# Diane Greene at Startup School 2013 > `[00:00:00]` Hi there. `[00:00:00]` 你好。 > I\'ve been in this auditorium once before. 我以前來過這個禮堂一次。 > I think it was before you were born. 我想是在你出生之前。 > It was 1989 and I was working for Tandem Computers which was one of the biggest companies in Silicon Valley and the very wonderful irreverent Founder CEO was holding an all hands meeting. 那是 1989 年，我為串列電腦工作，這是硅谷最大的公司之一，這位非常不敬的創始人首席執行官正在舉行一次全員會議。 > And I was in the audience as a software engineer. 當時我是一名軟件工程師。 > So it\'s pretty special to be here today. 所以今天來這里很特別。 > I\'ve done three startups. 我做了三次創業。 > The first one was a low band BMW streaming video company the extreme that Microsoft bought was the basis for their movie player and came out of Silicon Graphics Internet television project. 第一家是一家低頻段的寶馬流媒體視頻公司，微軟收購了這家公司，這是他們的電影播放器的基礎，也是硅谷圖形網絡電視項目的基礎。 > And then I\'m doing a startup right now which I\'m not going to talk about. 然后我現在正在做一家創業公司，我不打算談論這個問題。 > And then the second startup I cofounded was VM in that I\'m going to try and sort of tell you a little bit about how we got going on VMware and how that company started just by way of background we founded the company in 1998. 然后我共同創立的第二家初創公司是 VM，我會試著告訴大家我們是如何使用 VMware 的，以及該公司是如何在 1998 年成立的。 > `[00:01:21]` It\'s virtualization we created sort of the virtualization industry and what it is it\'s a layer of software that sits between the hardware and the operating system kind of fakes out the operating system to think it\'s running on the hardware lets you run multiple operating systems that can be moved around on a single computer across computers and works on desktops and servers and increases efficiency makes things easier to use and so forth. `[00:01:21]` 我們創建了某種虛擬化行業，它是一層介于硬件和操作系統之間的軟件，它偽造了操作系統，以為它運行在硬件上，讓您可以在一臺計算機上運行多個操作系統，在桌面和服務器上工作，提高效率，使用起來更容易等等。 > So that was what we did. 所以我們就是這么做的。 > I left the company in 2008. 2008 年我離開了公司。 > Our run rate was about 2 billion. 我們的運行速度大約是 20 億。 > We grew my last quarter we had year over year growth of 54 percent. 我最后一個季度增長了，同比增長了 54%。 > About 6000 people in offices all over the world. 在世界各地的辦公室里大約有 6000 人。 > `[00:02:04]` And it continues to be an even bigger company today okay. `[00:02:04]` 現在它仍然是一家更大的公司，好嗎？ > `[00:02:11]` So one thing we did when we startedV.M. `[00:02:11]` 所以當我們開始工作的時候，我們做了一件事。 > where was we had a big vision. 我們在哪里有一個遠大的愿景。 > `[00:02:16]` And to lessen constraints and facilitate innovation for other system builders as well as end users of computers. `[00:02:16]` 并為其他系統建設者和計算機的最終用戶減少限制和促進創新。 > And we also pushed ourselves. 我們也在努力。 > We said it would be ubiquitous by the year 2000. 我們說到 2000 年它將無處不在。 > We missed by a good six years or so but we did make it ubiquitous. 我們錯過了六年左右，但我們確實使它無處不在。 > `[00:02:36]` And then we we had some students leave school on us so we had a goal of getting them to get theirPh.D. `[00:02:36]` 然后我們讓一些學生離開學校，所以我們的目標是讓他們獲得博士學位。 > and interestingly enough one of them after getting married having two kids in grade school went back to Stanford and finished his pitch. 有趣的是，其中一人在結婚后，在小學有了兩個孩子，回到了斯坦福，完成了他的演講。 > And he\'s a professor in Switzerland now. 他現在是瑞士的教授。 > `[00:02:56]` So but but we had this big vision. `[00:02:56]` 但是我們有一個遠大的愿景。 > `[00:03:01]` This was our founding team minus myself I took the picture. `[00:03:01]` 這是我們的創始團隊，除了我自己，我拍了這張照片。 > And it has my husband who\'s Professor of Computer Science at Stanford. 還有我的丈夫，他是斯坦福大學的計算機科學教授。 > His two of his graduate students Ed and Scott and then my husband I met at UC Berkeley and graduate school computer science and the other person came from there and then one was there employee number one. 他的兩個研究生埃德和斯科特，然后我的丈夫，我在加州大學伯克利分校和研究生院，計算機科學，而另一個人來自那里，然后有一個是第一雇員。 > He was a undergraduate working on the research project. 他是研究項目的本科生。 > And I\'m proud to say that he has gone on. 我很自豪地說他還在繼續。 > `[00:03:34]` Founded his own company in which Google recently bought an just for historic reasons. `[00:03:34]` 成立了自己的公司，谷歌最近出于歷史原因收購了一家公司。 > `[00:03:46]` For those of you that are local. `[00:03:46]` 你們中有本地人。 > This was our first office over the cheese board in town and country shopping center. 這是我們在城鎮和鄉村購物中心的奶酪板上的第一個辦公室。 > And I know people are paying upwards 5 6 dollars versus square foot today. 我知道今天人們花的錢比平方英尺高出 56 美元。 > We were a little luckier it was Adella 75 when we got our first office. 當我們拿到第一間辦公室的時候，我們更幸運的是 75 歲的阿黛拉。 > `[00:04:03]` And one little bit of advice we didn\'t we we we made sure we had desks to sit at but we didn\'t really spend much on fixing up the office. `[00:04:03]` 還有一點建議，我們沒有 > `[00:04:11]` I brought in unbelievable office manager. `[00:04:11]` 我請來了令人難以置信的辦公室經理。 > She was more like the chief operating officer when we were about 10 people and that\'s when we fixed up the office. 她更像是我們 10 歲左右的首席運營官，而那就是我們設立辦公室的時候。 > One other thing worth mentioning about us and our founding. 還有一件事值得一提的是我們和我們的創立者。 > Once we had decided to found the company I was I became pregnant with her second child. 一旦我們決定成立公司，我就懷上了她的第二個孩子。 > And so I wasn\'t planning to take the company all the way. 所以我并不打算一路收購這家公司。 > I said Look I\'ll get it off the ground. 我說了，我會把它從地上弄出來的。 > I know how to do a startup but I\'m just telling my second kid but it ended up you know for all the family in the audience it worked just great. 我知道如何創業，但我只是告訴我的第二個孩子，但最終，你知道，對于所有的家庭觀眾，它的工作非常好。 > `[00:04:48]` It actually I would have left if it wasn\'t working. `[00:04:48]` 事實上，如果它不起作用的話，我早就走了。 > My my daughter was jumping for joy when I told her I was about to do a third startup. 當我告訴我女兒我要做第三家創業公司的時候，我的女兒高興極了。 > She\'s in high school now. 她現在上高中了。 > So it couldn\'t have been too bad for her. 所以這對她來說不算太糟。 > You just have to include them like her son\'s fifth birthday. 你只需要像她兒子的五歲生日那樣把它們包括進去。 > We moved from this office to another and we rented a pickup truck which was of course his dream to get to drive a sit in our lap and drive of pickup truck. 我們從這間辦公室搬到另一間辦公室，租了一輛皮卡，這當然是他的夢想，那就是坐在我們的膝上，開著皮卡。 > So we really integrated the family. 所以我們真的融入了家庭。 > `[00:05:24]` OK. `[00:05:24]` 好的。 > So there were five of us funding sides. 所以我們有五個資助方。 > What we did we sell funded initially we said immediate family could put in money but no friends. 我們做了什么，我們出售的資金，最初，我們說，直系親屬可以投入資金，但沒有朋友。 > We weren\'t told. 我們沒有被告知。 > `[00:05:35]` I mean it took us many hours the first time I think about four hours to boot windows on Linux the first time and I was a little nervous that we were gonna get the performance down but and then once we convinced ourselves that this was really going to work. `[00:05:35]` 我的意思是，我們第一次在 Linux 上開機花了很多小時，我第一次想到在 Linux 上開機大約四個小時，我有點緊張，因為我們會降低性能，但是有一次，我們說服自己，這真的會奏效。 > We went out for angel money which very carefully chose our angels to be people that were very technically sophisticated that would understand what we were doing. 我們去尋找天使的錢，他們非常小心地選擇了我們的天使，他們是技術上非常成熟的人，能夠理解我們在做什么。 > So they were computer scientists it was Andy Becquerel shine. 所以他們是計算機科學家，是安迪·貝克勒爾·懷特。 > `[00:06:07]` JOHN HENNESSY And David Sheridan and because they understood it so well it only took a phone call really you know which is how a lot of angel investing I think happens. 約翰·亨尼西和大衛·謝里丹，因為他們對此非常了解，所以只需要打個電話，你知道，我認為很多天使投資都是這樣發生的。 > And then once we got a little further along once we got into the market we decided you know we need a more runway we would take some more money and we do do a real outside round and we decided we were selling product at that point. 一旦我們走得更遠，一旦我們進入市場，我們決定我們需要一條更多的跑道，我們會花更多的錢，我們做一個真正的戶外活動，我們決定在那個時候銷售產品。 > `[00:06:41]` Desktop product and so we thought well let\'s let\'s let\'s get some partners to invest in us because they\'ll be strategic. `[00:06:41]` 桌面產品，所以我們認為，讓我們找一些合作伙伴來投資我們，因為他們將是戰略性的。 > And so we we looked. 所以我們找了看。 > We decided that since we had we we\'re going to start down on the workstation where we\'re going to go into the server once we got into the server that would be a really difficult market to go into. 我們決定，既然有了，我們就從工作站開始，一旦我們進入服務器，就會進入服務器，這將是一個很難進入的市場。 > So let\'s get the hardware vendors to invest in us. 所以，讓我們讓硬件供應商投資于我們。 > So we won and then we thought well it\'s IBM Dell or HP and we thought IBM and HP could build software so they wouldn\'t be good partners in the long term perhaps but Dell we didn\'t expect. 所以我們贏了，然后我們認為這是 IBM，戴爾或惠普，我們認為 IBM 和 HP 可以開發軟件，這樣他們就不會成為長期的好合作伙伴，但我們沒想到戴爾會這樣做。 > Today they do do software but back then there was no chance they were going to do software. 今天他們做軟件，但那時他們沒有機會去做軟件。 > And so we went to Michael Delling and convinced him to invest in us and take the lead on a round. 于是我們去找邁克爾·德林，說服他對我們進行投資，并在一輪比賽中發揮帶頭作用。 > And actually we were going through that round. 實際上我們正在經歷這一輪。 > `[00:07:41]` This was in 2000 and it was sort of the height of the bubble and some seeds found out we were doing around some really great voices and they said what are you doing you should take our money we\'re gonna do it we\'ll give you you know and we said well we\'re gonna we decide we would keep the valuation where it was they could they they were willing to take it higher but we weren\'t and we knew we wanted to go public. `[00:07:41]` 這是在 2000 年，那是泡沫的頂峰，一些種子發現我們正在做一些非常好的聲音，他們說你在做什么，我們應該拿我們的錢，我們會告訴你的，我們會決定，我們會把估值保持在他們可能的水平上我們愿意走得更高，但我們不是，我們知道我們想上市。 > We didn\'t want to ever risk a down round. 我們不想冒任何危險。 > We believed the bubble was going to burst and so we held our valuation and Nate and I kept I didn\'t tell Dell that we were doing. 我們相信泡沫會破裂，所以我們保持了估值，我和內特一直沒有告訴戴爾我們在做什么。 > Looking at doing these scenes I just kept that term Shi going and we move forward with the V CS and then in April of 2000 the bubble burst and the VCR called up and said we\'re going to have to have your valuation look what\'s happened everybody\'s have their valuation now and and we were able to say no we don\'t need to do that and we close the round the next day with Dell. 在拍攝這些場景時，我只保留了“史”這個詞，我們繼續使用 VCS，然后在 2000 年 4 月，泡沫破裂了，錄像機打電話給我們，說我們會讓你的估值，看看現在發生了什么，每個人都有他們的估值，我們可以說不，我們不需要那樣做，第二天我們就和戴爾關閉了。 > `[00:08:44]` It\'s just hard to keep your options open and am we wasn\'t going to say about the funding. ‘ > `[00:08:57]` Oh I couldn\'t say that. `[00:08:57]` 哦，我不能那么說。 > You know we were so I\'ll get to how we launched and how we got our first idea. 你知道，我們是這樣的，所以我會講到我們是如何啟動的，我們是如何得到我們的第一個想法的。 > But I\'ll just mention that we were people were running Windows on Linux with our product. 但我只想說，我們是在 Linux 上用我們的產品運行 Windows 的人。 > And Michael Dell who was our lead investor was quoted in CNN as saying I invest in lots of Linux companies none of them are ever gonna make a profit. 美國有線電視新聞網援引邁克爾·戴爾(MichaelDell)的話說，我投資了許多 Linux 公司，其中沒有一家能盈利。 > I just want to help Linux and when you\'re a entrepreneur you just don\'t like seeing that in the press. 我只是想幫助 Linux，當你是一名企業家時，你只是不喜歡在媒體上看到這種情況。 > Your company fortunately he was Rog. 你的公司很幸運他是羅格。 > The downside of non-professional investors you know but he was he was he was very helpful to us. 非專業投資者的壞處，你知道，但他對我們很有幫助。 > `[00:09:44]` So OK. `[00:09:44]` 所以好吧。 > `[00:09:45]` So we had money we had a place to live and we we were building our product and this virtualization there was a lot of very deep technology that we had to do but we had to figure out what we\'re gonna be our first. `[00:09:45]` 所以我們有了錢，我們有了一個居住的地方，我們正在建造我們的產品，我們的虛擬化有很多非常深層次的技術，我們必須做，但我們必須弄清楚，我們將成為我們的第一個。 > You know when you have a giant vision thing you want to do is find a very doable first milestone that creates value for somebody. 你知道，當你有一個巨大的愿景，你想要做的是找到一個非常可行的第一個里程碑，為某人創造價值。 > It could be another company it could be a ideally a customer but it doesn\'t have to be a customer. 它可以是另一家公司，它可以是一個理想的客戶，但它不一定是一個客戶。 > So what small thing could we do rather than our big vision and we thought well we had this 686 virtualization you know it would be a really great way for someone that was running Linux not you know there were a lot of developers using Linux. 那么，我們能做什么，而不是我們的遠大愿景，我們認為我們有了 686 虛擬化，你知道，這對于運行 Linux 的人來說是一個很好的方法，而不是你知道，有很多開發人員在使用 Linux。 > Back then it was just starting to rise. 當時它才剛剛開始上升。 > Linus Torvalds had not quite yet been on the cover of Time though. 然而，萊納斯·托瓦爾茲還沒有上過“時代”雜志的封面。 > And so we would build a desktop product that would let you run Windows on Linux. 因此，我們將構建一個桌面產品，可以讓您在 Linux 上運行 Windows。 > And that way we would weave and we could also let Linux run on Windows and we figured that way we could use the Windows device drivers and not have to build every device driver that APC needs and we wouldn\'t have to go into the server market. 這樣我們就可以編織，我們也可以讓 Linux 在 Windows 上運行，我們認為這樣我們就可以使用 Windows 設備驅動程序，而不必構建 APC 所需的每一個設備驅動程序，我們就不必進入服務器市場。 > And we also had a rule that we couldn\'t have a dependency on anybody. 我們也有一條規則，我們不能依賴任何人。 > So we didn\'t want to require Intel Saby 6 architecture to make any concessions for us because that would give us them a lot of power over us and we couldn\'t require Microsoft to make any concessions for our software to run because they would obviously have complete control over us so we set out to build this desktop product that would run Windows on Linux or Linux on Windows but requires zero change for many operating system or chipset vendor and it had to have adequate performance as someone would want to use it. 因此，我們不想要求 Intel Saby 6 架構為我們做出任何讓步，因為這將給我們很多權力，我們也不能要求微軟為我們的軟件運行做出任何讓步，因為他們顯然對我們有完全的控制權，所以我們著手構建這個在 Linux 或 Linux 上運行 Windows 的桌面產品。但是對于許多操作系統或芯片組供應商來說，這需要零更改，而且它必須有足夠的性能，就像某些人想要使用的那樣。 > And we set that as our first first milestone. 我們把這作為我們的第一個里程碑。 > And so we kind of got it working. 所以我們讓它起作用了。 > And we said OK how do we take it to market. 我們說，好的，我們如何把它推向市場。 > We\'ll take it to market as a Linux tool so that when you want to run you know Mike back then everybody that worked in a company had to run Microsoft Outlook Microsoft Office. 我們將把它作為 Linux 工具推向市場，這樣當您想要運行時，您就知道 Mike 了，那時在一家公司工作的每個人都必須運行 MicrosoftOutlookMicrosoftOffice。 > But they wanted to live in a Linux world. 但他們想生活在 Linux 世界里。 > So this was the way to do it without having to have more than one computers or having to dual boot and and so and then the Linux community would be a very technical friendly community for us. 因此，這是這樣做的方式，而不必有多臺計算機或雙引導等，然后 Linux 社區將是一個非常技術友好的社區對我們。 > So that\'s what we did and we launched it. 這就是我們所做的，我們發射了它。 > Everybody thought we were a Linux tool we had three Linux companies come to us and try and buy us and we didn\'t know how much we could charge for that. 每個人都認為我們是一個 Linux 工具，我們有三家 Linux 公司來找我們，試圖買下我們，我們不知道我們能為此收取多少錢。 > You got to price your first product. 你得給你的第一件產品定價。 > And so we said well we\'ll just put the data up there we\'ll make it fully functional free. 所以我們說，我們只需要把數據放在那里，我們就可以讓它完全免費。 > Anybody can have it over the Internet but they have to. 任何人都可以在互聯網上得到它，但他們必須這樣做。 > It\'s only a 30 day trial and they can renew it every 30 days if they want to go through the hassle because we really weren\'t sure anybody would pay for it and then we said well if you use it commercially if you\'re using it in a company you should pay two hundred ninety nine dollars. 這只是 30 天的試用期，如果他們想解決麻煩，他們可以每 30 天續訂一次，因為我們真的不確定是否有人會為此買單，然后我們說，如果你在一家公司里使用它，你應該支付 299 美元。 > And if you don\'t want to have to renew every 30 days and you\'re just a hobbyist you should pay ninety nine dollars. 如果你不想每隔 30 天續訂一次，而且你只是個業余愛好者，你應該付九十九美元。 > So it was this total trust system. 所以這是一個完全的信任系統。 > We didn\'t know how it would work but we just put it up on the internet like that and we had to figure out how to spread the word. 我們不知道它將如何工作，但我們只是把它放在互聯網上，我們必須想辦法傳播這個消息。 > You know when we launched this thing so we decided we would go to a conference that launched startups demo. 你知道，當我們推出這個東西時，我們決定去參加一個啟動創業演示的會議。 > And that was a funny anecdote somebody told us we need to hire a marketing person to help us get into demo. 這是一個有趣的軼事，有人告訴我們，我們需要聘請一個營銷人員，以幫助我們進入演示。 > So we hired the person well we brought the person in. 所以我們雇傭了那個人我們把那個人帶進來了。 > They recommended to talk to them and they demo. 他們建議和他們談談，然后他們演示。 > You can either be on stage or you can just have a little you. 你要么站在舞臺上，要么就擁有一點你自己。 > Everybody gets a table but you have to audition to get on stage she said you\'ll never get on stage. 每個人都有一張桌子，但你必須試鏡才能登上舞臺，她說你永遠不會上舞臺。 > And actually we couldn\'t even recruit a PR firm at the time everybody thought this was such a bad idea. 事實上，我們當時甚至無法招聘一家公關公司，當時大家都認為這是個糟糕的主意。 > But you know because this was when Webvan was out there on toys dot com was out there. 但你知道，因為這是當韋文在那里的玩具網站上，com 是在那里。 > Pet stock com was out there. 寵物店就在外面。 > So anyhow so we decided we would launch our product demo. 所以無論如何，我們決定推出我們的產品演示。 > We fired. 我們開了槍。 > We didn\'t hire this marketing person and we did it ourselves. 我們沒有雇傭這個營銷人員，而是我們自己雇的。 > We auditioned we had a great we had a funny audition because we had two computers we brought in. 我們試鏡，我們有一個很棒的，我們有一個有趣的試鏡，因為我們有兩臺電腦，我們帶來了。 > You didn\'t really have laptops and we had one was a backup in case of thing didn\'t work. 你并沒有真正的筆記本電腦，而且我們有一臺是備用的，以防東西壞了。 > And I\'m sitting there with my with the two founders and the women were auditioning for. 我和兩個創始人坐在一起，女人們在試鏡。 > And all of a sudden the founder just froze the keyboard pinned me air and I\'m like I wonder what that was about. 突然，這位創始人凍結了鍵盤，把我的空氣固定住了，我想知道那是怎么回事。 > They keep talking away about all the ways you could use this and then it starts working. 他們不停地談論你用這個的所有方法，然后它就開始起作用了。 > He gets his keyboard up and it\'s working and what he did was it crashed and he won no excuse to switch computers. 他拿起鍵盤，鍵盤在工作，他做的是它崩潰了，他沒有理由換電腦。 > So he pretended like he had dropped his keyboard. 所以他假裝掉了鍵盤。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > We we we got on stage and we we actually got it was really wonderful experience. 我們登上舞臺，我們得到了非常美妙的體驗。 > We got a standing ovation because we did the Windows Blue Screen of Death but we hadn\'t really crashed the computer we had just crashed the virtual machine and we switched into a new window and that got a standing ovation. 我們得到了起立鼓掌，因為我們做了 WindowsBlue 屏幕的死亡，但我們沒有真正的崩潰計算機，我們剛剛崩潰的虛擬機，我們切換到一個新的窗口，這得到了起立鼓掌。 > So laughter. 所以笑。 > So we did a demo. 所以我們做了個演示。 > We did Slashdot which was where all the Linux developers exchanged information we got Slashdot ad and then we decide not to spend any money on marketing but to but to get PR public relations to get press because we thought it was interesting enough and it worked. 我們做了 Slashdot，這是所有 Linux 開發人員交換信息的地方，我們得到 Slashdot 廣告，然后我們決定不把任何錢花在營銷上，而是讓公關部門得到媒體的關注，因為我們認為這很有趣，而且效果很好。 > We got a lot of great coverage including in the Wall Street Journal. 我們得到了很多很好的報道，包括“華爾街日報”。 > Actually what happened was when we launched our beda. 實際上發生的事情是在我們發射貝達的時候。 > We were very frugal and we didn\'t have enough bandwidth. 我們非常節儉，沒有足夠的帶寬。 > We launched it on a Sunday we had announced we would launch it on Monday. 我們在一個周日發布了它，我們已經宣布我們將在周一推出它。 > And so many people came to our site in the middle of the night to download our product that hours we ran out of bandwidth and our ISP would give a name or bandwidth thought of Madoc. 這么多人在半夜來到我們的網站下載我們的產品，以至于我們耗盡了幾個小時的帶寬，我們的 ISP 會給出 Madoc 的名字或帶寬。 > So a kid at Cornell a sophomore at Cornell took our side and hosted it at Cornell and posted a sign don\'t sue me be anywhere I\'m keeping track of everybody that comes to your site but your site is down. 所以康奈爾大學二年級的一個孩子站在我們這邊，在康奈爾舉辦了一次活動，并在康奈爾發布了一個告示 > And he said he hosted us until we could get back up and running again. 他說他招待了我們直到我們能重新站起來再跑。 > And he came in and turned with us after that and laughter. 然后他走了進來，然后和我們一起笑了起來。 > So that was great. 那真是太棒了。 > `[00:16:24]` So anyhow we Yeah. 無論如何，我們是對的。 > `[00:16:28]` So we got all that and we we also filed patents held to say a bit about patterns. `[00:16:28]` 所以我們得到了所有的東西，我們也申請了一些關于模式的專利。 > `[00:16:33]` We started working on patterns from day one. `[00:16:33]` 我們從第一天開始研究模式。 > When you sit in between Microsoft and Intel you sort of want to try and protect yourself with IP I have to say a little startup. 當你坐在微軟和英特爾之間的時候，你想試著用 IP 來保護自己，我不得不說是一個小小的啟動。 > It\'s pretty hopeless to protect yourself against a monopoly because you know they can afford giant legal bills and you can\'t. 保護自己不受壟斷是非常沒有希望的，因為你知道他們有能力支付巨額的法律賬單，而你卻付不起。 > But but we did get our patents filed. 但我們確實申請了專利。 > I can\'t say even though they were pretty rock solid patents. 我不能說，即使它們是非常可靠的專利。 > They never really helped us that much. 他們從來沒有幫過我們那么多。 > But anyhow Microsoft actually bought someone that a copy does and we weren\'t going to ever sue them because we knew we were gonna beat them. 但是無論如何，微軟實際上是買了一個拷貝做的人，我們不打算起訴他們，因為我們知道我們會打敗他們。 > But then we when we found out Microsoft was trying to buy them we decided to sue them because certainly Microsoft wouldn\'t buy a company that was violating our rock solid patent. 但當我們發現微軟試圖收購他們時，我們決定起訴他們，因為微軟肯定不會收購一家侵犯我們穩固專利的公司。 > But we were wrong anyhow. 但無論如何我們都錯了。 > But it still took and actually ended up slowing Microsoft down because that company\'s code wasn\'t very good and Microsoft tried to use it. 但是，微軟的代碼不是很好，微軟試圖使用它，所以它還是慢了下來，最終減緩了微軟的速度。 > But anyhow board when I went out to look for a board a board of directors. 但不管怎樣，當我出去找董事會的時候。 > You know since we had sort of self funded and we had had the angels we just sort of had our own internal board and then we finally said well we should get some external people. 你知道，既然我們有了自籌資金，有了天使，我們就有了自己的內部董事會，然后我們終于說好了，我們應該找一些外部的人。 > And again you know we did have a lot of trepidation about wedging ourselves in between Intel and Microsoft. 再一次，你知道，我們在英特爾和微軟之間有很多不安。 > And so I kind of went out and looked for surd of who I thought was the best able to help us figure out how to stand up to those guys and that Larry Sutton Senior was the managing partner of Wilson Sonsini and pretty powerful attorney business minded attorney. 所以我就出去找我認為最能幫我們找出如何對付那些家伙的人拉里·薩頓·古爾是威爾遜·索尼尼的執行合伙人，也是一位很有實力的律師，有商業頭腦的律師。 > So I decided he needed to be our board member I\'d never man him. 所以我決定他必須成為我們的董事會成員，我永遠不會讓他成為男子漢。 > And this is sort of a philosophy I have if you have a good reason for someone to help you. 如果你有充分的理由讓別人幫你的話，這就是我的哲學。 > That goes beyond the fact that there are you know rich and powerful. 這超出了你所知道的富強的事實。 > `[00:18:37]` You can generally convince them because what I did you know he had never met me. `[00:18:37]` 你通常可以說服他們，因為我所做的，你知道他從未見過我。 > I told a lawyer Wilson Sonsini that we would move to their law firm if I could have a meeting with Larry Sonsini. 我告訴一位律師威爾遜·索尼尼，如果我能和拉里·桑西尼會面，我們就會搬到他們的律師事務所去。 > So I got my meeting. 所以我去開會了。 > I sent him a bunch of materials over before I arrived about what we were doing and went into his office you know and I wasn\'t sure I wanted him on my board but he smiled at me and asked how we could help. 在我到達之前，我給他寄了一堆關于我們正在做的事情的材料，然后走進了他的辦公室。我不確定我想讓他加入我的董事會，但他對我微笑著，問我們怎樣才能幫上忙。 > And I thought yes I want them on my board. 我想是的，我希望他們在我的董事會上。 > And he said how can I help you. 他說我能幫你什么。 > I said I really like you to join my board he said. 我說我真的很喜歡你加入我的董事會，他說。 > Oh he laughed and said he was busy getting off boards and I said Well let\'s talk about the company until we started talking and we started talking about we had had at that point quite a history with Intel around working with shall we say they were interested in our IP and we were not about to give it to them and there were some a lot of discussions going on. 哦，他笑著說，他正忙著離開董事會。我說，讓我們談談公司，直到我們開始談論，我們開始談論我們與英特爾合作的歷史，我們說他們對我們的知識產權感興趣，我們不打算把它給他們，而且有很多討論在進行。 > `[00:19:39]` And so I was talking to him about this and I was talking to him about some things that were already going on with Microsoft and he was really interested. `[00:19:39]` 所以我和他談了這件事，我和他談了一些微軟已經發生的事情，他真的很感興趣。 > And and then it was late Friday afternoon and I left. 然后是周五下午晚些時候，我離開了。 > He said he\'d let me know and I came in Monday morning at 7:00a.m. 他說他會通知我的，我星期一早上 7 點來。 > and they\'re on my voicemail from 6:00 in the morning with this voicemail from Larry Sonsini saying he would join our board he was just an invaluable board member because he had seen every deal in the world and you know knew how to negotiate these things. 他們在我早上 6 點的語音信箱里收到拉里·索尼尼的留言說他會加入我們的董事會他只是個無價的董事會成員因為他看過世界上的每一筆交易你知道如何談判這些事情 > And then from there I added some other board members but I think a board can be really really helpful to you if you get the right people. 然后，我增加了一些其他的董事會成員，但我認為，如果你找到合適的人，董事會對你很有幫助。 > Let\'s see. 讓我們看看。 > So we basically we launched our pride day when we started selling. 所以，當我們開始銷售的時候，我們基本上啟動了我們的驕傲日。 > We just sold it over the Internet. 我們只是在網上賣的。 > We supported it via e-mail and so on. 我們通過電子郵件等方式支持它。 > We\'re very frugal and we were cash neutral and we were international. 我們非常節儉，現金中立，我們是國際化的。 > We were all over the world from day one and it was pretty exciting. 我們從第一天起就走遍了世界，這是相當令人興奮的。 > `[00:20:44]` Back in 1999 Yelle. `[00:20:44]` 早在 1999 年，Yelle。 > `[00:20:49]` So now I\'m gonna just talk a little bit about the enterprise market because it\'s sort of daunting to go into the enterprise market and in fact I remember one of our top engineers left. `[00:20:49]` 現在我只想談一談企業市場，因為進入企業市場有點讓人望而生畏，事實上，我還記得我們的一位頂尖工程師離開了。 > He said You\'re not going to be able to get into the enterprise market. 他說你不能進入企業市場。 > This company is going to fail. 這家公司要倒閉了。 > And I remember talking to one of the better known tech bankers and he made fun of us. 我記得和一位知名的科技銀行家交談，他取笑我們。 > He said you can\'t make it in the enterprise. 他說你在企業里做不到。 > You can do these things but you really got to build up your credibility and you really got a you know played the wind shifts to get there. 你可以做這些事情，但你真的要建立你的信譽，你真的有一個，你知道，發揮風向，以達到那里。 > We decided we should go to market we couldn\'t possibly build out an enterprise sales force and we should go to market with the hardware vendors and we found a way that we could help the hardware vendors make money. 我們決定去市場，我們不可能建立一支企業銷售隊伍，我們應該和硬件供應商一起去市場，我們找到了一種方法來幫助硬件供應商賺錢。 > So basically IBM at the time and now IBM had invention invented virtualization back in the 60s. 所以從根本上說，當時的 IBM 和現在的 IBM 發明了虛擬化，早在 60 年代。 > It had completely died out because people thought it was something for big mainframes but they got what we were doing and IBM had some huge x 86 serversP.C. 它已經完全消失了，因為人們認為它適用于大型主機，但他們得到了我們所做的，而 IBM 擁有一些龐大的 x86serversP.C。 > servers that they were having trouble selling because nobody had a workload that was big enough to need such a big server. 因為沒有人有足夠大的工作量需要這么大的服務器，所以他們在銷售時遇到了問題。 > `[00:22:10]` But these big servers were very high margin so they we were talking to them we were talking to HP we\'re trying to convince anybody that would listen to us and people just to give you make a point about how little people listen to us. `[00:22:10]` 但是這些大服務器的利潤率很高，所以我們和他們交談，我們和惠普交談，我們試圖說服任何愿意聽我們說話的人，他們只是想讓你知道，人們聽我們的話有多么少。 > We were trying to talk to all the analysts like Gartner and forester and everything. 我們試圖與高德納、弗羅斯特等所有分析師進行對話。 > And one day we had one marketing guy runs into my office he goes we finally got a meeting with Forester. 有一天，我們有一個營銷人員跑到我的辦公室，他說，我們終于和福雷斯特開了個會。 > It at 9:00 o\'clock tomorrow morning in Boston. 明天早上 9 點在波士頓。 > And I you know we were in Palo Alto and I\'m like Okay so we get on the red eye and we go out to Boston and we come into a forest we\'re so excited to have the audience of of an analyst and the person they sent in was covering the auto industry. 我，你知道，我們在帕洛阿爾托，我很好，所以我們開始紅眼睛，我們走到波士頓，我們來到一個森林，我們很興奮有一位分析師的觀眾，他們派進來的人是汽車工業。 > It was just like nearly jumped at him but he didn\'t have proceeded to tell a virtualization was but anyhow so so so so finally we were trying to get these hybrid banners to work for us. 這就像幾乎撲向他，但他沒有繼續告訴虛擬化是，但無論如何，最后我們試圖讓這些混合橫幅為我們工作。 > And what happened was an IBM fellow comes knocking at our door. 發生的事情是一個 IBM 的人來敲我們的門。 > We hadn\'t launched our server product yet and he says I\'ve been looking at your desktop product. 我們還沒有推出我們的服務器產品，他說我一直在看你的桌面產品。 > I think it would be great. 我覺得會很棒的。 > On one of our servers as a way to help sell them a very technical guy we\'d only been talking to the marketing people. 在我們的一臺服務器上，作為幫助銷售他們的一種方式，我們只和營銷人員交談過，這是一個非常技術性的人。 > So we said oh come into our labs and we showed it you know we had been building it from day one and it was working. 所以我們說，哦，來到我們的實驗室，我們展示給它看，你知道，我們從第一天開始就在建造它，它正在工作。 > And so we got our partnership with IBM going and then we did this created this sort of artificial VMware preferred hardware vendor program and set a deadline and they put a bunch of requirements on it and all the other hardware vendors signed up by that deadline. 于是我們和 IBM 建立了合作關系，然后我們創建了這種人工 VMware 首選硬件供應商程序，并設定了一個最后期限，他們對此提出了大量的要求，所有其他硬件供應商都在最后期限前簽署了協議。 > I\'m not sure they knew why they were signing up but having a deadline helps in almost everything. 我不確定他們是否知道為什么要報名，但有一個截止日期幾乎對一切都有幫助。 > And and so we so we were able to start selling with with the hardware vendors and it\'s interesting sort of story how we got going with IBM. 因此，我們能夠開始與硬件供應商一起銷售，這是一個有趣的故事，我們是如何與 IBM 合作的。 > It\'s sort of you know startups are one lucky break after another and the name of the game is to put yourself in position to take advantage of all these lucky breaks. 你知道，創業是一次又一次的幸運休息，游戲的名稱是讓自己處于有利的位置，利用所有這些幸運的機會。 > And so what happened was IBM was going to resell our product but we used Linux as a way to get going you know to kind of boot and then Linux got out of the way and then the virtual R software took over. 所以，IBM 打算轉售我們的產品，但是我們用 Linux 作為啟動的一種方式，你知道的，然后 Linux 退出了，然后虛擬 R 軟件接管了。 > You didn\'t use it anymore. 你不再使用它了。 > And IBM lawyers discovered that we had GPL Linux software in our distribution and they killed the whole deal because they were afraid it would pollute everything and all of IBM software would suddenly have to be open sourced and they didn\'t want to risk that. IBM 律師發現，我們的發行版中有 GPL Linux 軟件，他們扼殺了整個交易，因為他們擔心這會污染一切，所有 IBM 軟件都會突然被開源，他們不想冒這個風險。 > And so we were like Oh now how are we ever gonna get anyone to help us sell our product and them. 所以我們就像哦，現在我們怎么能讓別人幫我們銷售我們的產品和他們呢？ > And then we had this idea and we said well what about if your resellers sold us. 然后我們有了這個想法，我們說，如果你的經銷商賣給我們怎么辦？ > Would that create this legal problem and they said no our resellers can sell you without it causing any problems. 這會不會造成這個法律問題，他們說，不，我們的經銷商可以賣給你，而不會造成任何問題。 > So we took that to them. 所以我們把這個交給了他們。 > And what ended up happening is they were about to have their worldwide conference of all their top tier resellers in the world by the way apologies for all of you that are in consumer and don\'t care a bit about your enterprise. 最后發生的是，他們即將在世界范圍內召開他們所有頂級經銷商的全球會議，順便說一句，為你們所有的消費者道歉，他們一點也不關心你們的企業。 > But it\'s sort of an interesting story. 但這是個有趣的故事。 > All these resellers it\'s just all over the world these are the best trained people that selling this kind of product. 所有這些經銷商-世界各地的經銷商-他們是銷售這種產品的訓練有素的人。 > And they invited us to the conference. 他們邀請我們參加會議。 > They let us keynote. 他們讓我們做主旨發言。 > They let us run training sessions. 他們讓我們進行訓練。 > And after that our server market took off. 在那之后，我們的服務器市場起飛了。 > `[00:25:57]` So it was kind of a lucky break to be able to do that. `[00:25:57]` 所以這是一個幸運的休息，能夠做到這一點。 > `[00:26:08]` The thing I wanted to close on and I even I couldn\'t believe it I experienced it here today I was walking around having a pizza pizza before I came inside and somebody grabbed me and said Are you the founder of GM or thank you for your product. `[00:26:08]` 我想接近的東西-我甚至不敢相信-我今天在這里經歷過-我在這里走來走去，在我進來之前，有人抓住我，說你是通用汽車的創始人，還是謝謝你的產品？ > I love your product. 我喜歡你的產品。 > `[00:26:24]` And I mean that hasn\'t happened in a few years. `[00:26:24]` 我的意思是這幾年沒有發生過。 > So thank you. 所以謝謝你。 > But laughter. 但是笑聲。 > `[00:26:30]` But anyhow that\'s really what it\'s about is bringing something to market that people absolutely love and you know makes their lives better. `[00:26:30]` 不管怎么說，這才是真正意義上的，是給市場帶來了人們絕對喜歡的東西，你知道，這會讓他們的生活變得更好。 > `[00:26:40]` And I just thought you know this was my favorite e-mail we ever received. `[00:26:40]` 我以為你知道這是我最喜歡的電子郵件。 > Congratulations for that. 恭喜你。 > Maybe mazing product. 也許是令人目眩的產品。 > I can\'t believe what I see. 我真不敢相信我看到了什么。 > I think it\'s the best discovery after landing on the moon. 我認為這是登月后最好的發現。 > The only thing I can\'t believe is why is it Beda other software. 我唯一不能相信的是為什么它是 Beda 其他軟件。 > We knew they meant Microsoft isn\'t that stable in an end version and somebody else said from Germany I can\'t believe it. 我們知道他們的意思是微軟在最終版本中沒有那么穩定，還有人從德國說我無法相信。 > Your brains must be bigger than Volkswagens. 你的大腦一定比大眾大。 > Laughter. 笑聲。 > And then this incredible article that the Wall Street Journal did about bringing freedom of choice to the desktop. 然后這篇令人難以置信的文章“華爾街日報”為桌面帶來了選擇的自由。 > `[00:27:15]` It\'s things like that. `[00:27:15]` 是這樣的。 > It was just such a wonderful fun experience to do you know to do to bring something so useful to people to market. 這是一次非常有趣的體驗，你知道如何為市場帶來一些非常有用的東西。 > `[00:27:27]` Well I thought there would be questions but I guess it\'s hard with this many people I\'d love getting questions. `[00:27:00]` 我原以為會有問題，但我想對這么多人來說，我很難得到問題。 > And I was just going to say good luck to all of you. 我只是想祝你們好運。 > That might be doing a startup I\'m doing another one too and each one is different and challenging and you know a lot of people kind of pay attention they think oh what are you doing and I\'m like I\'m just another slob trying to do a startup. 這可能是在做一家創業公司，我也在做另一家公司，每一家都是不同的，而且都很有挑戰性。你知道，很多人都會注意，他們會想，哦，你在做什么，而我就像是另一個嘗試創業的懶蟲。 > You know we\'ll see. 你知道我們會看到的。 > But good luck to you and thank you very much. 祝你好運，非常感謝。