - 組建工程團隊
- Dalton Caldwell - 如何在 Y Combinator 上申請和成功
- Patrick Collison - 運營你的創業公司
- Geoff Ralston - 籌款基礎
- Kirsty Nathoo - 了解保險箱和定價股票輪
- Aaron Harris - 如何與投資者會面并籌集資金
- Paul Buchheit 的 1000 億美元之路
- PMF 后:人員、客戶、銷售
- 與 Oshma Garg 的對話 - 由 Adora Cheung 主持
- 與 Aileen Lee 的對話 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Garry Tan - 初創企業設計第 1 部分
- 與 Elizabeth Iorns 的對話 - 生物技術創始人的建議
- 與 Eric Migicovsky 的硬技術對話
- 與 Elad Gil 的對話
- 與 Werner Vogels 的對話
- YC 創業課 2019 中文筆記
- Kevin Hale - 如何評估創業思路:第一部分
- Eric Migicovsky - 如何與用戶交談
- Ali Rowghani - 如何領導
- Kevin Hale 和 Adora Cheung - 數字初創學校 2019
- Geoff Ralston - 拆分建議
- Michael Seibel - 如何計劃 MVP
- Adora Cheung - 如何設定關鍵績效指標和目標
- Ilya Volodarsky - 初創企業分析
- Anu Hariharan - 九種商業模式和投資者想要的指標
- Anu Hariharan 和 Adora Cheung - 投資者如何衡量創業公司 Q&A
- Kat Manalac - 如何啟動(續集)
- Gustaf Alstromer - 新興企業的成長
- Kirsty Nathoo - 創業財務陷阱以及如何避免它們
- Kevin Hale - 如何一起工作
- Tim Brady - 構建文化
- Dalton Caldwell - 關于樞軸的一切
- Kevin Hale - 如何提高轉化率
- Kevin Hale - 創業定價 101
- Adora Cheung - 如何安排時間
- Kevin Hale - 如何評估創業思路 2
- Carolynn Levy - 現代創業融資
- Jared Friedman - 硬技術和生物技術創始人的建議