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                合規國際互聯網加速 OSASE為企業客戶提供高速穩定SD-WAN國際加速解決方案。 廣告
                # Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014 > `[00:00:02]` Well do you think we\'d be here now. `[00:00:02]` 你認為我們現在會在這里嗎? > `[00:00:06]` So five years ago Matthew I was sitting in your seats. `[00:00:06]` 那么,五年前,馬修,我坐在你的座位上。 > We started Clotfelter five years ago and I thought I just tell you a little bit of what\'s happened those five years and then we get into some of the things we\'ve learned along the way. 我們五年前創辦了 Clotfelter,我想我只需要告訴你這五年發生了什么,然后我們就會了解到我們在這過程中學到的一些東西。 > `[00:00:19]` So you guys can build really big successful companies too. `[00:00:19]` 這樣你們就可以建立真正成功的大公司了。 > And so today. 所以今天。 > So what does Klopfer do. 那么 Klopfer 是做什么的。 > We\'re building a better Internet. 我們正在建設一個更好的互聯網。 > We have 2 million customers who have signed up for a service all around the world including Y Combinator fluting Y Combinator and why people sign up is that we make their web properties load fast. 我們有 200 萬用戶已經在世界各地注冊了一項服務,其中包括 Y Combinator、Flating Y Combinator 以及人們注冊的原因是我們讓他們的 Web 屬性加載得更快。 > We protect them from online cyber attacks including DNS tax. 我們保護他們免受網絡攻擊,包括 DNS 稅。 > We just make sure we load balance make it available available. 我們只需確保負載平衡,讓它可用。 > We just make the Internet run better. 我們只是讓互聯網運行得更好。 > `[00:00:48]` We\'re Cisco as a service. `[00:00:48]` 我們是思科的一家服務公司。 > It\'s good service. 這是很好的服務。 > `[00:00:52]` It\'s only you know 250 billion dollar market cap area. `[00:00:52]` 只有你知道 2,500 億美元的市值。 > `[00:00:57]` And so over these five years we have 2 million customers we have about 120 employees in San Francisco and London two offices. `[00:00:57]` 因此,在這五年中,我們有 200 萬客戶,我們在舊金山和倫敦的兩個辦事處有大約 120 名員工。 > And everyday about 3000 new people sign up for our service. 每天約有 3000 人報名參加我們的服務。 > It\'s been definitely a rocket ship if you look at our growth numbers. 如果你看看我們的增長數字,它肯定是一艘火箭飛船。 > It is the perfect opt in to the right on all metrics just grow grow grow grow growth growth growth growth growth. 這是最完美的選擇,在所有衡量標準上都是正確的,只是增長。 > `[00:01:18]` And yet last night I was at your house having dinner freaking out about what in the world where we\'re going to talk to these people about. `[00:01:18]` 然而昨晚我在你家吃晚餐,為我們將要和這些人談論的世界上的什么事而發狂。 > And Andrew back stage is saying is it basically just going to be the here\'s why you should sign up for CloudFlare show which we definitely don\'t want to do so. 后臺的安德魯說,這基本上就是你為什么要報名參加 CloudFlare 秀的原因,我們絕對不想這樣做。 > Definitely not. 絕對不是那么回事 > What what what what what do you want to talk with. 你想和什么說話。 > Well I had no idea. 我完全不知道。 > `[00:01:43]` Truth be told he\'s very nervous. `[00:01:43]` 事實告訴他,他很緊張。 > He\'s like how are we going to make this without seeming lame. 他就像我們怎樣才能做到這一點而不顯得蹩腳。 > And I was like No no I feel like we actually I think seeing cofounders together and dynamics you. 我就像,不,我覺得我們實際上,我認為看到聯合創始人在一起,讓你充滿活力。 > Many of you probably have cofounders and I feel like there\'s a lot of stories online where things don\'t necessarily work out where they end up no longer talking or getting pushed out. 你們中的許多人可能都有共同創始人,我覺得網上有很多故事,在這些故事中,事情不一定會解決,結果他們不再說話或被排擠出去。 > I think seeing a model where five years in we still talk to one another. 我想看到一個模特,在這五年里,我們還在互相交談。 > `[00:02:07]` We\'re at a distinct disadvantage because we\'re neither of us is very funny and neither of us has been fired. `[00:02:07]` 我們處于一個明顯的劣勢,因為我們倆都不是很有趣,而且我們都沒有被解雇。 > `[00:02:12]` So you know Andrew definitely has laughter. `[00:02:12]` 所以你知道安德魯肯定有笑聲。 > He was. 他是。 > `[00:02:29]` So when we started was people come to us. `[00:02:29]` 所以當我們開始的時候,有人來找我們。 > We talked on hours all the time like how did you do it. 我們一直在聊天,就像你是怎么做到的。 > Like how did you get to where you are today. 就像你是如何到達今天的位置的。 > And what I would say is there\'s no silver bullet. 我要說的是沒有銀彈。 > There\'s really no silver bullet. 真的沒有銀彈。 > And you know you\'ve heard lots of successful and incredible line of speakers today tell their version of what you need to do to be successful. 你知道你已經聽過很多成功和難以置信的演講者今天告訴他們你需要做些什么才能成功。 > And you know Matthew has his analogy about sharks and mosquitoes and I think that\'s a really good place to start. 馬修對鯊魚和蚊子有他的類比,我認為這是一個很好的開始。 > `[00:02:56]` So you know I think that there are three of us started CloudFlare and Micheles the person that makes the trains run on time. `[00:02:56]` 所以你知道,我想我們有三個人開始了 CloudFlare 和 Micheles,那個讓火車準時運行的人。 > She she\'s essentially our CEO although we\'ll talk about why actually that\'s not we don\'t have titles really. 她本質上是我們的首席執行官,盡管我們會討論為什么實際上我們沒有頭銜。 > Lee Holloway we don\'t leave the let him leave the office. 李?霍洛威,我們不讓他離開辦公室。 > He\'s currently chained to his desk writing code right now. 他現在被鎖在書桌上寫代碼了。 > And so he\'s the one actually building this stuff and my role is basically to assemble the IKEA furniture and tell the story of what we\'re doing which is actually strangely a really important role. 所以他才是真正建造這些東西的人,我的角色基本上是組裝宜家的家具,講述我們正在做的事情,這實際上是一個非常重要的角色。 > But you need those three things in order to do it. 但你需要這三件事才能做到。 > And so you know I think a lot of times in early on you know we freaked out about how are we going to raise money and how reacted you know how are we going to get media and how we\'re going to press and what you know I really have always valued in Michelle\'s role has been what Michelle worries about more than anything is you know how are we going to. 所以你知道,我想很多時候,你知道,我們害怕我們如何籌集資金,我們如何反應,你知道我們將如何獲得媒體,我們將如何出版,你知道我一直很重視米歇爾的角色,而米歇爾最擔心的是,你知道我們將如何去做。 > How are we going to hire people. 我們要怎么雇人。 > How are we to make sure people get along when they\'re in the office. 我們怎樣才能確保人們在辦公室里相處融洽。 > How are we going to make sure we\'re planning making sure things get done. 我們怎樣才能確保我們的計劃能夠完成。 > `[00:04:05]` And again as Michelle references it\'s a little bit like worrying about sharks versus mosquitoes I tend to worry about the sharks that are out there. `[00:04:05]` 米歇爾再次提到,這有點像擔心鯊魚和蚊子一樣,我傾向于擔心外面的鯊魚。 > But it turns out that if you look at it around the world sharks only kill about six people a year tally 10 10 people a year. 但事實證明,如果你環顧世界,鯊魚每年只殺 6 個人,每年 10 人。 > Mosquitoes kill hundreds of thousands millions of people a year and 50000 there you see says she. 她說,蚊子每年殺死數億人,在那里殺死 50000 人。 > And so sweating those little details ends up being a significantly bigger deal in terms of being successful. 因此,從成功的角度看,汗流浹背的小細節最終是一筆大得多的交易。 > We early on I mean when we first interviewed a PR firm that we hired and we were like We need to be on stage at every event talking about how we\'re going to change the Internet. 我們很早的時候,我是說,當我們第一次采訪一家我們雇傭的公關公司時,我們覺得我們需要在每一場活動中都站在舞臺上,談論我們將如何改變互聯網。 > We\'re building a better internet and everyone just said Whoa whoa whoa whoa slow slow slow down. 我們正在建設一個更好的網絡,每個人都說,哇,慢點。 > And again Michelle to her credit was always focused on how do we hire great people. 米歇爾的功勞總是集中在我們如何雇傭優秀的員工上。 > How do we listen to our customers. 我們如何傾聽顧客的意見。 > How do we solve those little problems that aren\'t particularly sexy that don\'t get written up in the news but that are absolutely critical. 我們如何解決那些小問題,這些小問題不是特別性感,沒有寫在新聞上,但絕對是關鍵的。 > `[00:05:09]` And so you know I think that I think that that\'s part of why we\'ve made made a pretty good team. `[00:05:09]` 所以你知道我認為這就是為什么我們組成了一支很好的球隊的原因之一。 > `[00:05:15]` And so what does that mean early on. `[00:05:15]` 那意味著什么呢? > So again five years ago we started with literally 35 years ago and for the first year we just built built the product behind the scenes and then opened up a private data. 再一次,五年前,我們從 35 年前開始,第一年我們只是在幕后建立了這個產品,然后打開了一個私有數據。 > So does that mean that means the first version of our product that we released we were if I was literally Marista I remember cringing when I said Oh God we\'re asking someone to sign up for it. 這是否意味著我們發布的產品的第一個版本-如果我是瑪莉斯塔的話-我還記得當時我說:“天哪,我們要請人報名。” > `[00:05:38]` I wasn\'t ready yet and I knew we had this long list of features but I eventually had to ship product and so we invited you know 10 people signed up 10 friends all 10 signed up and we took all ten Web sites off line. `[00:05:38]` 我還沒準備好,我知道我們有這么長的功能清單,但最終我不得不發布產品,所以我們邀請了 10 個人,注冊了 10 個朋友,所有 10 個都注冊了,我們把所有 10 個網站都取消了。 > `[00:05:53]` So the exact opposite of our value proposition of making things better and we fix those problems and have them sign up again. `[00:05:53]` 與我們的價值主張完全相反的是,我們把事情做得更好,我們解決了這些問題,并讓他們重新注冊。 > And then we took all 10 of them off line again. 然后我們又把所有的 10 個都調離了線。 > `[00:06:03]` So but then we fix those problems in the next 10 maybe eight went off line and we kept getting better and better and better and better. `[00:06:03]` 但是我們在接下來的 10 天里解決了這些問題,也許是 8 點,我們做得越來越好了。 > `[00:06:11]` It\'s amazing that they tolerated us. `[00:06:11]` 令人驚訝的是,他們容忍了我們。 > It was actually more like 90 percent of those initial customers are still users the 10 percent that dropped out just went out of business. 實際上,90%的初始客戶仍然是用戶,而退出的 10%剛剛倒閉。 > So it\'s now it\'s pretty boring. 所以現在很無聊。 > `[00:06:25]` And that\'s true and the way we are able to get these initial customers is often people say How do you get your first customers. `[00:06:25]` 這是真的,我們能夠得到這些最初顧客的方式通常是人們說你是如何得到你的第一批顧客的。 > It\'s really hard when we got to 100 customers we took the whole company into Vegas. 當我們有 100 個客戶時,我們把整個公司都帶到了拉斯維加斯,這真是太難了。 > There were six of us so it wasn\'t that many people but it was like a big celebration. 我們有六個人,所以沒有那么多人,但這就像是一個盛大的慶典。 > And so for months we tried to get to 100 customers. 因此,幾個月來,我們努力爭取到 100 個客戶。 > `[00:06:40]` It was really really hard that my father saw so when we there was no Amazon Web Services hadn\'t really taken off. `[00:06:40]` 當我們沒有亞馬遜網絡服務的時候,我父親很難看到它真的沒有起飛。 > We believe the guy chained to the desk and I had started an open source project a long time ago and we had about 80000 users and we needed servers to develop CloudFlare. 我們相信那個人被鎖在桌子上,我很久以前就開始了一個開源項目,我們有大約 80000 用戶,我們需要服務器來開發 CloudFlare。 > And I was like How are we going to get servers we don\'t have any money and what are we going to do. 我就像我們要如何得到服務器,我們沒有錢,我們要做什么。 > `[00:07:01]` And Michelle said you know you always talk about how loyal this project Honeycut community is. `[00:07:01]` 米歇爾說,你知道你總是談論這個項目蜂蜜社區是多么的忠誠。 > What if we just asked them if they can donate servers to us. 如果我們只是問他們能不能把服務器捐贈給我們呢。 > `[00:07:12]` And that seemed absurd at the time but we emailed anyone who was within about a 50 mile radius of Palo Alto which is where our first office was and said hey if you\'ve got an extra server and we there\'s been only about 200 people. `[00:07:12]` 當時這聽起來很荒謬,但我們給帕洛阿爾托(Palo Alto)方圓約 50 英里的人發了郵件,我們的第一間辦公室就在這里,如果你有額外的服務器,而我們只有大約 200 人,我們就會說嗨。 > We got a 70 percent response rate on people who said either I\'ve got some server or I know someone who does. 對于那些說我有服務器或者我認識某個人的人,我們得到了 70%的回應率。 > `[00:07:31]` And then Michelle in her Jatta which is the same car we actually drove down here and drove around from person to person to person picking up all of these servers none of which worked. `[00:07:31]` 然后米歇爾開著她的 Jatta,也就是我們開車來這里的那輛車,從一個人開車到另一個人,撿起所有這些服務器,這些服務器都不起作用。 > Putting them in the back of a car and then we assembled this to we got essentially to what turned into these Frankin servers that that was what that was what we originally built CloudFlare on. 把它們放在一輛車的后座上,然后我們把它組裝到-我們把它變成了這些 Frankin 服務器-這就是我們最初建造的 CloudFlare。 > But the most important part was Michelle actually showed up talk to these people said hey here\'s what we\'re thinking building what do you think. 但最重要的是,米歇爾真的出現了,對這些人說,嘿,這是我們的想法,你怎么想的? > `[00:08:00]` And they were the first people that were giving us feedback on hey I\'d use it if you did this but I wouldn\'t use it if you did that and that was that was really what what that that driving around in your Jetta I think was what kind of got our first. `[00:08:00]` 他們是第一批給我們反饋的人-嘿,如果你這么做,我會用它,但如果你那樣做,我就不會用它了-這就是在你的捷達里開來開去的那輛車,我認為這是我們的第一輛車。 > First people using the service. 第一批使用這項服務的人。 > `[00:08:14]` Yeah definitely although I also couldn\'t Cozza I had nothing else to do. `[00:08:14]` 當然,雖然我也不能,但我沒有別的事可做。 > So that was a good use of time. 所以這是很好的利用時間。 > `[00:08:20]` That\'s important. `[00:08:20]` 那很重要。 > It was like early on we had a conversation about you know Michelle Michelle\'s background was was in biochemistry and chemistry and and had worked did you know for Toshiba and Google and we had Metan in business school. 就像我們很早就聊了起來,你知道米歇爾的背景是生物化學和化學,你知道東芝和谷歌,我們在商學院有 Metan 嗎? > And you know from my perspective like I knew instantly that she was the sort of person that really filled in the blanks of the things that I wasn\'t good at. 你知道,從我的角度看,就像我馬上就知道她是那種真正填補了我不擅長的東西的空白的人。 > And I had known Lee for 10 years. 我認識李十年了。 > And what Michelle did was she just she made sure we got things done. 米歇爾所做的就是她確保我們能做好所有的事情。 > `[00:08:57]` And you know what we always talk about is early on people ask us a couple of things people would ask us if we were dating which was which was strengthened when we weren\'t and we\'re not and we\'re not still don\'t say that so hard. `[00:08:57]` 你知道,我們一直在談論的是,人們很早就會問我們,如果我們在約會的話,人們會問我們的幾件事-當我們沒有約會的時候,我們變得更堅強了,我們現在還沒有那么難說。 > Go hang out with Andrew. 去和安德魯出去玩。 > `[00:09:22]` So so they asked us that and then the other would they say they\'d say How do you split up issues and if you\'re sitting in the audience and you\'re a co-founder team and you\'re fighting about who does what. `[00:09:22]` 所以他們問我們這個問題,而另一個人會說他們會說你如何解決問題,如果你坐在觀眾席上,你是一個聯合創始人團隊,你在為誰做什么而爭吵。 > I hate to tell you this but you Prai have the wrong co-founder because like we\'ve I don\'t think we at any of the three of us have ever been so clear that lead builds the stuff. 我不想告訴你,但你卻錯了聯合創始人,因為就像我們一樣,我不認為我們三個人中的任何一個人都這么清楚,領導創造了這些東西。 > Michelle make sure it gets done and I assemble Ikea furniture that that\'s. 米歇爾確保它完成,我組裝宜家的家具。 > `[00:09:50]` You know think of it as a Venn diagram. `[00:09:50]` 你知道的,把它想象成一個文恩圖。 > Back to my science roots so we and I\'ve used this so many times where you know Matthew Lee and I were very different we cover so much surface area we have a little bit of overlap so we share the same vision and we trust one another and that makes an amazing founding team. 回到我的科學根源,我們和我用了這么多次,你們知道,馬修·李和我很不一樣,我們覆蓋了如此多的表面積,我們有一點重疊,所以我們有著相同的愿景,我們彼此信任,這是一個了不起的創始團隊。 > And so if you\'ve already picture cofounders I mean better to have the conversation now than in three years seriously because again five years in I now understand why cofounders get into fights and get pushed out of companies because your role changes and all these different sorts of dynamics happen. 因此,如果你已經想象過聯合創始人的形象,我的意思是現在進行談話要比三年后好,因為五年后,我再次明白為什么聯合創始人會卷入爭斗,被趕出公司,因為你的角色發生了變化,所有這些不同的動態都發生了。 > So today you should take a look at my cofounders. 所以今天你應該看看我的聯合創始人。 > `[00:10:26]` Do we do we cover a lot of surface area. `[00:10:26]` 我們是不是覆蓋了很多表面積? > Do we have different skill sets. 我們是否有不同的技能。 > And is it somebody that that I trust fundamentally and that those are really really really important questions to ask yourself because if so then you\'ve really strong foundation to go for it. 這是否是我從根本上信任的人,這些都是非常重要的問題,因為如果是這樣的話,你就有很強的基礎去追求它。 > And so I think for us we have we covered a lot of surface area whereas at first it wasn\'t obvious like that we are good co-founder. 因此,我認為,對于我們來說,我們已經覆蓋了很多表面積,而在開始的時候,并不是很明顯,我們是很好的聯合創始人。 > `[00:10:46]` I mean we didn\'t know each other that well we weren\'t that I mean we knew each other but we weren\'t like best friends not best friends. `[00:10:46]` 我的意思是,我們不太了解對方,我們不是說我們認識對方,而是我們不是最好的朋友,而是最好的朋友。 > `[00:10:52]` So sure we went to business school together but we were not we just didn\'t know each other and I did not know me at all. `[00:10:52]` 我們很確定我們一起上過商學院,但我們不是,只是彼此不認識,我一點也不了解我。 > `[00:10:57]` I knew him through Mano?l. `[00:10:57]` 我是通過 Mano l 認識他的。 > At first actually Lee late when we were starting this he said I understand why we\'re going to work well but why do we need Michelle. 一開始,李,當我們開始工作的時候,他說,我理解為什么我們會工作得很好,但為什么我們需要米歇爾。 > About three months in he said I now understand why we need Michelle but we\'re not sure why we need you. 大約三個月,他說,我現在明白為什么我們需要米歇爾,但我們不知道為什么我們需要你。 > `[00:11:11]` Laughter. `[00:11:11]` 笑聲。 > Thankfully we kept all of us. 謝天謝地我們留下了我們所有人。 > `[00:11:15]` But these are the sorts of things where you know again those decisions early on helped us attract other people to fill in the gaps where we didn\'t already cover a lot of area and and make progress early on and again I think you know if you take anything away from today it\'s as a startup your greatest asset is momentum. `[00:11:15]` 但這些都是你再次知道的事情-那些早期的決定幫助我們吸引了其他人來填補那些我們還沒有覆蓋很多領域的空白,并且很早就取得了進展,我想你知道,如果你從今天的創業中拿走了什么,你最大的資產就是動力。 > You have to make progress. 你必須取得進展。 > You have to make progress faster than you\'re the incumbents in the marketplace and that can mean anything from building a product or building a community of people who are like following your blog. 你必須取得比你在市場上的現任者更快的進展,這可能意味著從建立一個產品或建立一個類似于你的博客的人組成一個社區。 > Or it can mean just assembling a team that can like building scrap only that people signed up for and use and that that progress you\'ll start to gain a lot of momentum around you and that\'s how really big companies get built. 或者,它可以意味著組建一個團隊,這個團隊只喜歡建立廢料,人們只需要注冊和使用,你就會開始在你周圍獲得很大的動力,這才是建立大公司的真正方式。 > `[00:12:03]` But it takes a long time and since the decisions that you make early on end up affecting much later we remember our first first board meeting. `[00:12:03]` 但這需要很長時間,因為你很早就做出的決定最終會影響到很久以后,我們還記得我們的第一次董事會會議。 > We raised money we went into the first board meeting and we were like Okay so here\'s the team in and like Michelle is going to be vice president of user experience and Leo was vice president of engineering and we were hiring this guy who is Ganem green Payton gay who was at it was at Facebook and it brilliant on their operations team at Facebook and we were we were recruiting him out to come work for us and we\'re like We want to hire this guy who is going to be vice president of technical operations. 我們籌集了資金,我們參加了第一次董事會會議,所以我們的團隊在這里,米歇爾將成為用戶體驗的副總裁,利奧是工程部門的副總裁,我們雇傭了一個叫加內姆·格林·佩頓的家伙,他曾在 Facebook 工作過,在他們的運營團隊中非常出色。我們招募他來為我們工作,我們就像我們想雇用這個即將成為技術運營副總裁的人。 > `[00:12:41]` And one of our board members said how many how many people is this guy hired how many people is this guy fired. `[00:12:41]` 我們的一位董事會成員說,這個人雇了多少人,這個人被解雇了多少人。 > Like is this person really someone who deserves that title. 就像這個人真的應該得到這個頭銜。 > And there are really two schools of thought on titles. 關于書名,確實有兩種思想流派。 > `[00:12:53]` There\'s there\'s sort of the Marken Dreesen school of thought which is that when you hire someone there are only so many different variables that you can play with you can you can increase their salary you can give them moral equity you can increase their sort of span of control what it is that it is that they supervise with is that supervise and give them a bigger title and have all of those things. `[00:12:53]` 有一種馬肯·德萊森學派,那就是,當你雇用一個人時,你可以和他一起玩的變量只有那么多,你可以提高他們的工資,你可以給他們以道德公平,你可以增加他們的控制范圍,他們監督的是監督,給他們更大的頭銜,并擁有所有這些東西。 > The cheapest is title so make everyone you know executive senior vice president of the earth. 最便宜的是頭銜,所以讓你認識的每一個人都成為地球的高級副總裁。 > `[00:13:22]` Laughter. `[00:13:22]` 笑聲。 > Laughter And that\'s and that\'s that\'s one school. 笑聲,那是一所學校。 > `[00:13:25]` The other school of thought is the Mark Zuckerberg school of thought which is when you joined Facebook everyone has to take a step down so you know a vice president become a director if you\'re a director you become an associate of your associate. `[00:13:25]` 另一個學派是馬克·扎克伯格思想學派,當你加入 Facebook 時,每個人都必須下臺,這樣你就知道,如果你是一名董事,你就會成為你的同事的助理。 > You become a like Pyon or whatever. 你變成了像派恩之類的人。 > And and so and we you know if I think if we had to do it over again we would just call every one engineer like just I don\'t care if you\'re doing customer support you\'re in engineering care doing financer you engineer and Keverian\'s sales is an engineer. 所以,你知道,如果我們不得不再做一次,我們只會打電話給每一個工程師,就像我不在乎你是否在做客戶支持,你是在工程護理,做財務工程師,而凱維利亞的銷售是一名工程師。 > `[00:13:53]` What we didn\'t said though was you know this first morning we\'re like everyone\'s vice president and the board feedback was honestly none of you deserved to be vice president. `[00:13:53]` 我們沒有說的是,你知道,第一天早上,我們就像每個人的副總裁,董事會的反饋是誠實的,你們都不應該成為副總裁。 > And I remember we were driving back in Michelle\'s Jeda again from from Palo Alto. 我記得我們又從帕洛阿爾托開車回米歇爾的杰達。 > And she said you know honestly I don\'t deserve that title. 她說你知道我不應該得到這個頭銜。 > Lee doesn\'t deserve that title. 李不應該得到這個稱號。 > We haven\'t fired or hired anyone sometimes you just get rid of titles and you have to. 我們沒有解雇或雇用任何人,有時你只是擺脫頭銜,你必須這樣做。 > And you have to appreciate that for a second how hard that is. 你必須意識到這有多難。 > As a founder of a company to say that I\'m going to I\'m actually going to say I don\'t want that but that then set a precedent where everyone we\'ve hired sense when they say oh I want to be you know executives senior vice president of whatever I go you know Michelle is to have a title What do you get one and that has has made sure that we\'re selecting people who really want to be there. 作為一家公司的創始人,我實際上要說我不想那樣做,但那就開創了一個先例,當我們雇傭的每個人都有理智的時候,他們說:哦,我想成為公司的高級副總裁,你知道的,米歇爾就是擁有一個頭銜,你能得到一個頭銜,這就確保了這一點。我們在挑選真正想去的人。 > But fundamentally it also meant that Michelle really had to trust trust me and trust the rest of the organization so that when it was the right time and we have now thankfully not fire that many people but hired a ton and still talked to every single candidate that we hire. 但從根本上講,這也意味著米歇爾必須信任我,信任公司的其他成員,這樣,當時機成熟的時候,我們現在已經沒有解雇那么多人,而是雇傭了很多人,并且仍然和我們雇傭的每一個候選人進行了交談。 > That that now we\'ve earned earn that title. 現在我們贏得了這個頭銜。 > `[00:15:08]` And so that that early decision that really required a humility was and it was easy it was easy for me because you know they were like someone needs to be CEOs. `[00:15:08]` 所以真正需要謙遜的早期決定對我來說是很容易的,因為你知道他們就像需要做 CEO 一樣。 > `[00:15:19]` You have been CEO. `[00:15:19]` 你是首席執行官。 > But it was really hard for Michelle and Lee but it was the right thing to do. 但這對米歇爾和李來說真的很難,但這是正確的選擇。 > And that\'s I mean one of the things I admire the most about Michelle is Michelle has Michelle Michelle has ego but no vanity. 這就是我對米歇爾最敬佩的地方之一,那就是米歇爾有自尊心,但沒有虛榮心。 > `[00:15:34]` And that\'s like if you can find people that are like that you want them to be around you because like a think of how we\'re building an infrastructure technology startup think about how many reporters call us every single day saying woman tech infrastructure technology startup. `[00:15:34]` 如果你能找到那些你希望他們在你身邊的人,就像思考我們是如何建立一家基礎設施技術初創公司一樣,想想每天有多少記者打電話給我們,說女性科技基礎設施初創公司。 > I want to write a let\'s put that on the cover and Michelle has always said it\'s the company first. 我想寫一篇文章,讓我們把它放在封面上,米歇爾總是說這是公司的第一名。 > `[00:15:58]` It\'s not about me. `[00:15:58]` 這不關我的事。 > It\'s not about any of that like let\'s make sure we\'re telling the right story about the company. 這不是像這樣的事情,讓我們確保我們講的是關于公司的正確故事。 > And again if you can find people like that to join your founding team those are those are absolutely people you want. 再一次,如果你能找到這樣的人加入你的創始團隊,那絕對是你想要的人。 > `[00:16:11]` They\'re out there you can find them apply. `[00:16:11]` 他們在外面,你可以找到他們申請。 > `[00:16:18]` The other thing like I think has been really key to our success is that there\'s that we have you know while I think we have sort of a shoe the women in tech story think that having a woman on on our board and having that for the sake of diversity is is really I mean we\'re very different people. `[00:16:18]` 另一件事,就像我認為的那樣,是我們成功的關鍵,我們有你知道的,而我認為我們有一只鞋,科技故事里的女人認為,我們的董事會里有一個女人,為了多樣性,我們的意思是我們是非常不同的人。 > My last startup there were three of us that started it. 我上一次創業是我們三個人開的。 > We went to junior high together. 我們一起上初中。 > We were essentially three white guys that all had some combination of technology and law and we fought like cats and it was and it\'s a miracle we even talk to this day. 我們本質上是三個白人,他們都有一些技術和法律的結合,我們像貓一樣戰斗,這是一個奇跡,我們甚至談到這一天。 > Whereas you grew up in Canada Lee grew up right here in Cupertino go Canada. 而你在加拿大長大,李就在加拿大庫比蒂諾長大。 > `[00:17:03]` A lot. `[00:17:03]` 很多。 > High a kind of low vanity high ego great great. 崇高一種低賤的虛榮心,崇高的自我,偉大的偉大。 > I like Canadians. 我喜歡加拿大人。 > We\'ll hire lots of names but I think having that that set of diversity. 我們會雇傭很多人,但我認為有這種多樣性。 > `[00:17:14]` I mean I\'m still I\'m so proud of the fact that we walk around the office and the number of different languages that are being spoken are are just incredibly diverse and that has so much more of an effect on on how rich the product is and how we see the rest of the world in a much more unique way. `[00:17:14]` 我的意思是,我仍然對這樣一個事實感到驕傲,那就是我們在辦公室里走動,人們說的不同語言的數量非常多樣化,這對產品的豐富程度和我們如何以更獨特的方式看待世界其他地方產生了更大的影響。 > `[00:17:35]` We do have a really diverse team and so diversity means lots of things gender\'s 1 but where they used to work where they grew up all those sorts of things really matter. 我們確實有一個非常多樣化的團隊,所以多樣性意味著很多事情-性別 1,但是他們過去工作的地方,他們成長的地方-所有這些事情都很重要。 > And so we\'re web infrastructure a company that\'s like again that is not something you just kind of learn night but the number of people on our team that come from a web infrastructure background it\'s very it\'s it\'s very very small. 所以我們是一家網絡基礎設施公司,這并不是你晚上就能學到的東西,而是我們團隊中來自網絡基礎設施背景的人數非常少。 > `[00:17:58]` In fact like for the first 25 hires no one did. `[00:17:58]` 事實上,就像最初的 25 名雇員一樣,沒有人這樣做。 > `[00:18:02]` And in a way. `[00:18:02]` 在某種程度上。 > So some people early on really gave us a lot of good guy needs go viral Sun Microsystems people and Juniper people and all these people who really understand how they get are Akamai people and they are really they are really their investors who really pressured us to do that. 所以,一些人很早就給了我們很多好男人,他們需要成為病毒,SunMicrosystems 人和 Juniper 人,以及所有這些真正理解他們是如何得到阿卡邁人的人,他們真的是他們的投資者,他們給我們施加了壓力,迫使我們這么做。 > We kind of said we\'re happy you know let us keep doing our thing. 我們說我們很高興你知道讓我們繼續做我們的事。 > And what I hear now a lot of people is if you are trying to do something or you know a lot about the industry sometimes you don\'t check your assumptions enough and it\'s really hard to to to really find that idea that really works. 我現在聽到很多人說,如果你想做些什么,或者你對這個行業了解很多,有時你對你的假設沒有足夠的檢查,很難找到真正有效的想法。 > And so we had a lot of adjacent experience related to the industry that we\'re doing. 因此,我們有許多與我們所做的行業相關的相鄰經驗。 > We had people who knew Web security and we really understood developers all these different sports things and that together has made something magical but it was a very adjacent industry. 我們有了解網絡安全的人,我們真正理解開發人員-所有這些不同的體育項目-一起創造了一些神奇的東西,但這是一個非常相鄰的行業。 > And so if you\'re if you\'re in our seats where you\'re like trying to start something I\'m actually not an expert in it. 所以,如果你坐在我們的座位上,你就像是在嘗試開始一些事情,我其實并不是這個方面的專家。 > `[00:18:58]` I would say you\'re at an advantage as long as you\'re interested and you have to actually you have to deeply be like. `[00:18:58]` 我會說,只要你感興趣,你就會有優勢,而實際上,你必須像這樣。 > I\'m fascinated by this problem. 我被這個問題迷住了。 > I don\'t feel like I necessarily understand all the different corners of it but sometimes by not understanding all of that. 我不認為我一定要理解它的所有不同的角落,但有時通過不理解所有這些。 > Like everyone who competed with us always charge on bandwidth. 就像每個和我們競爭的人一樣,總是收取帶寬。 > We had no idea what we were supposed to do that so we just don\'t. 我們不知道該怎么做,所以我們就不這么做了。 > And as a result you know we\'ve that\'s that\'s been a real key to us growing as quickly as we have. 因此,你知道,這對我們的成長來說是一個真正的關鍵。 > `[00:19:25]` We were a bit naive of how hard it would be if we had had it. `[00:19:25]` 我們有點天真,不知道如果我們有了它會有多難。 > We\'ve come up against some very hard technical problems but you know what they if you\'re looking to hire engineers good engineers want to work on our technical problems and we\'ve found really great solutions to those technical problems and that\'s been quarter success what we always say is okay we can solve this. 我們遇到了一些非常困難的技術問題,但是你知道他們如果你想雇用工程師,優秀的工程師想要解決我們的技術問題,我們已經找到了解決這些技術問題的很好的解決方案,這是我們經常說的好辦法,我們可以解決這個問題。 > That just increases the hurdle for the people that are behind us. 這只會給我們身后的人增加障礙。 > `[00:19:45]` And it is one of the things I\'m struck by when. `[00:19:45]` 這是我所震驚的事情之一。 > Because we\'re in a fortunate position now where a lot of entrepreneurs come to us for advice and there are a lot of people that gave us advice over the years so we try and make time for that. 因為我們現在很幸運,很多企業家來找我們咨詢,多年來有很多人給了我們建議,所以我們努力爭取時間。 > But oftentimes the ideas that come in people try to understand all sort of four corners and have you from the beginning. 但很多時候,人們都會嘗試著去理解所有的四個角落,從一開始就讓你。 > And and that\'s mean if you can see all of the problems probably isn\'t a big enough idea and the reality is it takes about as much time and about as much effort to build like an iPhone app that tells people when you\'re running late which is just a really Lugia ridiculously stupid idea. 這意味著,如果你能看到所有的問題,可能不是一個足夠大的想法,而現實是,它需要同樣多的時間和同樣的努力,就像一個 iPhone 應用程序,當你遲到的時候告訴人們,這是一個非常愚蠢的想法。 > As it does to build CloudFlare right. 就像建造 CloudFlare 一樣。 > `[00:20:28]` And that\'s and that\'s you know so what you want to work on and if you\'re an employee which do you want to work on you want to work on something where you actually can really make a dent in what the universe is doing. `[00:20:28]` 你知道你想做什么,如果你是一名員工,你想要做的事情實際上可以在宇宙所做的事情上發揮作用。 > `[00:20:41]` You know today one out of every 20 web requests 5 percent of web requests flow through our network. `[00:20:41]` 你今天知道,每 20 個 Web 請求中就有一個通過我們的網絡,5%的 Web 請求通過我們的網絡。 > You know it\'s a huge huge huge organizations rely on us to be available and online. 你知道,這是一個龐大的組織,依靠我們的服務和在線。 > And it is incredibly stressful. 令人難以置信的壓力。 > But at least we matter like the word the curse is if you\'re sitting around and you see people in your organization who are bored like you. 但至少我們很重要,就像“詛咒”這個詞一樣,如果你坐在你身邊,看到你組織中的人像你一樣感到無聊,那就更重要了。 > If that\'s true. 如果那是真的。 > Start firing people because you really do like that the somewhat the critique sometimes our team will will level on us is that you know we always talk about how we\'re running hot where we want to run incredibly hot based on what it is. 開始解雇別人是因為你真的喜歡,有時候我們的團隊會對我們提出一些批評,你知道我們總是在談論我們是如何運行的,而我們想要運行的地方是非常熱的,這取決于它是什么。 > There\'s never been a company in history that\'s done a billion page views per employee. 歷史上從來沒有一家公司每名員工的頁面瀏覽量達到 10 億次。 > We do 5 billion. 我們做了 50 億。 > And that\'s really really hard. 這真的很難。 > And we as a result though we end up attracting some of the most talented people in the world. 因此,我們最終吸引了一些世界上最有才華的人才。 > Just this week this guy Olafur walks into our office starts. 就在這個星期,奧拉弗走進了我們的辦公室。 > Turns out he\'s one of seven people in the world that have done their cryptographic signing of the DNS route. 事實證明,他是世界上已經完成 DNS 路由加密簽名的七個人之一。 > `[00:21:50]` And he holds one seventh of the DNS key and he says You guys are doing interesting things I want to come and work there work on hard things work on big challenges work on things that make you uncomfortable make it bigger and it\'s going to be hard no matter what you do. `[00:21:50]` 他拿著 DNS 鍵的七分之一,他說你們正在做一些有趣的事情,我想去那里工作,在那里工作,努力工作,面對巨大的挑戰,做一些讓你不舒服的事情,讓它變得更大,不管你做什么,都會很難。 > But if if it works you know in one case you\'ve made an iPhone app that tells people when you\'re running late in the other case you know you\'ve helped protect democracy in Hong Kong. 但如果它奏效,你知道,在一種情況下,你制作了一款 iPhone 應用程序,當你運行得很晚時,你就會告訴人們,你知道你幫助保護了香港的民主。 > And you know have have the government of the UK as a customer and and really do things that are meaningful and impactful you get to work with really incredible people. 你知道,有英國政府作為一個客戶,做一些有意義和有影響的事情,你就可以和真正令人難以置信的人一起工作。 > `[00:22:29]` So again the when you think about the idea you\'re working on you want to make sure it\'s big and mountain matters because you know we started someone back and backstage asked Did you really think that was going to. `[00:22:29]` 所以,當你再一次思考你正在研究的想法時,你想要確保這是重大的和山區的事情,因為你知道我們在后臺啟動了一個人,然后問你是否真的認為這會發生。 > We\'ve been doing it for five years now. 我們已經做了五年了。 > Did you not realize you were signing up for a five year term and so if you look at the data the average time to exit whether it\'s acquisition or IPO even though I know Andrew said don\'t do that. 你難道沒有意識到,你的簽約期為 5 年,所以如果你看一下數據,不管是收購還是 IPO,退出的平均時間-即使我知道-安德魯說,不要這么做。 > Whatever I\'m less negative on IPO is eight years average time is eight years. 無論我對 IPO 不那么消極,都是 8 年,平均時間是 8 年。 > I did not think of that when I started Clotfelter. 當我創辦 Clotfelter 的時候,我沒有想到這一點。 > And you know what it doesn\'t matter because I was like This is interesting I\'m signing up for this. 你知道什么不重要,因為我覺得這很有趣,我要注冊這個。 > I think if it\'s going to work it\'s going to be amazing if it doesn\'t. 我認為如果它能起作用的話,如果它不起作用的話,那就太棒了。 > I can say I tried. 我可以說我試過了。 > And so you know don\'t get too hung up on that but do pick something that you\'re going to like put your blood sweat and tears into because there\'s definitely a lot of blood sweat and tears. 所以你知道,不要太執著于此,但一定要選擇一些你會喜歡的東西,把你的血汗和眼淚放進去,因為那里肯定有很多的血汗和眼淚。 > `[00:23:21]` The crazy thing is that it like early on it\'s a roller coaster. `[00:23:21]` 瘋狂的是,它就像一輛過山車。 > Yes. 是 > And it\'s up and down and up and down and up and down like by the hour. 它是上下的,就像一個小時一樣。 > It\'s no different now. 現在沒什么不同了。 > I mean we had a phone call this morning that didn\'t go particularly well. 我是說今天早上我們有個電話打得不太好。 > And we\'re driving down here going wow that was our finest hour. 我們開車到這里,哇,那是我們最好的時刻。 > And then the phone rang again and it was another phone call and it just completely switched the day. 然后電話鈴又響了,這是另一個電話,它完全改變了一天。 > `[00:23:49]` And that\'s it. `[00:23:49]` 就這樣。 > This is Saturday. 今天是星期六。 > Right. 右(邊),正確的 > `[00:23:53]` And and that\'s that\'s just it\'s amazing how how much going up and down matters and that\'s why you know again coming back to having other people around you who you really trust and you really value whether they\'re are cofounders or their investors. `[00:23:53]` 而這只是讓人驚訝的是,上下波動有多重要,這也是為什么你再次認識到,身邊有其他你真正信任的人,你真的很珍惜他們是共同創始人還是他們的投資者。 > `[00:24:10]` And I think actually that\'s one of the things we\'ve been really really good at is picking really great investors but having someone that you can trust and that you that you know when when you do have the worst of all possible things happen. `[00:24:10]` 事實上,我認為這是我們真正擅長的一件事,就是挑選真正偉大的投資者,但是有一個你可以信任的人,你知道什么時候你會發生最糟糕的事情。 > `[00:24:25]` You\'re willing to call them up and say say here\'s this really horrible thing that happened. `[00:24:25]` 你愿意打電話給他們,說發生了一件非常可怕的事情。 > `[00:24:30]` What are we talking about is there a litmus test for who we invite to be on our board which is essentially you know who your investor is is if you imagine the worst of all possible things that could happen. `[00:24:30]` 我們要說的是,對于我們邀請誰加入董事會有一個試金石,那就是,如果你想象可能發生的最糟糕的事情,你就知道你的投資者是誰。 > And you know in our case that\'s our network gets hacked and sites on our network get redirected to something else. 你知道,在我們的例子中,我們的網絡被黑客入侵,我們網絡上的網站被重定向到其他的東西上。 > That\'s that\'s like our disaster scenario would we. 這就像我們的災難場景一樣。 > Would we hesitate for a second calling someone who is on our board and and if the answer is yes they probably don\'t belong there. 我們會猶豫第二次打電話給我們董事會上的人嗎?如果答案是肯定的,他們可能不屬于那里。 > Right. 右(邊),正確的 > And if you have any sort of Scooby sense about someone who you\'re about to have in as an investor that like I\'m not sure I really want this person but you know they\'re going to be me a really high valuation. 如果你對你將要投資的某個人有任何感覺,我不確定我真的想要這個人,但你知道他們會給我很高的評價。 > `[00:25:11]` Run as fast as you possibly can like in our last round. `[00:25:11]` 在我們的最后一輪比賽中,你要盡可能快地跑。 > `[00:25:15]` We actually took the lowest possible the lowest valuation that we received which was half of what the what the what the highest was because we wanted one particular person to be in the boardroom although we didn\'t actually even technically give them a board seat. `[00:25:15]` 我們實際上得到了盡可能低的估價,也就是最高估值的一半,因為我們想讓一個特定的人進入董事會,盡管我們實際上甚至沒有給他們一個董事會席位。 > `[00:25:36]` So he stood still is there and he\'s and he\'s incredibly valuable and I think that that was choosing based choosing based on surrounding yourself with great people. `[00:25:36]` 所以他靜靜地站在那里,他是非常有價值的,我認為這是建立在與偉大的人圍繞的基礎上的選擇。 > `[00:25:46]` Whether again it\'s cofounders employees investors ends up being so much matter more important over the long term than sort of saying we\'re going to dial you know. `[00:25:46]` 無論是它的共同創始人、員工、投資者最終都是如此重要,從長遠來看,比說我們要撥電話要重要得多。 > You know I\'m you know maximize on how much the how much the stock is worth. 你知道我,你知道,最大限度地了解股票的價值。 > `[00:26:01]` Yeah. `[00:26:01]` 是的。 > So if people tell you maximize on valuation the person doesn\'t matter. 因此,如果人們告訴你在估值時最大化,那么這個人就不重要了。 > That\'s not true. 那不是真的。 > All investors are not created equal. 并非所有投資者生來都是平等的。 > And you know five years in we\'ve we\'ve we\'ve done three rounds of fundraising. 你知道,在我們這五年里,我們做了三輪募捐。 > We\'ve raised over 70 million dollars. 我們籌集了七千多萬美元。 > We\'ve talked to a lot of investors people who were have huge brand names you know top notch they\'re not all created equal. 我們曾與許多擁有巨大品牌的投資者交談過,你知道,一流的品牌并不都是平等的。 > `[00:26:26]` And so you need to find the what we maximize on and when again I really strongly encourage you to do is talk to them and find out what vision for the company is you want to make sure the visions align how you the ones the Vesta\'s that we have with our visions align. `[00:26:00]` 所以你需要找到我們最大的目標,當我再次強烈鼓勵你和他們交談,找出公司的愿景是什么,你想確保你的愿景與我們的愿景是一致的-維斯塔。 > They want to make the Internet better and that might mean making decisions today that delay revenue and all these different sorts of things are growing at a responsible rate. 他們想讓互聯網變得更好,這可能意味著今天做出決定,拖延收入,所有這些不同的事情都在以負責任的速度增長。 > So you know we we as as a board have said that\'s what we want to do. 所以你知道,作為一個董事會,我們說這是我們想要做的。 > We\'ve had other investors who again are really great investors who said Oh you have to go faster you have to grow faster you have to do it even higher four times no people you\'re hiring and we\'re just like we don\'t want to do that because we don\'t think that that\'s responsible. 我們有其他投資者,他們再次是真正偉大的投資者,他們說:“哦,你必須走得更快,你必須增長得更快,你必須做得更高,不需要雇傭更高的人,我們就像我們不想那樣做,因為我們不認為那是責任。” > And you get another company might choose the other and that\'s fine that you want to align if you. 你得到另一家公司可能會選擇另一家公司,如果你愿意的話,那是很好的。 > But once you make a decision on who to take money from you. 但一旦你決定由誰拿你的錢。 > It is very hard to get to that decision. 很難做出那個決定。 > So it\'s OK to have those conversations upfront. 所以提前進行這些談話是沒問題的。 > And we again we\'ve again well-known investors who have gone very far down the path with energy bringing the board along with you and then you\'ve said you know we\'re not going to go that way. 我們再一次 > `[00:27:30]` We disagree with their vision and you can do that as as management of your company. `[00:27:30]` 我們不同意他們的觀點,你可以這樣做,作為你公司的管理者。 > And so these are just the sorts of things that if you pick the right people along the way the other people around the world say OK well I trust you guys. 所以,如果你選擇正確的人,世界各地的其他人都會說,好吧,我相信你們。 > So that\'s it then we\'re we back you and let\'s and let\'s find the right partner for us to build the company into everything it can. 就這樣,我們支持你,讓我們找到合適的合作伙伴,把公司建設成它所能做的一切。 > And so those are examples of where people really do matter. 因此,這些就是人們真正重要的地方的例子。 > `[00:27:55]` So we\'re out of time out of time. `[00:27:55]` 所以我們沒有時間了。 > Thank you so much for tolerating our sort of rambling discussion Gelhaus. 非常感謝你容忍我們漫不經心的討論,蓋爾豪斯。
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