# Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012 > `[00:00:00]` Morning them. `[00:00:00]` 早上好。 > Hopefully this clicker works. 希望這個按鍵能起作用。 > When I sat down to write this talk I really racked my brains to try to figure out what the most interesting and relevant and useful content would be for a lot of people who were sort of interested in web startups. 當我坐下來寫這篇演講的時候，我真的絞盡腦汁想弄清楚，對于很多對網絡初創公司感興趣的人來說，最有趣、最相關、最有用的內容是什么。 > When I thought about it in those terms. 當我用這些術語來思考這件事的時候。 > The topic of my talk became fairly obvious but then. 我演講的主題變得相當明顯，但后來。 > I thought about it more and the Algren doesn\'t even seem to be deterministic. 我想得更多了，阿爾金人似乎并不是決定性的。 > I\'m not sure anyone even knows how it works. 我不確定是否有人知道它是如何工作的。 > So I guess I\'ll actually have to talk about stripe instead. 所以我想我得去討論條紋了。 > Two years ago Brian from Airbnb Inbee spoke at Sahib\'s school. 兩年前，Airbnb 的布萊恩在薩希布的學校演講。 > In 2010 he opened his talk by showing a picture of Startup School in 2008. 2010 年，他在演講開始時展示了一張 2008 年創業學校的照片。 > Two years previously and that picture showed a snapshot of the audience and he picked out one particular head. 兩年前，這張照片展示了觀眾的快照，他挑出了一個特定的頭部。 > He was just sitting there and anonymous had in the audience and I know this because I was at his talk in 2010. 他只是坐在那里，匿名者在觀眾席上，我知道這一點，因為我在 2010 年參加了他的演講。 > And so two years later he was on stage outside of school and somehow two years later here I am and I\'m sure there\'s at least one person here who who\'ll be on stage in two years time and stripe definitely isn\'t as far along as air being. 兩年后，他在校外的舞臺上，不知何故，兩年后，我來到這里，我確信至少有一個人將在兩年后登上舞臺，身上的條紋絕對不像空氣那么遠。 > But it drove home the point to you when I realized this that startups are very unpredictable. 但當我意識到創業公司是非常不可預測的時候，我就明白了這一點。 > You know software is really hard to get your head around somebody telling me not all that long ago that that evidence was just becoming a huge success. 你知道，就在不久之前，軟件真的很難讓你了解到有人告訴我，證據只是一種巨大的成功。 > They were making something like ten thousand dollars a week and we\'re thinking man that\'s really impressive. 他們每周掙一萬美元左右，我們認為這是令人印象深刻的。 > And now I\'ve no idea what urban Ebony\'s actual revenue figures are today but it wouldn\'t at all shock me if they\'re making ten thousand dollars an hour. 現在我不知道城市埃伯尼現在的實際收入數字是多少，但如果他們每小時掙一萬美元，我一點也不吃驚。 > Like what Dad even liked to try to build a company for that kind of growth is possible. 就像爸爸所喜歡的那樣，為了這樣的增長而努力建立一家公司是有可能的。 > Startups are strange for a whole bunch more reasons. 創業公司很奇怪，因為還有很多原因。 > They\'re usually kind of counterintuitive because they were counterintuitive. 他們通常是違反直覺的，因為他們是違反直覺的。 > Somebody else would probably solved the problem is already on top of that. 其他人可能會解決問題，問題已經解決了。 > Startups often don\'t actually want don\'t actually want to be all that well understood it can actually be quite helpful to be sort of under estimated and under comprehended. 初創企業通常不想被完全理解-實際上，被低估和被理解是很有幫助的一件事。 > But I think the biggest reason that startups are hard to understand is that so few people still get to see them up close during those first couple orders of magnitude. 但我認為，創業公司之所以難以理解，最大的原因是，在最初的幾個數量級中，幾乎沒有人能近距離地看到它們。 > And when people do tell the stories or from the stories are told they often tend to be kind of wrong. 當人們講故事或從故事中講述時，他們往往是錯誤的。 > They\'re about sort of rocketships and frantically holding on and trying to add more server capacity as quickly as you can to handle the next million users. 它們是某種程度上的火箭，瘋狂地堅持和試圖盡快增加更多的服務器容量，以處理下一個百萬用戶。 > They\'re not about the late night arguments and wondering if your product could ever possibly work more. 他們不是關于深夜的爭論，而是想知道你的產品是否還能發揮更大的作用。 > Trying to figure out when you launch your product why it\'s not growing. 試圖弄清楚你什么時候推出你的產品，為什么它沒有增長。 > The thing is even the really successful startups have this phase that that famous summer when Facebook moved out to Palo Alto in 2004. 事實是，即使是真正成功的初創企業，也有著著名的夏季階段，當時 Facebook 在 2004 年搬到了帕洛阿爾托(PaloAlto)。 > Most people don\'t realize this but there were other people in the same house working in other startups like this is the most successful technology company started in the 21st century and in the same house there were people working at a startup ideas six months after launch. 大多數人沒有意識到這一點，但在同一家公司里的其他人在其他初創公司工作，這是 21 世紀創立的最成功的科技公司，而在同一家公司，在成立 6 個月后，也有人在創業點子上工作。 > It\'s it really takes a while. 這真的需要一段時間。 > And so stripe is obviously very very different to Facebook and urban bee and nowhere near as far along as they are. 因此，條紋顯然與 Facebook 和城市蜜蜂非常不同，而且與它們相去甚遠。 > But we\'ve now gone through a small bit of growth. 但我們現在經歷了一小部分增長。 > And so I want to try to describe how it actually works. 所以我想試著描述一下它是如何工作的。 > In October of 2009 John and I were walking home from dinner in Potrero up in the city. 2009 年 10 月，我和約翰在波特雷羅市吃完晚飯步行回家。 > I\'ve been kicking around this idea of starting an online payments company. 我一直在考慮創建一家在線支付公司的想法。 > We\'re really kind of fascinated by the concept of Internet payments and all the other companies in the space seemed like total dinosaurs. 我們對互聯網支付的概念非常著迷，而在這個領域的所有其他公司似乎都像恐龍一樣。 > And as the web sort of spread around the world and more deeply into our lives through mobile devices it seemed kind of obvious there should be some kind of universal payment infrastructure for the Internet to be just really easy to transact online. 隨著網絡在世界各地傳播，并通過移動設備深入到我們的生活中，似乎很明顯，互聯網應該有某種通用的支付基礎設施，才能真正容易地在網上進行交易。 > And John just turned to me he said you know while the debate about you know what I would just go build it won\'t be all that hard. 約翰轉過身來對我說，你知道，雖然關于你的辯論知道我會去建造什么，但它不會那么難。 > `[00:04:00]` He actually said that if I won\'t be all that hard and so I said okay sure why not backtracked a little bit here. `[00:04:00]` 他實際上說，如果我不那么難的話，所以我說，好吧，為什么不在這里退一步呢。 > `[00:04:09]` John is my co-founder at stripes. 約翰是我的創立者之一。 > He\'s ulting my brother. 他在打我弟弟。 > And people often ask me about how this works in practice. 人們經常問我這在實踐中是如何運作的。 > And so for the record started a company with your brother. 所以為了記錄在案，你和你哥哥開了一家公司。 > Turns out to be a really good idea. 原來是個好主意。 > John is not only the most brilliant people I know. 約翰不僅是我認識的最聰明的人。 > I think he got the highest results in Irelands university entrance examinations but he\'s also someone with whom I\'ve literally decades of experience building things. 我認為他在愛爾蘭大學入學考試中取得了最高的成績，但他也是一個我有幾十年經驗的人。 > `[00:04:33]` Here\'s an earlier venture that we worked on together. `[00:04:33]` 這是我們一起工作過的一個早期冒險項目。 > `[00:04:38]` And so it\'s October 2009 we decide to work in this online payments company. `[00:04:38]` 所以 2009 年 10 月我們決定在這家在線支付公司工作。 > We decided to call it slash dev slash payments. 我們決定叫它斜杠開發削減付款。 > The API should be just as straightforward as any other node endeavor Fasth were kind of OK had programming and definitely not at naming things. API 應該和任何其他節點的努力一樣簡單，Fasth 是某種程度上可以編程的，而不是在命名方面。 > But everyone else seriously have been targeting their product. 但其他人都在認真地瞄準他們的產品。 > They told us a finance sector product they were targeting chief foes and business people. 他們告訴我們一個金融部門的產品，他們的目標是主要敵人和商人。 > And we thought the international just moving in a completely different direction. 我們認為國際社會正在向一個完全不同的方向發展。 > We decided to target makers the people actually building things. 我們決定把目標對準制造者-實際上是建造東西的人。 > We thought that Internet payments was a technology problem and we wanted to build a completely new stack for anybody transacting online. 我們認為互聯網支付是一個技術問題，我們想為任何在線交易的人建立一個全新的堆棧。 > So we worked nights and weekends. 所以我們晚上和周末都工作。 > We were both in college at the time I was at MIT. 我在麻省理工學院的時候我們都在上大學。 > And John was off the road at Harvard and so we\'d code together in the evenings between problem sets and writing papers. 約翰離開了哈佛大學，所以我們在晚上一起寫習題和寫論文之間的代碼。 > January rolls around switch for both of those schools. 這兩所學校的一月輪流上課。 > You sort of have that month off but of course anybody who knows Boston knows a January in Boston is unbelievably freezing. 你有幾個月的假期，但當然，任何知道波士頓的人都知道波士頓的一月是令人難以置信的寒冷。 > And so we decide to go somewhere else to work for the month. 所以我們決定去其他地方工作一個月。 > We read a few blogs that claim the one Azarias was surprisingly a really good place to get things done. 我們讀了一些博客，聲稱只有一個 Azarias 是一個非常好的地方來完成事情。 > It\'s it\'s pretty cheap it\'s really warm it\'s friendly. 很便宜，很暖和，很友好。 > For some reason I don\'t know why those Wi-Fi everywhere everything happens on a really late schedule like the bars up until 5:00 AM nobody has dinner until midnight and nothing starts before noon. 出于某種原因，我不知道為什么到處都是 Wi-Fi，一切都是按很晚的時間表進行的，就像酒吧直到早上 5 點，沒有人要到午夜才吃晚飯，中午之前什么也不開始。 > It\'s Veazey a city on a programers schedule. 這是維西，一個按節目編排的城市。 > So we read all of this really great. 所以我們讀到了所有這些非常好的東西。 > We\'ve got to run as our eyes. 我們得像眼睛一樣奔跑。 > And so we did and we just worked nonstop in cafes for three weeks. 所以我們做到了，我們只是不停地在咖啡館里工作了三個星期。 > I still never seen a single one of the tourist attractions and one Azarias or I presume they exist and then read like we could all day and we go to dinner at 11:00 o\'clock or something and then go to bed. 我還從來沒有見過一個旅游景點和一個阿扎里亞斯，或者我認為它們存在，然后像我們整天一樣閱讀，然后我們在 11：00 或什么時候去吃晚飯，然后睡覺。 > I can\'t emphasize this enough if you want to get something done consider going to an Atari\'s. 我不能強調這一點，如果你想要完成某件事，可以考慮去 Atari‘s。 > On January 9. 1 月 9 日。 > We got our first production user for sloughed slushed such payments. 我們得到了我們的第一個生產用戶的落水，這樣的付款。 > Like I say it. 就像我說的。 > This is only a few weeks after we started working on it but we really wanted to get production users shaping the product as quickly as we could. 這是僅僅幾個星期后，我們開始工作，但我們真的想讓生產用戶盡快塑造產品。 > The user was a friend of ours. 用戶是我們的朋友。 > I called Ross Bouchet who was working in a company called Tweetie north at the time. 我打電話給羅斯·布切特，他當時在一家叫 Twetie North 的公司工作。 > Results also actually wisely funded. 結果實際上也得到了明智的資助。 > Funnily enough he actually became the seventh person to work at stright but that\'s a separate story. 有趣的是，他實際上成了第七個在斯特賴特工作的人，但那是另外一個故事。 > Here\'s a screenshot of what DIAF payment looked like at the time and this screenshot you can see that John and I are definitely programmers and not designers but OK. 這是一個關于 diaf 付款的截圖，這個截圖你可以看到，約翰和我絕對是程序員，不是設計師，但沒問題。 > So January 9th we now have one user. 所以 1 月 9 日我們有了一個用戶。 > This great story from the early days of Amazon how a celebrated when they got their first buyer who wasn\'t any of their moms. 這個偉大的故事發生在亞馬遜的早期，當他們找到第一個不是媽媽的買家時，他們是多么有名。 > And you know Ross wasn\'t exactly our mom but he was a good friend. 你知道羅斯不是我們的媽媽，但他是個好朋友。 > So we definitely weren\'t out of the woods just yet. 所以我們肯定還沒脫離險境。 > So we went back to school and we can do to work on debt payments in our spare time. 因此，我們回到學校，我們可以做的工作，在我們的業余時間償還債務。 > There was this one cafe that I worked out of so much they took pity on me and I\'m still Facebook friends with a bunch of the Bristow\'s. 有一家咖啡館是我工作的地方，他們很同情我，而我仍然是一群布里斯托的 Facebook 好友。 > Yeah like strivings that kind of unusual company. 是啊，就像拼搏，那種不尋常的公司。 > We\'re about technology but roles about payments and the technology side requires good reliability and you know clean baby eyes and a really nice product and have lots of technology things Wheatley\'s hoped to know something about. 我們是關于技術的，但是關于支付和技術方面的角色需要很好的可靠性，你知道干凈的嬰兒眼睛和一個非常好的產品，并且有很多技術的東西，Wheatley 希望了解一些東西。 > But the Peyman side requires working with banks and dealing with credit card companies and just generally handling a slew of finance industry issue issues. 但佩曼方面要求與銀行合作，與信用卡公司打交道，一般只需處理一系列金融業問題。 > We really had no new experience with no idea how to handle. 我們真的沒有新的經驗，不知道如何處理。 > We love meetings where I sort of sat somebody down and said Right. 我們喜歡讓我坐下來說對的會議。 > So payments how do they work. 所以支付是如何運作的。 > Programmers often and this is unfortunate looked down at the folks who are trying to learn to code of. 程序員經常-這是不幸的-瞧不起那些試圖學習代碼的人。 > I want to learn real for my web startup crowd but actually a lot of sympathy for them because we were that bad. 我想學習真實的我的網絡創業人群，但實際上很多同情他們，因為我們是那么糟糕。 > But in finance summer came around to of six months and we moved out to Palo Alto though we hadn\'t actually yet decided to take leave from school. 但在金融界，夏天已經過去了六個月，我們搬到了帕洛阿爾托，盡管我們還沒有決定從學校休假。 > We found a tiny bungalow just off university and the living room and the kitchen became our office. 我們在大學附近發現了一間小平房，起居室和廚房成了我們的辦公室。 > It was pretty hot didn\'t have any air conditioning and so John just slept in the garden most nights wouldn\'t allow me to post a picture of this. 天氣很熱，沒有空調，所以約翰大部分晚上都睡在花園里，不允許我貼這張照片。 > And by and large we just kept on writing code because I mean that\'s mostly what sauteing a software company looks like in the early days or through the writing code or you\'re talking to people who use the code or you\'re wasting time. 總的來說，我們只是繼續編寫代碼，因為我的意思是，這主要是軟件公司早期的樣子，或者是通過編寫代碼，或者你在和使用代碼的人交談，或者你在浪費時間。 > And here\'s a chart of our transaction volume over the first six months. 這是我們前六個月交易量的圖表。 > And that\'s not a technical error. 這不是技術上的錯誤。 > If you look really closely you can see a tiny little wiggly line at the bottom. 如果你仔細觀察，你會看到底部有一條小小的搖擺線。 > It\'s admittedly not wiggling all that much around this time though we did have our first person join and we\'re based in Silicon Valley home to the best international talent from Berlin to Beijing to Bangalore and so of course we took full advantage of it. 誠然，在這段時間里，我們并沒有搖擺不定，盡管我們確實有第一人加入，我們總部位于硅谷，擁有最好的國際人才，從柏林到北京，再到班加羅爾，我們當然充分利用了這一點。 > We heard a guy called Dara Butley who was one of my smartest friends from college and he grew up in a small town called Limerick in Ireland. 我們聽到一個叫達拉·布特利的家伙，他是我大學里最聰明的朋友之一，他在愛爾蘭的一個叫利默里克的小鎮長大。 > About 2 miles from here John and I grew up. 離這里大約 2 英里，我和約翰長大了。 > Raised our first investment for our first real investment I guess. 為我們的第一筆真正的投資籌集了我們的第一筆投資。 > Why see it obviously already invested. 為什么看到它顯然已經投資了。 > This was from from Peter Till then we hadn\'t told very many people about DIAF payments and those we had told had reacted mostly by telling us we were crazy. 這是彼得·蒂爾寫的，當時我們并沒有告訴很多人有關節食付款的事情，而我們告訴過的那些人的反應主要是告訴我們瘋了。 > But of course luckily Peter Teal is crazy. 當然，幸運的是彼得·提爾瘋了。 > So he invested and it\'s been really helpful to have him on board. 所以他投資了，讓他上飛機真的很有幫助。 > Soon after that moved into our first office which looked something like this. 在那之后不久，我們的第一間辦公室就變成這樣了。 > It\'s actually sort of said Ramona and university and Parlato just sort of Cubitt cafe. 實際上，拉莫納、大學和帕拉托只是一種立體咖啡館。 > It\'s actually a converted house and because it was a house it had this wonderful fireplace the world light in the winter. 它實際上是一座改造過的房子，因為它是一座房子，它有一個美妙的壁爐-冬天的世界之光。 > The fireplace looked something like this which I think may have contravened some fire in the workplace codes and baozi were just working nonstop. 壁爐看起來像這樣，我認為這可能違反了工作場所的一些規定，而且包子只是不停地工作。 > We acted to we we became four people around this time. 我們這個時候變成了四個人。 > The first person fourth person was a guy named Greg. 第一人稱第四人是一個叫格雷格的人。 > I remember when Greg was sort of considering joining and dropping out of school he asked me about our work schedule and whether or not we worked weekends. 我記得格雷格在考慮加入和輟學的時候，他問我們的工作時間表，以及我們周末是否工作。 > Obviously we did work weekends but he really didn\'t want to make this sort of scare him off and make it seem like he\'d have to answer. 很明顯，我們周末確實工作過，但他真的不想讓這種事嚇跑他，讓人覺得他必須回答。 > So I sort of said well you know we usually work some of the weekend we really care about work life balance and we just cut me off means I\'m great. 所以我說，嗯，你知道，我們通常在周末工作，我們真的很關心工作和生活的平衡，我們只是切斷了我的關系，這意味著我很棒。 > I\'m not on the same page and working all day everyday. 我已經不一樣了，每天都在工作。 > And so we knew he\'d fit in. 所以我們知道他會加入。 > We decide to change our name. 我們決定改名。 > I can\'t even begin to list the problems that flashed such payments had somehow it turned out that not everyone immediately got the devil S analogy. 我甚至不能開始列出那些閃現這種付款的問題，如果事實證明不是每個人都立即得到了魔鬼 S 的類比的話。 > Nobody was really able to get their head around the whole slash thing and we started to get Mayeux with things like this. 沒有人真的能把他們的頭繞在這整條斜線上，而我們開始用這樣的東西來對付 Mayeux。 > And then there was the admittedly pretty inconvenient fact that Amazon had launch a product an online payments product called Amazon dev pay and so it precursory just wasn\'t going to work out and so we spent hours brainstorming names and we eventually came up with the name stripe and we didn\'t actually think that stripe was all that great an aim for come up with it but we decided to just put a date in the calendar and if we didn\'t come up with a better name by that date then we\'d stick with stripe. 還有一個不可否認的非常不方便的事實，那就是亞馬遜已經推出了一款名為 Amazondev Pay 的在線支付產品，所以它的先兆是不可能實現的，所以我們花了幾個小時的頭腦風暴名字，最終我們想出了 stripe 這個名字，我們并不認為這個 stripe 是想出它的偉大目標，但我們決定了。只要在日歷上放一個日期，如果我們沒有在那個日期之前想出一個更好的名字，我們就會堅持使用條紋。 > And sure enough it became striped and actually a few months later I learned that this is how Apple ended up with a name Apple with the exact same thing. 果然，它變成了條紋，實際上幾個月后，我了解到，這就是蘋果的最終名稱-蘋果的名字與之完全相同。 > Jeremy reached the end of our first year mostly intact. 杰瑞米到了第一年年底，基本上完好無損。 > A bunch of Y Combinator companies started to use Stripe and those was pretty good where we\'re getting some real feedback. 一群 Y 組合公司開始使用 Stripe，在這里我們得到了一些真正的反饋。 > And here\'s another chart. 這是另一張圖表。 > This are transaction volume through the first year. 這是第一年的交易量。 > And so it\'s still kind of a ways to go. 所以這仍然是一段路要走。 > We spent January of 2011 our one year anniversary in Rio de Janeiro because January in South America was becoming a tradition as anyone who\'s been to Rio de Janeiro knows it\'s when most beautiful places on earth. 2011 年 1 月，我們在里約熱內盧度過了一周年紀念日，因為南美洲的一月正成為一種傳統，任何去過里約熱內盧的人都知道，這是世界上最美麗的地方。 > `[00:12:11]` And of course we took full advantage of it. `[00:12:11]` 我們當然充分利用了它。 > `[00:12:18]` At this point we\'re an invite only private beta and so there probably is something obvious we could have done to grow at least a little bit faster are you to launch a friend refers to invite only private beta as the baby blankets of startups. `[00:12:18]` 在這一點上，我們只是一個私人的測試版，所以很明顯，我們可以做一些事情，至少能更快地成長，你會不會把一個朋友當作初創公司的嬰兒毯子來邀請私人測試版？。 > And I think that\'s about right. 我認為這是正確的。 > But the beta period was actually really helpful to stripe and were Paul Buchheit saying that should start out by making hundred people really happy rather than many more people. 但測試期實際上對條紋很有幫助，保羅·布切特(PaulBuchheit)曾說過，這應該從讓一百人真正快樂開始，而不是讓更多人快樂。 > Only a little bit happy you really took this to heart and took advantage of the small number of users to really focus on them as much as we could and really try to figure out what they wanted. 只是有點高興，你真的把這個放在心上，利用少數用戶的優勢，真正關注他們，盡可能多，并真正地試圖找出他們想要什么。 > Forgiveable not long after we launch the first version of strife we had a Peter duty so we\'d all get called from the site with down pretty standard and pretty reasonable. 可原諒后不久，我們推出了第一個版本的沖突，我們有一個彼得的職責，所以我們都會被打電話從網站上下來，相當標準和相當合理。 > But then we realized that any time a user gets any kind of error or like even if the site is down that\'s actually a really bad experience for them and we could probably make them much happier if we went and investigated the error and sort of proactively reach out to them and help them fix it. 但后來我們意識到，每當用戶遇到任何錯誤，甚至是網站癱瘓時，這對他們來說都是一次非常糟糕的體驗。如果我們去調查錯誤，主動地聯系他們，幫助他們解決錯誤，我們可能會讓他們更開心。 > `[00:13:14]` And so we changed the code a little bit so that any time anyone hit any error it would send an e-mail that would go sort of straight the top of everybody\'s inbox and I would also phone everybody and we\'d go and fix it no matter what. `[00:13:14]` 所以我們對代碼做了一點改動，每當任何人遇到任何錯誤時，它都會發送一封電子郵件，這種郵件會直接發送到每個人的收件箱頂部，我也會給每個人打電話，不管發生什么，我們都會去修復它。 > And I really mean that I would get out of bed if necessary. 我的意思是如果必要的話我會起床的。 > We\'re basically never without a laptop and the means to tether. 我們基本上從來沒有筆記本電腦和捆綁的手段。 > Here\'s a photo of one such incident. 這是一張這樣的事件的照片。 > This is Greg and I have gone to the cinema in Redwood City a user encountered an error. 這是格雷格和我去了雷德伍德市的電影院，一個用戶遇到了一個錯誤。 > And so of course out came our laptops and we had to go fix it. 所以，當然，我們的筆記本電腦出來了，我們必須去修理它。 > I think Greg I think Greg is here so much. 我想格雷格經常來這里。 > `[00:13:46]` I mean I think he still feels a little bit bitter about missing the start of the movie over this movie may or may not have been Twilight Breaking Dawn start after high stress you need to unwind. `[00:13:46]` 我的意思是，我認為他仍然對錯過這部電影的開頭感到有點痛苦，因為這部電影可能是或可能不是“暮光之城”，黎明開始于你需要放松的高度壓力之后。 > `[00:14:00]` We also realize that ending with an engineer is basically the best support experience possible. `[00:14:00]` 我們也意識到，以工程師為結尾基本上是最好的支持經驗。 > Like it\'s really frustrating to have to go into to file a ticket and find the support email address and then wonder does this come to reply to those who bought e-mails or if they do reply. 就像它真的很令人沮喪，必須要去提交一張罰單，找到支持的電子郵件地址，然后想知道這是來回復那些購買電子郵件的人，或者如果他們真的回復。 > How long does it take them or all of these issues. 他們需要多長時間或者所有這些問題。 > Like it\'s much nicer you can just start sort of directly chatting with somebody. 更好的是，你可以直接和別人聊天。 > And it\'s also way more productive for us because we can then go and sort of try to figure out what the underlying issue is rather than having to sort of guess based on the user\'s initial description. 這對我們來說也更有效率，因為我們可以嘗試找出潛在的問題是什么，而不是根據用戶的初始描述進行猜測。 > So we just opened up this chat system on our Web site where anyone can jump in and just start asking questions and we actually still have this today and that was it was really good but then we thought why stop there. 所以我們剛剛在我們的網站上打開了這個聊天系統，任何人都可以跳進來問題，實際上我們今天仍然有這個，這是真的很好，但是我們想為什么停在那里。 > Isn\'t it really a really bad experience when somebody asks a question and there\'s nobody there to answer them. 當有人問題，卻沒有人回答問題時，這難道不是一次非常糟糕的經歷嗎？ > And so we a hot pager duty. 所以我們要負責傳呼。 > And so we hooked it up so that if you asked a question in the Streib chat room and there was nobody there to answer you it would go and phone one of us after 30 seconds. 所以我們把它連接起來，如果你在 Streib 聊天室問了一個問題，沒有人回答你，30 秒后，它會給我們中的一個人打電話。 > And so I don\'t think many of you will know this but like for many months that stripe if you asked a question in our chat room there\'s no one there to answer someone would be woken up if necessary to help you. 所以我不認為你們中的很多人會知道這一點，但就像幾個月以來，如果你們在我們的聊天室問了一個問題，沒有人會回答，如果有必要的話，他們會被喚醒來幫助你。 > `[00:15:02]` We don\'t do that today. `[00:15:02]` 我們今天不這么做。 > `[00:15:07]` So those strike wasn\'t yet publicly available to everyone. `[00:15:07]` 所以那些罷工還不是每個人都能看到的。 > We really tried to sort of turn up the dial on our users feedback and to force ourselves to be extremely sensitive to what they wanted and what their experience was like. 我們真的試著打開用戶反饋的刻度盤，強迫自己對他們想要的東西和他們的體驗非常敏感。 > We our users talking to us during every waking hour. 在每個清醒的時間里，我們的用戶都在和我們交談。 > And if anything went wrong for them they were like literally interrupting our sleep. 如果他們出了什么問題，他們就像是打斷了我們的睡眠。 > The other thing that comes in bated was the fact we weren\'t just building a fin software layer. 另一件事是，我們不僅僅是在構建一個 FIN 軟件層。 > We thought that stripes would encompass everything from the API requests to have the money ended up in your bank account and we wanted to able to define the experience. 我們認為條形碼將包含從 API 請求到將錢放在您的銀行帳戶中的所有內容，我們希望能夠定義這種體驗。 > And we wanted to be able to do it at scale. 我們想要在規模上做到這一點。 > We were really influenced by things like Amazon Web Services and easy to watch. 我們確實受到像 AmazonWebServices 這樣的東西的影響，而且很容易觀看。 > It\'s really interesting innovation because you see two is fantastic you\'re a smaller company or a startup startup or a side project or something like this but it scales right through to be a Netflix or a Zynga or indeed an Amazon. 這是一個非常有趣的創新，因為你看到兩個很棒，你是一個較小的公司，一個創業公司，一個類似的項目，但它一直延伸到一個 Netflix，一個 Zynga，甚至亞馬遜。 > `[00:15:58]` It\'ll work for a company of any size and we decided we wanted to do that. `[00:15:58]` 它將為任何規模的公司工作，我們決定這樣做。 > But for internet payment infrastructure we wanted to make something that was really easy to start with but something would also work for the largest companies in the world. 但對于互聯網支付基礎設施，我們想要做的東西，是真的很容易開始，但也會對世界上最大的公司工作。 > Until that meant working with really good banks. 直到這意味著要和真正好的銀行合作。 > The problem is that banks and startups are basically the business equivalent of oil and water and figuring out how to combine them is pretty hard. 問題是，銀行和初創企業基本上相當于石油和水，要想把它們結合起來是相當困難的。 > The best bank in the business is like Wells Fargo which powers some of the largest payments companies in the world and almost it was pretty tough to get them to talk to us or even to return our e-mails. 業務中最好的銀行是富國銀行(WellsFargo)，富國銀行為世界上一些最大的支付公司提供了動力，幾乎很難讓它們與我們交談，甚至很難回復我們的電子郵件。 > Their price hardware some strange kind of Nigerian scam like Make Money Online Fast from the comfort of your own home. 他們的價格，硬件，一些奇怪的尼日利亞騙局，像網上賺錢快速從您自己的舒適的家。 > So we asked a friend an investor and now a partner at Y Combinator. 于是我們問了一位朋友，一位投資者，現在是 YCombinator 的合伙人。 > Jeff Ralston to help out. 杰夫·拉斯頓來幫忙。 > Jeff had previously been CEO of a company called Lalah an online music startup and they had negotiated successfully with the record labels and we thought that if you could as a technology startup negotiate successfully with the record labels you could basically convince anyone in the world to do anything ever. 杰夫以前是一家名為 Lalah 的在線音樂初創公司的首席執行官，他們成功地與唱片公司進行了談判。我們認為，如果你能作為一家技術初創企業，成功地與唱片公司談判，你基本上可以說服世界上的任何人做任何事情。 > And here\'s a picture of Jeff on a conference call with Wells Fargo. 這是杰夫和富國銀行電話會議的照片。 > That\'s Dhara. 那是達哈拉。 > They\'re on the other side and you might wonder why is Jeff on the floor. 他們在另一邊，你可能會想為什么杰夫在地板上。 > Well Jeffrey on the floor. 杰弗里躺在地上。 > Because our office was also flooded at the time. 因為我們的辦公室當時也被淹了。 > We also had a security audit that day sometimes trucks are just like a reality TV show. 那天我們還進行了一次安全審查，有時卡車就像真人秀一樣。 > It\'s like negotiate with one of the biggest banks in the world. 這就像和世界上最大的銀行之一談判一樣。 > While Undergoing a security audit while wading through water and the water is full of Trina\'s or something. 當你在水中涉水時進行安全審計時，水中充滿了 Trina‘s 之類的東西。 > But thanks to Jeff and a bunch of others we eventually convinced Wells Fargo to become one of our backhands in moving all of our systems to work out of their platform. 但多虧了杰夫和其他一些人，我們最終說服富國銀行成為我們的反手之一，把我們所有的系統都移出了他們的平臺。 > It was a couple of weeks of honestly really intense work we had to hit a particular deadline. 這是幾個星期的真誠的緊張工作，我們必須在一個特定的最后期限。 > This is the night of our first successful transaction. 這是我們第一次成功交易的夜晚。 > This is John after another particularly long all nighter in general I mean this seriously. 這是約翰，一個接一個，通宵，我的意思是認真的。 > This is the unglamorous side of startups that people do not get to see all that much. 這是創業公司平淡無奇的一面，人們看不了那么多。 > You really want to make something work and lots of other people think that it\'s a bad idea and it\'s really hard. 你真的想讓一些東西發揮作用，很多人認為這是個壞主意，而且真的很難。 > And everything happens much much slower than you\'d like and you\'ve sort of many late night discussions like this and sort of soul searching debates and wondering like Is this actually a good idea or maybe it is a good idea but it\'s just too hard for us to pull off and Tharp\'s are hard. 每件事發生的速度都比你想象的要慢得多，你像這樣在深夜里討論了很多次，還想知道這到底是個好主意，還是一個好主意，但對我們來說太難了，而 Tharp 的想法也很難。 > And the thing is this doesn\'t actually go away. 問題是這件事并沒有消失。 > This is the thing I didn\'t realize before doing a startup. 這是我在創業之前沒有意識到的。 > I thought the two of you have all these doubts in the early days and then it was hard to take off and things would get easy. 我以為你們兩人在最初的日子里都有這些疑慮，然后很難擺脫，事情會變得容易。 > But no matter how successful you will have lots of doubts. 但無論你多么成功，你都會有很多疑問。 > The first American to win the Tour de France was a guy called Greg Lamond and he has a quote I\'ve always really liked. 第一個贏得環法自行車賽的美國人是一個叫格雷格·拉蒙德的人，他有一句我一直很喜歡的話。 > It doesn\'t get easier you just get to go faster and it\'s kind of like this with startups like the startup might start going faster. 它不會變得更容易，你只要走得更快，就像這樣，初創公司可能會更快地發展起來。 > It doesn\'t really get easier. 這并不是很容易。 > In our case we\'ve got the pieces in place and we got to the point were ready to launch we launch on the twenty ninth of September 2011. 在我們的例子中，我們已經做好了準備，準備在 2011 年 9 月 29 日發射。 > So just over a year ago at the time striated in predict had been in production use for 19 months and we\'ve been working on it fulltime for four year and three months. 所以就在一年多以前，在預測的時候，我們已經投入生產使用了 19 個月，我們已經全職工作了四年零三個月。 > We\'re 10 people whom we launched Eisele to fit all the names in a tweet. 我們是 10 個人，我們推出了 Eisele，把所有的名字都放在推特上。 > And by the end of the year here\'s our daily transaction volume looks like promising but launching is definitely not a panacea. 到今年年底，我們每天的交易量看起來很有希望，但推出肯定不是萬靈藥。 > But the signs were positive and we kept going. 但跡象是積極的，我們繼續前進。 > And over the last few months two and a half years in stripe has finally started to become an overnight success. 在過去的幾個月里，兩年半的條紋終于開始在一夜之間取得成功。 > Jessica talked about how startups are roller coasters and there\'s a lot of downs but there\'s also ups the next slide is our daily transaction volume through today and it looks like this. 杰西卡談到了創業公司是如何過山車的，有很多的下降，但也有上升，下一次下滑是我們今天的每日交易量，看起來是這樣。 > From being for people not all that long ago stripe is now 34 people. 就在不久以前，條紋已經是 34 個人了。 > Which is actually twice as many people as are in this picture because everything is all behind them a start up and we haven\'t got around to taking our newgroup shot yet and many thousands of companies are using Stripe and a lot of new things go live everyday. 這實際上是這張照片中人數的兩倍，因為一切都在他們的背后，我們還沒來得及嘗試我們的新團隊，成千上萬的公司都在使用 Stripe，每天都會有很多新的東西出現。 > I mean it\'s a bunch of well-known brands like Foursquare and boxy and Hipmunk and the Afaf and New York MoMA but loved less well-known ones too. 我的意思是，這是一群知名品牌，如 Foursquare 和 Boxy，Hipmunk，Afaf 和紐約現代藝術博物館，但也喜歡不太知名的人。 > And they actually tend to be sort of just as interesting as things like good eggs which enables you to buy directly from local farmers or Samasource which brings computer based work to people living in poverty or even stuff like the Bedford cheese shop which is now just selling its cheese online. 事實上，它們和好雞蛋一樣有趣，它可以讓你直接從當地農民那里購買，或者把電腦工作帶給生活貧困的人，甚至像貝德福德奶酪店，它現在只是在網上銷售奶酪。 > I guess I\'m just hungry and I\'m making these slides she seemed like a good idea. 我想我只是餓了，我在做這些幻燈片-她看起來是個好主意。 > If anyone here ever looked into the history of container shipping sir I know there\'s a bit of context for trom cheese container shipping and the shipping container like with those 40 foot shipping containers. 如果說這里有誰研究過集裝箱運輸的歷史，先生，我知道這里有一些關于特倫奶酪集裝箱運輸的背景，還有像 40 英尺集裝箱那樣的集裝箱。 > On some level they\'re the most mundane thing in the world and we see them around all the time but there were actually an absolutely enormous innovation 60 years ago before shipping containers transportation was a massive issue with physical goods transportation costs often accounted for up to 25 percent of the final cost of a physical item. 在某種程度上，它們是世界上最平凡的東西，我們一直都看到它們，但在 60 年前，在集裝箱運輸成為一個巨大問題之前，我們確實有了一項巨大的創新，實物運輸成本往往占到實物最終成本的 25%。 > Overall transportation costs and shipping costs were like 10 percent of the value of all the imports in theU.S. 總體運輸成本和運輸成本相當于美國所有進口商品價值的 10%。 > Think about that read 10 percent. 想想看，讀 10%吧。 > That means your margins 20 percent just by bringing your goods to another market. 這意味著，你的利潤 20%，只要把你的產品帶到另一個市場。 > You cut your profit in half. 你把利潤減半了。 > So unsurprisingly most manufacturing happens at a very close to our physical price was consumed. 因此，毫不奇怪，大多數制造業發生在一個非常接近我們的實物價格被消費。 > And so the shipping container and then in the mid 1950s essentially eliminated the cost of shipping physical goods. 因此，集裝箱運輸，然后在 20 世紀 50 年代中期，實質上消除了運輸實物貨物的成本。 > It cut the costs of loading and unloading ships by 95 percent. 它使船舶裝卸成本降低了 95%。 > And it\'s now at the point for and actually cutting this from aU.S. 現在它已經到了從美國開始削減的時候了。 > government report. 政府報告。 > It\'s better to assume that moving goods is essentially costless. 最好假設貨物運輸基本上是無成本的。 > Really the history here is Vaselines a few kind of good books about it. 真的，這里的歷史就是關于它的幾本好書。 > But the point is this technological breakthrough is sort of this elimination of friction. 但關鍵是這個技術上的突破是某種程度上消除了摩擦。 > And in particular this abstraction over geography. 尤其是對地理的抽象。 > It played an enormous role in facilitating the rise of Singapore and South Korea and Taiwan and Japan and China as manufacturing hubs and my point is really that a technology that doesn\'t just monetize itself but actually enables new commerce can really enormous impact the shipping container literally reshape the world economy. 它在促進新加坡、韓國、臺灣、日本和中國作為制造業中心的崛起方面發揮了巨大的作用。我的觀點是，一種不僅能使自身貨幣化，而且實際上能夠實現新商業的技術，能夠對航運集裝箱真正重塑世界經濟產生巨大影響。 > We sometimes describe we\'re doing with stripe as building economic infrastructure for the Internet. 我們有時會把我們的做法描述為互聯網建設經濟基礎設施。 > It\'s not very flashy but for most of human history we\'ve had to buy from the people beside us. 這并不是很華而不實，但在人類歷史的大部分時間里，我們不得不從我們身邊的人那里買東西。 > But thanks to the Internet that\'s no longer true. 但多虧了互聯網，\不再是真的了。 > We have a new way to abstract over place. 我們有了一種抽象概念的新方法。 > Anyone can now build a global business. 現在，任何人都可以建立一家全球性的企業。 > But yet while the Internet has revolutionized how we communicate and how we collaborate and how we share we\'ve only sort of started to explore how it can change what we create and how we transact and what kind of business is possible. 然而，盡管互聯網已經徹底改變了我們的溝通方式、協作方式和共享方式，但我們只是開始探索它如何改變我們的創造和交易方式，以及什么樣的業務是可能的。 > And a lot of the other companies whose founders are speaking today are are pretty good examples of that thrived. 許多創始人今天發表講話的其他公司都是這方面的一個很好的例子。 > We simply want to turn payment\'s into a ubiquitous utility. 我們只是想把支付變成一種無處不在的實用工具。 > We won more commerce on the internet but it\'s still really early days and honestly most the time we\'re not thinking at these kinds of problems we\'re trying to figure out how to decrease the load on DBI 3 or trying to get some particular design just right and working through the 20th iteration or wondering if some particular product is a is a good idea or having some debate in Gmail that\'s so long We\'ve overflowed the Gemalto thread limit. 我們在互聯網上贏得了更多的商業，但它還真的還處于早期階段，而且老實說，大多數時候我們并不是在考慮這些問題，我們試圖找出如何減少 dbi 3 的負載，或者試圖得到一些正確的特定設計，并在第 20 次迭代中工作，或者想知道某個特定的產品是否是一個好主意，還是有一些爭論。在 Gmail 中，我們已經超過了 Gemalto 線程的限制。 > And it\'s now become a completely new thread. 現在它變成了一個全新的線索。 > It\'s all the day to day stuff. 日復一日的事情。 > You know it turns out that all the high level stuff the the larger motivations and and the bigger ideas and the day to day implementation like the debates and the tweaking and the iterations both of them are really addictive and that\'s why we keep doing this. 你知道，所有高層次的東西，更大的動機，更大的想法，以及日復一日的實現，比如辯論、調整和迭代，都是令人上癮的，這就是我們一直這樣做的原因。 > Thank you. 謝謝。