# Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012 > `[00:00:00]` Thank you for coming. `[00:00:00]` 謝謝你能來。 > Thank you very much for inviting so many people. 非常感謝你邀請了這么多人。 > A lot of people. 很多人。 > So maybe the start you could just tell us a little bit about what Rocketdyne is and how you got started. 所以也許你可以先告訴我們羅克迪恩是什么以及你是如何開始的。 > `[00:00:09]` OK. `[00:00:09]` 好的。 > So I found in Iraq then in 1997 as a matter of fact you know I was trying to partner with one of your find a program and you know my concept was to create what we call Internet shopping mall in Japan. 所以我在 1997 年在伊拉克發現，事實上，你知道我試圖與你的一個尋找項目合作，你知道我的概念是在日本創建我們所謂的網絡購物中心。 > It was very very arty RTD and we tried to do it was full for viruses that didn\'t go through. 這是非常藝術性的 RTD，我們試圖這樣做，這是充分的病毒，沒有經過\‘。 > So we started to hire you know young graduate school students start it from initial capital of 200000 USD never raise any money from NBC just hired young guys and went public in the year 2010 started to you know by many companies. 所以我們開始雇傭，你知道，年輕的研究生院的學生從最初的 200000 美元開始，從來沒有從 NBC 籌集任何資金，只是雇傭了年輕人，并且在 2010 年開始上市，你知道的，很多公司都知道。 > Now we\'re number one in e-commerce about 35 to 40 percent market share in terms of e-commerce normally online travel. 現在，我們在電子商務方面排名第一 > Number one in online banking. 網上銀行的第一名。 > `[00:01:14]` Number two online brokerage and we do about 38 different businesses in Japan. `[00:01:14]` 第二大在線經紀公司，我們在日本做了大約 38 個不同的業務。 > `[00:01:22]` And we said to globalize our business so now we\'re in more than 13 countries. `[00:01:22]` 我們說要使我們的生意全球化，所以我們現在 13 個以上的國家。 > We bought the second largest area in a company called Corbeau which is doing extremely well in Europe and Canada and in Asia. 我們在一家名為 Corbeau 的公司購買了第二大區域，該公司在歐洲、加拿大和亞洲的表現非常好。 > So we\'re a little bit different Internet company in Japan and now trying to globalize our business. 所以我們在日本的互聯網公司有點不同，現在我們正在努力使我們的業務全球化。 > `[00:01:52]` How is starting a company in Japan and growing a company in Japan different and Silicon Valley. `[00:01:52]` 如何在日本創辦一家公司，在日本發展一家不同的硅谷的公司。 > Well you know there is no TV venture capital ecosystem. 你知道沒有電視風險投資生態系統。 > `[00:02:05]` There are venture capitalists but not like you know you know a single but a type of food service. `[00:02:05]` 有風險資本家，但不像你所知道的那樣，只有一種食品服務。 > They will invest but not much. 他們會投資但不多。 > They will not get involved into the management that much. 他們不會那么介入管理的。 > So just kind of providing the capital. 所以只是提供資金。 > `[00:02:27]` So how did you learn the lessons that seasoned Silicon Valley tradition traditionally help entrepreneurs with. `[00:02:27]` 那么，你是如何學到經驗豐富的硅谷傳統幫助企業家的呢？ > How did you learn how to run a company and grow it. 你是如何學會如何經營和成長一家公司的。 > `[00:02:35]` I don\'t know how she bases are helping these venture companies because I haven\'t never experienced the way I\'ve a game. 我不知道她是如何幫助這些風險公司的，因為我從來沒有經歷過這樣的游戲。 > `[00:02:44]` I find it happening with my own. `[00:02:44]` 我發現它發生在我自己的身上。 > `[00:02:47]` You know the money initial capital was just 200000 USD. `[00:02:47]` 你知道最初的資金只有 200000 美元。 > But since I knew that I\'m not going to be funded a huge amount from ABC I create it sort of cash flow system so that I don\'t need to read I on NBC. 但由于我知道我不會從 ABC 獲得巨額資金，所以我創建了一種現金流系統，這樣我就不需要在 NBC 上讀我的文章了。 > We ask our merchant to pay 500 dollars per month but we ask them to pay us six months upfront. 我們要求我們的商人每月支付 500 美元，但我們要求他們提前六個月付款。 > `[00:03:17]` So from the second months of our service at my company it was cash flow positive cash flow through every month and it was just very impressive. `[00:03:17]` 所以從我們在我公司服務的第二個月開始，我們每個月的現金流都是正的，這是非常令人印象深刻的。 > `[00:03:32]` Looking back to that first year you know when you were sort of becoming cash flow positive very quickly and figuring this out as you went. `[00:03:32]` 回顧第一年，你知道，當你很快變成現金流正的時候，你就會明白這一點。 > Are there any things that stick out that you would do differently. 有沒有什么特別的事情你會以不同的方式去做。 > Well so ongoing. 還在繼續。 > `[00:03:46]` We never raised any money from outside we raise later on from friends and families and we didn\'t need any money but it was kind of just you know for the friendship sake I want to make my family and my friends happy. `[00:03:46]` 我們從來沒有從外面籌集過錢，后來我們從朋友和家人那里籌到了錢，我們不需要任何錢，但為了友誼，我想讓我的家人和朋友開心。 > `[00:04:05]` How far along were you when you about friends and family around. `[00:04:05]` 當你談論朋友和家人的時候，你走了多遠？ > No there was like six months before we go public. 不，在我們上市前的六個月。 > `[00:04:15]` Two days before our IPO my friend must solve Softbank call me and ask me to let him in. `[00:04:15]` 在我們首次公開募股前兩天，我的朋友必須解決軟銀的問題，打電話給我，讓我讓他進來。 > But I said it\'s too late. 但我說現在太晚了。 > `[00:04:27]` Well we were very patient. `[00:04:27]` 我們很有耐心。 > `[00:04:30]` To be honest we were a very patient for the first two years and tried to be create the you know Connell of our business model. `[00:04:30]` 老實說，我們在頭兩年非常有耐心，并試圖創造我們的商業模式的“你知道的康奈爾”。 > `[00:04:42]` So we\'re not trying to compete with the modelAmazon.com or eBay. `[00:04:42]` 所以我們不想和 Amazon.com 或者 eBay 競爭。 > We\'re trying to create a great system to support medium to small sized merchant to sell their product all over Japan. 我們正在努力創建一個偉大的系統，以支持中小型商人在日本各地銷售他們的產品。 > So we really tried to create an extremely strong culture of the company because I knew that I\'m going to be in this business for a long long time. 所以我們真的試著為公司創造一種非常強大的文化，因為我知道我將在這個行業工作很長一段時間。 > So we didn\'t rush really we were very patient. 所以我們并不著急，我們很有耐心。 > `[00:05:12]` Did you figure out that kernel on the first try did you get right. `[00:05:12]` 你在第一次嘗試時就知道內核是正確的嗎？ > The thing that made Rocketdyne what it is the first try did you have to iterate and evolve to get. 讓 Rocketdyne-它是第一次嘗試-的東西，你必須經過迭代和進化才能得到。 > `[00:05:19]` Well one thing we did differently from most of space e-commerce company is we try to facilitate communication between the merchants and the consumers because the way I feel is of course you know buying products Price is important. `[00:05:19]` 我們所做的與大多數太空電子商務公司不同的是，我們試圖促進商家和消費者之間的溝通，因為我的感覺是，你當然知道購買產品的價格是很重要的。 > Efficiency is important but more than that in my opinion by being you know should be fun. 效率是很重要的，但在我看來更重要的是成為你知道應該是有趣的。 > And no we need to create a rich experience. 不，我們需要創造一個豐富的經驗。 > So we try to be a liason between the consumer and the retailer instead of trying to compete against the retailer using the idea we want to use our technology to help small to medium size enterprise do business with consumers. 因此，我們試圖成為消費者和零售商之間的負擔，而不是試圖與零售商競爭，使用我們希望利用我們的技術幫助中小型企業與消費者做生意的想法。 > So that was totally different idea and I was 100 percent confident my employees will really like the idea of helping small medium size companies rather than trying to destroy their business. 所以這是完全不同的想法，我百分之百地相信我的員工真的會喜歡幫助中小型公司的想法，而不是試圖摧毀他們的業務。 > `[00:06:24]` So I mean as you said this is very different than anyone else was doing in e-commerce at the time really still is. `[00:06:24]` 所以我的意思是，正如你所說的，這與當時在電子商務中所做的非常不同。 > Did you know that that was going to be the model you\'re going after before you started the company was that we were you convinced that this was what you were going to do differently. 你知道嗎，在你創立公司之前，你所追求的模式是，我們確信這就是你要做的不同的事情。 > `[00:06:38]` We didn\'t think about how we would do it differently but we know what we wanted to do. `[00:06:38]` 我們沒有想過我們將如何做不同的事情，但我們知道我們想做什么。 > I always don\'t think about our competitors much because you know you cannot do too many things about Atabay you just need to focus on what you do to improve your service and improve customer satisfaction. 我總是不太關心我們的競爭對手，因為你知道你不能對 Atabay 做太多的事情，你只需要專注于你所做的事情來改進你的服務和提高客戶滿意度。 > `[00:06:57]` I think that\'s part of the nature of Japanese companies keep improving improving improving. `[00:06:57]` 我認為日本公司的部分性質在不斷改進。 > `[00:07:05]` How did you grow both in the early days when you were signing up these small and medium businesses that you wanted to help and then in the later days obviously you made a lot of acquisitions that helped drive growth. `[00:07:05]` 你是如何成長的？在早期，當你注冊這些你想幫助的中小型企業的時候，很明顯，在后來的日子里，你進行了大量的收購，幫助了經濟的增長。 > Could you just talk about how you figure out growth along the way. 你能不能談談你是如何計算出一路上的增長的。 > `[00:07:19]` Well first we have organic growth and we buy many companies in domestically and internationally domestically. `[00:07:19]` 首先，我們有了有機的增長，我們在國內和國際上收購了許多公司。 > We created three things one great great brand by the way we have a professional baseball ruffling egos. 我們創造了三件事，一個偉大的品牌，通過我們的方式，我們有一個職業棒球，憤怒的自我。 > And so everybody knows racketing brand even if you don\'t even use internet they know raft and brand we host a TV found tennis tournament. 所以每個人都知道球拍品牌，即使你不使用互聯網，他們知道木筏和品牌，我們主持電視，發現網球賽。 > So we have an extremely strong brand too. 所以我們也有一個非常強大的品牌。 > We created the strongest Mindich award program caught up in Sipple points so we can use those points to cross-sell our services and we also created the sort of the consumer database to analyze consumer data and now about eight 80 million. 我們創建了最強大的 Mindich 獎勵計劃，被抓到 Sipple 積分，這樣我們就可以利用這些積分交叉銷售我們的服務，我們還創建了消費者數據庫來分析消費者數據，現在大約有 8000 萬。 > `[00:08:12]` So about 90 percent of Internet operations are member we can use our currency points to cross-sell various services through them back to the topic of acquisitions. `[00:08:12]` 因此，大約 90%的互聯網運營是會員，我們可以使用我們的貨幣點交叉銷售各種服務，通過他們回到收購的主題。 > `[00:08:27]` What do you look for when you make an acquisition and how do you integrate into the company into or 10 so that you\'re all one company together. `[00:08:27]` 當你進行收購的時候，你會尋找什么？你如何融入公司，或者 10，使你成為一家公司。 > `[00:08:34]` So there\'s two types of acquisitions we make. `[00:08:34]` 所以我們有兩種類型的收購。 > One is purely geographic expansion to buy a time. 一個是純粹的地域擴張來爭取時間。 > So we bought thatBuy.com in theU.S. 所以我們在美國買了那個 Buy.com。 > played com UK prime minister in France and we try to use their presence in brand name and their presence and convert their business model to lock them model. 英國首相在法國玩過游戲，我們試著利用他們的品牌和存在來改變他們的商業模式來鎖定他們的模式。 > The second type is addition to our ecosystem very chain like COBOL which is not doing as well as in other countries but they\'re very strong. 第二類是添加到我們的生態系統，像 COBOL 一樣，它做得不如其他國家那么好，但它們非常強大。 > They have now more market share in Canada and in France and Japan. 它們現在加拿大、法國和日本擁有更多的市場份額。 > `[00:09:20]` So we need. `[00:09:20]` 所以我們需要。 > We knew that we need a digital books service in our sort of product line up so we know that we can use our membership to facilitate the growth of COBOL business. 我們知道，我們需要一個數字圖書服務，在我們的產品線，所以我們知道，我們可以利用我們的會員，以促進 COBOL 業務的發展。 > `[00:09:39]` So there is two types geographic expansion and to buy a time and those who addition to our ecosystem. `[00:09:39]` 所以有兩種類型的地域擴張，一種是為了贏得時間，另一種是為了增加我們的生態系統。 > `[00:09:47]` And then once you make these acquisitions how do you integrate them into the culture of architecture mission practice and value. `[00:09:47]` 然后一旦你進行了這些收購，你如何將它們融入建筑文化、使命、實踐和價值之中。 > `[00:09:57]` So before buying a company we talk about our dream and goal and culture and talk over and over and over again before we make acquisitions. 所以，在收購一家公司之前，我們先談談自己的夢想、目標和文化，然后再一次又一次地談一遍又一遍，然后再進行收購。 > If they don\'t like our culture or our practice or our mission we\'re not going to buy even if you like their service because it doesn\'t make sense to lose the founders and the management of the company. 如果他們不喜歡我們的文化、我們的實踐或我們的使命，即使你喜歡他們的服務，我們也不會購買，因為失去公司的創始人和管理層是沒有意義的。 > So we talk over before the closure of the deal. 所以我們在交易結束前再談一談。 > We talk a lot about those kind of things. 我們談論了很多類似的事情。 > `[00:10:27]` And what\'s your success rate for acquisitions in terms of good integration on those points. `[00:10:27]` 在這些方面，你的收購成功率是多少？ > `[00:10:33]` Oh it\'s difficult. `[00:10:33]` 哦，這很難。 > `[00:10:36]` I don\'t know but there\'s still no one you know only one fada we made was we went into China partnering with supply which is the largest search engine company in China but it didn\'t work out well. `[00:10:36]` 我不知道，但仍然沒有人，你知道，我們做的唯一的一件事就是，我們和中國最大的搜索引擎公司-供應公司-合作進入中國，但結果不太好。 > So you know we discussed with them and agreed that we should shut the business now and we withdrew from China yet year ago. 所以你知道，我們和他們討論過了，并同意我們應該現在關閉業務，而且我們已經從中國撤出了一年。 > `[00:11:00]` So there is the on the you know the big Vedia I recognize at this moment even more than the sort of the cultural ideas you\'ve talked about. `[00:11:00]` 現在我認識的那個大維迪亞，比你所說的那種文化觀念更重要。 > `[00:11:16]` You know one thing that I just heard again and again and that Rockton is known for having having a great culture. `[00:11:16]` 你知道我剛剛聽到的一件事，那就是羅克頓以擁有偉大的文化而聞名。 > Could you talk about how you\'ve held that culture all the way through for the last 15 years as you said. 你能不能像你說的那樣，在過去的 15 年里一直堅持這種文化？ > How do you think about the culture the company needs to be to be successful needs to have to be successful. 你如何看待公司需要成功的文化，需要成功才能成功。 > `[00:11:31]` So in my opinion you need to have two things. `[00:11:31]` 在我看來，你需要有兩件事。 > One is of course innovation and the second part is operation and innovation is kind of not so difficult to encourage people to be innovative but at the same time if you want a scale you business you need to have a strong operation culture as well and you wanted to achieve strong operational culture. 一個當然是創新，第二個部分是運營和創新，鼓勵人們創新并不難，但同時，如果你想要一個規模，你的業務，你需要有一個強大的經營文化以及你想要實現強大的經營文化。 > `[00:11:58]` You need to have sort of these shared practices and the idea is kind of the framework for managing the company may mean using more numbers and keep your eyes more. `[00:11:58]` 你需要有一些共享的實踐，而這種管理公司的框架可能意味著使用更多的數字，更多地關注你的眼睛。 > Most likely the entrepreneurs who don\'t like you know just running the numbers but I think be quantitive and any frequentative is also very important. 最有可能的是，那些不喜歡你的企業家只會計算數字，但我認為量化和任何頻率都是非常重要的。 > `[00:12:31]` So recently you invested in Pinterest. `[00:12:31]` 你最近投資了 Pinterest。 > Can you talk a little bit about how that came together and what you see in Pinterest and how you hope that relationship is going to evolve. 你能談談它是如何結合在一起的，你在 Pinterest 中看到了什么，以及你希望這種關系將如何發展。 > `[00:12:41]` Well I think Pinterest spoke or just had a phone call with him and I think he was great. `[00:12:41]` 我想 Pinterest 和他通了電話，我覺得他很棒。 > He\'s great. 他很棒。 > We like the company and I think Pinterest is very different from other social networks. 我們喜歡這家公司，我認為 Pinterest 與其他社交網絡有很大不同。 > It\'s very you know graphical and appeals to the heart of your interest and has a strong influence over to buying behavior and buying the shoes of the people. 這是非常你知道圖形和吸引力的核心你的興趣，并有很強的影響力，在購買行為和購買鞋的人。 > So as an e-commerce company I think Pinterest is the best social network. 因此，作為一家電子商務公司，我認為 Pinterest 是最好的社交網絡。 > So we found Pinterest and I had a meeting with Ben Dring in Cairo. 所以我們找到了 Pinterest，我和 Ben Dring 在開羅舉行了一次會議。 > `[00:13:18]` And he liked me. `[00:13:18]` 他喜歡我。 > He let us in. 他讓我們進去的。 > `[00:13:27]` What I think maybe you should ask them. `[00:13:27]` 我認為也許你該問他們些什么。 > `[00:13:30]` But he he still I think he had seen something different in us you know compared with otherU.S. `[00:13:30]` 但是他仍然我認為他在我們身上看到了一些與其他美國不同的東西。 > based Internet companies so if he says I will ask him what do you see as the big challenges and the opportunities in retail and e-commerce coming down over the next few years. 基于互聯網公司，所以，如果他說，我會問他，你認為什么是巨大的挑戰和機會零售業和電子商務在未來幾年下降。 > `[00:13:50]` Of course you know I think this is to the siege stage one for e-commerce. `[00:13:50]` 你當然知道，我認為這是電子商務的第一階段。 > Now we are seeing lots of decent content sales so they bookC.D DVD games everything will be digital and online Difford into the logistics will become more and more important. 現在我們看到了很多像樣的內容銷售，所以他們的書，D，DVD，游戲，一切都將數字化和線上，迪福德的物流將變得越來越重要。 > And there are lots of innovative logistics company you know using robots and automation to you know improve the efficiency and also the devices the mobile phones smartphones. 有很多創新的物流公司，你知道，使用機器人和自動化，你知道，提高效率，也提高設備，移動電話，智能手機。 > The tablet will become the major device to buy products and maybe there will be a sort of social. 平板電腦將成為購買產品的主要設備，也許還會有一種社交功能。 > I think these social shopping is still Milbury fine. 我覺得這些社交購物還是不錯的。 > The strong answer to it. 對此的有力回答。 > `[00:14:46]` But I think in the future it will call for social shopping or anything else. `[00:14:46]` 但我認為，在未來，它將需要社交購物或其他任何東西。 > Are there major ways you identified the Japanese consumers behave differently than consumers anywhere else in the world. 你是否認為日本消費者的行為方式與世界上其他地方的消費者不同？ > `[00:14:57]` Well Knapton is what I call a shopper centric marketplace meaning that every shop has a very different characters and so the design and the user experience and we provide all sorts of tools for them to make fans around shop. `[00:14:57]` 我稱之為以顧客為中心的市場，這意味著每一家商店都有非常不同的特征，所以設計和用戶體驗，我們提供了各種各樣的工具，讓他們在商店周圍成為粉絲。 > `[00:15:21]` So I think Rapidan was very social from day one. `[00:15:21]` 所以我認為 Rapidan 從第一天起就很喜歡社交。 > We try to create a fans around shops not our own rocket and still that JP the fans around shops and all these shops as well you know professional staff and they are the sort of curator of wines or sports goods or you know groceries and so forth. 我們試著在商店周圍創造一個粉絲，而不是我們自己的火箭，仍然是 JP，商店周圍的粉絲，以及所有這些商店，你知道專業的工作人員，他們是葡萄酒或體育用品的策展人，或者你知道雜貨等等。 > `[00:15:43]` So I think my question is if you want to buy some product do you want to ask your friend or do you want to ask the staff at the pro shop and my. 我想我的問題是，如果你想買一些產品，你想問你的朋友還是問我和專賣店的員工。 > Of course sometimes your friend is can give you a bit of advice then staff at the brushoff but most time you know I think you should ask professionals. 當然，有時你的朋友是可以給你一點建議，然后在工作人員在布魯霍夫，但大多數時候，你知道，我認為你應該問專業人士。 > So that was our approach and I think it worked extremely well in Japan and now we\'re testing in other countries and I think it\'s it\'s working very well as well. 這就是我們的方法，我認為它在日本非常有效，現在我們正在其他國家進行測試，我認為它也非常有效。 > `[00:16:19]` Can you talk you talked a little bit about mobile and tablets but obviously in Japan that\'s become a huge way that people are probably even bigger than here where it seems like own right on the phone all the time. `[00:16:19]` 你能談談嗎？你談了一點關于移動和平板電腦的話題，但很明顯，在日本，移動和平板電腦已經成為一種巨大的方式，人們可能比這里的人更大，在這里，人們似乎一直在打電話。 > How much are you thinking about mobile and how you\'re thinking about mobile as sort of the future of the company. 你對手機有多少想法？你認為移動是公司未來的一部分。 > `[00:16:34]` Well already 25 percent of Rockton transaction which is big. `[00:16:34]` 已經有 25%的羅克頓交易，這是很大的。 > We do about 15 billion USD or even more this year just for pure e-commerce in Japan and already 25 percent of actually is coming from mobile devices including future Volhynia smartphone. 我們今年做了大約 150 億美元，甚至更多，僅僅是為了在日本的純電子商務，已經有 25%的實際來自移動設備，包括未來的 Volhynia 智能手機。 > Maybe a 60 percent smartphone 40 percent feature phone and smartphone transaction is growing about 300 to 400 percent year on year. 也許 60%的智能手機，40%的功能手機和智能手機的交易比去年同期增長了 300%到 400%。 > So it will be more than 50 percent in a couple of years. 因此，在未來幾年內，這一比例將超過 50%。 > `[00:17:12]` It\'s `[00:17:12]` huge. `[00:17:12]` `[00:17:12]` 太大了。 > `[00:17:14]` That is huge. `[00:17:14]` 那是巨大的。 > You said something earlier that was so interesting to me I made a note to go back to it which is that you don\'t think a lot about competition because you can\'t do much about that. 你之前說了些我很感興趣的話，我做了個筆記，讓我回顧一下，那就是你對競爭并不怎么想，因為你對此無能為力。 > One thing that I hear from startups all the time is Fearby competition. 我從初創公司一直聽到的一件事是恐懼的競爭。 > So when you were starting the company and Amazon and eBay were were huge. 所以，當你開始創業的時候，亞馬遜和 eBay 都是大公司。 > Was that a problem for you. 這對你來說是個問題嗎。 > Did people ask you what are you going to do about Amazon and eBay. 人們有沒有問過你，你打算對亞馬遜和 eBay 做些什么？ > You know how are you going to beat them how you can be with them and how do you think about sort of how did you stay focused on doing your own thing and ignoring competition. 你知道如何打敗他們，如何和他們在一起，你如何思考，你是如何專注于做自己的事情，忽視競爭的。 > `[00:17:46]` Well let me put it I learn from the competitors but I\'m not afraid of competitors because even if you are afraid of it doesn\'t do any good for you. 讓我說一句，我向競爭對手學習，但我不怕競爭對手，因為即使你害怕它，對你也沒有任何好處。 > I learned what they\'re doing and then maybe you know try to match if I have to. 我學會了他們在做什么，然后如果我需要的話，也許你可以試著去匹配。 > `[00:18:05]` But I think the the way we approach e-commerce is totally different fromAmazon.com because again we try to facilitate the transaction is medium to small margins to the larger ones to the consumers. `[00:18:05]` 但我認為我們對待電子商務的方式與 Amazon.com 完全不同，因為我們再一次試圖促進交易，對于消費者來說，這是中到小的利潤。 > As a consequence you know we have big brands almost old department store as big a big fashion brands almost entire Tahnee companies are using our platform. 因此，你知道，我們有大品牌，幾乎是舊百貨商店，大時尚品牌，幾乎整個塔尼公司都在使用我們的平臺。 > And that\'s a major portion of our business but approaches to how to help small to medium size merchants to do business with consumers. 這是我們業務的一個主要部分，但我們將如何幫助中小型商家與消費者做生意。 > So. 所以 > `[00:18:52]` I think we have a philosophical difference between ourselves andAmazon.com So I\'m not very afraid of them but I\'m always thinking about how we can scale. `[00:18:52]` 我認為我們和 Amazon.com 之間有一個哲學上的區別，所以我不太害怕他們，但我總是在想我們如何擴大規模。 > `[00:19:03]` Our business holding on time but the way I see what\'s so interesting here we\'re talking a little bit backstage about just sort of Japanese culture and the differences between starting a startup here and we talk about investing. `[00:19:03]` 我們的業務準時舉行，但在我看來，這里很有趣的是，我們在后臺談論的只是一種日本文化，以及在這里創業和我們談論投資的不同之處。 > Could you talk about hiring and how you hired the initial people and especially in a culture where joining a startup is not as cool as it was making it now as it is in the valley. 你能談談招聘以及你如何雇傭最初的員工嗎？尤其是在這樣一個文化中，加入一家初創公司并不像現在硅谷那樣酷。 > `[00:19:32]` Well now of course it\'s different from 50 years ago when I started a company you know nobody wanted to work for small startups but now they have seen many successes and there are so many young people who want to work for the startups and ventures and so forth. `[00:19:32]` 現在，當然了，這和 50 年前我開了一家公司是不一樣的。你知道，沒有人想為小型創業公司工作，但現在他們已經取得了很多成功，有那么多年輕人想為創業公司工作，等等。 > `[00:19:56]` I think the way I mean hiring younger people and not to higher the mid to upper age people as much as possible because I knew that we wanted to embrace our older you know corporate culture. `[00:19:56]` 我認為我的意思是雇傭更年輕的人，而不是盡可能多地雇用中上層的人，因為我知道我們想擁抱我們的老年企業文化。 > `[00:20:16]` So it was very important for me to hire young people and educate them especially in 90 days after we went public. `[00:20:16]` 所以，在我們上市后的 90 天里，雇用和教育年輕人對我來說是非常重要的。 > We started to hire many Lobethal gray gray hair people and you know because we need that we need more professional expertise. 我們開始雇傭許多 Lobethal 白發人，你知道，因為我們需要更多的專業知識。 > And two and a half years ago we announced that we are going to convert dunnhumby Kishen language from Japanese to English. 兩年半前，我們宣布，我們將把敦恩姆比·基申語從日語轉換成英語。 > `[00:20:42]` And this was a big splash in the Japanese society and some CEOs that you know you know explicitly announce that we are crazy company as we are but now 70 percent of new engineers joining us are no Japanese. `[00:20:42]` 這是日本社會的一大轟動，一些 CEO 明確宣布我們是瘋狂的公司，但現在加入我們的新工程師中有 70%不是日本人。 > 30 percent of the new employees are not Japanese so we had to equal mobilizing our recruitment. 30%的新員工不是日本人，所以我們不得不平等地調動我們的招聘人員。 > `[00:21:08]` Mark Zuckerberg a few years ago made a comment about hiring young people preferentially and it was all that the press talked about for two weeks so maybe you\'ll be featured a lot. 馬克·扎克伯格幾年前發表了一條關于優先雇用年輕人的評論，媒體在兩周里一直在談論這個問題，所以你可能會經常被報道。 > `[00:21:18]` Now I\'m talking alone. `[00:21:18]` 我現在一個人說話。 > `[00:21:22]` Why did you make that decision to make English the official language of the company. `[00:21:22]` 為什么你決定把英語作為公司的官方語言。 > Well so the thing I have done in Japan is each side to create an open culture company so we disclose almost all information to entire employees. 那么，我在日本所做的事情是，每一方都創建一個開放的文化公司，所以我們向全體員工披露了幾乎所有的信息。 > So we\'re the people who is doing e-commerce know what\'s going on for our banking business. 所以，我們是從事電子商務的人，我們知道我們的銀行業務正在發生什么。 > And we of course share all these expertise and platforms as much as possible you know web marketing engineering and so forth and so forth. 當然，我們也盡可能多地分享這些專業知識和平臺，比如網絡營銷、工程等等。 > So that was our strengths. 這就是我們的優勢所在。 > How common is that for Japanese companies to do to share everything openly. 日本公司公開分享一切是多么普遍。 > Well sharing the opening up is very common and we call this Yohko then meaning a horizontal transfer of expertise. 分享開放是非常普遍的，我們稱之為 Yohko，意思是橫向轉移專業知識。 > `[00:22:12]` I think this is one of the strengths of Japanese company because it\'s not good or bad. `[00:22:12]` 我認為這是日本公司的優勢之一，因為它不是好的或壞的。 > It\'s not performance oriented Nevius system. 它不是以性能為導向的 Nevius 系統。 > And I wanted to do this globally but I couldn\'t because most of the expertise is in Japan and our most of our stuff cannot communicate in English. 我想在全球范圍內做這件事，但我做不到，因為大部分的專業知識都在日本，而我們大部分的知識都不能用英語進行交流。 > `[00:22:34]` So you know I was kind of a liason between our global business and Japanese business and that was getting me tired just know talking you know and being Shazli doing everything. `[00:22:34]` 所以你知道，我對我們的全球業務和日本業務有點說三道四，這讓我很累，只知道說話，你知道，沙茲利什么事都做。 > And so one day I woke up and thought about everything in English. 所以有一天，我醒來，用英語思考每一件事。 > And so I stood in front of entire Simonson\'s employees and told them I\'m going to convert the. 所以我站在整個西蒙森的員工面前告訴他們我要改變。 > Show business language show adopting from Japanese to English. 從日語到英語的商務語言表演。 > `[00:23:05]` What was the reaction in that room. `[00:23:05]` 那個房間里有什么反應？ > `[00:23:06]` It was a very quiet very quiet but as told that he changed the score of employees improve almost 200 points for the last two years what\'s called an English test. `[00:23:06]` 這是一個非常安靜的過程，但當他被告知，在過去兩年里，他改變了員工的分數，提高了將近 200 分，這就是所謂的英語考試。 > And most of the staff can manage to communicate in English. 大多數員工都能用英語進行交流。 > They\'re afraid of going abroad or joining the international conference. 他們害怕出國或參加國際會議。 > Now we have so many people you know known Japanese foreigners in Tokyo office and now they starting to benchmark international players instead of domestic players so they changed. 現在我們有很多人，你們知道，日本人在東京辦事處，現在他們開始測試國際球員，而不是國內球員，所以他們改變了。 > `[00:23:50]` That\'s great. `[00:23:50]` 那太好了。 > One last question. 最后一個問題。 > We were talking backstage and the last time that Paul and Mickey met was 16 or 17 years ago when Paul was working on the web. 我們在后臺交談，保羅和米奇最后一次見面是在 16 或 17 年前，當時保羅正在網上工作。 > So Paul loves to ask people these what was someone like the first time you met them. 所以保羅喜歡問這些人，當你第一次見到他們的時候，他們是什么樣的人。 > `[00:24:06]` So finally we get asked what program is like. `[00:24:06]` 最后，我們被問到程序是什么樣子的。 > `[00:24:10]` So it\'s a reading the Harvard Business School case so initially I went after I left my bank I started sort of a business consulting firm and I was looking for something new to do. `[00:24:10]` 這是在閱讀哈佛商學院(Harvard Business School)的案例，所以一開始我離開銀行后，我創辦了一家商業咨詢公司，我在尋找新的工作。 > And you know I came up with the internet shopping idea and one of my classmate hovers at school call me Mickey you needed look at this company it\'s called bio web and it\'s my friend\'s company. 你知道，我想出了一個網上購物的點子，我的一個同學在學校里閑逛，叫我米奇，你需要看看這家公司，它叫做生物網絡，它是我朋友的公司。 > So I went viaWeb.com and look at me like that next day. 于是我去了 viaWeb.com，第二天就這樣看著我。 > I put the economy class airplane ticket and flew over to Boston and I went for. 我把經濟艙的機票寄到波士頓去了。 > And it was five people company. 是五人公司。 > And we kind of as we said we\'re going to do things together but the last minute Paul was supposed to come over to Japan at the airport. 就像我們說的那樣，我們要一起做一些事情，但是最后一分鐘保羅應該在機場來日本。 > He found out that his passport has expired. 他發現他的護照過期了。 > `[00:25:08]` And somehow the deal didn\'t go through. `[00:25:08]` 而這樁交易卻以某種方式沒有通過。 > So I feel that was really the first moment I fell. 所以我覺得那是我第一次摔倒。 > `[00:25:18]` I met the tudi strong entrepreneur and I feel the excitement and energy in Paul and he and his team. `[00:25:18]` 我遇到了圖迪強大的企業家，我感受到保羅和他的團隊的興奮和活力。 > `[00:25:29]` That was great note and thank you very much. `[00:25:29]` 那是很棒的筆記，非常感謝你。 > Thank you. 謝謝。