# Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012 > `[00:00:00]` Hi everyone. `[00:00:00]` 大家好。 > All right time to wake up how do we have slides. 好的，該起床了，我們怎么有幻燈片。 > We do have a clicker. 我們確實有一個按鍵。 > Yes. 是 > How many is a lot of people here. 這里有多少人。 > How many of you are going to make some kind of a start up after this event when this is done because you raise your hand please keep my humor humor. 你們中有多少人會在這件事結束后做一些開始，因為你們舉手請保持我的幽默。 > OK. 好的 > One two three four. 1 2 3 4 > How many of you are going to be one of those 15 startups every year that hits a hundred million in revenue and deserves vesi funding more than 15. 你們中有多少人會成為這 15 家初創公司中的一家，這些公司每年的收入將達到 1 億美元，應該得到超過 15 家公司的資助。 > That\'s awesome is a really good class. 那是一門很棒的課。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > `[00:00:38]` I made something which a lot of people don\'t understand is that these two companies that I have Focker software and Stack Exchange and tell you that sort of just in chronological order to try to explain it. `[00:00:38]` 我做了一件很多人都不明白的事情，那就是我有 Focker 軟件和 Stack Exchange 的兩家公司，告訴你，這只是按時間順序來解釋的。 > And there\'s all kinds of interesting lessons in there. 里面有各種各樣有趣的課程。 > I think four different ways to create a startup and to bootstrap a startup or take funding. 我認為有四種不同的方式來創建一個創業公司和啟動一個創業公司或者接受資金。 > Almost every talk that I\'ve heard today has assumed that you\'re going to be getting money from overseas and there isn\'t enough money in all of your in California to fund all your companies. 我今天聽到的幾乎每一次談話都假定你將從海外獲得資金，而你在加州的所有資金都不足以為你的所有公司提供資金。 > `[00:01:11]` And so if you all kind of bang your heads against that door some of them are going to get bloodied. `[00:01:11]` 如果你們的頭撞在那扇門上，他們中的一些人就會血流成河。 > I\'m sorry I\'m really bad with metaphors. 對不起，我對隱喻的理解很差。 > This is the very first Greek office. 這是第一個希臘辦事處。 > Michael Pryor and I started fuck Creek software in the year 2000 after we\'ve been working together at a company called Juno Online Services which is a free ISP and I never wanted to start a company. 2000 年，邁克爾·普賴爾和我一起在一家名為 Juno Online Services 的公司工作，這是一家免費的 ISP，我從未想過要創辦一家公司。 > `[00:01:35]` It wasn\'t my lifetime goal I was already in my mid 30s by the time I started Greek. `[00:01:35]` 當我開始學希臘語的時候，我已經 30 多歲了，這不是我一生的目標。 > And how does that make me now. 那我現在是怎么。 > `[00:01:45]` The point point was that I couldn\'t find a cool place to work. `[00:01:45]` 重點是我找不到一個很酷的工作地方。 > I couldn\'t find a place where I wanted to work as a programmer. 我找不到一個我想做程序員的地方。 > And I finally gave up on and decided that if I was going to have a career that I found enjoyable as a programmer I would have to build my own workplace. 最后，我放棄了，決定如果我想擁有一份我覺得很享受的職業，作為一名程序員，我將不得不建立我自己的工作場所。 > And of course the irony is that I don\'t get the program anymore but. 當然，諷刺的是我已經不懂這個程序了，但是。 > `[00:02:03]` The very beginning of Fire Creek we rented this office and that was my desk and I literally took home everything of the company in my knapsack at work at the at the end of the day for what I wanted to have a place to go to work and it was me and Michael and we hired a couple of people very quickly. `[00:02:03]` 從 Fire Creek 一開始，我們就租了這間辦公室，那是我的辦公桌，我把公司的所有東西都裝在我的背包里，在一天結束的時候，為了我想要去的地方工作，我和邁克爾很快就雇傭了幾個人。 > Now we had the reason we knew we could start a business even though I\'m kind of a scaredy cat and not an entrepreneurial type was that I had seen a whole bunch of other businesses in those days so this was the first dotcom boom and this was sort of a period much like today when people were starting all kinds of idiotic businesses to sell grilled cheese sandwiches and whatever crazy you know Instagram for squirrels. 現在我們知道我們可以創業，盡管我有點膽小，而不是一個企業家，因為我在那個時候見過很多其他的生意，所以這是第一次互聯網熱潮，這段時期就像今天人們開始做各種各樣的白癡生意，賣烤奶酪三明治。不管你對松鼠的 Instagram 知道些什么。 > Except it was called something else in those days. 只不過在那些日子里它被稱為別的東西。 > And all these idiotic companies or what you could do is you can look at them and say wow if I did that company and I just didn\'t do these two stupid things. 所有這些愚蠢的公司，或者你能做的是，你可以看著他們說，哇，如果我做了那家公司，而我沒有做這兩件蠢事。 > But I did them in a smart way then that would definitely be a better business than this one right. 但我用一種聰明的方式做了，那肯定比這次更好。 > So for me the model was a company called Ask digital which is a consulting company that filled Granz Greenspan created which collapsed after they took vesi but everything did really. 所以對我來說，模型是一家名為 Ask Digital 的公司，它是一家填充 Granz Greenspan 的咨詢公司，在他們服用 Vesi 之后就崩潰了，但一切都是真的。 > `[00:03:14]` And we were gonna make two tweaks on the digital model so he had this model that was like we\'re going to open source software and then consulting based on the open source software and my tweak was it was going to be proprietary software and consulting based on the proprietary software. `[00:03:14]` 我們要對數字模型做兩次調整，所以他有了這個模型，就像我們要開放源碼軟件，然后基于開源軟件進行咨詢，我的調整是，它將是專有軟件，而咨詢是基于專有軟件的。 > And then you have another source of revenue. 然后你就有了另一個收入來源。 > What\'s the theory. 理論是什么？ > We were both wrong. 我們都錯了。 > It doesn\'t matter what my theory was. 不管我的理論是什么。 > You know we worked on it for about 15 minutes before we effectively pivoted to something else. 你知道，我們花了大約 15 分鐘的時間才能有效地轉到其他的東西上。 > But the most important part of our business model is we weren\'t going to spend any money until we had some consulting revenue. 但我們的商業模式中最重要的部分是，在獲得咨詢收入之前，我們不會花任何錢。 > And so this was a time in the late 90s when there was absolutely unlimited demand for anybody who could put together you know left if you could type a left less then integrate and then sign to make email on the keyboard then you could build about two hundred dollars an hour and if you could actually make an ACL page that was like double that. 這是 90 年代末的一個時期，人們對任何一個人的需求都是無限的-你知道，如果你可以輸入左鍵，然后進行整合，然后在鍵盤上簽名發送電子郵件，那么你可以每小時建大約 200 美元，如果你真的可以制作一個 ACL 頁面的話，大概是這個數字的兩倍。 > `[00:04:06]` And there was sort of essentially infinite demand. `[00:04:06]` 實際上有無限的需求。 > There was a company called Science which fortunately is now completely gone. 有一家名為“科學”的公司，幸運的是，現在它已經完全消失了。 > But in those days they had they hired thousands of computer science students and stuff like that to build web pages for people and Scient used to brag that they only accepted 10 percent of the clients that wanted to hire them. 但在那些日子里，他們雇傭了成千上萬的計算機科學專業的學生和諸如此類的東西來為人們建立網頁，而山特曾經吹噓說，他們只接受了 10%的想雇用他們的客戶。 > So if you wanted a site to build your Web site you had to apply and then you had to get approved by the sign board of whatever. 因此，如果你想要一個網站來建立你的網站，你必須申請，然后你必須得到任何標志板的批準。 > So there was just way too much demand and we thought you know we\'ll just take some of that overflow of all that demand build some Web sites for some people make a few hundred dollars an hour you know with two or three of us and build up enough money in the bank to basically bootstrap the business. 所以我們的需求太大了，我們認為我們會利用這些需求中的一些溢出，為一些人建立一些網站，你知道，每小時和我們兩、三個人一起賺幾百美元，然后在銀行里積累足夠的錢，基本上可以啟動這個業務。 > `[00:04:48]` And the truth is that that worked for us we had about two months of consulting consulting and I think we might have accumulated 250000 dollars in the bank or something like that. `[00:04:48]` 事實是，我們進行了大約兩個月的咨詢，我想我們可能已經在銀行里積累了 250000 美元或者諸如此類的東西。 > And that was really really. 那真是真的。 > So we started in September 2000 in this very office. 因此，我們于 2000 年 9 月在這個辦公室開始工作。 > We the consulting market the dot dot com crash occurred in November of 2000. 我們咨詢市場的網點崩潰發生在 2000 年 11 月. > `[00:05:11]` I know the exact month because in that month if you look at all of these consulting companies are Scient Razorfish Viant March 1st there was a whole bunch of them and if you looked in November 2000 their billings went down by 90 percent in one month. `[00:05:11]` 我知道確切的月份，因為在那個月里，如果你看看所有這些咨詢公司都是山達拉佐魚公司，三月一日，有一大堆這樣的公司，如果你在 2000 年 11 月看，他們的賬單在一個月內下降了 90%。 > And they didn\'t know it because they thought that this was just an unusual lengthening of the sales cycle meaning it was taking longer to close deals. 他們不知道這一點，因為他們認為這只是銷售周期不尋常的延長，這意味著完成交易需要更長的時間。 > They didn\'t realize that this market has completely collapsed and they didn\'t really decide that the consulting market was gone and never coming back until April of 2001. 他們沒有意識到這個市場已經完全崩潰了，他們也沒有真正決定咨詢市場已經消失，直到 2001 年 4 月才回來。 > And in the meantime they had these big armies of consultants and they burned through every penny that they had in the bank paying these armies of consultants to do nothing because they had no clients they had no clients because everybody got scared that the dot com crash was going to happen and stopped hiring consultants to save money. 與此同時，他們有一大批顧問，他們把銀行里的每一分錢都花光了，讓這些顧問大軍什么也不做，因為他們沒有客戶，因為每個人都擔心網絡崩潰會發生，并停止雇傭顧問來省錢。 > So. 所以 > Consulting market crashed we did accumulate a little bit of money and we luckily hadn\'t hired very many people so we didn\'t waste all that money just keeping people employed when we had no money. 咨詢市場崩潰了，我們確實積累了一點錢，幸運的是，我們沒有雇傭很多人，所以我們沒有浪費所有的錢，只是在我們沒有錢的時候讓人們繼續工作。 > We did not we had hired a couple of people. 我們沒有-我們雇了幾個人。 > We let them go. 我們放了他們。 > So it was just me and Michael for a long time as the cofounders and we moved into this building which conveniently My grandmother owned and I was in charge of managing it so I just sort of moved in and continued to pay her rent for a while. 所以很長一段時間里，只有我和邁克爾作為共同創始人搬進了這棟大樓，這是我祖母擁有的，我負責管理它，所以我就搬了進來，繼續支付她的租金一段時間。 > `[00:06:31]` This was our office downstairs and we continue to sort of build a business really really slowly and because there was no consulting business what we started selling was fog bugs the only thing we could find which is a bug tracking software written internally in VB script. `[00:06:31]` 這是我們樓下的辦公室，我們繼續慢慢地建立一家企業，因為沒有咨詢業務，我們開始銷售的是迷霧 bug，我們唯一能找到的就是用 VB 腳本內部編寫的 bug 跟蹤軟件。 > And we started selling you know five weeks version1.0 and you know like the first day we sold it there\'s like 2000 dollars somebody bought a site license from Brazil or something. 我們開始銷售，你知道，五個星期，版本 1.0，你知道，就像第一天，我們在那里賣了大約 2000 美元，有人從巴西買了一個網站許可證之類的東西。 > And it was awesome. 太棒了。 > And in fact what we were noticing is I think of the first first few months we were making somewhere around five thousand dollars a month I think is the right number. 事實上，我們注意到的是，我想到了最初的幾個月，我們每個月的收入在 5000 美元左右，我認為這是正確的數字。 > And that was kind of enough to eat. 那就夠吃了。 > And you know eventually we paid my grandmother for all the rent that we were consuming. 最終我們付了我祖母所有的房租。 > And as time elapsed. 隨著時間的流逝。 > The neat thing was that this number was going up every single month and it was going up very slowly but it was going up and it was in a really really bad market. 最妙的是，這個數字每一個月都在上升，而且增長非常緩慢，但它一直在上升，而且在一個非常糟糕的市場上。 > But we were selling software and it just got better and better and better because we worked on it and our revenue went up to hit fifteen thousand dollars. 但是我們在銷售軟件，它變得越來越好，因為我們致力于它，我們的收入增加到一萬五千美元。 > We could afford to pay Michael a salary and I had some savings in the bank. 我們付得起邁克爾的薪水，我在銀行里存了一些錢。 > So fifteen thousand dollars a month is I always just automatically calculate 10000 hours per person that needs a salary and all our overhead expenses including the rent was five thousand dollars. 所以每月一萬五千美元，我總是自動計算每個人 10000 小時的工資，我們所有的間接費用，包括房租，都是五千美元。 > So we then hit 25000 I started taking a salary. 所以我們達到了 25000，我開始拿薪水。 > And when we hit 35000 we hired a third guy who came on to start answering phones and doing some tech support and helping us with some of the some of the coding tasks that we had. 當我們達到 35000 的時候，我們雇傭了第三個人，他開始接電話，做一些技術支持，幫助我們完成一些編碼任務。 > And at some point we built it all and we got actually got an office. 在某一時刻，我們建造了這一切，我們實際上得到了一間辦公室。 > This was guessing about 2003 so like several years on it was a really long slog before we got our first legit office and we built it out really nicely and we were we were always obsessed about giving programmers air on chairs and 30 inch monitors in private offices with doors closed. 這大概是在 2003 年，所以就像幾年前，在我們第一個合法的辦公室之前，這是一個非常漫長的過程，我們把它建得很好，我們總是癡迷于讓程序員們坐在椅子上呼吸空氣，讓 30 英寸的顯示器在私人辦公室里關上門。 > `[00:08:23]` And when we built this office I think we had room first time we took this office for seven people there were seven desks. `[00:08:23]` 當我們建造這間辦公室的時候，我想我們第一次有房間了，我們第一次把這間辦公室給七個人，一共有七張桌子。 > And eventually we doubled the space that we had there and we made room for I think 12 people or something like that and it\'s getting bigger and bigger we all eat lunch together at this big table. 最后，我們把那里的空間擴大了一倍，我們為 12 個人或諸如此類的人騰出了空間，這樣的空間越來越大，我們都在這張大桌子上一起吃午餐。 > These are a lot of summer interns we took summer interns every summer and that\'s how we did it got our recruiting pipeline and again just continue to grow and this is the last time I remember getting the company together for an all company picture. 這是很多暑期實習生，我們每年夏天都去做暑期實習生，我們就是這么做的，得到了我們的招聘渠道，而且還在繼續增長，這是我最后一次把公司召集在一起拍一張全公司的照片。 > But I think we\'re now at let\'s say 40 45 people. 但我想我們現在有 4045 個人。 > `[00:09:01]` So that\'s one that\'s one kind of company and that\'s that\'s Fog Creek. `[00:09:01]` 那是一種公司，那是霧溪。 > Fuck Rick continue to do well we continue to sort of try to launch new products every single year. 他媽的里克繼續做得很好，我們每年都會嘗試推出新產品。 > We had this idea that bug tracking was not really the be all and end all of products and we launched a bunch of stuff. 我們有這樣的想法，即錯誤跟蹤并不是所有產品的全部和最終，我們推出了一堆東西。 > We had a bunch of summer interns launch a remote desktop product called co-pilot that did pretty well that actually more than paid for itself and now earns a sort of a nice dividend PHOG Bogues was obviously the big bread winner and is now a very large product. 我們有一群暑期實習生推出了一款名為“副駕駛”的遠程桌面產品，它做得非常好，實際上比自己付出的還要多，現在賺到了不錯的紅利，菲格·博格斯顯然是個大贏家，現在已經是一個非常大的產品了。 > And we launched a bunch other stuff so it worked some of it didn\'t work. 我們推出了一些其他的東西，所以其中一些不起作用。 > There was we launched a job board for the Indian programmers market and made 50 rupees total ever selling one job listing is a worst product we ever did. 在那里，我們為印度程序員市場推出了一個招聘板，總共賣出了 50 盧比，這是我們做過的最糟糕的產品。 > And then what I wanted to do this thing I wanted to kill experts extant exchange which you all probably know about. 然后我想要做的這件事，我想殺死專家，現存的交流，你們可能都知道。 > Does anybody know Stack Overflow. 有人知道堆棧溢出。 > No one heard of that stack overflow thing. 沒人聽說過堆棧溢出的事。 > So the goal there was to kill experts exchange because they were evil. 因此，他們的目標是殺死專家，因為他們是邪惡的。 > What was cool about stack overflow is you could explain it simply and everybody understood what you were talking about. 堆棧溢出的酷之處在于，您可以簡單地解釋它，并且每個人都理解您在說什么。 > You didn\'t have to go into any detail of how it work. 你不需要詳細說明它是如何工作的。 > And I couldn\'t find anybody internally that wanted to work on that. 我在內部找不到任何想要做這件事的人。 > So I got together with Jeff Atwood who\'s another blogger called known as Coding Horror and said you know will you join. 所以我和杰夫·阿特伍德在一起，他是另一位名叫“編碼恐怖”的博主，他說你知道你會加入。 > Will you join us. 你愿意加入我們嗎。 > This will be sort of a 50/50 Fog Creek. 這將是一種 50/50 霧溪。 > Jeff Atwood joint production to do stack overflow and I thought I thought of this as sort of a side bet like Let\'s get Jeff working on this. 杰夫阿特伍德聯合生產做堆棧溢出，我認為這是一種邊賭，讓我們讓杰夫工作這一點。 > I\'ll help him when I can. 我會盡我所能幫助他。 > If this thing takes off awesome if doesn\'t take off doesn\'t matter but hopefully I can get rid of this experts exchange problem. 如果這個東西起飛了，如果不起飛的話，那就不重要了，但希望我能擺脫這個專家交流的問題。 > But But Stack Overflow did really well. 但是 Stack Overflow 做得很好。 > As it turns out the growth isn\'t credible unlike the other speakers I\'m perfectly happy to number the numbers on my Y-axis. 事實證明，增長是不可信的，不像其他發言者，我非常樂意在我的 Y 軸上對數字進行編號。 > `[00:11:03]` Even tell you the growth year was insane. `[00:11:03]` 甚至告訴你生長的年份是瘋狂的。 > `[00:11:10]` From day one we saw this like literally every single week we had more visitors in the week before. `[00:11:10]` 從第一天起，我們幾乎每一個星期都會看到更多的訪客。 > At the beginning I think it was the numbers were crazy. 一開始我覺得是數字太瘋狂了。 > We started out with 30000 daily visitors and that\'s about the same number as people as I would get on ONJ on software blog post. 我們一開始每天有 30000 名訪客，這與我在 ONJ 上的軟件博客帖子中的人數大致相同。 > `[00:11:23]` So I knew that that was the yourselfer audience coming initially and over time and that took ten years to build that audience by the way writing a blog. `[00:11:23]` 所以我知道這是你自己的聽眾，最初和時間的推移，通過寫博客的方式，花了十年的時間才建立起這樣的觀眾。 > And you would look at the Google Analytics every single week and just get a little bit higher. 你可以每周看一次谷歌分析，然后再高一點。 > Of course it went down on the weekends and it would just go a little bit higher and at some point it was growing by more than a Jaun software like every week and then it was growing by drawing software every day and it just grew faster and faster and eventually encompassed the universe. 當然，在周末它會下降，它只會稍微高一點，在某個時候，它比 Jaun 軟件每周都有更多的增長，然后它通過每天繪制軟件來增長，它只是增長得更快，最終覆蓋了整個宇宙。 > Now we at one point when we were around 6 million on here does it so this measure is global unique monthly visitors that measures people that just visit your site once a month and place a cookie. 現在，我們在一個地方，當我們在這里大約 600 萬，所以這個措施是全球唯一的每月訪問者，衡量的人，只是訪問你的網站每月一次，并放置一個曲奇。 > And all we do is count the cookies on google analytics so there\'s maybe two users on to maybe one person on two computers. 我們所做的就是計算 Google 分析中的 cookie，這樣可能有兩個用戶，或者兩臺計算機上的一個人。 > `[00:12:12]` The other thing about Google Analytics is that the cookie is placed on your domain and we have four domains. `[00:12:12]` Google Analytics 的另一件事是，cookie 放在您的域上，我們有四個域。 > So we have to break it down and we may have dealt we maybe double counting people that visit two of our sites and if they go to two different domains but I think that\'s okay personally. 因此，我們必須分解它，我們可能已經處理了，我們可能會重復計算訪問我們的兩個站點的人，如果他們訪問兩個不同的域，但我認為\個人來說是可以的。 > And when we hit about 6 million users we had a meeting with folks in developer relations at Microsoft and we said hey how many developers do you think they\'re on the world they said 16 million. 當我們接觸到大約 600 萬用戶時，我們與微軟的開發人員舉行了一次會議，我們說，嘿，你認為他們在世界上有多少開發人員，他們說有 1600 萬。 > They said 9 million. 他們說有 900 萬。 > And we\'re like okay we got two thirds of the developers in the world and then we hit 9 million and then we had 10 and now we hit 20 million an at about 25 million of the world\'s 9 million software developers and how you need that number. 我們可以說，我們有世界上三分之二的開發者，然后我們達到了 900 萬，然后我們有了 10 個，現在我們達到了 2000 萬，在全世界 900 萬軟件開發人員中，大約有 2500 萬，以及你是如何需要這個數字的。 > `[00:12:50]` So so there\'s two kinds of businesses here that are completely different actually. `[00:12:50]` 所以這里有兩種完全不同的生意。 > `[00:12:57]` There is two ways you can build a business and everybody up until now today. `[00:12:57]` 到今天為止，有兩種方法可以建立企業和每個人。 > And from Zuck onward has been talking about the get big fast business and stack exchange is indeed a get big fast business. 從賽克開始，他就一直在談論快速交易，而堆棧交換確實是一項快速交易。 > It\'s growing Saxony\'s dotcom domain is growing and it\'s working. 它正在增長，薩克森州的互聯網領域正在增長，而且正在發揮作用。 > `[00:13:16]` Work is it the stack exchange com domain is now growing at 350 percent year over year which is I don\'t know the fastest thing in the world but it\'s pretty friggin steady as you saw from that chart. `[00:13:16]` 工作-堆棧交換 COM 域現在以每年 350%的速度增長，也就是說，我不知道世界上最快的東西，但是它非常穩定，就像你從圖表中看到的那樣。 > So it\'s early. 所以現在還早。 > Sure thanks Jessica. 當然謝謝杰西卡。 > `[00:13:33]` I wrote a blog post on unshorn software a long time ago in the middle to the early 2000s we don\'t have anything else to do because you know the economy is collapsing and it was called strategy letter 1 because I was very self important and pompous then unlike today of course. `[00:13:33]` 很久以前，我寫了一篇關于 UnShn 軟件的博客文章，在本世紀初到本世紀初，我們沒有別的事可做，因為你知道經濟正在崩潰，它被稱為戰略信 1，因為我當時非常重要，不像今天。 > Thank you. 謝謝。 > And I was writing about how there\'s two kinds of companies that get big fat fast companies like Amazon. 我還在寫兩種公司是如何得到像亞馬遜這樣的快速增長的大公司的。 > And then there\'s organic growth companies and I had just read the story of Ben and Jerry\'s so they were an example of an ice cream company and I kind of compared and contrasted these two different ways of growing company. 然后是有機成長型公司，我剛剛讀過本和杰瑞的故事，所以他們是冰淇淋公司的一個例子，我比較和對比了這兩種不同的成長方式。 > And what\'s interesting of course is that Stack Exchange and fall Creek have kind of exactly the same characteristics that he\'s seen as a big Fast Company and Rick software is an organic growth company. 有趣的是，Stack Exchange 和 Fall Creek 有著與他被視為一家大型快速公司的完全相同的特性，而 Rick 軟件則是一家有機成長的公司。 > `[00:14:18]` So first of all how do you decide which kind of company you should be. `[00:14:18]` 那么首先，你該如何決定你應該成為什么樣的公司呢？ > It\'s not like you get to choose like how many of you want to get big fast you hand. 這不是說你可以選擇有多少人想快速變大-你的手。 > Right. 右（邊），正確的 > Okay. 好的。 > You have to look at the actual market that you\'re in and there\'s two kinds of markets get big fast business is when you\'re in therefore there is some kind of a land grab. 你必須看看你所處的實際市場，而有兩種市場是快速發展的，當你進入市場時，就會有某種形式的土地搶奪。 > `[00:14:36]` There is an attempt to capture uncaptured territory before anybody else does the same thing. `[00:14:36]` 有人企圖在其他人做同樣的事情之前占領未被占領的領土。 > OK so Uber isn\'t that category. 優步不是那個類別。 > Amazon was certainly in that category. 亞馬遜當然也屬于這一類。 > Ben and Jerry\'s was not because Ben Jerry\'s was just ice cream you can\'t capture the entire ice cream market. 本和杰里不是因為本杰瑞只是冰淇淋，你不能占領整個冰淇淋市場。 > There already is an icecream market right. 已經有了冰淇淋市場的權利。 > This is Trenton New. 這是特倫頓新城。 > New technology trying to landgrab virgin territory in an organic growth business. 新技術試圖在一個有機增長企業中占有處女地。 > You already have a million competitors and all you\'re doing is trying to claw them away one at a time patiently from from your competitors. 你已經有了一百萬的競爭對手，而你所做的一切就是試著一次地把他們從你的競爭對手那里奪走。 > The reason you try to get big fast and you go for a land grab is because there are network effects. 你試著快速獲取土地的原因是因為有網絡效應。 > So you all know what network effects are the idea of network effect is the more users you have the more valuable your network is. 所以大家都知道什么是網絡效應，網絡效應的概念是，你擁有的用戶越多，你的網絡就越有價值。 > And so a network of let\'s say if Facebook had 10000 users that\'s not very valuable. 因此，如果 facebook 有 10000 用戶，那么這個網絡就不太值錢了。 > And in fact it would be extremely difficult. 事實上，這將是非常困難的。 > Facebook was a classic land grab because nobody\'s going to be on there if they can\'t communicate with their friends. Facebook 是一種典型的搶占土地的行為，因為如果他們不能與朋友溝通，就沒有人會出現在 Facebook 上。 > `[00:15:32]` The same reason I can\'t get anybody to use KIC because there\'s nobody else on there. `[00:15:32]` 同樣的原因，我不能讓任何人使用 KIC，因為那里沒有其他人。 > I mean there\'s like 10 million people on there but it doesn\'t really help. 我的意思是，那里有大約 1000 萬人，但這并沒有多大幫助。 > It\'s not enough. 這還不夠。 > `[00:15:41]` I need I need a billion and a network effect says basically the value is increasing as you get more and more people on there because you know the value is a function of and squared right. `[00:15:41]` 我需要 10 億，一個網絡效應說，隨著越來越多的人在那里，這個值基本上在增加，因為你知道這個值是一個正確的函數和平方。 > You\'re all computer scientists. 你們都是電腦科學家。 > The other thing about get big fast is that network effect creates Lockean. 快速增長的另一件事是網絡效應創造了 Lockean。 > Nobody\'s going to leave Facebook for something that\'s 20 percent better or 50 percent better or even a hundred percent better because their grandma is still looking for the pictures of the puppy. 沒有人會離開 Facebook 去尋找比這更好 20%、50%甚至 100%更好的東西，因為他們的奶奶還在尋找小狗的照片。 > And she likes the pictures of the puppy that you upload and if you stop putting them on Facebook she\'s going to call you laughter. 她喜歡你上傳的小狗的照片，如果你不再把它們放到 Facebook 上，她就會叫你笑。 > Doesn\'t matter if the other thing is like more technologically innovative and cool now that an organic growth company you don\'t have these things. 如果另一件事在技術上更創新、更酷，那就無所謂了，因為一家有機成長型公司沒有這些東西。 > And so you don\'t really care about that and you don\'t need to go for a land grab in a land grab won\'t help you because you\'re not grabbing virgin territory. 所以你不關心這個，你也不需要去搶土地，搶地對你沒有幫助，因為你不是在搶處女地。 > So that\'s what get big fast means you need to be really big in order to create real value. 這就是快速變大的原因，這意味著為了創造真正的價值，你需要變得很大。 > And with organic growth you\'re in there for the long haul. 隨著有機的增長，你將在那里度過漫長的一段時間。 > It took us 10 years to build fog bugs into a respectable business. 我們花了 10 年的時間才把迷霧蟲打造成一家體面的企業。 > And the reason is that there are a million bug trackers out there. 原因是那里有一百萬個 bug 追蹤器。 > `[00:16:48]` And so with organic growth business you unless you have infinite money because you were born rich or something you need to break even right away and you find a way to break even right away and we did that by consulting by essentially you know sort of sorting ourselves out for a couple months to raise a little bit of cash and you want to start getting money from clients on day one and you want to start kind of obsessing about a need to make this business survive. `[00:16:48]` 因此，對于有機增長業務，除非你有無限的錢，因為你生來富有，或者你需要馬上實現收支平衡，你找到了一種立即實現收支平衡的方法。從客戶的第一天，你想開始有點困擾的需要，使這一業務生存。 > So I can be there to slowly pry away customers 1 1 dead customer at a time from my end. 這樣，我就可以慢慢地從我的終點開始，逐個撬開顧客，11000 個死去的顧客。 > One thing about an organic growth business is you don\'t go in here unless you have a product that\'s valuable. 有機增長企業的一件事是，除非你有一種有價值的產品，否則你不會進入這里。 > Even with one customer. 即使只有一個顧客。 > So the ideal business is something with a first person that downloads it and starts using it already getting value out of this thing. 因此，理想的業務是有第一個人下載它并開始使用它，它已經從這個東西中獲得了價值。 > `[00:17:31]` You run your business completely differently. `[00:17:31]` 你的經營方式完全不同。 > So when you when you\'re trying to get big fast. 所以當你試圖快速變大的時候。 > If you have a problem that can be solved with money. 如果你有一個可以用金錢解決的問題。 > Money is cheap which sounds weird but in this environment it\'s if you have a successful Get Big Fast business it\'s very easy to raise money. 錢很便宜，這聽起來很奇怪，但在這種環境下，如果你成功地獲得了“快速大生意”，就很容易籌集資金。 > There\'s a lot of capitalists that are looking for places to put their money and so you use that need to try to solve problems even if it\'s a very expensive way of solving them. 很多資本家都在尋找投資的地方，所以你可以用這種方法來解決問題，即使這是一種非常昂貴的解決問題的方法。 > But in an organic growth company you\'re trying to survive. 但在一家有機成長型公司，你正在努力生存。 > You\'re just trying to stay around for as long as you possibly can. 你只是想盡可能長時間地呆在這里。 > So you you try to be frugal and cheap about everything that you do. 所以你試著在你所做的每件事上變得節儉和廉價。 > Similarly when you\'re trying to get big fast you put up a little signs all over the office that say Move fast and break break stuff. 同樣地，當你試圖快速變大的時候，你會在辦公室里貼上一小塊牌子，上面寫著“快速移動”和“打碎東西”。 > And the idea is to make lots of mistakes. 我們的想法是犯很多錯誤。 > It doesn\'t matter you\'ve got to be moving fast you can\'t be scared in any way you just got to be running down the hill with an organic growth business. 這不重要，你必須快速行動，你不能害怕，你只需要跑下山，有一個有機的增長業務。 > Those mistakes can kill you. 那些錯誤會害死你的。 > And when they kill you you don\'t have any way to come back. 當他們殺了你就沒有辦法回來了。 > The thing that scared us at Falls Creek all the time is that if we ran out of money in the bank we would have to close. 一直以來，Falls Creek 令我們感到害怕的是，如果銀行里的錢用完了，我們就得關門。 > We did not have a source of a million dollars to stick into the business to survive one more month. 我們沒有一百萬美元的資金可以繼續經營下去才能再活一個月。 > So you\'re much much more careful in an organic growth business because you have to be because this is your only business and that means that they get big fast business you have a tiny teeny weeny very very very small chance of of it becoming a 10 billion dollar business. 所以你在有機增長業務中要小心得多，因為你必須這么做，因為這是你唯一的生意，這意味著他們得到了巨大的、快速的生意，你有很小的機會把它變成 100 億美元的生意。 > `[00:18:50]` And I just made up the number 10 billion but you know really really big business. `[00:18:50]` 我剛剛創造了 100 億，但你知道很大的生意。 > And if you consider that you know of all the why or let\'s say you all apply to white hominum and you all get in. 如果你認為你知道所有的原因，或者說你們都申請了白人同性戀，你們都會加入。 > I\'m sure that\'s not in the cards. 我肯定那不是卡上的。 > You know two of you actually of all the people in this room that apply to Y Combinator and the 60 70 80 at are not going to get in you know maybe two or three of them have a chance of being a 10 million dollar business and that\'s being really really optimistic it\'s actually less than that. 你們知道，你們中的兩個人，實際上，在這間屋子里所有申請 Y 組合的人中，有 607080 人是不會進入的，你知道，也許他們中的兩三個人有機會成為一家一千萬美元的公司，而且他們中的兩個人真的很樂觀。 > So your chances of you making a ten dollar 10 billion dollar business this way by starting out trying to get big fast are vanishingly small I\'m afraid and some people like those odds. 所以，你以這樣的方式做 100 億美元的生意，試圖快速獲得更大的成功的機會是微不足道的，我擔心，有些人喜歡這種可能性。 > So good for them. 對他們太好了。 > Some people incidentally all the people that make 10 billion dollars couldn\'t care less. 有些人順便說一句，所有賺了 100 億美元的人都不在乎。 > They\'re doing it because they\'re scratchiness. 他們這么做是因為他們身上沒有抓痕。 > They\'re trying to solve some problem that they have in then monitor maniacally focused on that it\'s never because they want to make them deadline. 他們試圖解決一些他們在其中的問題，然后瘋狂地關注這個問題，因為他們不想讓他們的最后期限到來。 > Now with an organic growth company though if you\'re just reasonably smart and you pay attention and you never make a terrible mistake then you\'re gonna make a nice 10 million dollar business. 現在有了一家有機成長型公司，如果你相當聰明，而且你注意到了，你永遠不會犯一個可怕的錯誤，那么你就會有一個好的 1000 萬美元的生意。 > And the number means 10 million means 10 revenue a year. 這個數字意味著每年 10，000，000 美元的收入。 > And at some point that\'s just gonna be a million to operate it 9 million it can go in your pocket if you own it and you have a really good chance of being able to build that in five to 10 years an organic growth business is not that hard as a lot of businesses like that. 在某種程度上，如果你擁有它，你就有機會在 5 到 10 年內建立起一個有機增長的企業，一個有機增長的企業并不像很多這樣的企業那么難，從某種意義上說，運營它的話，900 萬美元就可以進入你的口袋，如果你擁有它，你就有很好的機會建立它。 > When I used to write a column for Inc magazine and I always wanted to write something about voices and my editor always said nobody nobody. 當我曾經為 Inc 雜志寫專欄的時候，我總是想寫一些關于聲音的東西，我的編輯總是說沒有人。 > No entrepreneur takes money from that it. 沒有任何企業家會從中獲得金錢。 > At such a now a world of people that get investments from overseas is such a tiny sliver of entrepreneurship that if we write about that in pages of our magazine we get hate mail because nobody cares. 在這樣一個世界上，從海外獲得投資的人是如此微小的創業精神，如果我們在雜志上寫到這一點，我們就會收到仇恨郵件，因為沒人在乎。 > It doesn\'t apply to their businesses the millions of businesses out there that are making somebody you know around a million dollars. 它不適用于他們的企業，也不適用于那些讓你認識的人賺了大約一百萬美元的數百萬家企業。 > `[00:20:38]` So again that\'s those are the two models are you bootstrapping or are you takingB.S. `[00:20:38]` 這兩種模式是你自己的，還是你的 B.S。 > And again there are millions of organic growth companies and they\'re very very small number of get big fast companies. 還有數以百萬計的有機成長型公司，他們是數量很少的快速成長的大公司。 > I wrote a few hundred. 我寫了幾百封信。 > But that\'s like the entire universe of companies in the world is this like one every decade or so from Silicon Valley. 但這就像世界上所有的公司，就像硅谷每隔十年就有一家這樣的公司。 > `[00:20:57]` And not being able to decide is what\'s really going to kill you. `[00:20:57]` 而不能做出決定才是真正要殺你的。 > So let me see if I can sort of finish a little bit of the story about about PHOG Oregon stack exchange with stack exchange. 所以讓我看看我能不能完成一個關于 Phog 俄勒岡州堆棧交換和堆棧交換的故事。 > Again we decided that it was a landgrab type of business and we spent a few years working on it just everyday working from home and being frugal and all that kind of stuff just to see where we get. 再一次，我們決定這是一種搶占土地的生意，我們花了幾年的時間在這上面工作，每天在家工作，節儉等等，只是為了看看我們能得到什么。 > Now one thing I don\'t know if anybody mentioned here but if you are actually trying to raise money you\'re always delaying as much as possible the actual raising of money because as your company becomes more and more valuable over time let\'s say your company now is worth a million dollars for next year can be worth 10 million dollars in order if you sell shares you\'re actually going to have to sell fewer shares to get the same amount of cash into your bank account. 現在，我不知道這里是否有人提到過，但如果你真的試圖籌集資金，你總是盡可能推遲實際的籌資，因為隨著時間的推移，你的公司變得越來越有價值，假設你的公司現在價值 100 萬美元，明年的價值可以達到 1000 萬美元。必須賣出更少的股票才能把同樣數量的現金存入你的銀行賬戶。 > So at any given time you always want to be raising the minimum amount of money you need to barely survive as a general general rule. 因此，在任何特定的時間，你總是希望籌集到最低限度的資金，作為一個普遍的規則，你幾乎無法生存。 > And if you can delay the raising of money the very very first time then your life is much better because you have to do less when you want to raise money and it\'s easier to raise money when you have a nice story about how successful you\'ve been on your own. 如果你第一次就能推遲籌集資金，那么你的生活就會好得多，因為當你想籌集資金時，你必須少做一些事情，如果你有一個很好的故事，說明你自己是多么成功，那就更容易籌集資金。 > So stock exchange was sort of technically bootstrapped for two years. 所以證券交易所在技術上有兩年的經驗。 > It was called Stack Overflow then and there were only three people working on full time and an awful lot of people from our community volunteering and helping out. 當時叫做 Stack 溢出，當時只有三個人全職工作，我們社區有很多人做志愿者和幫忙。 > But it was really three full time hours that we\'re working mostly without pay from home. 但實際上是三個全天候的工作時間，我們主要是在家里無償工作。 > We built the servers are we. 我們建造的服務器就是我們。 > Jeff would built the service himself with his hands and he optimized them to make them really really fast. Jeff 會親自動手構建這項服務，并對其進行了優化，使其變得非常快速。 > You put in a lot of RAM and he got really good SSD drives and all kind of stuff. 你投入了很多內存，他得到了非常好的 SSD 驅動器和諸如此類的東西。 > We used a compiled language which is unheard of which actually allowed us to run this gigantic site on a very small number of web servers. 我們使用了一種編譯語言，這是聞所未聞的，它實際上允許我們在極少數的 Web 服務器上運行這個龐大的站點。 > It was remarkably small I mean for the longest time we had three boxes on on the on the rack. 它非常小，我的意思是，在最長的時間里，我們在架子上有三個盒子。 > And now we don\'t but I think we could probably fit on rack for four Stack Exchange right now which is a top 100 Web site in terms of traffic. 現在我們沒有了，但是我認為我們現在可能適合四層棧交換，這是一個流量排名前 100 的網站。 > So you know we were sort of we worked on trying to save money on the servers. 所以你知道我們在努力節省服務器上的錢。 > We were reasonably frugal people were working from home there was no office. 我們相當節儉，人們在家工作，沒有辦公室。 > But we realized after a couple of years that this was a get big fast business. 但幾年后，我們意識到這是一項快速發展的大生意。 > And I\'ll tell you why. 我來告訴你為什么。 > If it\'s not obvious with a question and answer website there are network there are very strong network effects. 如果問答網站不明顯，就會有很強的網絡效果。 > You go to the site where you\'re most likely get an answer. 你去你最有可能得到答案的網站。 > And we dominate for programmers and pretty much anything related to programmers including system administrators and school administrators and Sequel. 我們主宰著程序員，幾乎所有與程序員有關的東西，包括系統管理員、學校管理員和續集。 > Sequel query writers and all those things that are close to programmers we dominate in math. 續集查詢作者和所有那些接近程序員的東西，我們在數學上占主導地位。 > We have two math sites the research and not research and we have about 90 categories where we don\'t quite dominate in most of them meaning somewhere else is another Web site out there. 我們有兩個數學網站，研究，而不是研究，我們有大約 90 個類別，我們在其中大多數并不占主導地位，這意味著其他地方是另一個網站。 > It\'s a better place to get answers to your questions about whatever it may be. 它是一個更好的地方，以獲得答案，你的問題，無論是什么。 > So a good example of that is Apple. 蘋果就是一個很好的例子。 > We have Apple Duffe vaccines ICOM it\'s a pretty good site I would guesstimate that it has maybe 20 percent of the market for question and answers about Apple products. 我們有蘋果杜夫疫苗，ICOM，這是一個很好的網站，我猜想它大概有 20%的市場是關于蘋果產品的問題和答案。 > It\'s a much better site but there is more traffic on Apple\'s own site and on other forums about Apple. 這是一個更好的網站，但在蘋果自己的網站和其他有關蘋果的論壇上有更多的流量。 > So that\'s it. 就這樣了。 > That\'s the landgrab that we\'re trying to get because none of those other sites yet have the magical up vote down vote badges karma reputation all the comments all the nice stuff that Stack Exchange has that makes it work as a Q and A platform. 這就是我們想要得到的土地，因為其他網站中沒有一個擁有神奇的向上投票，徽章，業力，聲譽，所有的評論，所有的好東西，這些東西使得它成為一個 Q 和 A 平臺。 > And it\'s not like people can\'t figure this out and there\'s not a single person that builds a Cuney site anymore that doesn\'t have an up vote in the down vote button. 這并不是說人們無法理解這一點，也沒有一個人建立了一個 Cuney 網站，在“向下投票”按鈕中沒有“向上投票”。 > That\'s not so hard to figure out. 這并不難搞清楚。 > So that\'s the landgrab is we need to take all the traffic away we know we can take traffic away from an old boring forum because those suck and it\'s a terrible place to get your questions answered. 這就是我們需要把所有的交通都帶走，我們知道我們可以把交通從一個舊的無聊的論壇上帶走，因為這些都很爛，而且這是一個讓你的問題得到回答的糟糕的地方。 > And what we have is ten times better than that and we can displace those. 我們所擁有的比這好十倍，我們可以取代那些。 > But if somebody else builds a stack exchange kind of work like with up votes and down votes in some category let\'s say physical anthropology that we don\'t have a site in then they\'re going to take that market and they\'re going to have that network effect. 但是，如果其他人建立了一種堆棧交換方式，比如在某些類別中使用向上投票和向下投票的方式-比如說物理人類學-我們在那里沒有網站，那么他們就會占領這個市場，他們就會產生這種網絡效應。 > So this is obviously a land grab and we needed to move as fast as absolutely possible to capture as much as possible of this territory before it got divided up by other people. 因此，這顯然是一次土地掠奪，我們需要盡可能快地采取行動，在這塊領土被其他人瓜分之前，盡可能多地占領它。 > And that\'s why we raised. 這就是為什么我們提出。 > That\'s why we raised money. 這就是我們籌集資金的原因。 > But this time when we were raising money it was like falling off a log is the easiest thing in the world. 但這一次，當我們籌集資金時，它就像從原木上掉下來一樣，是世界上最簡單的事情。 > I only talked to VCR that I actually wanted to invest in the company. 我只和錄像機談過我真的想投資這家公司。 > I didn\'t go knocking on every single door. 我沒有去敲每一扇門。 > I spent exactly two weeks on the fundraising and that was done and that\'s all. 我花了整整兩周的時間來籌集資金，然后就完成了，僅此而已。 > That\'s all it took. 這就夠了。 > And I was able to raise from my number one choice ofE.S. 我可以從我的第一選擇 E.S。 > which was Union Square Ventures. 聯合廣場風投公司。 > Like I say it took about two weeks to put together. 就像我說的，花了大約兩周的時間。 > It was very very easy. 很簡單。 > And that was because of you know 10 years of work building Fog Creek and getting a reputation. 這是因為你知道 10 年的工作，建造霧溪，并獲得了聲譽。 > And two years of work building Stack Exchange and getting all that momentum. 兩年的工作建立了 Stack Exchange 并獲得了所有的動力。 > So anything you can do to boost bootstrap anything you can do to defer the moment where you need to go raise some money from somebody so that you\'re in a better position is going to make it so much easier to raise money under under under far better terms that\'s really really worth doing. 所以，你能做的任何事情都能促進你的成功，任何你能做的事情，在你需要從某人那里籌到一些錢，以便你處于一個更好的地位的時候，都會使你在更好的條件下籌集資金變得更加容易，這是非常值得去做的。 > `[00:25:55]` The other the other part of that story actually is I have four minutes left to go. `[00:25:55]` 故事的另一部分實際上是我還有四分鐘的時間。 > `[00:26:00]` The other part of that story is another product the Fox we started doing now I had to move over to stack and stack exchange is now 75 employees and we\'re just we\'re building a 30000 square foot office in Manhattan which is with a kitchen everything is going to be fancy and expensive and it\'s going to cost us like cost like five million dollars to build out with the landlords paying some of that. `[00:26:00]` 故事的另一部分是福克斯公司現在開始做的另一件產品，我不得不搬到堆疊，現在我們有 75 名員工，我們只是在曼哈頓建了一間 30000 平方英尺的辦公室，那里有一間廚房，一切都很花哨和昂貴，這將花費我們大約五百萬美元來建造房子，房東們會付一部分錢。 > So we\'re doing like these amazing big things. 所以我們就像這些了不起的大事一樣。 > It\'s Stack Exchange. 這是堆棧交換。 > We have a lot of employees. 我們有很多員工。 > We have an office in Denver we have an office in London. 我們在丹佛有一個辦事處，在倫敦有一個辦事處。 > We have like I said something that\'s a 50 minute million global users if you allow me to double count some of them. 就像我說的那樣，如果你允許我對其中一些用戶進行雙重統計的話，那就是全球 5 千萬用戶。 > We\'re top 100 websites so that took a lot of work. 我們是排名前 100 的網站，所以這需要做大量的工作。 > I became CEO eventually a stack exchange and it became a full time job. 我最終成為了首席執行官，成為了一份全職工作。 > And it turns out you can\'t be CEO of two companies at once because of the IP problem if you invent something it\'s you know both companies would claim to own it. 事實證明，由于知識產權問題，你不可能同時成為兩家公司的首席執行官，如果你發明了某種東西，你知道，兩家公司都會聲稱擁有它。 > So. 所以 > So I only work for Stack Exchange although I\'m still on the board of Creegan I did my Tozan every once in a while. 所以我只為 StackExchange 工作，雖然我還在 Creegan 董事會工作，但我偶爾也會做一次 Tozan。 > And what they started working on a Greek thuggery by the way is now let\'s say 45 employees and it\'s a cash machine that just because fog bugs is like a mint money every month and we\'re kind of like a kibbutz. 順便說一句，他們開始研究希臘的殺人事件，現在假設有 45 名員工，這是一臺自動取款機，僅僅因為霧蟲每月都像薄荷幣，而我們就像個集體農場。 > And so at the end of the year in July we take all the profit and divide it up among the employees based on seniority. 因此，在今年 7 月底，我們拿走了所有的利潤，并根據資歷將其分配給員工。 > So whatever money is left in the business at the end of the year goes to the employees depending on how long they\'ve been there. 因此，不管年底企業剩下多少錢，都要視員工在公司工作的時間而定。 > We don\'t dividend it out to shareholders. 我們不把它分給股東。 > We just pay it in bonuses to the employees. 我們只是向員工發放獎金。 > So if you\'ve been a factory employee for several years you\'re probably doubling your salary on that on that profit share. 因此，如果你已經在工廠工作了幾年，那么你的工資就可能是這個利潤的兩倍。 > So this is the thing that Minns cash because we\'re not really. 所以這就是明斯的現金，因為我們不是真的。 > It\'s not that you know we keep selling the product in a long after we\'ve written it. 這并不是說我們寫完產品后很久就一直在賣。 > Though we are still working on that one. 雖然我們還在研究這個問題。 > We recently Fogg launched a new product called Trello. 我們最近推出了一款名為 Trello 的新產品。 > This launched about a year ago and that\'s actually a Get Big Fast landgrab business as well. 這是大約一年前推出的，實際上，這也是一項快速搶奪土地的業務。 > Trello is online kind of organization software yellow logo. Trello 是一種在線的組織軟件黃色標志。 > Check it out. 去看看。 > It\'s really awesome. 真的很棒。 > And in the years since we launched we went from zero to I think about 800000 users and it\'s doing great. 在我們推出后的幾年里，我們的用戶數量從零上升到了 800000，而且它做得很好。 > It said it needs a dev team of about 10 people. 它說，它需要一個大約 10 人的開發團隊。 > What we have to work on every stupid mobile platform under the sun so we got somebody working on iPhone and somebody working on Android and somebody working on a Windows Surface. 我們必須在太陽底下的每個愚蠢的移動平臺上工作，所以我們讓一些人在 iPhone 上工作，有人在 Android 上工作，有人在 Windows Surface 上工作。 > And. 和 > `[00:28:17]` No no that was my idea. `[00:28:17]` 不，那是我的主意。 > `[00:28:20]` And the web app and adding new features all the time and we don\'t actually understand exactly how we\'re gonna make money off of Trello we\'re not quite sure about that because we thought free was a really good price if we wanted to reduce friction so we could get big really really fast and get all those wonderful network effects and have this massive land grab we\'re Trello takes over the world of project management. `[00:28:20]` 網絡應用和不斷添加新功能-我們并不完全理解我們如何從 Trello 賺到錢-我們不太確定這一點，因為我們認為如果我們想要減少摩擦，那么我們就可以得到一個非常好的價格，這樣我們就可以獲得巨大的、非常快的網絡效果，并且擁有這種大規模的土地占用，我們將 Trello 接管了整個項目管理的世界。 > And eventually you know as everybody here has said we\'ll figure out some way to make money on that. 最終，你知道，正如在座的每個人都說的，我們會想出辦法來賺錢的。 > In the meantime I\'ve got ten employees working on that and impactful a service that I\'ve got to add a new server to every couple of weeks. 同時，我有 10 名員工在做這方面的工作，并影響到一項服務，我需要每隔幾周就添加一臺新服務器。 > And that costs money. 這要花錢。 > But we have this lovely cash cow a fog bugs it\'s sort of spewing out extra money. 但是我們有一只可愛的搖錢樹，一只迷霧的蟲子-它好像是在吐額外的錢。 > So we asked the shareholders of Fog Creek which is the employees we said hey can we use your bonus that we would have paid you in profit share and just plow that back into Trello and you\'re never gonna see it again. 所以我們問 FogCreek 的股東，也就是我們說過的員工，嘿，我們能用你的獎金嗎？我們本來可以付給你利潤份額，然后再把錢投回特雷洛，你就再也見不到了。 > And they said yes and. 他們答應了。 > We didn\'t have to go go to a VCR and we didn\'t have to go to an outside vesi and by the time if we ever get to the point where we just need a hold data center in Oregon somewhere in order to run Trella which will happen and we do need Veazey at that point at that point we\'re going in with traction with an established team with a product has already proven itself and you can take an investment on a very very good terms even if you want to and so at that point I imagine you wouldn\'t give up any control of the company. 我們不需要去錄像機，我們也不需要去外面的 VISI，到那時，我們需要在俄勒岡州的某個地方建立一個保持數據中心，以便運行 Trella，而我們需要 Veazey，在那個時候，我們需要一個已經建立起來的團隊。一個產品已經證明了自己，你可以非常好的條件進行投資，即使你愿意，所以我想你不會放棄對公司的任何控制。 > Even now I think we raised money we wouldn\'t give up any control you\'d probably still continue to have an absolute control over the board at that stage and you wouldn\'t take very much dilution because because the valuation would be so high even though we don\'t actually make any money. 即使現在我認為我們籌集到了資金，我們也不會放棄任何控制權-在那個階段，你可能仍然對董事會擁有絕對的控制權，而且你也不會接受太多的稀釋，因為即使我們實際上沒有賺到任何錢，估值也會很高。 > So I\'m sort out of time but this is the important part of what I\'ve been trying to spew here at about a million words per minute. 所以我已經沒有時間了，但這是我試圖以每分鐘一百萬字的速度在這里吐出來的重要部分。 > This is normally a two hour speech. 這通常是兩個小時的演講。 > You have to decide if you\'re going to be a slow growth company or get big fast company because any time you try to straddle those two lines painful things happen to you. 你必須決定你是一家成長緩慢的公司，還是一家快速發展的大公司，因為每當你試圖跨越這兩條線時，痛苦的事情就會發生在你身上。 > I\'m traumatized absolute traumatized because Juno Online Services where I work for years was actually competing against AOL and AOL was just going all out sending everybody these damn floppy disks so that everybody would sign up for AOL because it was a land grab. 我受到了極大的創傷，因為我工作了多年的 Juno 在線服務公司實際上是在與 AOL 競爭，而 AOL 正全力向所有人發送這些該死的軟盤，這樣每個人都會注冊 AOL，因為這是一次搶奪土地的行為。 > There was a land grab going on and AOL had instant messenger and instant messenger had network effects and AOL had lock in. 搶奪土地，AOL 有即時通訊，即時通訊有網絡效果，AOL 有鎖定。 > Because once you had your Lacewell email address you never wanted to move to somewhere else because you\'d have to tell 400 people about your new email address. 因為一旦你有了 Lacewell 電子郵件地址，你就不會想搬到其他地方，因為你必須告訴 400 人你的新電子郵件地址。 > So AOL was building this remarkable landgrab business with all kinds of network effects and Lokken and stuff like that. 所以 AOL 建立了一項了不起的土地搶占業務，包括各種網絡效應和 Lokken 之類的東西。 > And you had every single one of those things but was kind of growing in a more bootstrapping way because they were afraid to spend the money on the little stupid little floppy disks. 你擁有所有這些東西，但卻以一種更有創意的方式成長，因為他們害怕把錢花在那些愚蠢的小軟盤上。 > And now Juno is a dial up ISP and I don\'t even know what AOL is anymore. 現在 Juno 是一個撥號的 ISP，我甚至不知道 AOL 是什么了。 > `[00:30:59]` But laughter but for a while AOL is a lot bigger. `[00:30:59]` 但是笑聲，但在一段時間內，AOL 要大得多。 > `[00:31:03]` So I was traumatized by that kind of failure to commit to one mode of bootstrapping or the other mode of getting really big fast. `[00:31:03]` 所以我受到了那種失敗的創傷，因為我沒有致力于一種引導方式，或者另一種快速增長的方式。 > And I think you should decide what you want to do. 我認為你應該決定你想做什么。 > You can really control your own destiny if you\'re willing to take a few more years and bootstrap with a small kind of reliable business and use that to build your next stage which is your facebook Netscape Groupon for squirrels. 如果你愿意再花幾年的時間來開創一家可靠的小公司，然后用它來建立你的下一個階段，那就是你的 Facebook、網景、松鼠 Groupon，你就能真正掌控自己的命運。 > Thank you very much. 非常感謝