# Phil Libin at Startup School 2013 > `[00:00:00]` Good morning. `[00:00:00]` 早上好。 > I think this is literally the largest number of people have ever spoken to. 我認為這是有史以來與之交談的人數最多的一次。 > `[00:00:07]` Pretty sure it is. `[00:00:07]` 很肯定是的。 > `[00:00:18]` Very cool very impressive. `[00:00:18]` 非常酷，非常令人印象深刻。 > Thank you for coming. 謝謝你的光臨。 > I\'m super psyched to talk to you. 我很想和你談談。 > You know Paul asked me to come in and talk a little bit about what we went through at Evernote especially in the early years and the mistakes we made and the lessons we learned. 你知道保羅讓我來談談我們在 Evernote 的經歷，特別是在早期，我們犯的錯誤和我們學到的教訓。 > And I\'m happy to do that. 我很樂意這么做。 > You know Evernote didn\'t come out of nothing. 你知道埃弗諾特不是憑空而來的。 > It was our third startup and we learned a lot kind of all the way through the process. 這是我們的第三次創業，我們在整個過程中學到了很多東西。 > The first real startup that I was involved with I started with with a few college roommates of mine you know my best friends in Boston who called to engine five. 我參與的第一個真正的創業項目是從我的幾個大學室友開始的，你知道我在波士頓的最好的朋友，他打電話給我的 5 號引擎。 > And `[00:01:05]` that was I think the first and probably the most important lesson to me right there was was that I had great cofounders. `[00:01:05]` 那是我認為的第一個，也可能是最重要的一課，對我來說，就是我有偉大的聯合創始人。 > The most important thing and this is very much the same team of people that was with me at the first startup and then the second startup and then many of them are even at Evernote. 最重要的是，這和我在第一家初創公司，然后是第二家創業公司的團隊是一樣的，他們中的很多人甚至都在 Evernote。 > `[00:01:24]` And so I think the most important thing to do and as young an age as possible is to just cultivate this group of really really really and high energy willing to work for free. `[00:01:24]` 所以我認為，最重要的事情是盡可能年輕地去做，就是培養這群真正的、高能量的人，他們愿意免費工作。 > `[00:01:37]` Best friends for life. `[00:01:37]` 終身摯友。 > `[00:01:40]` And it\'s super important to do that. `[00:01:40]` 這樣做非常重要。 > And you have to pay attention like I got lucky I got lucky that that the people that I that I happened to meet in college in the computer science department a boss university or people that have stuck with me for four. 你得注意，好像我很幸運，我碰巧在大學里遇到的人，在計算機科學系，一個老板的大學，或者和我在一起呆了四個小時的人。 > `[00:01:54]` So far the rest of our lives. `[00:01:54]` 到目前為止，我們的余生。 > And I fully expect much longer. 我完全期待更長的時間。 > `[00:01:59]` In fact I would go so far as to say that you shouldn\'t even make friends with people that you don\'t see starting your company with. `[00:01:59]` 事實上，我甚至會說，你甚至不應該和那些你不認為與你一起建立公司的人交朋友。 > `[00:02:07]` Laughter. `[00:02:07]` 笑聲。 > It `[00:02:10]` kind of sounds Dikkers shale gas but thank you. `[00:02:10]` 聽起來有點像迪克斯頁巖氣，但謝謝你。 > To be honest with you. 老實對你說。 > Like why. 比如為什么。 > Why bother. 何必費心呢。 > You only have nearly so many best friends that you\'re going to have and if you can\'t if you can\'t imagine counting on them in a Pinterest co-founder you know use those. 你只有那么多最好的朋友，而你將擁有這些朋友，如果你無法想象在 Pinterest 聯合創始人身上指望他們，你知道，就用這些吧。 > `[00:02:25]` Yeah use those resources wisely. `[00:02:25]` 是的，明智地使用這些資源。 > `[00:02:28]` And so I just looked into it I happened to get these great people and and I\'ve been able to get really great people in in every other company. `[00:02:28]` 所以我剛剛調查了一下，我碰巧找到了這些很棒的人，而且我在其他公司都能找到非常優秀的人。 > So basically we started our first company engine 5 the core group of those people went on to found the second company core street the core group of those people went on to found Evernote Evernote. 所以基本上，我們啟動了我們的第一個公司引擎 5，這些人的核心小組繼續找到了第二家公司的核心街道，這些人的核心小組繼續創建了 Evernote。 > I really hope is is my life\'s work. 我真的希望這是我一生的工作。 > I don\'t intend to really work on anything else but if I ever do I already know the 50 or so people that Evernote that you know that are going to hopefully be with me for whatever the next thing is and so developing this crew. 我不打算做任何其他的事情，但如果我真的做了，我已經認識了 50 多個人，你知道，無論下一件事是什么，以及發展這支隊伍，他們都希望能和我在一起。 > Is super huge and. 超級巨大。 > Can kind of tell from most of you. 從你們大多數人身上可以看出。 > `[00:03:07]` You look like you\'re right at about that age and in an area of life where you\'re making these connections you\'re making these friendships and it\'s going to go by really fast. `[00:03:07]` 你看起來就像你在那個年齡左右，在生活的某個領域里，你正在建立這些聯系，你正在建立這些友誼，而且這種友誼會很快就會過去的。 > `[00:03:14]` So make the most of it. `[00:03:14]` 所以要充分利用它。 > `[00:03:16]` So engine 5 was a consultant. `[00:03:16]` 所以 5 號發動機是一名顧問。 > We started this company that was original going to be five of us but then two people chickened out but we really had the domain name and it was just all three of us were computer programmers were all developers and we literally didn\'t know that there was such a thing as investors. 我們創辦了一家公司，原來是我們五個人，但后來有兩個人退縮了，但我們真的有了域名，我們三個人都是電腦程序員，都是開發人員，我們根本不知道有投資者這樣的東西。 > `[00:03:34]` But this was a new concept to us. `[00:03:34]` 但這對我們來說是一個新概念。 > We didn\'t know that there were people who would give you money so that you could build something. 我們不知道有人會給你錢，這樣你就能建造一些東西。 > `[00:03:39]` We just assumed that the way you build a business is you know you start working and you get paid and you make more money that you spend and so on. `[00:03:39]` 我們只是假設你建立一家企業的方式是你知道你開始工作，你得到了報酬，你賺了更多的錢，你花了這么多錢等等。 > And luckily this was right at the lead up to the original dotcom bubble in the very late 90s and so if you could program people would just throw money at you. 幸運的是，這正是 90 年代末互聯網泡沫的源頭，所以如果你能編程，人們就會把錢投到你身上。 > And we didn\'t have much motivation in starting this company other than we just wanted to work together. 除了我們只是想一起工作之外，我們創辦這家公司沒有什么動力。 > We want to see what it would be like to have a company to be our own boss to you know to call the rules. 我們想看看擁有一家公司做我們自己的老板會是什么感覺，你知道，把這些規則稱為“規則”。 > And so we did a lot of you know programming consulting mostly on e-commerce stuff and what we learned and this is probably the second most important lesson is. 所以我們做了很多你們都知道的編程咨詢，主要是關于電子商務和我們學到的東西，這可能是第二個最重要的教訓。 > `[00:04:14]` You know being your own boss and having your own company and making the rules kind of sucks. `[00:04:14]` 你知道，做你自己的老板，擁有自己的公司，制定規則是很糟糕的。 > `[00:04:22]` If what you\'re doing ultimately is you know being a consultant it\'s just like you just getting paid by somebody else to write some code because you\'re not actually building any value any long term value. `[00:04:22]` 如果你最終要做的是你知道你是一名顧問，那就像你得到別人的報酬去寫一些代碼，因為你實際上并沒有構建任何長期價值。 > You can you can be getting paid you could be making a decent amount of money while you\'re working. 你可以-你可以得到報酬-當你工作的時候，你可以賺到相當多的錢。 > But all of this idea that you\'re actually calling the shots and you\'re in control is because a complete illusion. 但是，所有這些認為你實際上是在發號施令，并由你來控制的想法，都是因為一個完全的幻想。 > If what you\'re really doing is working for building something for some other company. 如果你真正做的是為其他公司建東西。 > So it\'s amazingly hard work. 所以這是一項令人驚訝的艱苦工作。 > And the rewards are very immediate but they\'re not they\'re not lasting. 回報是即時的，但不是持久的。 > You don\'t you don\'t build anything up. 你什么都不做。 > `[00:04:57]` And so after working harder than we\'ve ever worked for for about two and a half years you know 16 hour days on average. `[00:04:57]` 你知道，在我們工作了兩年半之后，平均每天工作 16 個小時。 > I remember I would come into the office at like 2a.m. 我記得我大約在凌晨 2 點來到辦公室。 > and there would be people you know leaning out of the windows smoking because you don\'t have time to even go outside and back then people used to smoke. 還有一些你認識的人，從窗戶里探出頭來抽煙，因為你甚至沒有時間出去或者回去，那時人們習慣抽煙。 > `[00:05:17]` Ask your parents. `[00:05:17]` 問你父母。 > `[00:05:21]` And we finally did so that we sold a company to a big company called vignette in Austin Texas about two and a half years later and we were super happy to sell it because we didn\'t we didn\'t love this work. `[00:05:21]` 我們終于把一家公司賣給了得克薩斯州奧斯汀市的一家名為 Vignette 的大公司，大約兩年半后，我們非常高興地賣掉了它，因為我們不喜歡這件作品。 > We\'re just working for somebody else. 我們只是在為別人工作。 > We\'re building stores and e-commerce things and so we sold it and it was pretty cool but we didn\'t know how to sell a company that became to Austin and it was totally the acquirers did everything that you would expect. 我們正在建立商店和電子商務，所以我們賣掉了它，它很酷，但我們不知道如何出售一家公司，后來變成了奧斯汀，完全是收購者做了你所期望的一切。 > Like we thought we would like slid the paper across the table with like I\'m going to write down a figure and split it across the table in totally two years was exactly like that if any of you have seen. 就像我們想的那樣，我們希望把紙滑到桌子上，就像我要寫下一個數字，在兩年內把它平分到桌子上，如果你們中的任何人都看到的話，就是這樣的。 > `[00:05:50]` He always sunny in philadelphia episode it was it was just that. `[00:05:50]` 在費城，他總是陽光明媚，就是這樣。 > `[00:05:58]` So we sold that company a couple of years later we be left wing and we decided OK what did we learn. `[00:05:58]` 幾年后，我們賣掉了那家公司，然后我們決定，我們學到了什么。 > You know it\'s time to do something new. 你知道是時候做些新的事了。 > Time to start a company because obviously were going to go and get real jobs at this point but what lesson to be learned. 是時候開始一家公司了，因為很明顯，在這一點上，他們會找到真正的工作，但是要吸取什么教訓。 > We said well our lesson is we don\'t want to be consultants we don\'t just want to develop stuff for somebody else want to build a product. 我們說，我們的教訓是，我們不想成為顧問，我們不只是想為別人開發東西，想要制造產品。 > And so we started our second company which is a mighty spinoff of the title cause Street where we got together with this brilliant mighty cryptographer to build a cryptography and security stuff for banks and for governments you know products. 于是我們開始了我們的第二家公司，這是“事業街”的一個強大的衍生，我們和這位杰出的密碼專家一起為銀行和政府建立了一個密碼學和安全方面的東西，你知道的產品。 > And that was better in the sense that we were building a product we were building something reusable we were building something that we can add value to. 這是更好的，因為我們正在建造一個產品，我們正在建造一個可重用的東西，我們正在建造一些我們可以為之增加價值的東西。 > But what we got wrong was it turned out that it wasn\'t a product that any of us were madly in love with because turns out nobody is madly in love with government security and cryptography stuff. 但我們錯了，事實證明，這不是我們中的任何一個人瘋狂地愛上的產品，因為事實證明，沒有人瘋狂地愛著政府的安全和密碼學的東西。 > `[00:06:53]` People don\'t wake up in the morning like Oh yeah I\'m so excited the new government standard for contactless smart cards is out today. `[00:06:53]` 人們不會在早上醒來，就像哦，是的，我太興奮了，政府關于非接觸式智能卡的新標準今天出來了。 > `[00:07:02]` Well like one guy does that. `[00:07:02]` 就像一個人那樣做。 > I was like I was me. 我就像我自己一樣。 > So it\'s like doubly sad. 所以這就像雙重悲傷。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > `[00:07:09]` And at some point basically we decided after about seven years of this and you know we had a good experience. `[00:07:09]` 在某種程度上，我們決定了大約七年之后，你知道我們有一個很好的經歷。 > We set out to change the world a little bit to redefine security I think we did that in a small way. 我們開始稍微改變世界，重新定義安全-我認為我們是以一種小的方式做到的。 > `[00:07:22]` But what we started realizing was I mean we just like I\'d sooner chew my own arm off than like sit through one more. `[00:07:22]` 但我們開始意識到，我的意思是，我們就像我寧愿咬掉自己的胳膊，也不愿再坐一次。 > You know the Department of Defense procurement process hearing. 你知道國防部采購程序聽證會。 > `[00:07:35]` And so we we exited that company. `[00:07:35]` 所以我們離開了那家公司。 > We brought on adult leadership and we were able to sell that that second company as well and then got together in 2007 and said okay now we\'re all in our in our mid 30s and we\'ve had two companies and we\'ve had some exits. 我們有了成年人的領導，我們也賣掉了第二家公司，然后在 2007 年聚在一起，說：好吧，現在我們都是 30 多歲了，我們有兩家公司，我們已經退出了一些公司。 > We\'ve made a little bit of money. 我們賺了一點錢。 > What do we want to do now. 我們現在想做什么。 > What lesson to be learned. 該吸取什么教訓。 > When we said Okay well the first lesson we were right. 當我們說好的時候，第一課我們是對的。 > You know let\'s not be consultants that\'s build a product. 你知道的，讓我們不要成為制造產品的顧問。 > But the second lesson is Shinji\'s be any product. 但第二個教訓是，辛吉是任何產品。 > It shouldn\'t be a product about we shouldn\'t sit around thinking you know what does the market want. 它不應該是一種產品，我們不應該坐視不管，以為你知道市場想要什么。 > Know what does the market fit. 知道市場適合什么。 > How do we build something that we can sell. 我們如何建造一些我們可以出售的東西。 > What will people buy. 人們會買什么。 > We got really tired of that. 我們對此感到厭倦了。 > I got tired of board members and investors constantly telling me which would happen all the time. 我厭倦了董事會成員和投資者不斷地告訴我什么會一直發生。 > They would constantly tell me you know remember Phil you\'re not the target audience. 他們總是告訴我，你知道，記住，菲爾，你不是目標觀眾。 > Know your customers are the target audience and you know remember the best product doesn\'t always win. 要知道你的客戶是你的目標受眾，你知道最好的產品并不總是贏的。 > `[00:08:29]` But all those things are all those things are true and especially true if you\'re building stuff or you know systems for banks and for governments but they were just boring. `[00:08:29]` 但所有這些都是真的，尤其是如果你在為銀行和政府建立系統，但它們只是無聊。 > And we said okay the third time around let\'s do this again but let\'s only build something for us. 我們說，好的，第三次，讓我們再做一次，但我們只為我們建立一些東西。 > Let\'s build something that we love. 讓我們來做一些我們喜歡的東西。 > Let\'s build something we love so that we are the target audience. 讓我們創造一些我們喜歡的東西，讓我們成為目標觀眾。 > `[00:08:50]` And let\'s do it in a way that we\'re not going to try to sell a company because we\'ve sold too. `[00:08:50]` 讓我們這樣做吧，這樣我們就不會試圖賣掉一家公司，因為我們也已經賣掉了。 > And you know selling a company is his. 你知道出售一家公司是他的。 > It\'s a mixed feeling. 這是一種喜憂參半的感覺。 > I mean it\'s nice especially the first time you do it if you have a decent exit and you make some money. 我的意思是這很好，尤其是當你第一次這么做的時候，如果你有一個體面的出口，并且你賺了一些錢。 > But you are you know you\'ve put your entire life into this for years and then you know and then it\'s not yours anymore. 但是你.你知道你已經把你的一生都投入到這件事上了，然后你知道，然后它就不再是你的了。 > So it\'s at best a bittersweet feeling. 所以這充其量是一種苦樂參半的感覺。 > And we said the third time around let\'s do it differently let\'s let\'s have two guiding principles. 我們說，第三次，讓我們做不同的事情，讓我們有兩個指導原則。 > It\'s only build things for us that we\'re in love with that we want to use and let\'s build a company that we want to keep Let\'s explicitly say there is no exit strategy. 我們只想為我們打造我們想要使用的東西，讓我們創建一家我們想要保持的公司-讓我們明確表示沒有退出戰略。 > `[00:09:26]` Let\'s make something that is sufficiently epic to be our life\'s work. `[00:09:26]` 讓我們創造一些足以成為我們一生工作的史詩。 > `[00:09:32]` And if you have something that\'s your life\'s work you don\'t need an exit strategy. `[00:09:32]` 如果你有什么東西是你一生的工作，你就不需要一個退出策略。 > There is no exit strategy for your life\'s work. 你的工作沒有退出策略。 > You should have a liquidity strategy especially if you\'re going to raise money you shouldn\'t. 你應該有一個流動性策略，尤其是如果你想籌集資金的話，你不應該這么做。 > You don\'t need an exit strategy. 你不需要退出戰略。 > Let\'s make something sufficiently epic let\'s make something that we can devote our lives to that we can devote our lives to building to building for us. 讓我們創造一些足夠史詩的東西，讓我們創造一些我們可以把我們的生命奉獻給我們的東西。 > And that was that was the motivation for Evernote. 這就是 Evernote 的動機。 > So we we sat around thinking OK well what should we build. 所以我們圍坐在周圍想，好吧，我們應該建什么。 > Well let\'s start with stuff that we like. 讓我們從我們喜歡的東西開始吧。 > You know what are we like. 你知道我們是什么樣的人。 > And we said I said you know I play a lot of video games so I love videogames. 我們說我說你知道我玩了很多電子游戲所以我喜歡電子游戲。 > Let\'s you know maybe we should start videogame company and we thought okay. 讓你知道，也許我們應該成立一家電子游戲公司，然后我們想得很好。 > But we already have really great experiences with video games. 但是我們已經有了非常棒的視頻游戲體驗。 > You know even back then there was already like a giant stack of games that I wanted to play that I couldn\'t play through. 你知道，即使是在那個時候，我也已經有了一堆我想玩的游戲，而我卻無法完成這些游戲。 > I thought the world isn\'t like the world isn\'t going to be significantly better if we had another one because there\'s already people doing a great job keeping us entertained with video games. 我認為這個世界不像這個世界，如果我們有另一個世界的話，這個世界就不會變得更好，因為已經有很多人在做一項偉大的工作，讓我們繼續玩電子游戲。 > So then we thought okay well what else do we like them. 所以我們想，好吧，那我們還喜歡他們什么呢。 > And one of my co-founder said Well you know I kind of like the new social networking social media stuff. 我的一位聯合創始人說，你知道，我有點喜歡新的社交網絡社交媒體之類的東西。 > And we forget that it\'s kind of cool. 我們忘了這很酷。 > You know Twitter was just kind of getting started. 你知道 Twitter 剛剛起步。 > There was a few other things but we thought you know what there\'s already so many companies doing it and it\'s already a great experience and you know I mean MySpace has already done everything you\'d ever do with a social network like why why would we want to start something you know to compete with MySpace or really providing great great service or could be nothing better. 還有一些其他的事情，但我們以為你知道，已經有那么多公司在做這件事了，這已經是一次很棒的經歷了，你知道我的意思是，我的空間已經做了你在社交網絡上所做的一切，比如為什么我們想要開始一些你知道的東西來和 MySpace 競爭，或者提供更好的服務，或者沒有什么比這更好的了。 > `[00:10:56]` So we have we decided not to do that. `[00:10:56]` 所以我們決定不這么做了。 > `[00:11:01]` By the way a sock is an angel investor just goes. `[00:11:01]` 順便說一句，襪子是天使投資者。 > `[00:11:05]` Now but then we thought OK well we have pretty good experiences with entertainment. `[00:11:05]` 現在，但我們認為，好吧，我們有相當好的娛樂經驗。 > `[00:11:13]` We have pretty good experiences with communication and social networking but when we were using productivity stuff when we\'re using stuff to try to make us smarter try to actually accomplish something. `[00:11:13]` 我們在交流和社交網絡方面有很好的經驗，但當我們使用生產力的東西時，我們使用的是東西，試圖使我們變得更聰明，嘗試去真正地完成一些事情。 > It\'s for the most part just a really crappy experience. 這在很大程度上只是一次非常糟糕的經歷。 > `[00:11:26]` Every time we use productivity software it feels either old or kind of cultish. `[00:11:26]` 每當我們使用生產力軟件時，都會覺得有些過時，有的甚至有點崇拜。 > It doesn\'t really get the job done as it feel very elegant and we thought OK that\'s cool that we were all nerds. 它并沒有真正完成它的工作，因為它感覺非常優雅，我們認為好吧，這是很酷的，我們都是書呆子。 > We all want to build a second brain. 我們都想建立第二個大腦。 > We all want to be smarter. 我們都想變得更聰明。 > It isn\'t a good experience right now. 這不是一次好的經歷。 > It really feels like things like smart phones and app stores are about to take off and get started. 它真的感覺像智能手機和應用商店即將起飛和開始。 > Let\'s let\'s build something that is that it\'s going to be the modern definition of what it means to be effective and productive as a knowledge worker. 讓我們來構建一個東西，那就是，作為一個知識工作者，它將是一個現代定義，它意味著什么才是有效的和有生產力的。 > `[00:11:56]` And we set out to do that. `[00:11:56]` 我們開始這么做。 > `[00:11:58]` So we made a plan. `[00:11:58]` 所以我們制定了一個計劃。 > We were going to call the company ribbon like Utai ribbon round your finger to remember and then in in my due diligence in my research about it we were in Boston we were going into this other group of people here in actually very close to here in Cupertino in Sunnyvale that was called Evernote that was started by this guy named Stefan Pacheco. 我們要給公司的絲帶打電話，就像烏泰絲帶繞著你的手指記住，然后在我的盡職調查中，我們在波士頓，我們接觸到了另一群人，實際上離這里很近，在桑尼維爾的庫比蒂諾，這個人叫 Evernote，是由一個叫 Stefan Pacheco 的家伙創立的。 > And he had a team of people upon it sort of this this genius kind of mad scientist inventor entrepreneur kind of Russian American guy. 他有一隊人，有點像個天才，一個瘋狂的科學家，發明家，企業家，一個俄羅斯裔美國人。 > He had a team of people that actually worked with the went all the way back to the Apple Newton days. 他有一個團隊，他們實際上是和蘋果牛頓時代一起工作的。 > The Apple Newton was kind of the way ahead of its time. 蘋果牛頓在某種程度上領先于它的時代。 > You know first a portable device with handwriting recognition and everything. 你首先知道的是一種帶有手寫識別和其他功能的便攜設備。 > And they were working on this idea of a second memory to everyone you know building a second brain. 他們正在研究第二次記憶的想法，每個人都知道，建立第二個大腦。 > We were seeing the same things. 我們看到的都是一樣的東西。 > `[00:12:44]` So Snap-On they got together and we decided hey instead of you know of competing let\'s let\'s actually just merge the companies let\'s merge the teams and make something Evernote and so we merge the two teams in in 07 and we kind of recreate it the company relaunched it as a new company called Evernote. `[00:12:44]` 因此，我們決定，嘿，而不是你知道的競爭，讓我們真正地合并公司，讓我們合并團隊，做一些 Evernote，所以我們在 07 年合并了這兩個團隊，我們重新創建了它，公司重新創建了一個新的公司，叫做 Evernote。 > `[00:13:01]` We recapitalized it which means it\'s a technical financial term it means that it used up capital and Evernote and we made it lower case and we also changed the investment structure that was less important to me. `[00:13:01]` 我們對它進行了資本重組，這意味著它是一個技術性的金融術語，意味著它耗盡了資本和 Evernote，我們降低了它的規模，我們還改變了對我來說不太重要的投資結構。 > And we launched the new product in 2008 and it was an important lesson there too which is this was a mistake that I think we made was a very unconventional start that this wasn\'t the typical start Silicon Valley startup start where you know you go to Y Combinator and you have you know a couple of cofounders and you get them a round and you start something we didn\'t do that it was a weird complicated structure with two teams coming together and one of the already had some investments and it will have to get redone. 我們在 2008 年推出了這款新產品，這也是一個重要的教訓，這是一個錯誤，我認為這是一個非常非常規的開始，這不是典型的硅谷初創公司，你知道你去了 Y Combinator，你認識了幾位聯合創始人，你讓他們開始了一輪新的創業。沒有做到這一點，這是一個奇怪的，復雜的結構，兩支球隊走到一起，其中一個已經有一些投資，它將不得不重新做。 > And this was a big mistake. 這是個大錯誤。 > I mean it was great that week combined the teams that we merged and the personalities were great. 我的意思是，那一周我們合并的團隊很棒，個性也很棒。 > We were able to build something really fantastic but we were way too clever with the structure and I\'ll never repeat that mistake it does not pay to be clever to be innovative on. 我們能夠建造一些非常棒的東西，但是我們在結構上太聰明了，我再也不會重復這個錯誤了，聰明就不值得去創新了。 > I\'m kind of the structure on the legal entity and how you divvy up your stock and any of that kind of stuff because it basically made us on fundable for a couple of years because until we were significant enough that it was actually worth a BCR time actually understanding WHY we were different and figuring out how to unwind it and how to fix it until we were significant enough to get over that barrier like no one would even even take a look at us. 我是法律實體的一種結構，以及你如何分配你的股票和諸如此類的東西，因為它基本上讓我們在幾年內都是可供支付的，因為直到我們變得足夠重要，實際上值得花一段時間，才能真正理解為什么我們是不同的，并弄清楚如何解除它，以及如何修復它直到我們變了為止。有足夠的意義來克服這個障礙，就像沒有人會看我們一樣。 > And it took us you know the fact that we were clever in the end in the early days and tried to kind of preserve this this incremental structure probably cost us 18 months of not being able to raise money. 我們花了很長時間，你知道，我們在早期的時候很聰明，并且試圖保持這種漸進的結構，這可能要花我們 18 個月的時間才能籌集到資金。 > So I definitely don\'t advise that I don\'t advise doing anything particularly clever or different about how you how you do the basics and the dynamics. 所以我絕對不建議我不建議做任何特別聰明或不同的事情，比如你是如何做基礎和動力的。 > So just pay attention to what people here will tell you and it might see in other resources and just do exactly that be innovative about one thing only which is your idea. 所以，只要注意這里的人會告訴你什么，它可能會在其他資源中看到，并且做的正是創新的事情，只有一件事，那就是你的想法。 > Like that\'s the only thing you can afford a startup founders to really be innovative about as the main thing that you\'re doing everything else you want to do as by the book as possible at least in the early days to to minimize your chances of failing for a stupid reason. 就像這樣，你唯一能讓初創公司創始人真正創新的事情，就是你正在做的所有你想做的事情，至少在最初的幾天里，盡量減少你因為一個愚蠢的原因而失敗的可能性。 > And we almost almost fail for the stupid reason that we were too clever with our legal forms early on so we cleaned up everything. 我們幾乎失敗了，因為我們很早就對法律形式太聰明了，所以我們清理了所有的東西。 > And you know have self funded and I put some money in the pot of money and we had some friends and family investors but we were just about ready to raise a big round. 你知道，我們有自籌資金，我把一些錢放進了一壺錢，我們有一些朋友和家庭投資者，但我們正準備籌到一大筆錢。 > And it took a long time but we finally got a 10 million dollar term sheet. 它花了很長時間，但我們終于得到了一千萬美元的條款表。 > Not from a Silicon Valley investor from a European investor. 不是來自硅谷的投資者，而是來自歐洲的投資者。 > The Silicon Valley guys still excited and want to talk to us and we had about three weeks of cash in the bank left it was a very long due diligence because we had to fix all the structure stuff but the deal was supposed to close. 硅谷的人仍然很興奮，想和我們談談，我們銀行里有大約三周的現金，這是一項非常長的盡職調查，因為我們必須修復所有的結構性問題，但這筆交易本應完成。 > Finally it was so close in 2008 in the fall and the day it was the closing date was actually the day that Lehman Brothers collapsed. 最后，它在 2008 年秋天非常接近，而關閉的那一天實際上是雷曼兄弟倒閉的那一天。 > And the investor called me on the day of closing and said Hey we just lost 60 percent of our fund value in one day we\'re not going to do the investment. 投資者在收市當天打電話給我說，嘿，我們只是在一天之內損失了 60%的基金價值，我們不打算投資。 > And I had we had three weeks of cash left. 我還有三個星期的現金。 > At that point we hadn\'t we hadn\'t been able to talk to too many other investors about the previous three months because we were kind of locked up and due diligence you know with exclusivity and you know so we panicked at that point already had 20 something people in the company. 那時，我們無法與太多其他投資者談論過去三個月的事情，因為我們處于某種程度上的封閉狀態，盡職調查，你知道的，你知道，所以我們當時驚慌失措，公司里已經有 20 多人了。 > So we spent a week just frantically calling everyone calling everyone I knew everyone I didn\'t know just trying to get you know trying to get meeting trying to get investment. 所以我們花了一周的時間瘋狂地打電話給我認識的人，我不認識的人，只想讓你知道，試著開個會，爭取投資。 > Nothing absolutely nothing. 沒什么絕對沒什么。 > It was arguably the worst time to be doing it in the history of the universe. 這可以說是宇宙歷史上最糟糕的時候。 > It was you know like late October 2008. 你知道，就在 2008 年 10 月底。 > I wasn\'t particularly good at it. 我不是很擅長這個。 > We had a spectacularly bad ABC pinch ABC pitchman something like this with the quick version that would say Hi I\'m Phillipine you\'ve never heard of me. 我們有一個非常糟糕的 ABC，捏了 ABC 的廣告員，就像這樣的快速版本，上面寫著“嗨，我是菲利普，你從來沒聽說過我。” > We\'re going to do this. 我們要這么做。 > We\'re gonna make this thing called Evernote. 我們要把這個叫做 Evernote 的東西。 > It\'s gonna let you you know write step down remember things using computers. 它會讓你知道，寫下來，放下，記住用電腦做的事情。 > And we\'re gonna give it away for free. 我們會免費送出去。 > Please give me Tomingley dot. 請給我托明利點。 > `[00:17:13]` Laughter and applause. `[00:17:13]` 笑聲和掌聲。 > `[00:17:23]` It worked in Europe. `[00:17:23]` 它在歐洲奏效了。 > It did. 是的。 > It worked in Europe. 它在歐洲奏效了。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > `[00:17:30]` And then usually you know usually they\'ll would be enough to get us thrown out in Silicon Valley. `[00:17:30]` 然后你通常知道他們會把我們趕出硅谷。 > But but but sometimes just out of politeness they would like ask a follow up question. 但有時出于禮貌，他們想問一個后續問題。 > And the most common question would be like So who is your competition. 最常見的問題是誰是你的競爭對手。 > Oh man. 哦伙計。 > I would I would nail this one. 我會把這個釘死的。 > This would be great. 這會很棒的。 > I would say a competition. 我可以說是一場比賽。 > Well pretty much every single computer or phone or a PDA or any other device that\'s ever come out in the last 50 years already has a pretty good free notetaking solution on it. 在過去 50 年里，幾乎每一臺電腦、手機、PDA 或任何其他設備都已經有了很好的免費筆記解決方案。 > And that didn\'t help us see it. 但這并沒有幫助我們看到它。 > Anyway I digress. 總之我離題了。 > So we\'re out of cash. 所以我們沒有現金了。 > I spent a week trying to give cash nothing. 我花了一個星期試圖不給現金。 > Now we have two weeks to cash off in the bank it\'s 3:00a.m. 現在我們有兩周的時間在銀行里兌現，時間是凌晨 3 點。 > and I totally remember the day I was sitting there atA.M. 我完全記得早上我坐在那里的那一天。 > and I decided finally this is it it\'s going to shut down the company tomorrow morning. 我終于決定了，明天早上公司就會倒閉。 > Go to sleep. 去睡覺吧。 > You\'re going to stand up from my desk and go to sleep. 你要從我的桌子上站起來睡覺。 > And it forces us to sleep and come into the office tomorrow to lay everyone off. 它迫使我們睡覺，明天到辦公室來解雇所有人。 > Shut the company because we only have two weeks of cash left and you can\'t really take it to zero and you get into legal trouble so you have to make sure you pay the last bills and all that stuff and they decided this was going to happen. 關閉這家公司，因為我們只剩下兩周的現金，你不能把它變成零，你就會遇到法律上的麻煩，所以你必須確保你支付最后的賬單和所有的東西，他們決定這一切都會發生。 > `[00:18:34]` And I remember sitting there at 3:00a.m. `[00:18:34]` 我記得我凌晨 3 點坐在那里。 > when I finally decided to do this. 當我最終決定這么做的時候。 > And I kind of had an epiphany. 我有種頓悟。 > I kind of thought oh this is what it must feel like to be an adult for the first time in my life I felt like I was an adult this is what it feels like to be an adult to make an adult decision. 我想，哦，這是我人生中第一次成為成年人的感覺，我覺得自己是個成年人，這是成年人做出成人決定的感覺。 > Socks whatever happens afterwards and when to optimize my life for being as childish as possible from here on out. 襪子，無論發生什么事之后，以及什么時候優化我的生活，因為從現在起，我盡可能地孩子氣。 > But I decided that this was what was going to happen. 但我決定這就是將要發生的事。 > `[00:19:03]` And at about 3:00a.m. `[00:19:03]` 和凌晨 3 點左右。 > right before I went to sleep I got I got an e-mail and so I said alright I\'ll read one more e-mail. 就在我睡覺之前，我收到了一封電子郵件，所以我說，好吧，我再讀一封電子郵件。 > And this e-mail was from some random guy in Sweden and he said You\'re Phil I\'m a random guy in Sweden. 這封電子郵件是來自瑞典的一個隨便的人，他說你是菲爾，我在瑞典是個隨機的人。 > And I I\'m just writing to let you know that I love ever no I\'ve been using it for about about two months. 我寫這封信只是想讓你知道我愛過你，不，我已經用了大約兩個月了。 > It\'s only been out for about two months that we have been using it for about two months. 我們已經用了大約兩個月的時間了。 > And I love it. 我愛死它了。 > It\'s changed my life. 它改變了我的生活。 > It\'s made me happy to be more organized. 這使我很高興能更有條理。 > It\'s it\'s really great. 真的很棒。 > And I remember thinking Oh that\'s nice. 我記得我在想，哦，那太好了。 > That makes me feel better. 這讓我感覺好多了。 > You know they say like if you could make a difference to one random guy in Sweden you\'ve kind of achieved something. 你知道，他們說，如果你能對瑞典的一個隨機的人有所改變，你就能取得一些成就。 > But then then he went on to say in his e-mail. 但后來他繼續在他的電子郵件中說。 > I\'m just writing to see if you guys need any investment. 我只是寫信看看你們是否需要投資。 > `[00:19:53]` And I wrote back and I wrote Why yes we would like some investment. `[00:19:53]` 我回信，寫了為什么我們想要一些投資。 > And then I stayed up it didn\'t go to sleep. 然后我就熬夜了-沒有睡著。 > `[00:20:03]` And 20 minutes later I was in a skype call with him and we told him the whole situation and two weeks after that he wired us half a million dollars. `[00:20:03]` 20 分鐘后，我和他打了一個 Skype 電話，我們告訴了他整個情況，兩周后，他給我們打了五十萬美元。 > And it was exactly enough that half a million dollars was exactly enough that we cut back ice. 只要 50 萬美元就夠了，我們就可以減少冰了。 > I had stopped drawing a salary a while ago and some of the management staff wasn\'t drawing a salary. 我一段時間前就不再領薪水了，一些管理人員沒有領工資。 > Really could really tighten their belt but that half million dollars was enough. 他們真的可以勒緊褲腰帶，但那 50 萬美元就足夠了。 > It got us. 它抓住了我們。 > It lasted about six months and then the worst of the crisis was over. 它持續了大約六個月，然后最嚴重的危機結束了。 > But more importantly we had already cleaned up all of our structure in the most important thing is we finally had traction. 但更重要的是，我們已經清理了我們所有的結構，最重要的是我們終于有了牽引力。 > We finally had enough data where I could do aB.S. 我們終于有了足夠的數據，我可以做 aB.S。 > presentation that wasn\'t awful where I can actually say this is the model. 在我可以說這是模型的地方，這并不是很糟糕的演示。 > These are the cohort charts these are the human unit economics. 這些是隊列圖，這些是人類單位經濟學。 > Here\'s how the business is actually working. 這是業務的實際運作方式。 > Here\'s how we are making money today and here\'s why it\'s going to scale and that\'s it\'s made all the difference. 這是我們今天賺錢的方式，也是我們為什么要擴大規模的原因，這就是我們所做的一切。 > And then we were able to to to get financing still not from Silicon Valley people. 然后我們還能從硅谷人那里得到資金。 > Now the first investors were actually Russians and Canadians and Japanese. 現在第一批投資者實際上是俄羅斯人、加拿大人和日本人。 > We got one of our first investors professional visionaries DoCoMo capital you know the giant telecom in Japan. 我們有我們的第一批投資者之一，專業的遠見家 DoCoMo 資本，你知道的，日本的電信巨頭。 > The reason we got that was pretty good. 我們得到這個的原因是很好的。 > You know they reached out somehow on Twitter because they liked Evernote. 你知道他們在推特上聯系是因為他們喜歡 Evernote。 > By the way every single investor in Evernote from the early days down to the people that they were bringing in. 順便說一句，Evernote 的每一位投資者，從最初的幾天，到他們所引進的人，都是如此。 > Now last year every single investor is a fan of the product. 去年，每一個投資者都是該產品的粉絲。 > We don\'t even talk to people anymore who don\'t love Evernote but even early on when no one knew what it was. 我們甚至不再和那些不愛 Evernote 的人交談，甚至在很小的時候，沒有人知道它是什么。 > The investors were all Giant fans of the product. 投資者都是該產品的超級粉絲。 > So we build it for us. 所以我們為自己建造它。 > But it turns out we also build it for our investors and for our employees and for the media and for everyone. 但事實證明，我們也為我們的投資者，為我們的員工，為媒體，為每個人建設它。 > Every other constituency that was important to us. 其他對我們很重要的選民。 > So DoCoMo came in we were still struggling at that point we still didn\'t have too much personal investment. 所以 DoCoMo 進來了，那時我們還在掙扎，我們仍然沒有太多的個人投資。 > But a couple of a couple of executives flew in from Japan. 但有幾位高管從日本飛來。 > They had a meeting with myself and our CTO Dave Engberg when my co-founder is in our office in Sunnyvale and you know they came in to the room and would bound and say hello and then in back of me here Dave was talking to them and I hear Dave say thank you very much to them in Korean. 他們和我們的首席技術官戴夫·恩伯格(DaveEngberg)有個會面，當時我的聯合創始人在我們位于桑尼維爾的辦公室里，你知道，他們來到房間里，綁起來打個招呼，然后在我后面和他們交談，我聽到戴夫用韓語對他們說非常感謝你們。 > And I hear this and my thought is why is Dave speaking to these people in Korean. 我聽到這個，我的想法是為什么戴夫要用韓語跟這些人說話。 > And I kind of look at him and he immediately realized what he had done because he would just in Korea. 我看著他，他立刻意識到自己做了什么，因為他只會在韓國。 > And he was just you know his brain just got frazzled so he immediately realized what he had just done that he misspoke. 他只是.你知道他的大腦剛剛疲勞，所以他立刻意識到他剛才做了什么，他說錯了話。 > You know you just said thank you. 你知道你剛剛說了謝謝。 > He meant to say hello in Japanese but he said thank you in Korean. 他想用日語打招呼，但他用韓語說謝謝。 > And he\'s like he\'s totally pale like he\'s just ashen. 他就像面色蒼白，就像臉色灰白。 > He was so embarrassed. 他很尷尬。 > And then look at the DoCoMo guys and the DoCoMo guys are completely completely embarrassed. 然后看看 DoCoMo 的家伙和 DoCoMo 的家伙都很尷尬。 > And the thing with Japanese people is they\'re so like for the most part they\'re so emphatic that they have so much empathy like they feel your embarrassment worse than you do. 日本人的特點是，他們大多數時候都是這樣的，他們是如此的堅定，以至于他們有如此多的同理心，就像他們覺得你的尷尬程度比你更糟一樣。 > Laughter and like they\'re mortified about how bad we feel. 笑，就像他們為我們的感覺感到羞愧。 > `[00:23:01]` Laughter. `[00:23:01]` 笑聲。 > `[00:23:03]` And so the only way out of the situation was for them to just give us several million dollars Sumathi just to prove that you know there no hard feelings. `[00:23:03]` 所以，唯一的出路就是讓他們給我們幾百萬美元，蘇門提，只是為了證明你知道沒有什么不好的感覺。 > `[00:23:18]` So we felt lucky in that in that as well. `[00:23:18]` 所以我們也感到很幸運。 > But then you know then things that get a lot better. 但你知道之后事情會好得多。 > And we did have traction and then a lot of Morgentaler came in as the first US Silicon Valley firm and then Sequoia went in big you know several times and it got you know it got a lot harder. 我們的確很有吸引力，后來很多 Morgentaler 作為美國硅谷的第一家公司進入，然后紅杉進入了大公司，你知道了好幾次，它讓你知道它變得更難了。 > It got a lot harder once we were a real company. 一旦我們成為一家真正的公司，事情就變得更加艱難。 > And I didn\'t I didn\'t appreciate that at the time that actually the most fun I ever had the most carefree that I ever was the least stressed that I ever had was back when that low tech and go out of business any day was back when the only priority was to raise money because things were things were really simple things were really simple and there was one fitness function. 我沒有意識到，在那個時候，我有過最快樂的時候，我有過的最無憂無慮的時候，我有過的壓力最小-當我回到那個低科技時代，任何一天都會停業，而那時，唯一的首要任務是籌集資金，因為事情非常簡單，而且有一個健身功能。 > You know as an engineer I just appreciated this is the only job is to raise money to make sure that we can meet payroll and have enough you know have enough cash. 你知道，作為一名工程師，我剛剛意識到，這是唯一的工作是籌集資金，以確保我們能夠滿足工資和有足夠的，你知道，有足夠的現金。 > And so you know when you\'re successful when the check when you when you call the bank and you see that there\'s a few more million dollars a you\'re. 所以你知道當你成功的時候，當你打電話給銀行的時候，你會發現你還有幾百萬美元。 > Yes. 是 > And you\'re totally ready to fail at that point. 那時你完全準備好失敗了。 > You know you just you expect to fail. 你知道你只是想失敗。 > You\'re ready to do it. 你已經準備好了。 > You\'ve made peace with it. 你已經和好了。 > You know what\'s going to happen. 你知道會發生什么 > And in fact it\'s kind of liberating. 事實上，這是一種解放。 > And the day after we raise they think our B round which was the first time where we had you know a couple of years of cash in the bank and we really felt like we weren\'t we were Nolt we were out of immediate existential danger. 第二天，他們認為我們的 B 回合，這是我們第一次讓你知道銀行里有幾年的現金，我們真的覺得我們是，不是，我們已經脫離了直接的生存危險。 > You know that day we had you know we celebrated we a big party felt great and like the next morning is when it got hard. 你知道，那天我們慶祝了，我們舉行了一次盛大的聚會，感覺很棒，就像第二天早上，事情變得很艱難。 > The next morning when I said okay. 第二天早上我說好的時候。 > Now there\'s an actual company and others people depending on us. 現在有一家真正的公司和其他人依靠我們。 > Now there\'s millions of users now there\'s expectations. 現在有了數以百萬計的用戶，現在有了期望。 > `[00:24:52]` Now is when we actually have to now when we actually have to do something. `[00:24:52]` 現在是當我們不得不去做一些事情的時候。 > `[00:24:58]` And so so you know I can stand here and say traditionally the you know it gets better. `[00:24:58]` 所以你知道我可以站在這里，傳統上說，你知道它會變得更好。 > It does very much. 它做得很好。 > `[00:25:08]` But it also gets harder it doesn\'t it doesn\'t get easier. `[00:25:08]` 但也越來越難，也不會變得更容易。 > `[00:25:11]` And so you shouldn\'t be in this business you shouldn\'t be thinking about founding a company. `[00:25:11]` 所以你不應該從事這個行業，你不應該考慮創立一家公司。 > If what you\'re trying to optimize for is easy it\'s never gotten easier for me it gets harder and harder all the time but it also becomes more and more important and more and more rewarding and in some sense more and more fun. 如果你想優化的東西很簡單，對我來說就永遠不會變得更容易，但它也變得越來越重要，越來越有價值，在某種意義上也變得越來越有趣。 > You know somebody asked me a reporter asked me the other day if if I was still having fun day to day and I had to be honest to say you know what not it\'s not a fun day today. 你知道，前幾天有人問我，一位記者問我，我是否每天都過得很開心，而我不得不誠實地說，你知道什么不是，今天不是一個有趣的日子。 > It\'s a huge amount of fun month to month but it\'s not fun day today. 這是一個月到一個月的巨大樂趣，但今天不是有趣的一天。 > You know when I look back. 你知道當我回頭看的時候。 > What do we achieve in the past 30 days. 我們在過去 30 天里取得了什么成就。 > It\'s awesome. 太棒了。 > It\'s really fun. 真的很有趣。 > It\'s really gratifying but day in and day out when you\'re like doing the job. 當你喜歡做這份工作的時候，這確實是令人欣慰的，但是日復一日。 > `[00:25:53]` Difficult is kind of the main thing. `[00:25:53]` 困難是最主要的事情之一。 > Difficult. 很難。 > But since I still have this amazing team of people this team with people who are much smarter than I am we\'re much more capable than I am. 但是，由于我還有這支了不起的團隊，這個團隊的人比我聰明得多，我們比我更有能力。 > `[00:26:03]` Many of which have been with me now for 20 years. `[00:26:03]` 許多人已經和我在一起 20 年了。 > But you know many have only been there for a couple of months. 但你知道很多人只在那里呆了幾個月。 > `[00:26:10]` It\'s vastly satisfying and the only reason this works. `[00:26:10]` 這是非常令人滿意的，也是唯一的原因。 > The only reason that that I can see myself doing this even though it\'s super difficult and super stressful I can see myself doing this from the rest of my life. 我能看到我自己做這件事的唯一原因，即使它是超級困難和超級壓力，我可以看到我自己做這個從我的余生。 > And and it stays rewarding is because we found something sufficiently epic to do. 而這也是值得的，因為我們找到了足夠的史詩來做這件事。 > We didn\'t try to think about what piece of crap can we sell someone to make some money and flip the company. 我們沒有想過我們能賣給別人什么垃圾來賺錢，然后把公司搞垮。 > We thought about what can we do that we will continue to stay in love with. 我們在想我們能做些什么，我們將繼續相愛。 > And this is the main this is the main way that starting a business right now is different from starting a business even five years ago. 這是現在創業的主要方式，與五年前的創業是不同的。 > You were starting a business even five years ago. 你五年前就開始做生意了。 > It would have been stupid advice to say build it for yourself if you\'re starting off now. 如果你現在就開始的話，說“自己動手”是個愚蠢的建議。 > It\'s stupid advice to do anything else because if you build something for yourself if you build something that you love that you think is sufficiently epic if you make something that you love there\'s probably another billion people in the world that love it as well. 做任何其他事情都是愚蠢的建議，因為如果你為自己建造了一些你喜歡的東西，如果你做了你喜歡的東西，那么世界上可能還有另外十億人也喜歡它。 > And unless you\'re like a really weird list you\'re just like a starter unless you\'re like a spectacular weirdo. 除非你是一個非常奇怪的名單，否則你就像個初學者，除非你是個了不起的怪人。 > But even if you are even if you\'re like even if you\'re several standard deviations away from a from the center of the bell curve on weirdness it\'s probably still 10 million people that love something just as weird as you and because the tech world because of the way that the tech world has assembled itself because of app stores and smartphones and social media the tech world is more of a meritocracy than it\'s ever been. 但是，即使你像你一樣，即使你偏離了奇怪的鐘形曲線的中心，也可能仍然有 1 千萬人喜歡和你一樣奇怪的東西，因為科技世界因為應用商店、智能手機和社交媒體而組裝自己的方式。比以往任何時候都更多的是精英主義。 > And so if you build something you love those ten million or billion other people will also love it they\'ll know about it the next day they\'ll be able to find that they will be able to use it they\'ll be able to pay you and if you\'re making it for yourself you\'re making something great. 所以，如果你建造了你所愛的東西，其他人也會喜歡它，第二天他們就會知道，他們會發現他們能夠使用它，他們將能夠付錢給你，如果你為自己制作它，你就能制造出很棒的東西。 > You had a huge advantage over somebody who\'s making something for somebody else because you can at least tell when it\'s great you know you\'re making it for yourself. 你比那些為別人做東西的人有著巨大的優勢，因為你至少可以知道什么時候很棒，你知道你是為自己做的。 > You could be an honest critic and an honest judge of your own products and if you\'re not doing that it\'s just it\'s just much harder. 你可以是一個誠實的評論家和一個誠實的判斷你自己的產品，如果你不這樣做，這將是困難得多。 > `[00:28:03]` So make something sufficiently epic make something that you will be able to be a fair judge of when it\'s a cheap greatness or at least when it\'s close to it. `[00:28:03]` 所以，讓某件事足夠史詩，使你能夠公正地判斷它是什么時候，它是一個廉價的偉大，或至少當它接近它。 > I don\'t think we achieve greatness in Evernote but I think we get closer to it everyday and don\'t bother making friends with people who can\'t start a company with thank you. 我不認為我們在 Evernote 上取得了偉大的成就，但我認為我們每天都會更接近它，也不會費心與那些不能用感謝建立一家公司的人交朋友。