# Patrick Collison > `[00:00:04]` Now onto the first speaker Our first speaker is Patrick Collison and he is the CEO and co-founder of stright which was started in 2010. `[00:00:04]` 現在，我們的第一位發言者是 Patrick Collison，他是 stright 公司的首席執行官和聯合創始人，該公司成立于 2010 年。 > Stripe is an online online payments company that makes it easy to process transactions from anywhere. Stripe 是一家在線支付公司，它可以方便地處理來自任何地方的交易。 > Patrick and his brother John originally from Limerick in Ireland and moved over to San Francisco to start their company. 帕特里克和他的兄弟約翰最初來自愛爾蘭的利默里克，后來搬到舊金山開始他們的公司。 > So please welcome Patrick. 所以請歡迎帕特里克。 > Applause. 掌聲。 > Warning. 警告。 > `[00:00:45]` As you just mentioned. `[00:00:45]` 正如你剛才提到的。 > I grew up in an American island. 我在一個美國島長大。 > And so it\'s kind of funny being back here in London because London was pretty formative in sort of getting me into technology. 所以回到倫敦很有趣，因為倫敦在讓我進入科技方面相當成熟。 > We used often come here during the summer holidays and money to basically spend my days at Foyle\'s and Waterstone\'s reading their computer books. 我們經常在暑假和金錢期間來到這里，主要是在 Foyle‘s 和 Waterstone 的電腦書籍上度過我的日子。 > I didn\'t buy them because they\'re really expensive. 我沒有買它們，因為它們真的很貴。 > But as I read them in the the bookshop all day. 但是當我整天在書店里讀到它們的時候。 > And then it was it was in 2007 actually that London sort of was part of me falling into startups that I had basically taken a. 然后是在 2007 年，實際上，倫敦是我的一部分，我加入了創業公司，我基本上是這樣做的。 > `[00:01:23]` Taking a gap year from college and John and I had to try to start this company together and we decided to apply to Y Combinator and Polygram suggested that we go and meet these two really promising British entrepreneurs. `[00:01:23]` 從大學開始的間隔年，約翰和我不得不一起創辦這家公司，我們決定申請 Y Combinator，Polygram 建議我們去見這兩位非常有前途的英國企業家。 > Harge and Coover you\'re a tiger. 哈吉和庫弗你是只老虎。 > And so we flew over the day and met the near Piccadilly Circus and decided basically there and then on the spot that we should. 于是我們飛了一天，遇到了皮卡迪利廣場附近的人，然后在那里決定了我們應該去的地方。 > Work together. 一起工作。 > So it\'s good to be back here. 所以回到這里很好。 > Once we decided to work with Hajim cool we sort of moved out to San Francisco immediately and you know when I was based in the Bay Area I ended up attending Startup School a couple of times there. 一旦我們決定和 Hajim 酷一起工作，我們馬上就搬到了舊金山，你知道，當我在海灣地區工作時，我在那里上過幾次創業學校。 > `[00:02:03]` And I think like most other attendees in the audience I felt a sort of a not insignificant amount of imposter syndrome right in that the people up there on stage giving the talks and talking about their startups and everything else. `[00:02:03]` 和大多數其他聽眾一樣，我覺得我感覺到了一種相當程度的冒名頂替綜合癥，那就是臺上的人們在演講，談論他們的創業和其他一切。 > And it kind of feel felt like they were they were cut from a different cloth. 感覺好像是從不同的布上剪下來的。 > And so if you take anything away from this talk you should at least at least take the sort of proof by existence that they\'re not giving my presence. 所以，如果你從這個演講中拿走了什么，你至少應該拿出這樣的證據來證明他們并沒有給我出現。 > `[00:02:31]` There\'s a lot that\'s kind of strange about startups. `[00:02:31]` 創業公司有很多奇怪的地方。 > I remember somebody telling me really not that long ago that Airbnb was doing super well. 我記得不久前有人告訴我 Airbnb 做得很好。 > They were now making over ten thousand dollars a week. 他們現在每周掙一萬多美元。 > Now I have no idea whatsoever what these revenue numbers are today or any metric about them but I\'m sure they\'re making more than ten thousand dollars an hour. 現在，我完全不知道這些收入數字是什么，也不知道關于它們的任何衡量標準，但我確信，它們每小時的收入超過一萬美元。 > And I wouldn\'t expect them making 10x that. 我可不指望他們能賺到 10 倍。 > Maybe they\'ll soon be making ten thousand dollars a minute. 也許他們很快就能賺到一萬美元一分鐘了。 > And that\'s just so strange right. 這太奇怪了，對吧。 > And that kind of where else in the world you of see growth rates like this and sort of changes of this magnitude on sort of such a short time horizon. 在這個世界上，你還可以看到像這樣的增長率，在如此短的時間范圍內出現如此巨大的變化。 > And I think it\'s it\'s very foreign to almost everybody. 我認為這對幾乎每個人來說都是非常陌生的。 > I think startups are a strange first of a couple of other reasons. 我認為創業是其他幾個原因中的一個奇怪的開始。 > And you know the companies that take off are usually pretty counterintuitive because otherwise somebody would already have done it. 你知道，那些起飛的公司通常都是違反直覺的，因為否則就會有人這么做了。 > And then compounding that you have the fact that the really good companies often want to be poorly understood because he it can be pretty helpful to be kind of underestimated and uncomprehended. 更重要的是，你有這樣一個事實：真正的好公司往往想要被理解得很差，因為他被低估和不被理解是很有幫助的。 > But really I think the biggest reason that startups are hard to understand is fairly prosaic and were quite new phenomenon and very few people still get to see them up close especially during kind of the early days and the first couple orders of magnitude. 但實際上，我認為創業公司難以理解的最大原因是相當平淡無奇的，而且是非常新的現象，而且很少有人能近距離地看到它們，尤其是在早期和最初幾個數量級的時期。 > And then what people do tell the stories they tend to kind of get them wrong. 然后人們所講的故事，他們往往會搞錯。 > They focus on sort of the rocketships and frantically trying to buy more server capacity and less about sort of the late night arguments and wondering if your idea could ever possibly work and trying to figure out why you\'re purportedly amazing product just isn\'t growing. 他們把注意力集中在火箭上，瘋狂地試圖購買更多的服務器容量，而不是深夜的爭論，想知道你的想法是否可行，并試圖找出為什么你所謂的驚人的產品只是沒有增長。 > And the thing is even the really successful startups go through this phase. 問題是，即使是真正成功的初創企業也經歷了這個階段。 > Like most people don\'t know this but drink that famous summer when Facebook moved out to Palo Alto. 像大多數人一樣，當 Facebook 搬到 PaloAlto 的時候，大家都不知道這一點，但是喝了那個著名的夏天。 > There were other people living in that same house who were working on different startup ideas like Facebook. 還有一些人住在同一棟房子里，他們在研究不同的創業理念，比如 Facebook。 > The most successful technology company started in the 21st century. 最成功的科技公司始于 21 世紀。 > The right to pass IBM in market cap. 有權通過 IBM 的市值。 > And that summer it wasn\'t sort of so obvious there was the most promising thing that people were certain they should they should go pursue that. 而那年夏天，并不是很明顯，最有希望的事情是，人們確信他們應該去追求這個目標。 > Even six months into the company\'s history. 甚至在公司成立六個月后。 > The stripe is obviously very different to both Facebook and urban bee and I definitely can\'t compare ourselves to them. 這條紋顯然與 Facebook 和城市蜜蜂非常不同，我絕對不能將自己與他們相比。 > But now that we\'ve gone through at least a small bit of growth I want to sort of try to describe how it actually works and felt from our perspective. 但是現在我們至少經歷了一點成長，我想試著從我們的角度來描述它是如何運作和感覺的。 > So in October 2009 John and I were walking home from dinner in San Francisco. 所以在 2009 年 10 月，約翰和我在舊金山吃完晚飯步行回家。 > We\'d been kicking around this idea of starting an online payments company. 我們一直在考慮創建一家在線支付公司的想法。 > We\'re sort of fascinated by developer tools and internet infrastructure and other online companies handling payments just seemed to be sort of complete dinosaurs. 我們對開發工具、互聯網基礎設施和其他處理支付的在線公司有點著迷，這似乎是完全的恐龍。 > And as the web sort of spread around the world and more deeply into our lives with mobile devices it seemed obvious there should be some kind of universal Peanut\'s platform for the Internet. 隨著網絡在世界各地的傳播，并通過移動設備深入到我們的生活中，似乎很明顯，應該有某種通用的花生互聯網平臺。 > `[00:05:19]` It would be really easy to transact online. `[00:05:19]` 網上交易真的很容易。 > And so John turned to me and we\'re just walking along and he said let\'s just do it. 于是約翰轉向我，我們只是走在一起，他說，我們就這么做吧。 > It won\'t be that hard and they won\'t take that long. 不會那么難的，他們也不會花那么長時間。 > He actually said that. 他其實是這么說的。 > And I said Alridge will give it a shot to backtrack a little bit here. 我說艾里奇會給它一個機會讓它在這里回溯一點。 > So you see these slides work like I mentioned Johns my co-founder it\'s right. 你看，這些幻燈片就像我提到的約翰，我的聯合創始人，它是對的。 > And he\'s also my brother. 他也是我弟弟。 > And so people often ask me about how this works out in practice. 所以人們經常問我這在實踐中是如何運作的。 > And so for the record starting a company with your brother turns out to be a very good idea and that John\'s not only one of the more brilliant people I know but he\'s also someone with whom I I\'ve literally decades of experience building things. 因此，正式地說，與你的兄弟創辦一家公司是一個非常好的主意，約翰不僅是我認識的最聰明的人之一，而且他也是一個我和他一起工作了幾十年經驗的人。 > And. 和 > You know when when companies go through sort of these these super high growth periods is often said of all kinds of co-founder tension and arguments and it\'s very common that there\'s co-founder departures and so forth. 你知道，當公司經歷這種超高速增長時期時，人們常說到各種共同創始人的緊張和爭論，而共同創始人的離職等等，這是非常普遍的現象。 > And again John and I have had all these arguments we just got to have them in three or four in five say it\'s October 2009 and we decide to work on this online payments company. 再一次，約翰和我有過所有這些爭論，我們只需要讓他們在三四分之一的時間，比方說是 2009 年 10 月，我們就決定在這家在線支付公司工作。 > We decided to call it an awesome name slash dev slash payments. 我們決定叫它一個很棒的名字，斜杠，開發，削減付款。 > So the idea was that the API should be just as straightforward as anything else in dev that. 因此，我們的想法是，API 應該像開發中的其他任何東西一樣簡單明了。 > `[00:06:33]` It\'s great. `[00:06:33]` 太棒了。 > You know we\'re better at producing the naming things at least but everyone else have been treating online payments as something that you know finance people should care about and targeted their products. 你知道，至少我們更善于制作點名的東西，但其他人都把在線支付當作人們應該關心并瞄準自己產品的東西。 > CFO foes in business people and their site looks like this. 首席財務官的敵人在商界人士和他們的網站看起來像這樣。 > No actually I took the screenshot this morning because a lot of sites haven\'t changed and we thought the internet was moving in a different direction and so we decided to target makers the people actually creating things. 不，實際上，我今天早上拍了截圖，因為很多網站都沒有改變，我們認為互聯網正朝著不同的方向發展，所以我們決定把目標對準那些真正創造東西的人。 > Basically we thought that payments on the Internet was a technology problem and in particular that sort of it was much more that you could do for users. 基本上，我們認為互聯網上的支付是一個技術問題，尤其是這類問題，你可以為用戶做更多的事情。 > There was much of value that you could create than just because of a basic electrical outlets. 有很多的價值，你可以創造，不只是因為一個基本的插座。 > To the credit card networks. 信用卡網絡。 > `[00:07:14]` And so we wanted to build a completely new stack for anyone starting a business online. `[00:07:14]` 所以我們想為任何在網上創業的人建立一個全新的堆棧。 > And so we worked nights and weekends. 所以我們晚上和周末都工作。 > We were at university in the States at the time I was at MIT and John was just up the road from me at Harvard and so we\'d code together in the evenings between writing or doing problems and writing papers and all the usual stuff. 當我在麻省理工學院的時候，我們在美國的大學里，約翰就在哈佛大學的路上，所以我們在晚上一起寫或寫問題，寫論文和所有平常的東西。 > January rolls around January 2010 which in Boston is of course unbelievably freezing. 2010 年 1 月前后轉，這在波士頓當然是令人難以置信的寒冷。 > And so John and I decide to go somewhere else to work for the month and we\'d read a few blog posts that described when as IRAs as a really great place to get things done because it\'s cheap it\'s warm it\'s friendly. 因此，約翰和我決定去其他地方工作一個月，我們讀了一些博客文章，把 IRAs 描述為一個非常好的地方來完成工作，因為它很便宜，很溫暖，很友好。 > `[00:07:49]` There\'s Wi-Fi everywhere. `[00:07:49]` 到處都是 Wi-Fi。 > Nobody has dinner until really late. 直到很晚才能吃晚飯。 > Bars are open to 5:00a.m. 酒吧營業時間是早上 5 點。 > and nothing starts before noon. 中午之前什么都不會開始。 > So like basically it\'s an entire city on a programers schedule. 從根本上說，這是一座整座城市，都在編劇的日程安排中。 > So John and I went there and we worked nonstop for three weeks. 所以約翰和我去了那里，我們不停地工作了三個星期。 > I\'ve still never seen any of the tourist attractions in the city. 我還沒見過這個城市的任何旅游景點。 > We just coated in cafes all day and then stopped for dinner at around 11 o\'clock. 我們在咖啡館里穿了一整天的衣服，然后在 11 點左右停下來吃晚飯。 > So really I can\'t emphasize this enough. 所以我怎么強調都不為過。 > If you want to get something done think up on his IRAs. 如果你想做點什么，想想他的 IRAS。 > And then on January 9th slashed sluff payments got its first production user. 然后，在 1 月 9 日，削減垃圾支付得到了它的第一個生產用戶。 > And now this was only a couple weeks after we\'d started working on it but we really wanted to have production users shaping the product as early as possible. 現在，這僅僅是我們開始工作的幾個星期后，但我們真的想讓生產用戶盡快塑造產品。 > FUSA was a friend of ours and here\'s a screenshot of what their payments looked like at the time. Fusa 是我們的朋友，這里是他們當時付款的截圖。 > And as you can see we\'re also definitely designers. 正如你所看到的，我們也絕對是設計師。 > But okay. 但是好吧。 > Now when user laughter. 現在當用戶大笑。 > There\'s this story at Amazon about how they celebrated when they got their first buyer who wasn\'t any of their moms. 亞馬遜有這樣一個故事：當第一個買家不是他們的媽媽時，他們是如何慶祝的。 > And so in our case the user wasn\'t our mom but he was a good friend. 因此，在我們的例子中，用戶不是我們的媽媽，但他是一個好朋友。 > `[00:08:52]` And so you know we weren\'t out of the woods. `[00:08:52]` 所以你知道我們并沒有脫離險境。 > And so this is. 所以這就是。 > Every two or three months and. 每兩三個月。 > Then we went back to school and we continued to work on debt payments and spare time. 然后我們回到了學校，我們繼續努力償還債務和業余時間。 > There was one cafe I worked out of so much that I think I\'m so Facebook friends with most of the Breece does. 有一家咖啡館是我工作得如此之多，以至于我覺得我和布里斯的大多數人都是臉書上的朋友。 > Strike. 罷工。 > `[00:09:08]` You as a slightly unusual company right. `[00:09:08]` 你是個有點不尋常的人，對吧。 > We\'re about technology but also I\'d finance you sort of spanned these two industries and the technology side requires obviously you know really good reliability and Kirei eyes and a good product. 我們是關于技術的，但我也會資助你跨越這兩個行業，而技術方面顯然需要很好的可靠性和 Kirei 眼睛和一個好的產品。 > And all these things. 還有所有這些事。 > But the payment side requires working with banks and credit card companies and generally handling sort of a slew of finance industry issues that we definitely have hadn\'t previously encountered until to a lot of meetings where I just sat down with somebody like. 但在支付方面，需要與銀行和信用卡公司合作，通常需要處理一系列金融業問題，這些問題我們以前肯定從未遇到過，直到很多會議上，我才與像這樣的人坐下來。 > Payments you know how does it work. 你知道它是怎么工作的。 > And programmers often and I think it is unfortunate to have looked down on people who are learning to code in order to do a startup you know the sort of high I want to learn rails for my web startup crowd. 程序員經常-我認為很不幸的是-看不起那些為了創業而學習代碼的人-你知道，我想為我的網絡創業人群學習 Rails。 > But actually a lot of sympathy for them because we were that budget and finance. 但事實上，我們對他們非常同情，因為我們是那樣的預算和財政。 > And. 和 > So summer came around and we\'re now six or seven months in and we moved out to Palo Alto. 所以夏天來臨了，我們已經過了六七個月，我們搬到了帕洛阿爾托。 > We hadn\'t yet decided to take leave from school. 我們還沒有決定離開學校。 > And here I briefly want to mention that sort of speaking as somebody who moved from the British Isles to theU.S. 在這里，我想簡單地提一下，作為一個從不列顛群島搬到美國的人所說的話。 > for a startup and I highly recommend this path in that the visa pains are just as bad as everyone talks about but. 對于一家初創公司，我強烈推薦這條路，因為簽證的痛苦和大家談論的一樣糟糕，但是。 > I think it\'s still a net worth it and there\'s a lot of discussion about whether you need to be in the valley or not or whether you can start a company other places. 我認為它仍然是一個凈值，并有很多討論，你是否需要在山谷，或你是否可以在其他地方開辦公司。 > But from my perspective at least I think that kind of misses the point a little bit in that it is definitely empirically we see it we see it be the case everyday that it\'s possible to create an amazing company outside of the valley. 但至少從我的角度來看，我認為這種觀點有點漏洞百出，因為從經驗上看，我們每天都能在山谷之外創建一家令人驚嘆的公司。 > But really the question is you know place maximizes your chance of success and at least again speaking as somebody who\'s made this move. 但真正的問題是，你知道地方最大限度地增加了你的成功機會，至少是作為一個做出這一舉動的人。 > I think I think about it does that. 我想就是這樣。 > Bring me back to Paul Balto. 帶我去見保羅·巴爾托。 > We\'ve found a tiny bungalow in the living room and the kitchen became the office and it was really hot but we didn\'t have any air conditioning. 我們在客廳里找到了一間小平房，廚房變成了辦公室，天氣很熱，但我們沒有空調。 > And so John took to sleeping in the garden most nights. 所以約翰大多數晚上都睡在花園里。 > And I couldn\'t find a photo of that. 我找不到那張照片。 > And by and large we just kept on writing code. 總的來說，我們只是繼續編寫代碼。 > That\'s mostly what the early days of starting a software company looks like. 這主要是軟件公司成立初期的樣子。 > Because anything that isn\'t trash or talking to your users is probably a waste of time. 因為任何不是垃圾或與用戶交談的東西都可能是浪費時間。 > Here\'s a chart of our transaction volume. 這是我們交易量的圖表。 > Over the first six months. 在前六個月里。 > And so you know that that\'s not a technical error. 所以你知道這不是技術上的錯誤。 > The numbers just really aren\'t all that big. 數字真的沒那么大。 > If you look really close but sure it\'s high enough resolution and you sort of see a weekly line at the bottom. 如果你看起來真的很近，但確定它足夠高的分辨率，你會看到每周的底線在底部。 > But I\'m not Riggleman very much so around this time we had our first person join. 但是我不是瑞格曼，所以這一次我們有了第一個加入的人。 > Me now based in Silicon Valley we have access to all the global talent. 我現在硅谷，我們可以接觸到所有的全球人才。 > That\'s one of the best parts about it. 這是它最好的部分之一。 > And so of course we hired Dara Butley who is a friend of mine from college who also grew up in Limerick in Ireland and. 當然，我們雇傭了達拉·布特利，他是我大學里的朋友，也是在愛爾蘭的利默里克長大的。 > We also raised our first real investment from PeterT.O and up to then we hadn\'t told many people about debt payments and those we had told he\'d reactivate telling us there were kind of crazy. 我們還從 PeterT.O 籌集了我們的第一筆真正的投資，到那時為止，我們還沒有告訴很多人償還債務的事情，而那些我們告訴他會重新啟動的人告訴我們，這是一種瘋狂的行為。 > But luckily Peter Taylor is crazy. 但幸運的是彼得·泰勒瘋了。 > And so it was really helpful to get him on board. 所以讓他上船真的很有幫助。 > Soon after that he was into our first office that looks something like this and Prezi actually been a house and it had this wonderful fireplace and so we stretched some of the workplace fire codes but generally we were just still working non-stop and we heard someone else. 在那之后不久，他進入了我們的第一間辦公室，看起來像這樣，而 Prezi 實際上是一棟房子，那里有一個很棒的壁爐，所以我們伸展了一些工作場所的防火代碼，但總的來說，我們還在不停地工作，我們聽到了其他人的聲音。 > His name was Greg. 他叫格雷格。 > I remember sort of he came out to spend a weekend with us before he decided whether we\'re going to join or not it was a weekend long interview and I remember him asking the sort of you know what our work schedule was like and whether we took weekends off and at the time we didn\'t take weekends off. 我記得在他決定我們是否要參加之前，他出來和我們共度了一個周末-這是一個周末長的面試。我記得他問過，你知道我們的工作日程是什么樣子的，我們是否周末休息，而在我們沒有休周末假的時候。 > Obviously working all the time but I sort of didn\'t want to scare him away right. 很明顯，我一直在工作，但我不想把他嚇跑。 > And so I said something like Well you know we usually work at the weekend. 所以我說了這樣的話，你知道，我們通常在周末工作。 > We don\'t expect other people to. 我們不希望別人這么做。 > We believe in work life balance whatever we sort of cut me off because I just want make sure they\'re on the same page and working all the time so we need to fit in. 我們相信工作和生活之間的平衡，因為我只想確保他們在同一頁上工作，所以我們需要適應。 > We did decide to change our name. 我們確實決定改名。 > I can\'t even begin to list the problem is the payments had somehow it turned out that not everyone immediately got the depth of fast analogy and we said we\'d start to get mail with names like this and stuff. 我甚至不能開始列出問題在于，如果事實證明不是每個人都立即得到了快速類比的深度，我們就會開始收到像這樣的名字之類的郵件。 > And then there is. 然后就有了。 > And then there is the kind of inconvenient fact that Amazon did indeed an online payments product called Amazon Deathday. 還有一個令人不快的事實，那就是亞馬遜確實開發了一款名為“亞馬遜死亡日”的在線支付產品。 > So we figured it just wasn\'t going to work out. 所以我們覺得這是不可能的。 > We brainstormed names and you know we really couldn\'t think of a good one. 我們集思廣益，你知道我們真的想不出一個好名字。 > And so it eventually came down to choosing between stripe and Page Daemon and we couldn\'t figure out which of these was a better name and so we decided that if we couldn\'t make up our minds by I think it was December 15th 2011 we just default stripe and December 15th came along and we couldn\'t we couldn\'t choose between them and so strike twice. 所以我們最終還是選擇了條紋和頁面守護進程，我們不知道哪一個名字更好，所以我們決定如果我們不能下定決心的話，我想是 2011 年 12 月 15 日，我們只是默認了條紋，12 月 15 日出現了，我們無法在兩者之間做出選擇，所以我們決定，如果我們不能做出決定的話，那就是 2011 年 12 月 15 日，我們只能選擇兩次。 > And I actually read them a few months after that. 幾個月后我就讀到了。 > This is apparently how Apple came up with its name. 很明顯，這就是蘋果想出名字的方式。 > They couldn\'t think of a word and so there was the same like deadline day strategy. 他們一個字都想不出來，所以有著同樣的截止日期策略。 > Anyway. 不管怎么說。 > So we reached the end of our first year and we\'re now going to four people. 所以我們到了第一年的最后一年，現在我們要找四個人。 > A couple of white startups that started had started using Stripe. 幾家剛起步的白色初創公司已經開始使用 Stripe。 > So that was good. 那就太好了。 > And here\'s our transaction volume looked like at the end of the first year. 這是我們第一年年底的交易量。 > So again still that is definitely quite a lot of work to do. 因此，這仍然是相當多的工作要做。 > We spent January of 2011 our one year anniversary in Rio de Janeiro and this is becoming a tradition. 2011 年 1 月，我們在里約熱內盧度過了一周年紀念，這正成為一種傳統。 > And Rio is anybody who\'s been there knows as when most beautiful cities in the world. 里約是任何一個曾經去過那里的人，就像世界上最美麗的城市一樣。 > And again we just took full advantage of it. 我們又一次充分利用了它。 > We were still in invite only private data this time and which meant there was indeed a fairly obvious way to grow faster namely launching and a friend refers to invite only private Boeta as like the baby blanket of startups. 這一次我們仍然只邀請私人數據，這意味著確實有一種增長更快的方式，也就是啟動，而一位朋友指的是只邀請私人的 Boeta，就像初創公司的嬰兒毯一樣。 > And I think that\'s about right. 我認為這是正確的。 > But I will say that the private beta period was really helpful to stripe. 但我要說的是，私人測試期確實對條紋很有幫助。 > Over a pullback I had saying that you should start out by making 100 users really happy rather than many more than that. 在退步過程中，我曾說過，你應該從讓 100 個用戶真正高興開始，而不是讓更多的用戶感到高興。 > Only a little bit happy. 只是有點高興。 > And so we really took this to heart and took advantage of our small number of users in order to listen as closely as we could to them. 所以我們真的把這件事牢記在心，利用我們為數不多的用戶，盡可能地傾聽他們的聲音。 > So not long after we launched the first version of stripe to a handful of people we had a Piedra duty as so we\'d get a call if the site was ever down. 所以不久之后，我們推出了第一個版本的條紋對少數人，我們有一個皮德拉的責任，因為我們會接到一個電話，如果網站曾經被關閉。 > Pretty standard. 相當標準。 > But then we realized that anytime anyone got an error of any sort. 但后來我們意識到，任何時候任何人都會犯任何錯誤。 > That\'s a pretty bad experience for them and it would make them really happy if we proactively reach out to them and fix the issue. 這對他們來說是一次非常糟糕的經歷，如果我們主動接觸他們并解決這個問題，他們會很高興的。 > So we changed our code so that anytime anyone got any error it would e-mail everyone at the company and then if they didn\'t immediately react. 因此，我們更改了代碼，以便任何人有任何錯誤時，都會給公司的每個人發電子郵件，如果他們沒有立即做出反應的話。 > Would also phone everyone and just go and fix it and I know what I really mean that like we said we\'d get out of bed if we had to. 也會打電話給每個人，去修理它，我明白我的意思，就像我們說的，如果我們必須的話，我們會起床的。 > We\'re basically never without a laptop and a means to tether. 我們基本上從來沒有筆記本電腦和拴住的手段。 > Here\'s a photo of Gregg fixing one of these is on our way to watch a movie. 這是格雷格修的照片，其中一張正在我們去看電影的路上。 > I think he still feels bitter about this user causing him to miss Twilight Breaking Dawn laughter. 我認為他仍然對這個用戶感到痛苦，這讓他錯過了“暮光之城”破曉“的笑聲。 > `[00:15:48]` We also realized that good thing Greg is out here. `[00:15:48]` 我們也意識到格雷格在這里是件好事。 > `[00:15:51]` We also realize that ending with an engineer is basically the best support experience possible right in that it\'s kind of frustrating have to go and like file a ticket or send an e-mail and you wonder do they actually enter the e-mails like this. `[00:15:51]` 我們還意識到，以工程師為結尾基本上是最好的支持體驗，因為它會讓人感到沮喪，比如提交一張罰單或發一封電子郵件，而你想知道他們是否真的像這樣輸入了電子郵件。 > We just added an open chatroom to our Web site where anyone could jump in and start asking questions. 我們剛剛在我們的網站上添加了一個開放的聊天室，任何人都可以跳進來問題。 > And so this ended up being much more productive for us too because you know we could ask clarifying questions and really figure out what the underlying issue was rather I to guess based on the user\'s initial description. 因此，這對我們來說也是更有效率的，因為你知道，我們可以問一些澄清的問題，并真正地找出根本的問題是什么，我可以根據用戶的初步描述來猜測。 > It was it was kind of good product developing for us. 對我們來說，這是一種很好的產品開發。 > And then we thought of course why stop there. 然后我們想到了為什么停在那里。 > And isn\'t it bad if somebody asks a question in our chat room and you know nobody\'s around to answer us. 如果有人在我們的聊天室問一個問題，而你知道周圍沒有人回答我們，那不是很糟糕嗎？ > And so we hooked that up to our other paging system so that if anyone didn\'t get an answer within 30 seconds it would just phone everyone. 所以我們把它連接到另一個尋呼系統上，如果 30 秒內沒有人得到答案，它只會給每個人打電話。 > And so you know our responsiveness at 3am improves substantially or quality of life deteriorated a bit. 所以你知道，我們在凌晨 3 點的反應能力有了很大的提高，或者生活質量有了一點下降。 > So you know those stright wasn\'t yet available to everyone. 所以你知道那些東西還不是每個人都能用的。 > We really tried to sort of turn up the dial on our users feedback and to force ourselves to really sensitive to sort of what they actually wanted into what their experience was like. 我們真的試著打開用戶反饋上的刻度盤，迫使我們自己對他們真正想要的東西非常敏感，讓他們的體驗變成什么樣。 > We had our users talking to us every waking hour. 我們讓我們的用戶在醒著的時候和我們交談。 > And thanks to this innovation also during our sleep. 多虧了這一創新，我們睡覺的時候也是如此。 > And. 和 > The other thing that kept us in data was the fact that we weren\'t just building sort of a thin software layer that we thought that sort of stripe should encompass everything from the API request to how the money ended up in your bank account and you wanted to build it defines the complete experience. 另一件讓我們保持數據的事實是，我們不只是在構建一個薄薄的軟件層，我們認為這類條帶應該涵蓋從 API 請求到資金如何進入您的銀行賬戶的所有內容，而您想要構建它定義了完整的體驗。 > And we want to be to do that scale. 我們想要達到這樣的規模。 > AndA.W. 還有。 > US and EU and so forth I think are really interesting innovations for this reason. 出于這個原因，我認為美國和歐盟等都是非常有趣的創新。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > And that easy YouTube works really well for someone with like a startup or a side project or whatever. 這個簡單的 YouTube 非常適合那些像創業公司或者附帶項目之類的人。 > But you can also be Netflix or Zynga or indeed Amazon itself and you can still run your systems on YouTube. 但你也可以是 Netflix 或 Zynga，甚至亞馬遜本身，你也可以在 YouTube 上運行你的系統。 > So we wanted to build that. 所以我們想建造它。 > But you know the the infrastructure for Internet commerce. 但你知道互聯網商業的基礎設施。 > Something as easy to start with protest something that would work for the largest companies in the world. 這件事很容易從抗議開始，這對世界上最大的公司是有好處的。 > So that meant working with really good banks. 所以這意味著要和非常好的銀行合作。 > But the problem is that banks and startups are kind of the business equivalent of oil and water. 但問題是，銀行和初創企業在某種程度上相當于石油和水。 > They just they really don\'t mix very well and it\'s quite hard to combine them. 他們只是-他們真的不能很好地混合-而且很難把他們結合起來。 > Into in theU.S. 進入美國。 > the best in the business was Wells Fargo the largest bank there by market cap. 業務中最好的是富國銀行(WellsFargo)，按市值計算，富國銀行是那里最大的銀行。 > But honestly it was pretty hard to get them to listen to us or even to return our e-mails or calls. 但老實說，很難讓他們聽我們的話，甚至很難回復我們的電子郵件或電話。 > I mean they price thug or some kind of strange like 4 1 9 scam right with Tiger instead of making money faster on the Internet from the comfort during home. 我的意思是，他們給暴徒定價，或者其他一些奇怪的東西，比如玩老虎的 419 騙局，而不是在家里舒適地在網上賺更快的錢。 > And so we asked a friend and I guess now a partner at ricey Jeff Raulston to help out. 所以我們請了一位朋友，我想現在是里奇的合伙人杰夫·拉斯頓來幫忙。 > Since he Prezi negotiated with record labels and we figured that if you could convince a record label to work with a startup you could basically talk anyone into anything. 因為他和唱片公司進行了談判，我們認為，如果你能說服唱片公司與一家初創公司合作，你基本上可以說服任何人做任何事情。 > And here\'s a picture of him on a conference call with Dara. 這是他和達拉在電話會議上的照片。 > And you might wonder why is he on the floor and he\'s on the floor because he\'s upstairs in our office in the upstairs had no furniture and he\'s upstairs because our office was also flooded at the time. 你可能會想，為什么他躺在地板上，而他卻躺在地板上，因為他在我們樓上的辦公室里，在樓上沒有家具，而他在樓上，因為當時我們的辦公室也被淹了。 > So this is a long story but this is just as a side note like a good example of what a startup often feels like where you\'re negotiating with your bank while your office is slowly filling with water. 因此，這是一個很長的故事，但這只是一個副詞，就像一個很好的例子，說明當你的辦公室慢慢充滿水的時候，你與銀行談判時的感覺。 > But thanks to the help of JAF and others we eventually did convince Wells Fargo to become one of our backhands. 但多虧了日航和其他人的幫助，我們最終說服了富國銀行成為我們的反手之一。 > And this meant moving all of our systems work on top of their platform and it was a few weeks of superintends work and this was the night of our first successful transaction. 這意味著把我們所有的系統都轉移到他們的平臺上，這是幾個星期的監督工作，這是我們第一個成功交易的夜晚。 > With John. 和約翰在一起。 > After that all nighter and. 在那之后一整晚。 > I want to show this stuff because I feel it in general. 我想展示這些東西，因為我總體上感覺到了。 > This is the sort of unglamorous part of a startup that people don\'t get to see all that much of right and that you really want something to work and lots of others think it\'s a bad idea and it\'s really hard and everything takes longer than you\'d like. 這是一家創業公司中那種平淡無奇的部分，人們看不出這么多正確的東西，而且你真的想要一些東西去工作，很多人認為這是個壞主意，它真的很難，每件事都比你想要的要花更長的時間。 > And you end up with like many late night discussions and sort of soul searching debates and there\'s no obvious end in sight and you\'re kind of constantly wondering whether it\'s actually a good idea or Amasia just go get a job at Google or something or you think maybe it is definitely a good idea. 最后，你會像很多深夜討論和靈魂探索的辯論一樣，看不到明顯的結局，你總是在想這到底是個好主意，或者阿馬西亞只是去谷歌找份工作，或者你認為這絕對是個好主意。 > But this kind of self-doubt. 但這種自我懷疑。 > Maybe I\'m just not the one to pull it off. 也許我不是那個成功的人。 > And the thing is like it doesn\'t really go away. 事情就像它并沒有真正消失。 > And no matter how successful you become you\'ll still have lots of doubts right. 不管你有多成功，你還是會有很多疑問的。 > Greg LeMond was the first American to win the Tour de France. 格雷格·萊蒙德是第一位贏得環法自行車賽冠軍的美國人。 > And I\'ve always liked his quote about it doesn\'t get easier. 我一直很喜歡他的話。 > And you just go faster. 你就跑得更快。 > So in our case we eventually sort of got the pieces in place. 因此，在我們的例子中，我們最終得到了一些零碎的東西。 > And we got to the point where a race launch we launched on the twenty ninth of September in 2011. 我們已經到了 2011 年 9 月 29 日啟動比賽的時候了。 > And so we\'ll soon celebrate our third birthday. 所以我們很快就要慶祝我們的三歲生日了。 > And. 和 > At that point stripey but in production use for I guess around 19 months or so and we\'ve been working on it fulltime for a year and three months. 在這一點上，條紋，但在生產中使用，我想大約 19 個月左右，我們已經為它全職工作了一年零三個月。 > We\'re 10 people and we launched fit other names in a tweet. 我們是 10 個人，我們在推特上發布了 FIT 其他名字。 > And by the end of the first year of our transaction volume looked like. 到了第一年年底，我們的交易量就像。 > And so it was kind of promising but launching finitely isn\'t a panacea. 因此，這是有希望的，但有限的推出并不是一種靈丹妙藥。 > But the signs were promising and we kept going and eventually after a couple years stripes starts then she started to become an overnight success. 但跡象是有希望的，我們繼續前進，最終在幾年后，條紋開始，然后她開始一夜之間的成功。 > And so it started school at the end of 2012. 所以它在 2012 年底開始上學。 > I showed this charge of our transaction volume up to that point and then back in November of last year. 我向大家展示了我們的交易量，直到那個時候，然后在去年 11 月。 > So I guess a year after that we tweeted this updated version so the blue part on the right is that of what had happened subsequently. 所以我想一年后，我們在推特上更新了這個版本，所以右邊的藍色部分是后來發生的事情。 > And here it really don\'t mean to kind of focus on the picture numbers right on that but mostly on this here. 在這里，它并不意味著把注意力集中在圖片的數字上，而主要集中在這里。 > It just takes so long for these things. 這些事情花了這么長時間。 > I mean even if you\'re onto something. 我是說即使你發現了什么。 > It takes a really long time for these things to start to work. 這些東西要花很長時間才能開始工作。 > We\'re 16 people on this day three years ago and we\'re now 150 people. 三年前的今天，我們是 16 個人，現在是 150 人。 > This is a photo from our all hands meeting just two days ago. 這是兩天前我們全體會議的照片。 > And. 和 > Thousands of companies using Stripe this week like the Guardian and Virgin and Ted and Reddit Salesforce Udacity. 本周，成千上萬家使用 Stripe 的公司，如“衛報”、“維珍”、“泰德”和“Reddit Salesforce Udacity”。 > But you know part of what\'s funny about doing it is that there\'s tons of companies that you know. 但你知道，這么做的一部分有趣之處在于，你知道有很多公司。 > People might not be as familiar with that are doing really cool things like form labs. 人們可能對此并不熟悉，因為他們正在做一些很酷的事情，比如表單實驗室。 > The first high resolution desktop 3D printer and Larry Lessig used stripe to do a crowdfunding campaign back a couple of weeks ago maybe. 也許幾周前，第一臺高分辨率桌面 3D 打印機和拉里·萊西格(LarryLessig)用條紋進行了一次眾籌活動。 > But you guys saw this made one thing they\'re trying to create a new pact to reduce the importance of money inU.S. 但是你們看到了這件事，他們試圖創造一個新的契約來降低金錢在美國的重要性。 > politics. 政治。 > `[00:22:03]` My heroine recently is Borro my doggy is Airblue and B for dogs right here in London. `[00:22:03]` 我最近的女主角是博羅，我的狗是 AirBlue，B 是倫敦這里的狗。 > And so when I was a call that the Thomas Soyer fence painting strategy with four dogs and. 所以當我呼吁托馬斯·索耶用四只狗作畫策略的時候。 > `[00:22:18]` Then no one here ever looked at the history of of container shipping. `[00:22:18]` 那么這里沒有人看過集裝箱運輸的歷史。 > And it was a bit of context for a trim dog walking. 這是一個修剪過的狗散步的背景。 > The shipping container. 集裝箱。 > The most mundane thing in the world and it\'s actually only about 60 years old before shipping containers in the early 1950s. 這是世界上最平凡的事情，實際上，在 20 世紀 50 年代早期，在集裝箱裝運之前，它只有大約 60 年的歷史了。 > Transportation costs accounted for about 25 percent on average of the final cost of a physical product. 運輸成本在實物產品的最終成本中約占 25%。 > And transportation costs amounted to 10 percent of the value ofU.S. 運輸成本相當于美國價值的 10%。 > imports. 進口品。 > And so you think about that right. 所以你要好好想想。 > And if your product is a margin of 20 percent on average just transporting it to another market cuts your profit in half. 如果你的產品平均利潤率為 20%，僅僅把它運到另一個市場，你的利潤就會減少一半。 > And so unsurprisingly manufacturing tended to happen pretty close to our goods were sold. 因此，毫不奇怪的是，制造業往往發生在與我們的商品銷售相當近的地方。 > To them then the shipping container invented in the mid 50s essentially eliminated the cost of shipping physical goods and reduce the cost of loading and unloading ships by about 95 percent. 對他們來說，50 年代中期發明的集裝箱基本上消除了運輸實物貨物的成本，使裝卸船舶的成本降低了大約 95%。 > And it\'s now to the point where there is actually quoting from aU.S. 現在已經到了引用美國的地步了。 > government report. 政府報告。 > And it\'s better to assume that moving goods is essentially costless. 更好的假設是貨物運輸基本上是無成本的。 > So this technological breakthrough you the elimination of friction and sort of abstraction over geography played an enormous role in enabling the rise of Singapore and South Korea Japan Taiwan China and various other manufacturing hubs. 因此，這一技術突破-消除摩擦和對地理的抽象-對新加坡和韓國、日本、中國臺灣和其他各種制造業中心的崛起起到了巨大的推動作用。 > And so my point here is that a good technology doesn\'t just sort of monetize itself. 因此，我的觀點是，一個好的技術并不僅僅是一種賺錢的方式。 > But in addition facilitates further structural changes in the shipping container basically reshape the world\'s economy. 但除此之外，還推動了航運集裝箱結構的進一步變化，基本上重塑了世界經濟。 > So we sometimes describe how we\'re doing with stripe as building economic infrastructure for the Internet. 因此，我們有時會描述我們是如何為互聯網建設經濟基礎設施的。 > I\'m very flashy and but for most of human history we\'ve sort of had to transact with people beside us. 我非常浮華，但在人類歷史的大部分時間里，我們不得不與身邊的人打交道。 > And now thanks to the Internet there\'s the potential for that to no longer be true with a new way to abstract or replace anybody you can in principle build a global business. 現在，由于互聯網的存在，用一種新的方式抽象或取代任何你原則上可以建立全球業務的人，這種可能性就不再存在了。 > But you know the Internet has already done a lot to sort of revolutionize how we communicate and how we collaborate and we share we\'ve only sort of started to explore how it can change what we create and how we transact and what kinds of businesses are possible. 但你知道，互聯網已經為我們的交流方式和協作方式帶來了很大的變革，我們只是開始探索它如何改變我們的創造和交易方式，以及什么樣的業務是可能的。 > You know the other companies whose founders are speaking today are are good examples. 你知道，其他創始人今天發言的公司就是很好的例子。 > And so with stripe we want to turn Internet payments into a ubiquitous utility. 因此，帶著條紋，我們想把互聯網支付變成一種無處不在的公共事業。 > Stuart Butterfield in a really good blog post a couple months ago called innovation the some of the changes across the system. 斯圖爾特·巴特菲爾德在幾個月前發表的一篇很好的博客文章中稱創新是整個系統的一些變化。 > And so we want our innovation to be more commerce and the Internet no more people starting businesses and those businesses operating more efficiently and more flexibly. 因此，我們希望我們的創新是更多的商業和互聯網，而不是更多的創業人員和那些更有效率和更靈活運作的企業。 > We want to increase the GDP of the Internet. 我們想增加互聯網的國內生產總值。 > But it still is super early days. 但現在還太早。 > And in reality the vast majority of the time we\'re really not thinking about those problems were trying to figure out how to decrease the load on some database or some server has exploded somewhere or we\'re trying to get some particular design just right. 而在現實中，我們實際上并沒有考慮這些問題，而是試圖找出如何減少某個數據庫或服務器的負載，或者我們試圖得到一些正確的設計。 > Or you know we\'re wondering if some new product is actually a good idea or an otter. 或者你知道我們在想新產品到底是個好主意還是水獺。 > I mean it\'s all the usual stuff. 我是說這是所有平常的事情。 > We\'re having debates that overflow G mails thread. 我們的辯論充斥著 G 郵件線。 > And you become a completely new thread. 你就變成了一個全新的線索。 > But honestly. 但說實話。 > That\'s how it goes at a startup. 創業就是這樣的。 > And you know speaking now for years in I\'m not sure I\'d want to be any different. 你知道，多年以來，我都不確定我是否想要與眾不同。 > Thank you. 謝謝。