# Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016 > `[00:00:04]` So up next needs no introduction. I\'ll give a very quick one. Reid Hoffman has been. Yeah there\'s a round of applause. Applause You know what it sounds like you know who he is. I\'ll skip the introduction. All right. For the first question. `[00:00:04]` 所以下一個不需要介紹。我會給你一個非常快的答案。里德？霍夫曼是的。是的，有一輪的掌聲。掌聲，你知道他是誰。我跳過介紹。好吧。第一個問題。 > `[00:00:21]` Tell us something you believe to be true that very few people agree with you on. `[00:00:21]` 告訴我們一些你認為是真的，很少有人同意你的觀點。 > `[00:00:26]` Well this room actually may actually agree with us but I think this is when you count the Globe The Globe The Globe. That question always has to be indexed against the population. But I would I would say is that we have an extremely high likelihood that within the next 50 to 100 years that we create another cognitive speciese.g. a species with a similar kind of or better cognitive abilities than we do people in this room normally tend to think that\'s artificial intelligence. But actually I think it\'s a jump ball between that and a different version of the homogeneous we\'re in actually relatively interesting and unique period by which homosapiens is the only part of the homogeneous because there was Florences and Neanderthal and so forth and when you consider longer timeframe is actually 40 50000 years ago is actually not that long ago. So I think we\'re gonna do that and it\'s conditioned upon Are there particular breakthroughs inA.I. which I think there is still some invention and magic to get a truly generalisedA.I. which may or may not happen quickly if it does than is likely if it doesn\'t then the homogeneous is likely just for fun and you don\'t have to answer this if you don\'t want but given that you made the point about indexing that question against the rest of the world and then many people in this room may agree with that although I would still but most don\'t. `[00:00:26]` 這個房間實際上可能同意我們的觀點，但我認為這是當你把地球計算在內的時候。這個問題必須始終與人口掛鉤。但我要說的是，我們極有可能在未來 50 至 100 年內創造另一個認知物種。一種比我們更有認知能力的物種通常會認為這是人工智能。但實際上，我認為這是一個跳躍球，在這和同質的不同版本之間，我們處于一個相對有趣和獨特的時期，在這個時期，同族是同質的唯一部分，因為有植物群和尼安德特人等等，當你考慮到更長的時間框架實際上是 40，50000 年前，實際上并不是很久以前。所以我認為我們要這樣做，這取決于人工智能中是否有特別的突破，我認為仍然有一些發明和魔法來實現真正的通用人工智能，如果這樣做的話，它可能會發生，也可能不會發生，如果不是，那么同質可能只是為了好玩，如果你不想的話，你不需要回答這個問題，但考慮到你想要的話，你不需要回答這個問題。提出了將這個問題與世界其他地方進行索引的觀點，然后在座的許多人可能會同意這一點，盡管我仍然同意，但大多數人不同意。 > `[00:01:54]` What is something that you believe that very few people in this room would agree with you on. `[00:01:54]` 你認為這個房間里很少有人會同意你的觀點。 > `[00:02:00]` Let\'s see in this room OK. Trying to index that I guess. `[00:02:00]` 讓我們在這間屋子里看看，好的，我想索引一下。 > `[00:02:12]` Well this might be they hadn\'t thought about it. I think that one of the things that\'s actually really important for inventing products is a fairly deep sense of a theory of human nature and humanity. And so I think that anyone who is inventing the kinds of products that we typically do you should actually in fact be able to articulate a relatively robust theory about what is human nature what is humanity like now and where is it going and how does your product or service fit into that. And that may not be so much they disagree as actually. Most people I talk to can\'t articulate a particular robust theory of human nature and that\'s one of the reasons why years back as you know I started saying this thing I invest in one or more of the seven deadly sins because I was trying to get people to think about what is actually in fact a kind of common human psychology and if you\'re trying to create a mass market consumer application what are the parts of how what it is to be human that you\'re actually triggering responding to us servingetc. `[00:02:12]` 嗯，這可能是他們沒有想過的。我認為，對于發明產品來說，真正重要的事情之一是對人性和人性的理論有相當深刻的理解。所以，我認為，任何發明我們通常做的產品的人，實際上應該能夠闡明一個相對強大的理論，關于什么是人的本性，什么是人性，人類現在是什么樣的，以及你的產品或服務是如何與之相適應的。事實上，這可能不是他們的意見分歧。與我交談的大多數人都無法闡明一個關于人性的強有力的理論，這也是為什么多年前我開始說這句話的原因之一，我投資于七宗罪中的一宗或多宗，因為我試圖讓人們思考什么實際上是一種共同的人類心理，如果你想創造出一種共同的人類心理。大眾市場上的消費者應用 > `[00:03:19]` That\'s a great answer that most people in this room don\'t think about that or don\'t agree it\'s important. So I want to talk about three main topics here. One is not the mistakes that people make when they start a company but the great things people do. Everyone worries about trying to avoid mistakes. That\'s not enough. You also have to do one thing really right. The second is how to raise money from Graylock and the third is how to scale up a company and when to start that. So let\'s start with the first. What are the things that you see entrepreneurs do. At the very beginning that are the opposite of mistakes that lead them to great results. `[00:03:19]` 這是一個很好的答案，這個房間里的大多數人都不考慮這個問題，或者不同意這一點很重要。所以我想在這里談三個主要的話題。一個問題不是人們在創業時所犯的錯誤，而是人們所做的偉大的事情。每個人都擔心如何避免錯誤。這還不夠。你還必須做一件非常正確的事。第二個問題是如何從格雷洛克那里籌集資金，第三個問題是如何擴大公司規模，以及何時開始這樣做。那么，讓我們從第一個開始。你看到企業家都做些什么。在一開始，這是相反的錯誤，導致他們偉大的結果。 > `[00:03:56]` So I think one of the let\'s see we could spend a whole half hour entirely on this but I\'ll try to do what I gave you three questions up front so you could allocate time. Yes. So one thing is build the strongest possible network around you and every single thing you\'re doing whether it\'s hiring whether it\'s getting investors whether it\'s who you\'re talking to about your company. Obviously Y C is a opportunity to generate a really strong network. And I think specifically in terms that it\'s not just like what do you think of the idea that\'s usually a weak question How can my idea be improved if my idea were to fail or my plan were to fail or my strategies fail. Why do you think it would fail. Right. Asking those kinds of questions I think another thing is to actually think about one of the challenges is it\'s awesome that we have gotten to such a massive entrepreneurial environment here. But for example breaking through the noise is really tricky so you actually have to really test and think about whether or not your idea will be sufficient to break through the noise. And so folks who really think about like some way that they can either you know grow on a particular platform or have a particular way that they can actually get good growth into their product is you know someone that sometimes has vitality. Sometimes CEOs sometimes other things. `[00:03:56]` 所以我想其中之一我們可以花半個小時在這上面，但是我會試著做我給你的三個問題，這樣你就可以分配時間了。是因此，有一件事是圍繞著你和你所做的每一件事建立最強大的網絡，不管是招聘，還是吸引投資者，不管你是在和誰談論你的公司。顯然，YC 是一個產生一個非常強大的網絡的機會。我特別認為，如果我的想法失敗了，或者我的計劃失敗了，或者我的策略失敗了，你會怎么看待這個通常是一個薄弱的問題呢？你為什么認為它會失敗。右（邊），正確的問這些問題，我認為另一件事是真正思考其中一個挑戰，那就是，我們在這里獲得了如此龐大的創業環境，真是太棒了。但是，例如，打破噪音是非常棘手的，所以你實際上必須真正測試和思考你的想法是否足以突破噪音。所以那些真正想要用某種方式來成長的人，或者你知道，在特定的平臺上成長，或者有一種特殊的方式，讓他們的產品得到良好的發展，你知道，有些人有時會有活力。有時是 CEO 有時是其他事情。 > `[00:05:25]` What are the early signs that an idea or particular product may be able to break through the noise. What do you look for when you\'re evaluating not because I think that is the critical thing but it\'s so hard to to really know. `[00:05:25]` 一個想法或特定產品能夠突破噪音的早期跡象是什么？當你進行評估時，你會尋找什么，而不是因為我認為這是關鍵的事情，但這很難真正知道。 > `[00:05:37]` Well obviously you know the obvious brain dead thing that everyone knows is once you see traction. You still have some questions How far does attraction go but that actually answers a bunch of those because you can study the actual like okay. Are people engaging or are they reengaging how did they discover it. And you can you can you can you can per thing you can deconstruct the answer to your question. The real challenging one is when you have the theories beforehand and the theories beforehand a little bit of that comes back to what I was saying in terms of a theory of human nature. You say OK why is it if it\'s viral why will the Big Rallies spread. Some of that\'s technique. But some of that\'s also it\'ll it will it will trigger a funny bone in some way and I wouldn\'t have looked at Pokémon Go and said well actually in fact this nostalgia thing will create a craze. I would have missed that. But I learned I along with lots of other people I downloaded and played with it immediately. OK how do I learn that pattern. What was the way that was fitting into people\'s identity. Why was this the thing that was creating something that literally spread through essentially what now did you get really into it. Well. Let me put this way I. It became a habitual thing that I would do during an Uber ride. I have no shame I\'ll just that I was one of those people for a couple of days like 3:00 in the morning my brothers and I would like to be out driving around Golden Gate Park trying to catch Pokemon dribble you know for me was when I got an uber pull it up and I go because you know you had advantage that someone else is driving you yelling at you can go through all the poka stops and everything else at a reasonably fast clip. And so the other thing is is is is there a principally protraction limit tuition consuming enterprise in consumer. The principal thing is there is actually an interestingly unique theory there\'s some kind of theory together with some understanding about how distribution works that you were applying. Like you say OK. I actually think people will send out the mass messages or send out emails or this will get indexed and search the falling way or people will actually in fact do the following activities which will cause it that people will discover this app site service and then that\'s a coherent theory. And that can sometimes be sufficient for doing it on the enterprise side. Actually sometimes clear mastery of traditional enterprise techniques is what matters right because actually in fact if you have a relatively high like a a good product in terms of what you could sell you can measure results you know your sales channel looks like a sales process can work effectively but those two things and the ability to pull them off are actually absolutely central to the things that you do right. The most classic problem Maju seen and I know you\'re toying with the success here but the classic problem is I\'ve got a cool idea where someone doesn\'t have a unique product and that\'s radically insufficient. You\'re making it just lucky whether or not in fact the distribution works. And these companies only grow to enough throw weight if they get to a point where they have enough distribution. So roughly speaking one of the rules of thumb that I use is if you don\'t if you don\'t see a path by which you\'re getting to 100 million a year in revenue and then have good growth after that you\'re not going to be a start. You have zero chance of being a stand alone tech company. `[00:05:37]` 很明顯，大家都知道，一旦你看到牽引力，就會有明顯的腦死亡。你仍然有一些問題，吸引力到底有多大，但這實際上回答了很多問題，因為你可以像好的那樣研究實際的事物。人們是在參與還是重新接觸他們是怎么發現的。每件事你都可以解構你的問題的答案。真正具有挑戰性的是，當你事先有了理論，而理論之前，有一點點回到了我所說的人性理論。你說，好的，為什么它是病毒，為什么大集會擴散。其中一些技巧。但其中的一些也會在某種程度上引發一根有趣的骨頭，我不會看“口袋妖怪圍棋”說，事實上，這種懷舊的東西會引發一股熱潮。我會錯過的。但我知道，我和很多其他人一起，我下載并立即與它玩。好的，我如何學習這個模式。什么樣的方式符合人們的身份。為什么這個東西創造了一些東西，從本質上講，你真正進入了它。井讓我這樣說吧。在優步搭車的過程中，這成了我習以為常的事情。我一點也不覺得羞恥，我只想在凌晨 3：00 這樣的幾天里，我和我的兄弟們一起在金門公園附近開車，試圖抓住口袋妖怪的運球，你知道的，當我把它拉起來的時候，我就走了，因為你知道你有其他人開車送你的優勢。對你大喊大叫，你可以在一個合理的快速剪輯，通過所有的波卡停止和其他一切。因此，另一件事是，在消費者中存在著一個主要限制學費消費的企業。最重要的是，實際上有一個有趣而獨特的理論就像你說的好。我實際上認為人們會發送大量信息或發送電子郵件，或者這個會被索引并搜索下落的方式，或者人們實際上會做以下的活動，這會導致人們發現這個應用站點服務，然后這是一個連貫的理論。這有時足以在企業方面做到這一點。事實上，對傳統企業技術的明確掌握有時才是最重要的，因為實際上，如果你有一個相對較高的產品，比如一個好產品，你可以衡量銷售結果，你知道你的銷售渠道看起來像一個銷售流程可以有效地工作，但這兩件事和成功的能力實際上對你所做的正確的事情來說是絕對重要的。馬庫看到的最經典的問題-我知道你在玩弄這里的成功-但經典的問題是，我有一個很酷的想法，那就是某人沒有獨特的產品，這根本是不夠的。不管分發是否有效，你都很幸運。而這些公司只有在達到足夠的分布點時才會有足夠的影響力。因此，粗略地說，我使用的經驗法則之一是，如果你看不到一條年收入達到 1 億美元的道路，那么在那之后，你就不會是一個開始了。你沒有機會成為一家獨立的科技公司。 > `[00:09:04]` Just continue on the maybe one more but then I do want to make sure we move on. `[00:09:04]` 也許再繼續吧，但我確實想確保我們繼續前進。 > `[00:09:07]` I was just thinking about so then the other things I think to do right are I think the key things are people who when when you\'re doing this as they fail fast point which is you\'re looking for the earliest possible proof to whether or not you\'re on the right track. It isn\'t that you\'re trying to fail but you actually hunting for the quickest and and and sometimes even argument evidence like for example when I was literally had the idea falling down I was going around and my friends going OK why won\'t this work. And the common pattern I was hearing is because in a network there is no value to you have a million people so no one\'s going to invite for the first million people. `[00:09:07]` 我只是在想，那么我認為應該做的其他事情是，我認為關鍵的事情是當你做這件事的時候，當他們失敗的時候，快速點，那就是，你在尋找盡可能早的證據來證明你是否在正確的軌道上。這并不是說你試圖失敗，而是你實際上是在尋找最快的、有時甚至是爭論的證據，比如，當我真的有了這樣的想法時，我就到處亂跑，而我的朋友們也很好，為什么不做這個工作呢？我聽到的常見模式是，在一個網絡中，有一百萬人是沒有價值的，所以沒有人會邀請第一個百萬人。 > `[00:09:52]` And the fact that I was that I knew that that was the thing that test that was the thing that I was essentially working on from day one to get to the minimum viable product in order to do that. `[00:09:52]` 而事實上，我知道這是測試的東西，這是我從第一天起就一直在研究的東西，為了達到這個目的，我得到了最低限度的可行產品。 > `[00:10:01]` Do you think that people give up too early related to that or at least they\'re looking at the wrong metrics. One of the things I see great founders do really well is not give up too early and it sounds simple but in this kind of culture of you know try something if it doesn\'t work fail fast stop. I do think you can lose a lot of great companies. `[00:10:01]` 你認為人們放棄得太早嗎？或者至少他們在考慮錯誤的衡量標準。我看到偉大的創始人做得很好的一件事就是不要太早放棄，這聽起來很簡單，但在這種文化中，你知道，如果失敗了，就試一試吧。我確實認為，你可能會失去許多偉大的公司。 > `[00:10:25]` So definitely you can and it isn\'t to try to pick. Like for example when I\'m talking entrepreneur the first time one of the things I test for is kind of what I what I call flexible persistence which is they\'ll both listen and hear the things I\'m saying. Questions and they will adopt. `[00:10:25]` 所以你當然可以，而且也不能嘗試挑選。例如，當我第一次談論企業家時，我所測試的其中一件事是我所說的“靈活堅持”，那就是他們都會聽和聽我說的話。問題就會被采納。 > `[00:10:45]` But think about it they\'ll respond they may be willing to consider that alter but then they also have conviction in their point of view. They have a theory of humanity a theory of distribution a theory of product that they go look I\'ve really thought through it and I think some really good stuff here and this is why it is. And if you don\'t have both you will almost certainly fail. And part of that is people\'s I\'ll just pivot my way there and learn or know have a deeply thought theory about what you\'re heading for And So Plan B frequently is not. Oh now I\'m doing something entirely different. Usually plans B or slight variations in tests. Will you do list your hypotheses about what it is you think you\'re going to. Why you you\'re going to win at the startup game. Then you start testing them part of a plan B is say well maybe hypothesis 3 isn\'t right but 3 prime is right and I can just shift a little bit of what I\'m doing this way and then it can work. And so like for example like one of the thoughts that we had very early and linked in is even though we made a very heavy debt on individuals as would we need to shift to enterprise and companies and groups as a possibility to make it work. It turned out that we needed to do that but that was okay as a Plan B. And I think that staying persistent ultimately really try it. You want to we\'re three points reducing your confidence before you really decide to pivot. `[00:10:45]` 但是想想看，他們會回應的，他們可能愿意考慮改變，但他們的觀點也有信心。他們有一個人性的理論，一個分配的理論，一個他們去看的產品理論，我已經仔細考慮過了，我認為這里有一些非常好的東西，這就是為什么。如果你沒有兩者，你幾乎肯定會失敗。這其中的一部分是，我會把我的方向轉向那里，學習或者知道一個關于你要去的東西的深思理論，所以 B 計劃經常不是。哦，現在我正在做一件完全不同的事情。通常計劃 B 或輕微的變化在測試。你會列出你的假設嗎？你認為你會做什么？為什么你會在創業游戲中獲勝。然后你開始測試他們，B 計劃的一部分是，假設 3 不對，但 3 素數是對的，我可以稍微改變一下我這樣做的方式，然后它就能工作了。例如，就像我們很早就想到的一個想法，即使我們欠了個人很重的債，我們也需要轉移到企業、公司和團體，作為一種可能，讓它發揮作用。事實證明，我們需要這樣做，但作為 B 計劃，這是可以的。我認為，堅持到底是真正的嘗試。你想讓我們在你真正決定轉向之前降低你的信心。 > `[00:12:07]` So in the interest of time let\'s move on to raising money. If I want to come raise money from Graylock. What can I do to be successful. What what is step one. And what is the last time before the check and everything in between. `[00:12:07]` 所以為了時間的考慮，讓我們繼續籌集資金吧。如果我想從格雷洛克那里籌到錢，我能做些什么才能成功。第一步是什么。支票之前的最后一次是什么，中間的一切都是什么。 > `[00:12:20]` So first and this is this is true for you know all top tier viss is much stronger off getting a referral right now. Y Combinator though. Well it\'s can be a referral from one of the partners combinators Y Combinator. But it\'s it\'s the here\'s why you should pay attention this. I probably get somewhere between 30 and 50 unsolicited decks in my email every working day. Right. And so it\'s kind of like okay. `[00:12:20]` 所以首先，這是事實，因為你知道，所有的頂級簽證都比現在得到推薦要強得多。不過是組合器。嗯，它可以是一個合作伙伴組合子 Y 組合子的推薦信。但這就是你為什么要注意這個問題的原因。我可能每個工作日都會收到 30 到 50 件未經邀請的郵件。是的。所以這是一種很好的選擇。 > `[00:12:50]` How many of us have you ever wondered. None that I\'m aware of. I mean sometimes what so the intro is really important. It was really important. Then who who counts as a good intro to you counts is a good intro is someone that I that I know and trust and respect. Right. So you have to guess that to some degree. But you know and here I\'ll throw you under the bus. Sam counts right. So that\'s one. `[00:12:50]` 你們中有多少人曾想過。據我所知沒有。我的意思是，有時候什么，所以介紹是非常重要的。真的很重要。那么，對你來說，誰是一個好的介紹，誰就是一個好的介紹，是一個我認識、信任和尊重的人。右（邊），正確的所以你必須在某種程度上猜到這一點。但是你知道，我會把你扔到公共汽車下面。薩姆數得對。那就是其中之一。 > `[00:13:21]` And the second is you know look again think of there\'s tons and tons of startups and your average every venture capital it looks at like 600 deals a year and funds between zero and two of them which means you\'re looking for something that is a little like your opening question you\'re looking for something is seriously unique right. You\'re looking for something that says look it doesn\'t have to be the only thing in its field although then it heads a bunch of things in its field why will this one be the one that will break through. Why will this one be the one that creates interesting company. But it\'s. No. OK. And so that\'s part of the reason why what I suggest to people who want to come talk to us is to say well what\'s the thing that either has suddenly opened up or the thing that makes your thing going to be very big when you when you realized there are thousands of startups now which is great but you know given you can fun between 0 2 and so for example in one of the ones I did the beginning of the year one called convoy which is essentially Uber for regional trucking. And actually that one took a bunch of work for me because there were a bunch of people doing that. Right. And I had to look through to see which one was the one to do because we can only do one. And what did that founder do to convince you that that was the one. Well first came in through through a great referral which is Hoddy Nyali Partovi right. Who had who had done a whole bunch of work and had chosen us. Second is in the discussion of literally in the very first discussion I got a very good sense that the that the Founders Dan and Grant understood the game in front of them they understood what the issues were they had thought about. Like for them when I pushed them about what the comparisons and thoughts with Uber were what was unique about this space why actually in fact this is a very different network than that a new were network. `[00:13:21]` 第二件事是，你要知道，再想想這里有無數的初創公司，平均每一筆風險投資每年大概有 600 筆交易，基金在 0 到 2 筆之間，這意味著你在尋找一些有點像你的開場白的東西，你在尋找一些非常獨特的東西，對吧？你正在尋找的東西，看，它不一定是唯一的東西，在它的領域，雖然它領導了許多事情在其領域，為什么這個將是一個突破。為什么這個人會創造一個有趣的公司。但是.否好的這也是為什么我建議那些想來和我們交談的人的原因之一，那就是，當你意識到現在有成千上萬家初創公司的時候，你想說的是什么東西突然打開了，或者讓你的事情變得很大，這是很棒的，但是你知道，你可以在 0 到 2 之間找到樂趣。舉個例子，在今年年初我做過的一次，一個叫車隊的車隊，本質上是用于區域卡車運輸的優步(Uber)。事實上，那個人為我做了大量的工作，因為有一群人這樣做。右（邊），正確的我必須看清楚哪一個是應該做的，因為我們只能做一個。那個創始人是怎么說服你的嗯，首先是通過一個偉大的推薦，這是霍迪尼亞利帕托維的權利。他做了大量的工作并選擇了我們。第二，在第一次的討論中，我有一個很好的感覺，開國元勛丹和格蘭特在他們面前理解游戲，他們明白他們所想的是什么問題。對他們來說，當我問他們優步和優步的比較和想法是什么，這個空間的獨特之處，為什么事實上，這是一個非常不同的網絡，而不是一個新的網絡。 > `[00:15:22]` What the challenges might be and they had actually thought about all of it doesn\'t mean that perfect answers it doesn\'t change but they had thought about it the way they were developing their product was in line with that thinking and they had a story and this is one of things that super important is like what is what. It\'s not to say you say I\'m like What\'s uncredible you say I\'m guaranteed to be successful I\'m coming in as a seed Series A and I\'m guaranteed to be successful and that either says to me that you\'re crazy because you don\'t actually understand the risk or you\'re lying to me. And both of those are not great outcomes from the viewpoint of a partnership. And so it\'s much better to say here in fact what I see the game in me here\'s what I think the risks are. Here\'s how I\'m addressing the risk. Here\'s how we\'re measuring and this is how I\'m doing. And by the way have confidence that I\'m going to succeed. Great. Perfect. So that ability to understand what the game is in front of you because then you\'ll you\'ll pass it the right way. I think it\'s very important to have an ability to have structured conversations early. It doesn\'t necessarily mean you have to have a deck some conversations. I have literally just Here\'s my set of beliefs that make me believe this Sharpe\'s a good idea. It\'s like a list of the investment theses the kinds of things that would say why it is this would be you know five to seven years from now this would be Air B and B this would be something that you would go oh my gosh this is a world changing company. Do you recommend the deck. `[00:15:22]` 挑戰可能是什么-他們實際上已經想過了所有的挑戰-并不意味著完美的答案不會改變，但他們對它的思考方式與他們開發產品的方式是一致的，他們有一個故事，這是非常重要的事情之一，就像什么是什么。這并不是說你說我是不可信的，你說我肯定會成功，我是作為種子系列 A 而來的，我保證會成功，這不是對我說你瘋了，因為你并不真正理解風險，或者你在騙我。從伙伴關系的角度來看，這兩者都不是很好的結果。所以在這里說更好，事實上，我在這里看到的就是我認為的風險。這是我如何應對風險的方法。這是我們測量的方法，我就是這樣做的。順便說一句，相信我會成功的。太棒了完美。所以你有能力理解你面前的游戲，因為這樣你就能正確地通過它。我認為有能力盡早進行結構化的對話是非常重要的。這不一定意味著你必須進行一些對話。我的信念讓我相信這個夏普是個好主意。這就像一張投資論文的清單，你知道為什么會這樣，從現在開始，這將是 B 航空公司，這將是你要去做的事情，哦，天哪，這是一家正在改變世界的公司。你推薦甲板嗎。 > `[00:16:55]` Wreck deck as a sort of PowerPoint. Yep. Generally speaking I think it\'s good to have at least a lightweight one and that\'s lightweight like 10 or 15 sides some basic. `[00:16:55]` 甲板作為 PowerPoint 的一種形式。是的。一般來說，我認為至少有一個輕量級的，這是好的，這是輕量級的，像 10 或 15 面，一些基本的。 > `[00:17:10]` Could `[00:17:10]` > `[00:17:10]` you just go quickly through that what what you expect to see in those slides. Like one of the main five or six critical topics. So I presume you guys point people to the linked in Series B deck that I published. We have but maybe not this audience so republished as linked in Series B deck and it\'s online and you should check it out. `[00:17:10]` 你很快就能在幻燈片上看到你期望看到的東西。就像五六個關鍵話題中的一個。所以我想你們應該把人們引向我出版的 B 系列的鏈接。我們有，但可能不是這樣的觀眾，所以重新出版的鏈接在 B 系列甲板和它是在線的，你應該看看它。 > `[00:17:28]` So `[00:17:28]` > `[00:17:28]` this is roughly speaking you should open with. Here\'s my here\'s here the hypotheses that back the investment thesis and that should be probably no more than seven bullets. Usually it\'s more than three but something that could be aid if it had to be. And then your slides are the backdrop of those bullets. Why is it you think you\'ll win at that. Right so for example you know there is actually a space for professional networks separate from a social one. It will stall this thing and people\'s lives you know that sort of thing is the kinds of things that are in it and they can get distributed through reality and we can we can solve the viral problem. Then I think you need to have something about like OK what\'s the mature business. It\'s a sketch look like it doesn\'t mean like oh here\'s my fake Excel revenue projections which anyone with a brain knows you can make these things look like anything but it\'s like. It\'s it\'s it\'s a oh we\'ll charging people like this. This is why the product will be good this is why we\'ll have good margins while we\'ll have a defensible position. This is why we\'ll be a big size and this is what we\'ll be growing right. And so for example that was one of the reasons why the pitch was really good from beginning is like well we\'re eBay for space and we\'re starting with travel and travel itself is huge and this is what the dynamics work in terms of opening up liquidity between host and traveler. Okay I get it right. That was one of the pitches little 2 minutes and you\'re like okay understand. And by the way you understood the risk then to the risk were like well Aschenbach people aren\'t used to this in opening your house and reserve trust and safety issue and is there a regulation issue and you know all these things but those are then these are known risks than working against to claim zero competition is usually not credible. Usually it\'s here\'s why The competition has a very different angle of attack than I do and this is why my angle of attack would work. And then you know kind of more or less like for example an early stage consumer companies why it is I think this is going to work. `[00:17:28]` 這大概是你該說的。這是我的，這是支持投資理論的假設，而這應該不超過七顆子彈。通常情況下，它會超過三個，但如果有必要的話，它是可以得到幫助的。然后你的幻燈片就是子彈的背景。為什么你認為你會贏。是的，例如，你知道，職業網絡實際上有一個空間，與社交網絡是分開的。它會拖住這件事，人們的生活-你知道，這類事情就是它里面的那種東西-他們可以通過現實得到分配，我們可以解決病毒的問題。那么，我認為你需要一些東西，比如好的，什么是成熟的業務。這是一個草圖，看起來不像，哦，這是我偽造的 Excel 收入預測，任何有頭腦的人都知道你可以讓這些東西看起來像任何東西，但它是一樣的。我們會像這樣向人收費。這就是為什么我們的產品將是好的，這就是為什么我們將有良好的利潤率，而我們將有一個辯護的立場。這就是為什么我們將成為一個大的規模，這就是我們將成長的方向。舉個例子，這就是為什么從一開始就很好的原因之一，就像我們是太空的 eBay，我們從旅行開始，旅行本身是巨大的，這就是在開放主機和旅行者之間的流動性方面的動力作用。好吧我弄好了。那是其中的一個投球，2 分鐘，你就會感覺很好，明白嗎。順便說一句，你理解了風險，那么對風險的理解就像阿申巴赫，人們在打開你的房子、保留信任和安全問題上不習慣這樣做，是否存在監管問題，而且你知道所有這些事情，但這些都是已知的風險，而不是聲稱零競爭通常是不可信的。通常情況下，這就是為什么競爭對手的進攻角度和我完全不同，這也是為什么我的進攻角度會起作用的原因。然后你就會知道，這多少有點像早期的消費公司，為什么我認為這會奏效。 > `[00:19:37]` And then can you give us a little bit of sense of how you think about terms what terms are important to venture firm to an entrepreneur and what a series they might look like. `[00:19:37]` 然后，你能給我們一點感覺嗎？你如何看待術語-什么條件對創業公司很重要，以及它們可能是什么樣的系列。 > `[00:19:47]` So to a venture firm part of the key thing is there\'s a big difference in Angels and ventures. Angel can invest in a wide variety of things they don\'t actually commit to doing that much. They do commit to doing a little bit of help but not that much help venture folks commit to. I\'m with the company more or less until it gets to port or not. I can only do really. It\'s very rare that you can do that a firm can do ones that are competitive so I can only do one of the space and I\'m going to throw a bunch of resources behind it. You know Andreessen Horowitz we other folks have like great recruiting practices a number of things like that as a way of doing it like a Graylock Our thing is we help people in companies find an engineer. Every other every alternative day during the year and that\'s you know that\'s a pretty good flow. And so typically the best way to do it is very clean. Terms have have either one or at most two leads two leads tends to be more on the enterprise side than the consumer. Somebody who is really going to roll up their sleeves and work with you. That usually gets for venture to a certain percentage typically. And it\'s actually not it\'s not an artificial number. Most targeted to 20 percent or greater ownership because when they look at when they do their models of what their baskets of ownership are on exits if they have north of 20 percent then they can make fun multiples work. And so that\'s the reason why that\'s the target. `[00:19:47]` 所以對一家風投公司來說，關鍵的部分是天使和冒險有很大的區別。安琪爾可以在各種各樣的事情上進行投資，他們實際上并沒有承諾做那么多事情。他們確實致力于做一點幫助，但沒有那么多的幫助，風險投資者承諾。我或多或少地和這家公司在一起，直到它到達港口。我只能做真的。這是非常罕見的，你可以這樣做，一家公司能做的是有競爭力的，所以我只能做一個空間，我將投入大量的資源在它背后。你知道，安德烈森·霍洛維茨，我們其他人都喜歡很棒的招聘實踐，有很多這樣的做法，就像格雷洛克一樣，我們的問題是幫助公司里的人找到一名工程師。一年中的每一天，每隔一天，你都知道這是一種很好的流動。因此，通常情況下，最好的方法是非常干凈。術語要么有一個，要么最多有兩個線索，往往更多的是企業一方，而不是消費者。一個真正要卷起袖子和你一起工作的人。通常情況下，風險投資會達到一定的比例。它實際上不是，它不是一個人工數字。大多數目標是 20%或更高的所有權，因為當他們看到他們的模型時，他們的所有權籃子在出口，如果他們有 20%以北，那么他們可以使有趣的倍數工作。這就是為什么那是目標。 > `[00:21:20]` What is a venture from as the 500 million dollar fund. What is the return on that fund that the firm would like to hit to be really great. Typically you would want to have two and a half billion dollars a return. GROSS So five bucks. GROSS That\'s before the GPS TAKE THEIR Carrion\'s. `[00:21:20]` 作為 5 億美元的基金，什么是風險投資？那筆基金的回報是什么，那家公司希望得到什么回報才是真正偉大的。通常情況下，你想要獲得 25 億美元的回報。真惡心，那么五塊錢。在全球定位系統帶走他們的卡介子之前真惡心。 > `[00:21:37]` Yes that\'s that\'s a reasonable fund that isn\'t the you know 10 plus X fund that you know all the top tier firms have hit at some point. There are funds where you get that but that\'s they. Oh that was a credible fund. `[00:21:37]` 是的，這是一只合理的基金，不是你所知道的 10+X 基金，你知道所有頂級公司在某個時候都遇到過這種情況。有些基金你可以從那里得到，但那就是它們。哦，那是一只可靠的基金。 > `[00:21:52]` So now I want to move on to the last topic. When you\'ve done things well you\'ve made a good company you\'ve got a product people like you\'ve raised a series A and now you transition to scale up. You\'ve popularized that term. What does that mean and how do you know when it\'s time to do it. `[00:21:52]` 現在我想轉到最后一個話題。當你做得很好，你就成了一家好公司，你有了一個像你一樣的產品人，你提出了一個系列 A，現在你開始逐步擴大規模。你推廣了這個術語。這意味著什么，你怎么知道什么時候該這么做了。 > `[00:22:09]` So we taught a class that\'s online. You can find it at Graylock and some other places I think on iTunes called Blits scaling. `[00:22:09]` 所以我們教了一個在線的課，你可以在 Graylock 和一些我認為是在 iTunes 上的叫做 BlitScaling 的地方找到它。 > `[00:22:18]` Sam was our opener was because we were essentially actually building on the class that Salmons Helfand one or two years earlier. 山姆是我們的開場白，因為我們實際上是建立在薩蒙斯·赫爾芬德(SalmonsHelfand)一、兩年前的課堂上。 `[00:22:26]` I can\'t remember exactly what it was and the key thing is first mover means first to scale and most often both within the consumer Enterprise the first the scale is the person who wins who owns the market who sets the terms who gets the best advantages from the capital market who gets the best advantages and tablet market is known to customersetc. It isn\'t necessarily the first out of the gate it\'s the first to scale. And so what that means pretty logically is your question would be is you know typically a comfort for investors entrepreneurs that say well let\'s completely resolve product market fit and then scale and if you can do that and because you\'re doing it sufficiently by yourself. You don\'t have aggressive competitors. Great. That\'s that\'s the right way to do it. You can always understand here my decision was working. My engagement model is working. I have a revenue model that at least is basically works and maybe can be improved. And now what I\'m just doing is figuring out how to how to accelerate that as much as possible. More often than not in Silicon Valley you\'ve got part of that story right. But you have intense enough competition that you have to make a decision at a scale sooner than that. And part of calling it blet scaling like one of the key things that if you actually look around at part of what\'s happened the last 20 years is that actually in fact startups will spend a bunch of capital at less efficiency than you would typically think because like perfect operational efficiency we know exactly what our model is rolling it out in order to get to scale fast. And obviously Uber is the canonical modern example of this and the decision to do that is partially a question of both kind of offense and defense authentic in terms of what I really need to establish myself. I need to get a critical mass in the network in order to have the network effects as kind of like early LinkedIn although we we eat that out in terms of an end. We didn\'t actually blitz to the first million. We kind of compounded until we got there so we were doing the other strategy because there was no one doing our strategy all credibly close to us so we could take on or defensive which is you\'re worried that someone else is going to get there first. And so you actually have to put on the afterburners and then try to adjust as you go. And that\'s the combination of offensive and defensive reason is part of the decision that you\'re making about what about how and when to do it. Now the other thing that\'s kind of classic and this is you know kind of a line that probably you haven\'t seen that\'s in the new draft of the book has built the scale which is when you begin to look at each different key element that can make your business scale quickly. It\'s like customer acquisition revenue model support model servicing model how in each of these things growing your company how in each of these things can you actually in fact get to a global scale relatively quickly. Now it doesn\'t make sense to obsess with that before you have when you have zero idea product market. It\'s only but it is important to start thinking about it because the thing that makes the really big businesses are the ones that can scale which direction do you see more entrepreneurs making this mistake in 2016. > `[00:22:26]` 我記不起到底是什么，關鍵是先動意味著先擴大規模，最常見的是，在消費企業中，第一個規模是擁有市場的人，誰擁有市場，誰從資本市場獲得最佳優勢，誰從平板電腦市場獲得最佳優勢，誰就知道誰是顧客。它不一定是第一個走出大門，它是第一個規模。因此，從邏輯上講，這意味著你的問題是，你知道，對于投資者來說，通常是一種安慰，企業家們說，讓我們完全解決產品市場的問題，然后擴大規模，如果你能做到這一點，而且因為你自己做得夠充分的話。你沒有咄咄逼人的競爭對手。太棒了那是正確的方法。你總能明白我的決定是有效的。我的訂婚模型起作用了。我有一個收入模式，至少基本上是可行的，也許還可以改進。現在我所做的就是想辦法盡可能加快速度。通常情況下，在硅谷，你對這個故事的一部分是正確的。但你有足夠激烈的競爭，你必須做出一個比這更快的規模的決定。稱它為 BLET 的一個關鍵因素是，如果你環顧過去 20 年發生的一些事情，實際上，初創企業會以比你通常想象的更低的效率花費大量的資本，因為像完美的運營效率一樣，我們確切地知道我們的模型是如何推出的，目的是為了快速擴大規模。很明顯，優步是一個典型的現代例子，做出這樣的決定在一定程度上是一個進攻和防御的問題，就我真正需要的是什么來證明自己。我需要在網絡中獲得一個臨界質量，這樣才能像 LinkedIn 早期那樣產生網絡效果，盡管我們在結束的時候就把它吃光了。我們實際上并沒有對第一個百萬人進行閃電戰。我們有點復雜，直到我們到達那里，所以我們做了另一種策略，因為沒有人做我們的策略完全可信地接近我們，所以我們可以采取或防御性的，也就是說，你擔心其他人會首先到達那里。因此，你實際上需要加裝燃燒器，然后試著調整一下。這是進攻性和防御性的結合，這是你決定如何去做和什么時候去做的決定的一部分。還有一件事是很經典的-你知道的-你可能還沒有在這本書的新草稿中看到-它已經建立了規模，當你開始研究每一個不同的關鍵因素時，你就可以迅速地擴大你的業務規模了。這就像客戶獲取收入模型，支持模型服務模式，如何在每一件事情中成長你的公司，在每一件事情中，你實際上能相對迅速地達到一個全球規模。現在，當你沒有概念產品市場的時候，在你有了這個想法之前，對它的糾纏是沒有意義的。這是唯一的，但開始思考這一點很重要，因為真正讓大企業發展起來的是那些能夠向哪個方向發展的企業，你會看到更多的企業家在 2016 年犯了這個錯誤。 `[00:25:38]` Are they waiting too long to start scaling or are they doing it too quickly. > `[00:25:38]` 他們是等待太久才開始縮放，還是做得太快了。 `[00:25:44]` It\'s both it\'s not. I don\'t think it\'s kind of like oh they\'re all like both mistakes are made. And you know the wait too long is kind of the question of I\'d like to prove it out more. I\'m not really that worried about competition. I\'d like to get complete certainty about about what I\'m doing. The going too fast is I haven\'t I haven\'t tested some key elements that are really important and then I get way over my skis and it\'s hard to correct because at that point for example you\'ve got investor expectations you raised a bunch of capital. You need to pivot. It\'s actually difficult to set back to etc. > `[00:25:44]` 兩者都不是。我不認為這有點像哦，它們都像是犯了兩個錯誤。你知道，等待太久是一個問題，我想更多地證明這一點。我不太擔心競爭。我想完全肯定我在做什么。速度太快了，我還沒有測試過一些非常重要的關鍵因素，然后我從滑雪板上走了出來，這很難糾正，因為在那個時候，你已經得到了投資者的期望，你籌集了大量資金。你需要轉向。它實際上很難回到等等。 `[00:26:27]` Have you found any successful way to do that. If you do get ahead of your skis because you\'re scared of a competitor but you find out the product is not quite working yet and you do need to pull back but you\'ve already raised this mega around on huge projections have you ever seen a way to make that work. > `[00:26:27]` 你找到了什么成功的方法嗎？如果你真的因為害怕競爭對手而搶先滑雪板，但你發現這個產品還沒有完全發揮作用，你確實需要撤退，但你已經在巨大的預測中揚起了這一巨大的力量-你有沒有見過一種辦法讓它發揮作用。 `[00:26:44]` One doesn\'t immediately come to mind although the advice that I would give would be this is one of the reasons why fundraising is not just a capital thing it\'s a partnership question and if you actually have a good partnership with the folks and you\'re kind of saying look we\'re sharing risk or sharing analysis like for example when you\'ve got the when you\'ve raised money you\'re not saying oh it\'s guaranteed it\'s perfect it\'s all it\'s all in the bag and it\'s all happening because then by the way very naturally your partners get very grumpy with you right when it\'s not that. But look we\'re trying this. We have we have good confidence at work but not perfect. We\'re going to be a good partner with you. And then if you have that then it\'s easy enough to go back and say look we need to really pivot and we do something different I\'m sure there are examples but it\'s not it\'s not immediately apparent to me. > `[00:26:44]` 雖然我會給出的建議是，這是籌款不僅僅是一個資本問題的原因之一，但如果你真的和人們有著良好的伙伴關系，你會說，我們在分擔風險或分享分析，比如當你籌集到資金的時候，你會說我們是在分擔風險或分擔分析。說，哦，這是肯定的，它是完美的，它都在袋子里，一切都在發生，因為順便說一句，你的伴侶很自然地會和你在一起，當事情不是這樣的時候。但聽著我們正在嘗試。我們對工作有很好的信心，但并不完美。我們會成為你的好搭檔。如果你有這個，那就很容易回去說，看，我們需要真正的轉向，我們做一些不同的事情，我確定有一些例子，但這對我來說不是很明顯。 `[00:27:29]` It\'s hard for me to think of one to one of the things that I have seen our companies struggle with the most when it comes to scaling quickly is how to identify enough good people to hire and related to that how to keep the culture as you double in size in a short period of time and then again and again and again. So to that joint question of how do you identify really good people and how do you bring them together in a way that preserves the company culture that got you here in the first place. Can you share with us about that. > `[00:27:29]` 當我看到我們的公司在快速擴張的時候，我很難想到一比一的事情，那就是如何找到足夠多的優秀人才來招聘，并與之相關，因為在短時間內，當你一次又一次地翻倍的時候，如何保持企業的文化。因此，對于這個共同的問題，你如何識別真正優秀的人，以及如何將他們聚集在一起，以一種保護公司文化的方式-最初的公司文化-把你帶到了這里。你能和我們分享這件事嗎。 `[00:28:00]` So I\'ll start with the culture and then I\'ll go to the hiring so culture part of the really key thing in culture is to and this is actually like I interviewed Reed Hastings about that scaling. He\'s actually a very good culture person. Part of the how he created the Netflix stack and how they got to thinking about it was actually in fact fairly key and that was kind of in the vein of they were discovering that they\'d hire really good people who are still players but weren\'t cultural fits and they would bounce out. And so the reason they codified the deck and published it was to make sure they weren\'t going to have that churn problem. You understand this is what we stand for. Now part of the reason why codifying it is useful is because part of how you scale a culture is that everyone is keeping each other accountable it\'s not hierarch hierarchical it\'s not just oh whatever the two or three founders say or one of the three founders say that\'s that\'s it. And whatever changes. It\'s no this is who we are. This is how we play. This is what we\'re doing and we\'re all holding each other accountable and so for example one of the big ones for Reed Hastings was and is is not a family where sports team. Right. And so it\'s not lifetime loyalty it\'s we\'re all performing. And when you\'re doing your your your kind of reviews of your team if you wouldn\'t fight to keep the person you don\'t just go Oh they\'re out there they\'re perfectly good but you wouldn\'t fight to keep them. You give them a severance package and you move on because that\'s what your target is in terms of what you\'re doing. And then there\'s other elements of culture like Do you really value design. Do we really value an ability to you know like for example in Illington cases the individual members first not the people who are paying us money. It\'s each individual member and that\'s an important part of the kind of culture and how we talk about like how we make product decisions. So that\'s the cultural part. Then the hiring part. One of the key things you can get. You have to correct for some downsides of this. But obviously using your network is super important because you get trusted connections and that can sometimes be you know a little too a little too much all the same. Like one of the problems is sometimes you your bad on diversity because of this is like oh well you know we\'re a bunch of men so we get a bunch of other men and it\'s like no no actually diversity makes you stronger so you should be doing that. So networks can have that bias problem that you have to you have to correct for systemically but you can still use the networks hunting. Make sure you get the appropriate diversity of skills and perspectives and awareness and you\'re in your company. Then the next thing is reference checking. And to give you a specific example of something that I do is usually what I\'m considering somebody if I can if I know a couple people who know this person even before I decide to reach out connection I\'ll frequently do a very light reference check because reference checks tell you a lot more. Everyone is very good at and most people are very good at seeming very coherent and reasonable in a in a in a couple of interactions. The real thing you want is how does the person work over weeks and months and years right in the trenches and references are very good for that and of course references from people you trust or people they trust is part of the right way to do that and the way that I frequently do that as I\'ll send a note to people saying Sam right I\'m one to 10. And the reason you want to 10 is because the weak answer is usually 7 and a half. That\'s kind of the oh I want to say bad things about Sam but I\'m not going to. And it\'s an e-mail and it\'s totally fine. And what you\'re looking for is a combinations of eight and nine. And when I get a 10 I are you alright backside. Oh really like Sam\'s one of the best people you ever worked with. Right just to make sure that this is you know this is kind of real. And then when you have a blend of them that can give you a sense of whether or not I should dig in more of this person. So networks referencing pre referencing and and then definitely doing deep referencing. Now one of the last things I\'d actually say in hiring is this is this is one of the ones that I find particularly entertaining is actually spend a bunch of time with the person. So if you\'re at the level of importance and hierarchy in the company like don\'t think two or three interviews and you\'re done when you\'re hiring. Look for example when I was hiring Jeff I spent probably about 40 hours with Jeff in discussion before we got to OK this is going to work. In addition all that referencing it was super important and important to get right in executives it can easily be 20 hours right. Sometimes it can be 10 to 15 because it\'s like OK. Do I do I get a sense of how we play together. Not just the references and e-mails. But but but how are problem solving techniques. Are our values the way that we the things we want to accomplish. Are they sufficiently alignedetc. > `[00:28:00]` 所以我將從文化開始，然后我會去招聘，所以文化的一部分，在文化中真正關鍵的是，這就像我采訪了里德·黑斯廷斯(Reed Hastings)。他實際上是個很好的文化人。他創建 Netflix 棧的方式之一，以及他們是如何思考這一問題的，實際上是相當關鍵的，這在某種程度上是他們發現，他們會雇傭真正優秀的人，他們仍然是玩家，但他們不適合文化，他們會反彈過來。所以，他們把甲板編成法典并出版的原因是為了確保他們不會有這種攪動的問題。你知道這就是我們所主張的。現在，編纂它有用的部分原因是，你如何衡量一種文化的一部分原因是，每個人都在相互問責，這不是等級制度，而不僅僅是，不管兩位或三位創始人說什么，或者三位創始人中的一位都這么說。不管發生什么變化。不，這是我們的身份。我們就是這樣玩的。這就是我們正在做的事情，我們都在互相問責，因此，舉個例子，里德·黑斯廷斯的一個大家族曾經是，現在也不是運動隊的大家庭。右（邊），正確的所以這不是一輩子的忠誠，而是我們都在表演。當你在對你的團隊做評論的時候，如果你不為留住你不想去的人而戰，哦，他們在外面，他們很棒，但你不會為留住他們而奮斗。你給他們一個遣散費，然后你繼續前進，因為你的目標就是你所做的事情。還有其他文化元素，比如你真的很重視設計。你知道，我們真的重視一種能力嗎？比如，在伊利頓的情況下，首先是個人成員，而不是付錢給我們的人。這是每一個成員，這是文化的一個重要組成部分，也是我們談論產品決策的方式。這就是文化的部分。然后是雇傭部分。你能得到的關鍵之一。你必須糾正這件事的一些缺點。但是很明顯，使用你的網絡是非常重要的，因為你得到了可信的連接，有時候你知道的太多了。就像問題之一，有時候你對多樣性不好，因為你知道，我們是一群男人，所以我們得到了一群其他的男人，而事實上，多樣性并沒有讓你變得更強大，所以你應該這么做。因此，網絡可能存在偏見問題，你必須系統地加以糾正，但你仍然可以使用網絡搜索。確保你獲得了適當的技能、觀點和意識的多樣性，你就在你的公司里了。接下來是引用檢查。給你一個我所做的事情的具體例子，如果可以的話，我通常會考慮某個人，如果我認識幾個認識這個人的人，甚至在我決定建立聯系之前，我就會經常做一個非常簡單的參考檢查，因為推薦信檢查會告訴你更多。每個人都很擅長，而且大多數人都很擅長在幾個互動中表現得非常連貫和合理。你真正想要的是，一個人如何在戰壕里工作幾周、幾個月、幾年，而推薦人對此很有好處，當然，你信任的人或他們信任的人的推薦信是正確做法的一部分，也是我經常這樣做的方式，因為我會給人們發一封信，說我是 1 比 10 的人。你想要 10 的原因是因為薄弱的答案通常是 7 個半。這就是我想說的關于山姆的壞話，但我不會說的。這是一封電子郵件，完全沒問題。你要找的是八和九的組合。當我拿到 10 分的時候，你的背部就沒事了。哦，真的很像薩姆，他是你共事過的最好的人之一。只是為了確保這是你知道這是真實的。然后當你把它們混合在一起，讓你感覺到我是否應該挖掘更多的這個人。因此，網絡參考前參考，然后肯定做深度參考。在招聘過程中，我要說的最后一件事是，這是我覺得特別有趣的事情之一，就是花很多時間和這個人在一起。因此，如果你處于公司的重要性和等級水平，就不要去想兩三次面試，你在招聘時就已經完成了。例如，當我雇用 Jeff 時，我可能花了大約 40 個小時與 Jeff 進行討論，然后我們才確定這是可行的。此外，所有的參考，它是非常重要和重要的是，得到正確的高管，它可以很容易是 20 個小時的權利。有時候它可以是 10 到 15，因為它很好。我能感覺到我們是怎么一起玩的嗎？不僅僅是推薦信和電子郵件。但是解決問題的技巧。我們的價值觀就是我們想要完成的事情。他們是否有足夠的身份。 `[00:33:03]` Great well thank you very much for spending the afternoon with us. Appreciate your thoughts. 太好了，非常感謝你和我們一起度過這個下午。感謝你的想法。 > `[00:33:08]` Applause. `[00:33:08]` 掌聲。